People v. Jaime CA2/6 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Jaime CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B324742
(Super. Ct. No. 1362689)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
CHRISTOPHER JAIME,
Defendant and Appellant.
Christopher Jaime appeals the summary denial of his
petition for resentencing under former Penal Code1 section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6). Jaime contends, and the People
correctly concede, that his petition sets forth a prima facie case
because the record of his conviction does not demonstrate he is
ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. Accordingly,
we shall reverse and remand for the issuance of an order to show
cause followed by an evidentiary hearing.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2013, Jaime and codefendants Roberto Castaneda and
Gregory Wallace were convicted of first-degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) with true findings on allegations that the murder was
gang-related (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that a principal’s
discharge of a firearm caused the victim’s death (§§ 12022.7,
12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)). He was also convicted of possession of
a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11378.) The trial
court sentenced Jaime to an aggregate state-prison term of 50
years to life plus 6 years.
In our original opinion on direct appeal, we affirmed the
judgments but ordered that the sentences of Jaime and
Castaneda, who were both 16 years old when the crime was
committed, be modified to reflect they were each entitled to
parole hearings during their 25th year of incarceration as
provided in section 3051, subdivision (b). (People v. Castaneda
(Aug. 19, 2015, B249571 [nonpub. opn.].) The facts at trial, as set
forth in our opinion, reflect that Jaime was not the actual killer.2
The record of his conviction also reflects the prosecution argued
Jaime could be convicted of first degree felony murder even if he
did not intend to kill if the killing was a natural and probable
consequence of a robbery. The jury was instructed on theories of
natural and probable consequences murder (former CALCRIM
No. 403), first-degree premeditated murder (CALCRIM No. 521),
first-degree felony murder (former CALCRIM No. 540B), and
2 We previously granted Jaime’s request for judicial notice
of the record of the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts in his
underlying appeal. We do not provide a detailed recitation of the
underlying facts because they are unnecessary to our decision.
2
conspiracy.3 The jury’s verdict forms do not indicate the theory
upon which Jaime was convicted of first degree murder
Following remand from our Supreme Court, we again
affirmed but remanded for the trial court to determine whether
Castaneda and Jaime were afforded a sufficient opportunity to
make a record of information that would be relevant at further
parole eligibility hearings, as set forth in People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. (People v. Castaneda (Dec. 5, 2016,
B249571) [nonpub. opn.] (Castaneda II).)
Shortly before our opinion in Castaneda II was filed our
electorate enacted Proposition 57, which altered the procedures
for trying juveniles in adult court. We granted Jaime and
Castaneda’s petitions for rehearing and deferred the matter
pending our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Superior Court
(Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, in which the court subsequently held
that Proposition 57 applied retroactively to nonfinal judgments.
In accordance with Lara, we conditionally reversed the
judgments against Jaime and Castaneda and remanded for the
3 The jury was instructed pursuant to former CALCRIM
No. 540B that Jaime “may be guilty of first degree murder, under
a theory of felony murder, even if another person . . . did the act
that resulted in the death” if he (1) “aided and abetted robbery or
attempted robbery, or was a member of a conspiracy to commit a
robbery;” (2) “intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing robbery or attempted robbery, or intended that one or
more members of the conspiracy commit robbery;” (3) either he or
the perpetrator with whom he conspired committed or attempted
to commit robbery; and (4) “[w]hile committing or attempting to
commit robbery, the perpetrator caused the death of another
person.” The instruction further stated that “[a] person may be
guilty of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional,
accidental, or negligent.”
3
trial court to hold juvenile fitness hearings as to both of them.
We also ordered the court to exercise its newfound discretion
whether to strike the firearm enhancements if it ultimately found
Jaime and Castaneda properly tried in adult court. (People v.
Castaneda (Jul. 26, 2018, B249571) [nonpub. opn.] (Castaneda
III).)
In all other respects, we affirmed the judgments. Among
other things, we rejected Jaime and Castaneda’s claim that the
jury was misinstructed on the theory they could be convicted of
first-degree murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as provided in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155. We
noted the instructions provided that if the jury found Jaime and
Castaneda guilty of murder on the natural and probable
consequences theory, it could not convict them of first-degree
murder unless it also found they acted with malice, i.e., an intent
to kill with premeditation and deliberation. We stated: “As these
instructions make clear, appellants could be found guilty of first
degree murder only if they intended to kill [the victim] and acted
with premeditation. The jury thus convicted them under direct
aiding and abetting principles, a theory that is still valid.
[Citation.]” (Castaneda III, supra, B249571.)
Following our decision in Castaneda III, Jaime stipulated
to his transfer to adult court. The trial court reduced his
conviction to second-degree murder pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d), sentenced him to 15 years to life in state prison,
struck punishment for the section 12022.53 enhancement and
dismissed the drug charges and related enhancements.
In 2022, Jaime petitioned for resentencing under section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The petition alleged (1) an
information was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
4
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or other now-
prohibited theory of imputed malice; (2) he was convicted of
murder or accepted a plea in lieu of a trial at which he could have
been convicted of murder; and (3) he “could not presently be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes made to [sections] 188
and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” The trial court appointed
counsel to represent Jaime.
In opposing the petition, the prosecutor argued that the
record of conviction, in particular the aforementioned statements
in our opinion in Castaneda III (ante, p. 4) demonstrates he is not
entitled to relief as a matter of law. In response to Jaime’s reply
brief pointing out that an appellate opinion could be considered
only for its procedural history (see, e.g., People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988), the prosecutor filed a supplemental
opposition asserting that the law of the case doctrine compelled
the trial court to follow our statement in Castaneda III. The trial
court summarily denied the petition, noting that although the
jury had been instructed on a theory of natural and probable
consequences, it was bound by our statements in Castaneda III
that established as a matter of law that Jaime was convicted as a
direct aider and abettor.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred in summarily
denying his petition for resentencing because his petition and the
record of his conviction set forth a prima facie case for relief. The
People correctly concede the issue.
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “to amend the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
5
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f); see § 189, subd. (e); accord, People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708.) SB 1437 eliminated the natural
and probable consequences doctrine by adding section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), which requires a principal to act with malice
aforethought in order to be convicted of murder. (People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile).) The bill added
section 189, subdivision (e), which states: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in
which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶]
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
[s]ection 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e); accord, Gentile, at p. 842.)
SB 1437 also added section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95) to
provide a procedure for those convicted of a qualifying offense “to
seek relief under the two ameliorative provisions above.”
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) This procedure is available
to persons convicted of “felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Individuals seeking such relief must file a petition alleging
that “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
6
against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder[; and] [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1)-(3); see also § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A); accord, People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960 (Lewis).)
If the defendant has filed a facially sufficient petition,
counsel must be appointed if requested and the court shall obtain
briefing from the petitioner’s counsel and the prosecution.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) The
court must then determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-
(c); accord, Lewis, at pp. 961-963, 966-967; see also People v.
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) In making the prima facie
determination, the court may rely on “‘the record [of conviction],
including [its] own documents, “contain[ing] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition.”’” (Lewis, at pp. 970-971, 972.)
Our Supreme Court has recognized that although appellate
opinions “are generally considered to be part of the record of
conviction[,] . . . the probative value of an appellate opinion is
case-specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion
might not supply all answers.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 972.)
Accordingly, an appellate opinion should generally only be
7
considered in this context for its procedural history. (See
§1172.6, subd. (d)(3)4.) Such a limitation is necessary because
“[i]t’s easy to conceive of a case where the issues on appeal
implicate different facts than a later resentencing petition.”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292.)
If the sentencing court determines the petitioner has made
a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to
vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At
this evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as
amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
As Jaime notes and the People concede, Jaime set forth a
prima facie case for relief because the record of his conviction
plainly and unequivocally demonstrates he was prosecuted on a
now-invalid theory of first-degree felony murder, the verdicts do
not indicate the theory upon which he was convicted, and no facts
in the record of conviction establish as a matter of law that he
was not convicted on this improper theory. The trial court
instead relied upon on our statement in Castaneda III that Jaime
was convicted as a direct aider and abettor. In the current
context, this statement is misleading We made that statement
while explaining that the jury was not misinstructed on first-
degree natural and probable consequences murder because the
instructions made clear that natural and probable consequences
4 Sec. 1172.6, subd (d)(3) provides that at an evidentiary
hearing the sentencing court may consider a prior appellate
opinion for its procedural history.
8
murder was only first-degree murder if the defendant intended to
kill and acted with premeditation and deliberation.
Our discussion and conclusion on this point did not
contemplate, however, that the jury was also instructed on the
theory of first-degree felony murder, which did not require a
finding of malice aforethought or even an intent to kill. To be
clear we instead should have stated that “As these instructions
make clear, appellants could be found guilty of first degree
murder under the natural and probably consequences doctrine
only if they intended to kill [the victim] and acted with
premeditation. Thus if the jury convicted them under this
doctrine they were convicted under direct aiding and abetting
principles, which are still valid.”
Castenada III did not establish, as a matter of law, that
Jaime was actually convicted under direct aiding and abetting
principles.
Moreover, the law of the case doctrine has no application
here. In resolving Jaime’s claim that the jury was instructed on
an invalid theory of first-degree natural and probable
consequences murder, we merely had to decide whether the
instructions allowed the jury to convict him on that invalid
theory, not whether the jury actually convicted him on that
theory. It is well-settled that “‘discussion or determination of a
point not necessary to the disposition of a question that is
decisive of the appeal is generally recorded as obiter dictum and
not as the law of the case.’ [Citation.]” (Gyerman v. United
States Lines Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 488, 498.) Because the record of
Jaime’s conviction demonstrates he may have been convicted on a
now-invalid theory of first-degree felony murder and the
statements to the contrary in our appellate opinion are dicta, the
9
court should not have summarily denied his petition for
resentencing.
Finally, the trial court’s reliance on our statement in
Casteneda III was not harmless because but for the error Jaime
would have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (People v.
Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 986 [“To demonstrate
prejudice from the denial of a section [1172.6] petition before the
issuance of an order to show cause, the petitioner must show it is
reasonably probable that, absent error, his or her petition would
not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary
hearing.”].)
DISPOSITION
The order summarily denying Jaime’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is reversed. The matter is
remanded for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing in accordance with section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
10
YEGAN, J., CONCURRING:
This is another instance where the majority attempt to
achieve perfect justice as viewed by the Legislature and the
Supreme Court. This case is going “nowhere” in the Superior
Court on reversal. Appellant, a documented and active member
of a street gang, was originally convicted of murder with a
firearm allegation and sentenced to prison for 50 years to life.
Prior to this appeal, he has managed to “whittle down” his
sentence to fifteen years to life.
Now he seeks a further reduction and the majority breathe
life into his endeavor. Ok, what did he do? He factually
conspired with and accompanied five other gang members to
execute a drug dealer who had the audacity to not pay tax to the
gang for selling drugs in the gang’s claimed territory. Appellant
carried the firearms to the scene of the crime and pointed out the
drug seller to his cohorts. They used the shotguns to murder the
drug dealer. We affirmed his conviction. Even if there were
instructional error, the legal fact remains that appellant can be
convicted under a presently valid murder theory. (Pen. Code,
§ 1172.6, subd. (3).) As a matter of law, appellant can be
convicted of being a direct aider and abetter of murder. Given
the historical facts, how could he not? This is harmless error.
But, I must concur for the reasons stated in People v. Arreguin
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 58, 63-64.
And, when appellant loses in the Superior Court, there will
be yet another appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
John F. McGregor, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Spolin Law, Aaron Spolin, Jeremy M. Cutcher, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.