People v. Medinilla CA2/6 ( 2024 )


Menu:
  • Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Medinilla CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B321160
    (Super. Ct. No. 1259550)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Santa Barbara County)
    v.
    BRYAN STEVEN MEDINILLA,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Bryan Steven Medinilla appeals the summary denial of his
    petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. He
    contends the trial court erred in concluding the jury’s finding that
    he personally used a weapon in committing murder (§ 12022,
    subd. (b)(1)) rendered him ineligible for resentencing as a matter
    of law. The People concede the issue. We will reverse and
    1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the
    Penal Code.
    remand with directions to issue an order to show cause and to
    hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
    Original Murder Conviction
    Appellant, Ruben Mize, Raul Diaz, and other members of
    Santa Barbara’s Eastside gang drove into the territory of the
    rival Westside gang in July of 2007. They spotted three
    “Westsiders” walking on the sidewalk: Lorenzo Carachure, Noe
    Carachure, and Rogelio Hernandez. Appellant and the other
    “Eastsiders” jumped out of the truck to confront them. The two
    groups yelled their affiliations and exchanged gang signs.
    Witnesses saw appellant and others converge on Lorenzo.3 Diaz
    struck Lorenzo in the head with a carjack, knocking him to the
    ground. Mize threw a bicycle on top him. Mize then pulled out a
    knife and stabbed Lorenzo twice in the neck and once in the
    abdomen. Appellant stabbed him in the chest or stomach.
    Lorenzo later died from the neck wounds.
    A jury found appellant and Mize guilty of first-degree
    murder (§ 187).4 Diaz and another defendant were found guilty
    2 The facts are derived from our opinion affirming
    Medinilla’s conviction on direct appeal. (People v. Nava (Jan. 8,
    2014, B233532 [nonpub. opn.].) We include these facts for
    narrative purposes and do not rely upon them to determine
    appellant’s eligibility for resentencing. (People v. Flores (2022) 
    76 Cal.App.5th 974
    , 988.)
    3We refer to Lorenzo and Noe by their first names to avoid
    confusion. No disrespect is intended.
    4 Appellants and his codefendants were juveniles when the
    crimes were committed and were charged as adults pursuant to
    former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d).
    2
    of second-degree murder. The jury also found true allegations
    that appellant and Mize personally used a deadly weapon in
    committing the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Appellant
    received an aggregate term of 26 years to life in state prison. We
    affirmed his conviction in 2014.
    Petition for Resentencing
    Appellant petitioned for resentencing under former section
    1170.95 (now section 1172.6) in 2021. The trial court initially
    denied the petition without appointing counsel. (People v. Lewis
    (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
     (Lewis).) The court later stayed the denial
    order and appointed counsel. The People opposed the petition,
    arguing the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a finding
    that appellant was the actual killer or a major participant in the
    offense. In response, appellant argued the jury was instructed on
    the now-disapproved natural and probable consequences theory
    of aider and abettor liability. There was nothing in the record of
    conviction to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury did
    not base [its] verdict” on this instruction.
    The trial court summarily denied the petition before
    holding an evidentiary hearing. It reasoned: “Based on the fact
    that [appellant] was convicted of murder and the personal use of
    a deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of the
    murder was found to be true, this Court finds that [appellant] is
    ineligible for relief under Penal Code Section 1170.95 because he
    was the ‘actual killer’ and, at the very least, a ‘major
    participant.’”
    DISCUSSION
    Appellant contends the trial court erred when it concluded
    the jury’s “true” finding on the use of a deadly weapon allegation
    3
    rendered him ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The
    People concede the issue.
    Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine as a basis for convicting a defendant of
    murder. (People v. Strong (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 698
    , 707-708
    (Strong); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People v. Gentile
    (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 842-843, 847-848 (Gentile).) Malice may
    no longer be imputed solely on a defendant’s participation in a
    crime. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) SB 1437 also limited the scope of the
    felony-murder rule. The revised felony-murder statute requires
    proving: (1) defendant was the actual killer; (2) if not the actual
    killer, they assisted in the commission of the murder with the
    intent to kill; or (3) they were “a major participant in the
    underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
    life.” (§ 189, subd. (e); Strong, at p. 708.)
    Those convicted of felony murder or murder under a
    natural and probable consequences theory may petition to vacate
    their conviction and seek resentencing under the revised laws.
    (§ 1172.6.) The trial court must appoint counsel if a petition
    contains all required information. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) The
    court then determines after briefing whether the petitioner has
    made a prima facie showing for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) It
    may summarily deny or dismiss the petition without a hearing
    “‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
    that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’” (People v. Curiel
    (2023) 
    15 Cal.5th 433
    , 450.)5 If the petitioner makes this showing
    5 Appellant and the People waived oral argument in this
    appeal and we submitted the cause on November 9, 2023. The
    Supreme Court decided People v. Curiel two weeks later. We
    4
    for relief the court must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
    subd. (c) & (d)(1).) The People bear the burden at the hearing “to
    prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
    murder” under the revised laws. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
    The trial court relied on the jury’s finding that appellant
    personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon to conclude he was
    either the actual killer or a “major participant” in the offense. A
    “finding of personal use,” however, “[does] not in itself prove [a]
    defendant was the actual killer” or perpetrator. (People v. Jones
    (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 1084
    , 1120.) For instance, “[i]f two robbers
    display guns to intimidate robbery victims and one shoots and
    kills a victim, both robbers could be found to have personally
    used a gun in the robbery and the felony murder, even though
    only one is the actual killer.” (Ibid.) The trial court erred to the
    extent it found the jury’s “true” finding alone justified denying
    appellant’s petition as a matter of law without a hearing.
    It was also error to conclude appellant was ineligible for
    relief because he was a “major participant” in the offense under
    section 189, subdivision (e)(3). While the record contained
    evidence that appellant was among those who attacked Lorenzo –
    including testimony that he stabbed Lorenzo after Mize – he was
    neither tried nor convicted by the jury on a theory of felony
    murder. However robust the court believed the evidence at trial
    against appellant, the record did not “establish conclusively” that
    he was the actual killer or sole perpetrator. (See, e.g., People v.
    Delgadillo (2022) 
    14 Cal.5th 216
    , 233 [summary denial of
    resentencing petition was proper where defendant “was the
    vacated the submission and requested supplemental briefing
    from the parties on the effect of Curiel, if any, on this case. We
    read and consider the parties’ briefs.
    5
    actual killer and the only participant in the killing”]; Lewis,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 [“a trial court should not engage in
    ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
    discretion’” at prima facie stage of section 1172.6 proceedings].)
    As the People concede: “the record does not foreclose the
    possibility that appellant could have been convicted under a
    natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and
    abetting.” As such, we reverse and remand the case with
    directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an
    evidentiary hearing. (People v. Strong, supra, 
    13 Cal.5th 698
    ;
    Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) We need not address
    appellant’s remaining claims.6
    DISPOSITION
    The order summarily denying appellant’s Penal Code
    section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is reversed. On remand,
    the trial court is directed to issue an order to show cause and
    conduct further proceedings in accordance with Penal Code
    section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1).
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    CODY, J.
    I concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    6 Appellant also filed a habeas petition contending he is
    entitled to relief pursuant to People v. Chiu (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 155
    . We deny the petition as untimely in a separate order.
    6
    YEGAN, J., CONCURRING:
    There is no way to “sugar coat” this. The result reached by
    the majority, compelled by precedent, is ridiculous. For the
    reasons stated in People v. Arreguin (2023) 
    89 Cal.App.5th 58
    , 63-
    64, I concur under compulsion of California Supreme Court
    authority. Appellant checked the box that said he cannot
    presently be convicted of murder. This is false. (Pen. Code,
    § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Notwithstanding instructional error, at
    the very least, appellant can only be described as a direct aider
    and abettor. (People v. Gentile (2020)
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 848; People
    v. Williams (2022) 
    86 Cal.App.5th 1244
    , 1252.)
    According to the majority opinion, appellant directly
    participated in a planned knife attack on a rival gang member.
    He actually used his knife to stab the decedent in the stomach.
    The majority recite that it was the co-defendant’s
    contemporaneous stabbing the decedent in the neck that was the
    fatal blow. This is not determinative. Does anyone actually
    believe that appellant did not intend to kill the decedent? Does
    anyone actually believe that he did not directly aid his co-
    defendant who stabbed the decedent in the neck?
    In denying the motion for resentencing, the trial court said:
    “Based on the fact that [appellant] was convicted of murder and
    the personal use of [a] deadly . . . weapon during the commission
    of the murder was found to be true, this Court finds that
    [appellant] is ineligible for relief under [Penal Code section]
    1170.95 because he was the . . . ‘actual killer’ . . . and, at the very
    least, a . . . ‘major participant.’” This is sound reasoning and
    consistent with common sense. Does the Legislature and/or the
    California Supreme Court contemplate that a defendant, in this
    circumstance, is to be treated with leniency? I once again ask
    that the Supreme Court to adopt a harmless error analysis for
    these types of cases. This case is going nowhere upon reversal.
    But it is going somewhere when he loses in superior court!
    Where? The Court of Appeal again. (See People v. Ruiz (2023) 
    97 Cal.App.5th 1068
    , 1082-1083, (conc. opn. of Yegan, J.).)
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    YEGAN, J.
    2
    Clifford R. Anderson, III, Judge
    Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
    ______________________________
    Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
    Attorney General, Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B321160

Filed Date: 1/17/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/17/2024