In re Taylor C. ( 2024 )

Filed 4/16/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re Taylor C., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168282
v. (Solano County
TAYLOR C., Super. Ct. No. J37038)
Defendant and Appellant.
Taylor C. (Taylor) was first declared a ward of the court when he was
14 years old. Several years later, after his wardship ended, Taylor
successfully moved to dismiss his wardship petitions under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 782.1 Taylor then moved to seal the related juvenile
court records, but the juvenile court denied the motion on the basis that his
prior adjudications for committing forcible lewd conduct (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (b)(1)) made his records ineligible for sealing under section 781,
subdivision (a)(1)(F).
On appeal, Taylor contends his juvenile records were eligible for sealing
because the court’s dismissal of the wardship petitions under section 782
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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erased the adjudication of his forcible lewd conduct offenses as if they “never
existed.” We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2006, the district attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (§ 602)
alleging Taylor, then 14 years old, committed misdemeanor sexual battery by
restraint (Pen. Code, § 243.4). In 2007, he admitted the allegation. The
juvenile court declared Taylor a ward of the court and placed him on
probation.
Later that same year, 2007, the district attorney filed another wardship
petition alleging Taylor committed two counts of a forcible lewd or lascivious
act on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)), in April
2007. After a contested hearing, the juvenile court sustained both
allegations. The court continued Taylor as a ward and placed him on
probation in a group home.
Between 2009 and 2010, the probation department filed three separate
wardship petitions alleging Taylor violated his probation after being
terminated from three different group homes. Taylor admitted the first two
allegations, and the juvenile court found true the third allegation following a
contested hearing. In 2010, the juvenile court committed Taylor to the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice (DJJ) for four years.
In 2013, the juvenile court terminated DJJ jurisdiction over Taylor and
placed him on probation in his mother’s custody. In 2015, Taylor’s probation
terminated and his wardship ended. In 2022, DJJ granted Taylor an
honorable discharge.
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Motions to Dismiss and Seal
In May 2023, Taylor sought dismissal of all the juvenile court petitions
filed against him pursuant to section 782, which permits a court to dismiss
wardship petitions pursuant to criteria specified within the code. (§ 782,
subd. (a)(1).) The juvenile court held a hearing, granted the motion, and
dismissed the petitions. It found that the interests of justice and Taylor’s
welfare warranted dismissal and that he was no longer in need of
rehabilitation.
At the dismissal hearing, Taylor argued that dismissal of the petitions
would also make him eligible to have his juvenile records sealed. The court
disagreed, citing to the prohibition in subdivision (a)(1)(F) of section 781 on
sealing records relating to his forcible lewd conduct offenses but noted Taylor
could file a motion to seal raising this argument.
In June 2023, Taylor moved to seal his juvenile court records under
section 781. He acknowledged that his prior offenses of forcible lewd conduct
came within section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F)—which limits the types of
juvenile records that can be sealed—because they occurred after he was 14
years old, were listed in section 707, subdivision (b), and required him to
register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.008. (See § 781,
subd. (a)(1)(F).) Nevertheless, he argued sealing was appropriate because the
court’s dismissal of his petitions under section 782 served to “ ‘erase’ ” the
prior adjudication entirely and thereby protect him from any adverse
consequences based on the adjudication. The district attorney opposed the
motion.
Following a hearing, the court denied the motion to seal. It found
Taylor’s records ineligible for sealing because section 782, subdivision (e)
provides that dismissal of a petition does not alone constitute a sealing of
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records and section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F), precludes sealing due to the
forcible lewd conduct offenses.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court erred by denying
Taylor’s motion to seal his juvenile records. As we explain below, it did not
err as the dismissal of a juvenile petition under section 782 does not obviate
the prohibition on sealing records under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F) in
cases involving certain delineated offenses.
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. (In re Noah S.
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 410, 414 (Noah S.).) “Our fundamental task in
construing a statute ‘is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent [and] effectuate
the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin our inquiry by examining the
statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” (In re
Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 406.)
Here, our analysis not only begins but also ends with the clear and
plain language of sections 781 and 782. (Noah S., supra, at p. 415 [“ ‘ “When
the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.” ’ ”].) Section 782
permits a juvenile court to dismiss a petition if the court finds dismissal
serves “the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the
subject of the petition.” (§ 782, subd. (a)(1).) Section 782 was amended,
effective January 1, 2023, to state that “[d]ismissal of a petition . . . pursuant
to this section . . . does not alone constitute a sealing of records as defined in
Section 781 or 786.” (§ 782, subd. (e); see Assem. Bill No. 2629, Stats. 2022,
ch. 970, § 1 (A.B. 2629).) Hence, dismissal of a petition does not
automatically result in the sealing of the juvenile records.
For sealing, we turn to section 781. (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The court
“shall” order records sealed if, after a hearing, it “finds that since the
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termination of jurisdiction . . . the person has not been convicted of a felony or
of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that rehabilitation has
been attained to the satisfaction of the court.” (Ibid.) However, subdivision
(a)(1)(F) of section 781 provides that a subset of sex offenses are categorically
and unequivocally not eligible for sealing: “Notwithstanding subparagraphs
(D) and (E), a record relating to an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section
707 that was committed after attaining 14 years of age for which the person
is required to register pursuant to Section 290.008 of the Penal Code shall
not be sealed.” (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(F).)
The statutory prohibition on sealing is clear, and Taylor does not
contest that his forcible lewd conduct offenses met the criteria set forth in
subdivision (a)(1)(F) as the offenses were listed in section 707, subdivision (b),
were committed after he turned 14, and required him to register under Penal
Code section 290.008. (See § 707, subd. (b)(6); Pen. Code § 290.008(c)(2).)
Nevertheless, relying on In re David T. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 866 (David T.),
he urges us to conclude the juvenile court’s dismissal of his petitions under
section 782 erased the adjudication of the prior offenses such that they are
deemed to have never occurred, which relieved him of any future adverse
consequences of those offenses, including the sealing limitation in subdivision
(a)(1)(F) of section 781. We are not persuaded.
In David T., our colleagues concluded the then-current version of
section 782 was a general dismissal statute; therefore, dismissal under that
section was “intended to erase a prior adjudication—not merely reduce or
mitigate it—and to thereby protect the person from any and all future
adverse consequences based on that adjudication,” including relief from a
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limitation on sealing pursuant to section 781.2 (David T., supra, 13
Cal.App.5th at p. 877.) Taylor’s reliance on David T. is unavailing because it
interpreted an earlier version of section 782 that—unlike the current
version—did not include any limitations on the relief offered by dismissal.
(David T., at pp. 873–874.)
The David T. court observed that, had the Legislature intended a
dismissal under section 782 to have prospective adverse consequences for the
person even after dismissal, it could have explicitly said so. (David T., supra,13 Cal.App.5th at p. 875.) After David T. was decided, that is precisely what
occurred with the enactment of A.B. 2629, which amended section 782 to
state that dismissal of a petition under that section “does not alone constitute
a sealing of records” under section 781. (§ 782, subd. (e); see A.B. 2629, § 1.)
This amended statutory language is unambiguous.3 Accordingly, we
conclude that, given the intervening amendment to section 782, the reasoning
of David T. no longer applies to the extent it held dismissal under section 782
2 The then-current version of section 781 stated: “ ‘Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall not order the person’s records sealed in any case in
which the person has been found by the juvenile court to have committed an
offense . . . listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 when he or she attained 14
years of age or older.’ ” (David T., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 870, fn. 2.)
Section 781 was thereafter amended to allow a juvenile court to seal records
related to offenses listed in subdivision (b) of section 707 if certain criteria are
met. (§ 781, subds. (a)(1)(D), (E); see Sen. Bill No. 312, Stats. 2017, ch. 679,
§ 1.) However, that same amendment created a narrower sealing prohibition
under subdivision (a)(1)(F) of section 781 for a subset of sex offenses, like
Taylor’s forcible lewd conduct offenses. (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(F); see Sen. Bill
No. 312, Stats. 2017, ch. 679, § 1.)
3 For this reason, we do not reach the parties’ arguments concerning the
legislative intent of section 782 or whether sealing Taylor’s records would
serve the interests of justice.
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automatically releases the person from the sealing limitations in section 781.
(See David T., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 875–877.)
As dismissal of Taylor’s petitions under section 782 did not serve to
automatically “erase” his prior adjudications or release him from the
prohibition on sealing in subdivision (a)(1)(F) of section 781 and Taylor’s
underlying offenses precluded sealing pursuant to section 781, the juvenile
court correctly denied the motion to seal. (Cf. David T., supra, 13
Cal.App.5th at p. 877.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Taylor’s motion to seal his juvenile court records is
affirmed.
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_________________________
Petrou, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P.J.
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
A168282/People v. Taylor C.
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Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Terrye Davis
Counsel: Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Katie Stowe, Deputy Attorney
General, and Charlotte Woodfork, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
First District Appellate Project, Charles B. Holzhauer, for
Defendant and Appellant.
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