Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 4/16/24 Certified for Publication 5/10/24 (order attached)
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    JONIE A. HOLLAND et al.,                            B323237
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,                 (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                          22STCV01945)
    SILVERSCREEN
    HEALTHCARE, INC.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Reversed
    and remanded with directions.
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Tracy D. Forbath,
    Kathleen M. Walker and Raymond K. Wilson, Jr., for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    Peck Law Group, Steven C. Peck and Adam J. Peck for
    Plaintiffs and Respondents.
    ______________________________
    Following the death of their son, Skyler A. Womack
    (Skyler),1 at Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., doing business as
    Asistencia Villa Rehabilitation and Care Center (Asistencia), a
    skilled nursing facility, Jonie A. Holland (Holland) and Wayne D.
    Womack (Wayne)2 brought this action against Asistencia,
    alleging survivor claims for dependent adult abuse and
    negligence on behalf of Skyler as well as their own claim for
    wrongful death. Asistencia moved to compel arbitration of the
    entire complaint pursuant to an arbitration agreement between
    Skyler and Asistencia. The trial court granted Asistencia’s
    motion as to the survivor claims. However, relying heavily upon
    Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 
    20 Cal.App.5th 835
     (Avila), it denied the motion as to the wrongful
    death cause of action on the ground that the parents did not have
    an enforceable arbitration agreement with Asistencia.
    Asistencia appeals, arguing that pursuant to Ruiz v.
    Podolsky (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 838
     (Ruiz), the parents are bound by
    1      Because they share the same last name, for clarity, we
    refer to Skyler and his father, Wayne, by their first names. No
    disrespect is intended.
    2      We hereinafter refer to Holland and Wayne, in their
    individual capacities, as the parents. We refer to the parents and
    Holland in her capacity as Skyler’s successor in interest,
    collectively as plaintiffs.
    2
    the arbitration agreement signed by Skyler; therefore, the
    parents’ wrongful death claim is subject to arbitration.
    We agree with Asistencia that Ruiz governs this matter.
    Accordingly, under Ruiz and Code of Civil Procedure section
    1295,3 the parents’ wrongful death claim must go to arbitration
    along with Skyler’s survivor claims.
    BACKGROUND
    I. Arbitration Agreement
    Skyler was a resident of Asistencia, a licensed 24-hour
    skilled nursing facility. On January 5, 2020, he signed a
    document titled, “Resident-Facility Arbitration Agreement”
    (arbitration agreement). (Bolding and capitalization omitted.)
    The arbitration agreement provides, in relevant part, “that
    any dispute as to medical malpractice” and “any dispute . . . that
    relates to the provision of care, treatment and services the
    Facility provides to the Resident . . . , including any action for
    injury or death arising from negligence, intentional tort and/or
    statutory causes of action (including all California Welfare and
    Institutions Code sections), will be determined by submission to
    binding arbitration . . . .”
    The arbitration agreement states that it “is binding on all
    parties, including the Resident’s representatives, executors,
    family members, and heirs.” It “exclude[s]” section 1281.2,
    subdivision (c),4 and further provides that “[t]he parties do not
    3    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
    Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
    4     “Section 1281.2[, subd.] (c) grants a trial court discretion [to
    refuse] to enforce written arbitration agreements when (1) a
    party to the agreement also is a party to pending litigation with a
    3
    want any claims not subject to arbitration to impede any and all
    other claims from being ordered to binding arbitration.”
    II. The Complaint
    Following Skyler’s death October 29, 2020, his parents filed
    this action. The complaint asserts four causes of action against
    Asistencia: (1) dependent adult abuse; (2) negligence;
    (3) violation of residents’ rights; and (4) wrongful death. The first
    three causes of action are Skyler’s survivor claims (Skyler’s
    claims) brought by his mother, Holland, in her capacity as
    Skyler’s successor in interest. The fourth cause of action for
    wrongful death is brought by Holland and Wayne as individuals.
    The complaint alleges that “[w]hile under the care and
    treatment” of Asistencia, Skyler “suffered from multiple falls
    with injury, and infections which caused him pain and suffering
    and were substantial factors in his untimely demise.” Despite
    knowledge of problems such as understaffing, Asistencia’s
    “officers, directors, and/or managing agents meaningfully
    disregarded the issues even though they knew the understaffing
    could, would, and did lead to unnecessary injuries to the
    residents and patients of their skilled nursing facilities, including
    [Skyler].” Asistencia “‘neglected’ [Skyler] as that term is defined
    in Welfare and Institutions Code [section] 15610.57 in that
    Asistencia . . . failed to exercise the degree of care that reasonable
    persons in a like position would exercise by denying or
    third party who did not agree to arbitration; (2) the pending
    third-party litigation arises out of the same transaction or series
    of related transactions as the claims subject to arbitration; and
    (3) the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or
    legal issues exists.” (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group
    (2013) 
    213 Cal.App.4th 959
    , 964.)
    4
    withholding goods or services necessary to meet the basic needs
    of [Skyler] . . . .” (Italics and capitalization omitted.)
    Specific to the wrongful death cause of action, the
    complaint alleges that Asistencia owed Skyler statutory and
    common law duties and failed to meet its duties. “As a proximate
    result of [Asistencia’s] negligence and ‘neglect,’” the parents
    “sustained the loss of the society, comfort, attention, and love of”
    Skyler “as a proximate result of the negligent acts (both
    negligence and neglect as that term is defined in Welfare [and]
    Institutions Code [section] 15610.57) . . . .” (Italics omitted.)
    III. Asistencia’s Petition to Compel Arbitration
    Asistencia filed a petition to compel arbitration of each of
    the four causes of action asserted in the complaint. Plaintiffs
    opposed the petition. They argued, inter alia, that (1) the
    arbitration agreement did not apply to the wrongful death cause
    of action because the parents did not sign it, and (2) the trial
    court should exercise its discretion under section 1281.2,
    subdivision (c), not to compel arbitration.
    IV. Trial Court’s Order
    The trial court found that Asistencia had demonstrated the
    existence of an arbitration agreement that covered and compelled
    arbitration of Skyler’s claims—that is, the first three causes of
    action for dependent adult abuse, negligence, and violation of
    residents’ rights.
    However, relying on Avila, 
    supra,
     
    20 Cal.App.5th 835
    , the
    trial court concluded that the parents’ wrongful death cause of
    action was not subject to arbitration because it was “based upon
    neglect within the meaning of the Elder Abuse and Dependent
    Adult Civil Protection Act” (Elder Abuse Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code,
    § 15600 et seq.) rather than medical malpractice. Accordingly,
    5
    section 1295 and the holding in Ruiz, 
    supra,
     
    50 Cal.4th 838
     did
    not apply.5
    Declining to exercise its discretion under section 1281.2,
    subdivision (c), to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement, the
    trial court granted Asistencia’s petition to compel as to Skyler’s
    claims but denied it as to the parents’ wrongful death cause of
    action.
    V. Appeal
    Asistencia’s timely appeal ensued.
    DISCUSSION
    The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court
    erred in denying Asistencia’s petition to compel arbitration as to
    the parents’ wrongful death cause of action.6
    5     Section 1295 “create[s] certain requirements for arbitration
    agreements of ‘any dispute as to professional negligence of a
    health care provider.’ (§ 1295, subd. (a).)” (Avila, 
    supra,
    20 Cal.App.5th at p. 841.) In Ruiz, 
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at page 849,
    “the California Supreme Court held that section 1295 permitted
    patients who consented to arbitration to bind their heirs in
    actions for wrongful death. [Citation.]” (Avila, 
    supra,
     at pp. 841–
    842.)
    6     In their respondents’ brief, plaintiffs urge us to reverse the
    portion of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration of Skyler’s
    claims. Because plaintiffs failed to file a cross-appeal from the
    order, they have forfeited their challenge. (See Gutierrez v.
    Chopard USA Ltd. (2022) 
    82 Cal.App.5th 383
    , 394 [the plaintiff’s
    failure to file a cross-appeal from the trial court’s order forfeited
    her challenge to the order seeking affirmative relief]; Caliber
    Paving Co., Inc. v. Rexford Industrial Realty & Management, Inc.
    (2020) 
    54 Cal.App.5th 175
    , 187 [“A respondent must file a notice
    of appeal and become a cross-appellant if the respondent seeks
    affirmative relief by way of appeal”].) Forfeiture aside, our
    6
    I. Standard of Review
    Where, as here, no evidentiary conflict exists, we review
    de novo an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. (OTO,
    L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 111
    , 126.)
    II. Relevant Law
    A. General arbitration law
    Generally, “a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a
    dispute that he or she has not agreed to resolve by arbitration.
    [Citations.]” (Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (2013)
    
    212 Cal.App.4th 674
    , 680 (Daniels).) As relevant here, an
    exception to this rule was carved out by the California Supreme
    Court in Ruiz, 
    supra,
     
    50 Cal.4th 838
    .
    Ruiz addressed the following issue: “[W]hen a person
    seeking medical care contracts with a health care provider to
    resolve all medical malpractice claims through arbitration, does
    that agreement apply to the resolution of wrongful death claims,
    when the claimants are not themselves signatory to the
    arbitration agreement?” (Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 841.)
    In answering this question, Ruiz focused on the legislative
    intent behind section 1295. Enacted as part of the Medical Injury
    Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), section 1295
    “contemplates that all medical malpractice claims, including
    wrongful death claims, may be subject to arbitration agreements
    between a health care provider and the patient.” (Ruiz, supra,
    50 Cal.4th at p. 841; see also id. at p. 843.) Section 1295
    encourages and facilitates arbitration of medical malpractice
    disputes, which “furthers MICRA’s goal of reducing costs in the
    conclusion that the parents’ wrongful death cause of action must
    be sent to arbitration renders plaintiffs’ argument moot.
    7
    resolution of malpractice claims and therefore malpractice
    insurance premiums.” (Ruiz, 
    supra, at p. 844
    .)
    Ruiz concluded “that section 1295, construed in light of its
    purpose, is designed to permit patients who sign arbitration
    agreements to bind their heirs in wrongful death actions.” (Ruiz,
    
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at p. 849.) Accordingly, Ruiz held “that all
    wrongful death claimants are bound by arbitration agreements
    entered into pursuant to section 1295, at least when . . . the
    language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind these
    claimants.” (Ruiz, 
    supra, at p. 841
    .)
    B. The wrongful death tort and the Elder Abuse Act
    At common law, personal torts expired when the victim
    died. Today, a cause of action for wrongful death exists by
    statute, giving a decedent’s heirs a totally new right of action, on
    different principles. (§§ 377.60–377.62; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.
    Center (2006) 
    140 Cal.App.4th 1256
    , 1263 (Quiroz).) The
    elements of a wrongful death cause of action are “‘the tort
    (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the
    damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs.’”
    (Quiroz, 
    supra, at p. 1263
    .)
    “Unlike a cause of action for wrongful death, a survivor
    cause of action is not a new cause of action that vests in the heirs
    on the death of the decedent. It is instead a separate and distinct
    cause of action which belonged to the decedent before death but,
    by statute, survives that event.” (Quiroz, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th
    at p. 1264.) The heirs can recover damages for “the loss or
    damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death,
    including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that
    the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the
    8
    decedent lived, and [not including] damages for pain, suffering, or
    disfigurement.” (§ 377.34, subd. (a).)
    One exception to the rule that damages for the decedent’s
    predeath pain and suffering are not recoverable in a survivor
    action is contained in the Elder Abuse Act. “The ability of the
    decedent’s successor in interest to recover damages for the
    decedent’s predeath pain, suffering, or disfigurement under
    [Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657] specifically trumps
    the general prohibition on such recovery provided at Code of Civil
    Procedure section 377.34. [Citation.]” (Quiroz, supra,
    140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.) But the law is clear that the cause
    of action for a violation of the Elder Abuse Act belongs to the
    elder victim; the claim does not pass on to survivors. (Tepper v.
    Wilkins (2017) 
    10 Cal.App.5th 1198
    , 1209 [“the cause of action for
    elder financial abuse belongs to [the elder] as the real party in
    interest”]; Quiroz, 
    supra, at p. 1283
     [“The legislative history does
    not reveal any intent to apply the [Elder Abuse] Act to a wrongful
    death action brought by a decedent’s heir on his or her own
    behalf”].)
    III. Analysis
    Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the
    parents’ wrongful death claim falls squarely within the scope of
    Ruiz and must be ordered to arbitration. The arbitration
    agreement’s plain language manifests an intent between the
    parties to bind Skyler’s heirs, i.e., the wrongful death claimants,
    to any claims of professional negligence. (Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th
    at pp. 849, 851.) After all, it complies to the letter with
    section 1295, subdivisions (a) and (b).
    And the parents’ bare bones claim against Asistencia
    sounds in professional negligence. (See § 1295, subd. (g)(2)
    9
    [“‘Professional negligence’ means a negligent act or omission to
    act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional
    services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a
    personal injury or wrongful death . . .”]; Unruh-Haxton v. Regents
    of University of California (2008) 
    162 Cal.App.4th 343
    , 353
    [“‘when a cause of action is asserted against a health care
    provider on a legal theory other than medical malpractice, the
    courts must determine whether it is nevertheless based on the
    “professional negligence” of the health care provider’”]; Simmons
    v. West Covina Medical Clinic (1989) 
    212 Cal.App.3d 696
    , 701–
    702 [elements of medical malpractice].) Specifically, the
    complaint alleges that Asistencia owed Skyler duties, that
    Asistencia failed to meet its duties, and that “[a]s a proximate
    result of negligence and ‘neglect’ . . . [Skyler] died.” The
    allegations of understaffing and the failure to prevent Skyler
    from falling or developing infections speak to “negligent act[s] or
    omission[s] to act by a health care provider in the rendering of
    professional services” which proximately caused Skyler’s death.
    (§ 1295, subd. (g)(2).)
    Urging us to affirm the trial court’s order, plaintiffs assert
    that the wrongful death claim is not subject to Ruiz because it is
    one for dependent adult abuse, not professional negligence.
    Certainly neglect can constitute abuse under the Elder Abuse
    Act. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57, subds. (a)(1),
    (b)(2), (b)(3).) That is why Skyler’s successor in interest can
    absolutely pursue a cause of action under the Elder Abuse Act on
    Skyler’s behalf. But the law does not permit Skyler’s parents to
    assert their own claim for neglect under the Elder Abuse Act
    (Quiroz, 
    supra,
     140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1282–1283 [only the
    decedent or his estate can assert an elder abuse claim; the heirs
    10
    have no claim in their own right under the Elder Abuse Act],
    [“the enhanced remedies provided under the [Elder Abuse Act]
    were intended to apply to actions by or on behalf of victims of
    elder or dependent care abuse” not “to a wrongful death action
    brought by a decedent’s heir on his or her own behalf”]), and they
    cannot circumvent this well-settled principle simply by labeling
    their claim as one for wrongful death, a cause of action “clear[ly]”
    subject to section 1295. (Ruiz, 
    supra,
     50 Cal.4th at p. 849.) In
    other words, if the parents cannot maintain a claim for abuse
    under the Elder Abuse Act in their own name, it makes no sense
    for them to be able to pursue a claim for wrongful death based
    upon that same alleged abuse.7
    The various Court of Appeal decisions that have confined
    Ruiz’s holding to wrongful death claims predicated on medical
    malpractice or professional negligence do not compel a different
    result because, as set forth above, the parents’ wrongful death
    claim sounds in professional negligence. (See Valentine v. Plum
    Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 
    37 Cal.App.5th 1076
    , 1084 [“a
    patient of a skilled nursing facility can bind her heirs to arbitrate
    wrongful death claims arising only from medical malpractice”];
    Avila, 
    supra,
     20 Cal.App.5th at p. 843 [where a wrongful death
    “claim is not one within the ambit of section 1295, . . . Ruiz’s
    7
    This conclusion begs a question not briefed by the parties:
    Are the arbitrator’s findings on Skyler’s claims binding on the
    parents’ wrongful death claim? (Sanchez v. Carmax Auto
    Superstores California, LLC (2014) 
    224 Cal.App.4th 398
    , 407
    [“‘“The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to judicial
    proceedings but also to arbitration proceedings. [Citation.]”
    [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The doctrine of collateral estoppel also
    applies. An arbitration award therefore can bar identical causes
    of action in court and have collateral estoppel effect”].)
    11
    holding does not apply”]; Daniels, 
    supra,
     212 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 677 [“Ruiz ha[s] no bearing on third party wrongful death
    claims outside the context of section 1295”]; Bush v. Horizon West
    (2012) 
    205 Cal.App.4th 924
    , 929 [Ruiz not applicable where case
    did not involve a wrongful death claim predicated on medical
    malpractice].) To the extent these cases hold otherwise, we
    respectfully disagree. (See, e.g., Avila, 
    supra,
     20 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 842 [“If the primary basis for the wrongful death claim sounds
    in professional negligence as defined by MICRA, then section
    1295 applies. If, as plaintiffs claim here, the primary basis is
    under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act
    . . . then section 1295 does not apply and neither does Ruiz’s
    exception to the general rule that one who has not consented
    cannot be compelled to arbitrate”].)
    But even if we agreed that a wrongful death claim based
    upon dependent adult abuse falls outside the scope of Ruiz and
    cannot be ordered to arbitration, that principle would not apply
    here. While a cause of action for statutory dependent adult abuse
    is distinct from one for medical malpractice (Delaney v. Baker
    (1999) 
    20 Cal.4th 23
    , 31), plaintiffs do not allege with adequate
    specificity how their claims here constitute dependent adult
    abuse and not professional negligence (Covenant Care, Inc. v.
    Superior Court (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 771
    , 791 [a cause of action
    under the Elder Abuse Act must be alleged with particularity]).
    Absent these specific allegations, we cannot ignore our Supreme
    Court’s mandate in Ruiz. (Loshonkohl v. Kinder (2003) 
    109 Cal.App.4th 510
    , 517.) We will not permit plaintiffs to
    circumvent Ruiz through intentionally opaque pleading. (Groom
    v. Health Net (2000) 
    82 Cal.App.4th 1189
    , 1196 [“it may
    reasonably be inferred [that the plaintiff’s amended complaints]
    12
    were artfully drafted for the purpose of avoiding arbitration”];
    Johnson v. Hydraulic Research & Mfg. Co. (1977) 
    70 Cal.App.3d 675
    , 682 [a plaintiff may not avoid arbitration by artfully
    pleading his complaint].)
    DISPOSITION
    The order is reversed. The trial court is directed to order
    the parents’ wrongful death cause of action to arbitration.
    Asistencia is entitled to costs on appeal.
    _____________________, Acting P. J.
    ASHMANN-GERST
    We concur:
    ________________________, J.
    CHAVEZ
    ________________________, J.
    HOFFSTADT
    13
    Filed 5/10/24
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    JONIE A. HOLLAND et al.,                B323237
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,      (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    v.                               22STCV01945)
    SILVERSCREEN                           ORDER CERTIFYING
    HEALTHCARE, INC.,                      OPINION FOR
    PUBLICATION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT:
    The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on April 16,
    2024, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports.
    For good cause it now appears that the opinion should be
    published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
    ____________________________________________________________
    ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT, J.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B323237

Filed Date: 5/10/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/15/2024