Vines v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises ( 2024 )

Filed 4/24/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
RENEE VINES, B327821
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. PC058046)
O’REILLY AUTO ENTERPRISES,
LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen P. Pfahler, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris, James M. Peterson,
Derek W. Paradis and Steven M. Brunolli for Defendant and
Appellant.
Mayall Hurley, William J. Gorham III and Nicholas F.
Scardigli for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal, the second in this litigation, is about interest
on an award of statutory attorneys’ fees. In particular, whether
interest on the award runs from the first, later-reversed
attorneys’ fees order or the second, post-remand attorneys’ fees
order. The answer depends on whether our opinion in the prior
appeal was a modification (so that interest runs from the first
order, which is what the prevailing plaintiff wants) or a reversal
(so that interest runs from the second, which is what the
defendant wants).
The line between modification and reversal, however, like
that (for example) between a mandatory and prohibitory
injunction, can be a little blurry. Here, however, we can safely
draw that line. Our directions in the prior appeal required the
trial court to do more than perform a pure mathematical
computation or add or delete a category of fees; the trial court
had to exercise its discretion to determine an appropriate award
of attorneys’ fees. Therefore, our prior opinion was a reversal,
not a modification, which means interest runs from the second
attorneys’ fees award.
The case arises out of an employment dispute. Renee Vines
sued his former employer, O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, for
violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.
Code, § 12900 et seq.), alleging causes of action for race- and age-
based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. A jury found
in his favor on his causes of action for retaliation and failure to
prevent retaliation, but against him on his other causes of action.
Although Vines asked for $253,417 in economic damages and
2
$1.3 million to $2.3 million in non-economic damages, the jury
awarded him only $70,200.
Vines moved for $809,681.25 in statutory attorneys’ fees.
On September 9, 2019 the trial court granted the motion, but
awarded only $129,540.44 in fees, based in part on the court’s
determination Vines’s unsuccessful discrimination and
harassment causes of action were not closely related to or
factually intertwined with his successful retaliation causes of
action.
Vines appealed, and we reversed. We held the trial court
erred in finding that, because the facts related to Vines’s
(successful) retaliation causes of action arose after he complained
about the discriminatory and harassing conduct, the
(unsuccessful) discrimination and harassment causes of action
were not related to the (successful) retaliation causes of action.
Therefore, we concluded, the trial court erred in ruling Vines was
not entitled to recover any fees he incurred pursuing his
discrimination and harassment causes of action. (Vines v.
O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 174, 185
(Vines I).)
On remand the trial court on June 29, 2022 awarded Vines
$518,161.77 in fees. O’Reilly paid the fee award, including
postjudgment interest from June 29, 2022. Vines’s attorneys,
however, wanted more; specifically, they wanted interest on the
attorneys’ fees award from September 9, 2019, not June 29, 2022,
which amounted to an additional $138,454.44 in interest.
Rather than asking the court to enter an amended
judgment that included the award of attorneys’ fees plus
additional interest or seeking an order for additional interest,
Vines applied for and obtained a renewal of the judgment in the
3
amount of $138,454.44 (i.e., the additional interest). O’Reilly
filed a motion to vacate the renewal of judgment, which the trial
court denied.
O’Reilly appeals from the order denying its motion to
vacate the renewal of judgment,1 challenging only the amount of
interest on the award of attorneys’ fees. O’Reilly argues that,
because our decision in Vines I was a reversal, not a modification,
of the trial court’s September 9, 2019 order, interest on the
amount of attorneys’ fees awarded should run from June 29,
2022, not September 9, 2019. We agree with O’Reilly, reverse the
order denying O’Reilly’s motion to vacate the renewed judgment,
and direct the trial court to grant the motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. A Jury Finds in Favor of Vines on Some of His
Causes of Action Under FEHA
In 2017 Vines filed this action against O’Reilly, alleging his
supervisor and others discriminated against him and harassed
him because of his age and race, in violation of FEHA. Vines also
alleged O’Reilly terminated his employment after he complained
about the harassment and discrimination. Vines asserted six
causes of action: two for discrimination (race and age); two for
1 “The renewal of a judgment is not an appealable event . . .
because there is no separate entity called a renewed judgment
. . . . Instead, it is the order denying a motion to vacate renewal
of a judgment that is appealable, as an order after (the
underlying) judgment.” (Goldman v. Simpson (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 255, 262, fn. 4, internal quotation marks
omitted.)
4
harassment (race and age); one for retaliation; and one for failure
to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
In 2018 O’Reilly moved for summary judgment or in the
alternative summary adjudication on each of Vines’s causes of
action. The trial court granted the motion for summary
adjudication on Vines’s causes of action for age discrimination
and age harassment. The parties tried the remaining four causes
of action (race discrimination, racial harassment, retaliation, and
failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation) to
a jury. The jury found against Vines on his causes of action for
race discrimination and harassment, but in favor of Vines on his
causes of action for retaliation and failure to prevent
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The jury awarded
Vines $70,200 in damages.
B. Vines Seeks $809,681.24 in Attorneys’ Fees, but the
Trial Court Awards Him Only $129,540.44
Vines moved under Government Code section 12965,
subdivision (c), for $809,681.25 in attorneys’ fees, based on a
lodestar of $647,745, with a multiplier of 1.25 because of the
difficulty of the case, the skills displayed by Vines’s attorneys,
and the fact his attorneys represented him on a contingency
basis. Vines argued his failure to prevail on his causes of action
for discrimination and harassment did not warrant a downward
(or fractional) lodestar adjustment because his causes of action
for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation (on which he
prevailed) were related to his causes of action for unlawful
discrimination and harassment (on which he did not).
In its opposition to Vines’s motion, O’Reilly argued that
Vines was not the prevailing party, but that even if he was, the
5
trial court should deny his fee request entirely because the
amount of fees he requested was excessive given his limited
success and the comparatively nominal jury award of $70,200. In
the alternative, O’Reilly argued the trial court should
substantially reduce the amount of fees because the unsuccessful
causes of action were not related to the successful causes of
action. O’Reilly also argued Vines had obtained only limited
success in the litigation, not substantial relief or “excellent
results.” O’Reilly contended that Vines’s attorneys spent more
than 75 percent of their time on the harassment and
discrimination causes of action and that the court should not
award fees for time spent litigating the unsuccessful causes of
action. O’Reilly also argued the court should make additional
reductions for counsel for Vines’s unreasonable billing entries,
excessive hourly rates, and unreasonable settlement positions.
O’Reilly also asked the court to reduce the lodestar figure to
33 percent of the requested amount, in part because Vines
prevailed only on one-third of his causes of action.
The trial court awarded Vines $129,540.44 in attorneys’
fees. The court found that Vines was the prevailing party
because he had succeeded on his causes of action for retaliation
and failure to prevent retaliation and that the court had
discretion to award Vines reasonable attorneys’ fees. As for
O’Reilly’s contention Vines could only recover on his two
successful retaliation-based causes of action, the court found
Vines had “won substantial relief and obtained excellent results.”
The court, however, found Vines’s unsuccessful causes of action
for discrimination and harassment were not sufficiently related
to or factually intertwined with his successful causes of action for
retaliation. The court agreed with O’Reilly the facts regarding
6
the retaliation allegations occurred after the facts regarding the
allegations of discrimination and harassment. Thus, based on
the finding Vines’s attorneys spent 75 percent of their time on the
unsuccessful causes of action for discrimination and harassment,
the court ruled Vines was not entitled to recover 75 percent of the
fees his attorneys charged.
The trial court also subtracted certain fees the court found
were not reasonably incurred, reduced the hourly rate for Vines’s
attorney Nicholas Scardigli, rejected O’Reilly’s argument Vines
should not recover any fees incurred after O’Reilly’s settlement
offer, and declined to apply an upward or downward multiplier to
the lodestar figure. From Vines’s requested lodestar of $647,745,
the court subtracted $129,583.23 for fees the court found were
not reasonably incurred and for Scardigli’s reduced hourly rate,
resulting in a subtotal of $518,161.77, which the court then
reduced by 75 percent (to $129,540.44) to account for Vines’s
failure to prevail on his discrimination and harassment causes of
action.
C. Vines Appeals from the Attorneys’ Fees Order,
and We Reverse
Vines appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him
attorneys’ fees, arguing the court abused its discretion in
reducing the fee award by 75 percent. Vines argued “the trial
court’s ruling was based on a faulty temporal analysis that failed
to recognize he had to present evidence of the conduct underlying
his discrimination and harassment claims to prove the
reasonableness of his belief that such conduct was unlawful, as
required to succeed on his retaliation cause of action.” (Vines I,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 185.) We agreed, concluding the trial
7
court erred in ruling that, “because ‘any facts related to [Vines]
being retaliated against arose after [he] complained about the
discrimination and harassment conduct,’” the causes of action
were not sufficiently related or factually intertwined. (Id. at
p. 186.) We held that “[e]vidence of the facts regarding the
alleged underlying discriminatory and harassing conduct about
which Vines had complained was relevant to establish, for the
retaliation cause of action, the reasonableness of his belief that
conduct was unlawful.” (Ibid.) Our disposition stated: “The
postjudgment order awarding attorney fees is reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.” (Id. at p. 190.)
D. On Remand the Trial Court Awards $518,161.77 in
Attorneys’ Fees
On remand Vines contended that in Vines I we had directed
the trial court “to perform a simple mathematical function” and
that the trial court should reverse the 75 percent reduction the
court had made for the unsuccessful causes of action and award
$518,161.77. O’Reilly argued that, although we rejected the trial
court’s rationale for reducing Vines’s fee request by 75 percent,
we did not express an opinion on the “wisdom of the fee amount.”
O’Reilly asked the trial court to award attorneys’ fees in an
amount similar to its previous award of $129,540.44 and
suggested “several other paths” the court could use to reach that
result.
On June 29, 2022 the trial court held a hearing. The court
stated that in Vines I we had “clearly found the fees intertwined
in bringing the entire action regardless of whether [Vines]
prevailed on all claims” and that the court “declines to once again
8
make a finding of decoupled fees.” After deciding not to increase
or decrease the lodestar amount by applying a multiplier, the
court awarded $518,161.77 in attorneys’ fees.
E. The Trial Court Denies O’Reilly’s Motion To Vacate
the Renewal of Judgment
O’Reilly paid Vines the full amount of the fee award plus
interest accruing from June 29, 2022, the date of the second
attorneys’ fees order.2 Vines applied for a renewal of judgment
under Code of Civil Procedure sections 683.110 et seq. in the
amount of $138,454.44 for interest accruing from September 9,
2019, the date of the original order awarding fees.3 The court
issued a renewal of judgment.
2 O’Reilly paid Vines $129,540.44 in January 2021 while
Vines I was pending, and an additional $397,886.41 in July 2022,
for a total of $527,426.85.
3 “Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020, which defines the
period for enforceability of judgments, provides after the
expiration of 10 years after the date of entry of a money judgment
. . . the judgment may not be enforced. One way to preserve such
a judgment is to file an application for renewal under the terms
of Code of Civil Procedure sections 683.120 and 683.130 before
the expiration of the 10-year enforceability period. Such
application automatically renews the judgment for a period of
10 years . . . .” (Kertesz v. Ostrovsky (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 369,
372-373.) The “entry of the renewed judgment is a ministerial
act . . . .” (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC
World Markets Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 185, 191.) Why
Vines applied for a renewal of a judgment that was less than a
year old is a mystery, a procedural irregularity O’Reilly does not
challenge.
9
O’Reilly filed a motion to vacate the renewal of judgment.
O’Reilly argued that Vines I was a reversal because we directed
the trial court to conduct further proceedings and determine a
reasonable fee award and that therefore Vines was entitled to
interest only from the date of the trial court’s June 29, 2022
order. Vines argued our decision in Vines I was a modification
because Vines challenged only discrete portions of the trial
court’s September 9, 2019 order and our opinion left significant
portions of that order undisturbed. The trial court denied the
motion to vacate. The court agreed with Vines that our decision
in Vines I was a modification, not a reversal, and that interest
ran from the September 9, 2019 attorneys’ fees order. O’Reilly
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A judgment bears interest from the date of its entry in the
trial court, even though it is still subject to direct attack. (Chodos
v. Borman (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 707, 712 (Chodos); see
Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1961) 55 Cal.2d 439, 442
(Stockton Theatres).) “When a judgment is modified upon appeal,
whether upward or downward, the new sum draws interest from
the date of entry of the original order, not from the date of the
new judgment. [Citations.] On the other hand, when a judgment
is reversed on appeal the new award subsequently entered by the
trial court can bear interest only from the date of entry of such
new judgment.” (Stockton Theatres, at pp. 442-443; accord,
Munoz v. City of Union City (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 199, 203.)
10
Whether an appellate court’s disposition is a modification
or a reversal depends on the substance and effect of the order, not
its form. (Chodos, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 713; see Snapp v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 816, 821 (Snapp).)
“An appellate court order is ‘a reversal in the legal sense’ when it
reverses the trial court and remands an issue to the trial court for
further hearing and factfinding necessary to the resolution of the
issue forming a basis for appeal.” (Chodos, at p. 713; see Stockton
Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 444.) But where “an order stated
in terms of reversal amends a trial court order on remand to
‘state what it should have stated on th[e] date’ of the original
order, it is ‘in law and in fact, a modification.’” (Chodos, at
p. 713; see Stockton Theatres, at pp. 443-444.) The date from
which postjudgment interest runs is a legal question, which we
review de novo. (Chodos, at p. 712.)
B. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling Vines I Was
a Modification
O’Reilly argues that our decision in Vines I was a reversal,
not a modification, and that the trial court erred in ruling
interest ran from September 9, 2019, the date of the original
attorneys’ fees award. In that order the trial court recognized
that a “party may recover attorneys’ fees for time spent litigating
unsuccessful claims when they are ‘closely related to or factually
intertwined with’ the successful ones.”4 The trial court found the
4 This is the first step of the two-part inquiry outlined in
Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 434, which California
courts follow in calculating an award of attorneys’ fees to a
partially prevailing party. (See Vines I, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 182-183.) “Where a prevailing plaintiff succeeded on only
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unsuccessful causes of action for discrimination and harassment
were not sufficiently related to or factually intertwined with the
successful retaliation causes of action because “any facts related
to [Vines] being retaliated against arose after [he] complained
about the discrimination and harassment conduct.” In Vines I we
concluded that ruling was legal error because evidence of the
discriminatory and harassing conduct Vines claimed he
experienced was relevant to prove he reasonably believed that
conduct was unlawful, an element of his retaliation causes of
action. (Vines I, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.) Therefore, we
held, the trial court “erred in determining any facts related to the
retaliation claim arose after he had complained about that
conduct.” (Id. at p. 187.) We reversed the September 9, 2019
order, directed the trial court to “recalculate Vines’s fee award,”
and “remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.” (Id. at pp. 177, 190.)
Because the effect of our opinion in Vines I was to remand
the matter “for further hearing and factfinding necessary”
(Chodos, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 713) to determine an
appropriate fee award, Vines I was a reversal, not a modification.
We did not hold that Vines’s unsuccessful causes of action were
(or were not) closely related to or sufficiently factually
intertwined with his successful causes of action as a matter of
some claims, the court should make a two-part inquiry: ‘First,
did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to
the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff
achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably
expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?’” (Id. at
p. 183, quoting Hensley, at p. 434.)
12
law.5 We stated the trial court committed legal error by relying
on an incorrect reason for concluding the causes of action were
not sufficiently related or factually intertwined. We directed the
trial court to determine, using the appropriate legal standard,
whether the causes of action were related and, if so, to proceed to
the second step of the analysis under Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983)
461 U.S. 424 and decide whether to reduce Vines’s fee award
because he achieved “‘only partial or limited success.’” (Vines I,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 183; see Hensley, at p. 436.)
As directed, the trial court conducted further proceedings,
allowed the parties to submit briefs, and held a hearing on the
amount of the fee award. Vines argued the court should simply
undo the 75 percent reduction and award $518,161.77. O’Reilly
argued that, under the second step of the Hensley inquiry, the
court should reduce Vines’s fee request because he achieved
limited success and the case was not complex. O’Reilly also
asked the court not to award any fees incurred after Vines
rejected O’Reilly’s settlement offer.
The trial court essentially restored the 75 percent reduction
the court had previously imposed, awarding Vines $518,161.77 in
attorneys’ fees to “reflect[ ] the balance prior to the 75%
reduction.” The trial court concluded that in Vines I we
instructed the court to “determine the fees as if the fees incurred
5 As we stated in Vines I, “our reversal of the trial court’s
order in this case is not based on a determination that retaliation
claims in all circumstances must be found to be closely
intertwined with the underlying discrimination claims for
purposes of assessing reasonableness of attorney fees.” (Vines I,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.)
13
on the non-successful claims were sufficiently related or factually
intertwined.” The trial court also concluded (somewhat
inconsistently) that in Vines I we instructed the court to “make
the determination based on the ‘probative’ process in
investigating the common core of facts rather than drawing
‘historical fact’ distinctions.” After discussing the two-part
Hensley inquiry, the trial court stated that in Vines I we “clearly
found the fees intertwined” and that the trial court “decline[d] to
once again make a finding of decoupled fees.” Recognizing it had
discretion to adjust the lodestar up or down, the court considered,
and rejected, O’Reilly’s request to reduce the lodestar. The court
also found there were “no extraordinary circumstances” that
would justify increasing the lodestar.6
When the trial court stated (in its order denying O’Reilly’s
motion to vacate the renewal of judgment) that it had “engaged in
no new fact-finding” in its June 29, 2022 order, the court appears
to have incorrectly focused on whether the facts, rather than the
factfinding, were new. The court stated that, because the
“increased fee award” involved “fees incurred in bringing the case
to trial, rather than an increase in fees unique to the appellate
process,” the court’s factfinding was not “new,” and our opinion in
Vines I was a modification. The court misunderstood. The issue
6 While the trial court recognized it had discretion to adjust
the lodestar amount up or down, it appears the court (incorrectly)
believed it did not have discretion to find Vines’s successful and
unsuccessful causes of action were not sufficiently related or
factually intertwined, in whole or in part. The trial court
misread our opinion in Vines I. We did not hold the successful
and unsuccessful causes of action were closely related or factually
intertwined as a matter of law; we held the trial court’s analysis
in reaching a contrary conclusion was legally erroneous.
14
was not whether Vines incurred any new fees since the first
ruling on the motion for attorneys’ fees; the issue was whether in
Vines I we directed the court to hear new argument, make new
factual findings, and determine anew the amount of Vines’s
reasonable attorneys’ fees (which is what we did).
Vines asserts our opinion in Vines I, like those in Stockton
Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.2d 439 and Snapp, supra, 60 Cal.2d 816,
was a modification “because it expressly left significant portions
of the trial court’s order intact and ‘undisturbed on remand,’
including the trial court’s reductions ‘in the amount of
$129,583.23 for specific billing entries’ and the $129,540.44” for
Vines’s successful retaliation causes of action. Vines is correct
that, in Vines I we left the reductions for specific billing entries
“undisturbed” because Vines forfeited his challenge to those
reductions. But we did not leave undisturbed the trial court’s
order awarding $129,540.44 in fees. On remand the trial court
had discretion to award a greater or lesser amount. More to the
point, whether an opinion reverses an entire judgment or only
portions of it is not the test for distinguishing between a reversal
and a modification. Vines cites no authority for his assertion,
other than pointing out that the opinions in Stockton Theatres
and Snapp were modifications that left portions of the challenged
orders intact. But that was not the determinative factor in either
case.
Stockton Theatres involved multiple appeals, including one
reversal and one modification. After the plaintiff filed a
memorandum of costs on appeal, the trial court in 1954 allowed
most of the claimed costs, but disallowed the cost of a surety bond
to preserve an attachment on appeal. (Stockton Theatres, supra,
55 Cal.2d at p. 440.) The Supreme Court reversed. The Court
15
held the bond premium was a recoverable cost if it was
reasonably necessary to preserve appellate rights and directed
the trial court to determine whether the bond was necessary and,
if so, to allow the premium as a cost. (Id. at p. 441.) On remand
the trial court in 1957 ruled the bond was unnecessary and again
disallowed the cost. The plaintiff appealed again, and the
Supreme Court reversed again. The Court “held that the
evidence produced at the hearing demonstrated ‘as a matter of
law’ that the challenged expenditure was ‘necessary’” and ordered
the trial court to allow the bond premium as a cost. (Ibid.) On
remand again the trial court in 1959 allowed the bond premium
as a cost and ordered interest to accrue from the date of its 1959
order. (Ibid.) The plaintiff appealed a third time, arguing the
trial court erred in ruling interest did not accrue until 1959. (Id.
at p. 442.)
The Supreme Court stated that its first opinion “was a legal
reversal” because “it directed the trial court to hold a hearing on
the necessity for the expenditure, and to make its award of costs
depend upon the outcome of that hearing.” (Stockton Theatres,
supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 443.) The Supreme Court held that its
second opinion, in contrast, was a modification because the Court
held in that case “the trial court, as a matter of law, should have
entered its order allowing the bond premium as an item of costs”
at the 1957 hearing. (Id. at p. 444.) Therefore, interest accrued
from the trial court’s 1957 order. (Ibid.) Like the first opinion in
Stockton Theatres, our opinion in Vines I was a reversal because
we directed the trial court to hold a hearing on Vines’s fee
request and determine a reasonable attorneys’ fees award. As
16
discussed, we did not hold Vines was entitled to recover the full
amount of fees he requested.7
Vines’s reliance on Snapp, supra, 60 Cal.2d 816 is also
misplaced. In Snapp the trial court held a property insurer was
liable to its insured only for damage that occurred before the
policy was terminated, and the court awarded $8,168.25 in
damages. (Id. at p. 817.) The Supreme Court held “the insurance
company was liable, under the findings, and as a matter of law,”
not only for the damage the trial court awarded, but also for
damage that occurred after the termination date caused by
factors that existed before the termination, up to the policy limit
of $25,000. (Id. at pp. 817-818.) Because the record showed the
damage exceeded $25,000, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment “‘with directions to enter judgment for plaintiffs in the
amount of $25,000.00.’” (Id. at p. 818.) The Supreme Court
concluded “the so-called ‘reversal’ with directions, was, in fact
and in law, a ‘modification.’” (Id. at p. 820.) The Court stated
that “the original judgment was increased from $8,168.25 to
$25,000, based solely on the record then before the appellate
court. No issues remained to be determined. No further evidence
was necessary.” (Ibid.) That was not the case in Vines I, where
7 Vines argues Stockton Theatres is distinguishable because,
at the time of the first opinion in that case, there had not yet
been an evidentiary hearing on whether the bond was necessary.
(See Stockton Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 441.) In contrast,
Vines argues, when we decided Vines I the trial court had already
held a hearing and determined Vines was entitled to attorneys’
fees as the prevailing party. But what made the first opinion in
Stockton Theatres a reversal was not what had occurred in the
trial court, but what the Supreme Court instructed the trial court
to do on remand. (Stockton Theatres, at p. 441.)
17
the record did not allow us to decide the amount of reasonable
attorneys’ fees as a matter of law. Instead, that issue remained
to be determined by the trial court.
The other modification cases on which Vines relies are
similarly distinguishable. In each of those cases the reviewing
court instructed the trial court to enter judgment in a certain
amount and did not direct the trial court to conduct further
proceedings. (See Chodos, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 711, 714
[opinion instructing the trial court to “enter a new judgment
based on . . . a $1.8 million lodestar amount” and to “make
adjustments to the $1.8 million award by adding the amount of
$24,921 and deducting the amount of $107,000” was a
modification]; Ehret v. Congoleum Corp. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
202, 205 [opinion remanding “the case to the trial court to enter
judgment . . . in the amount of $817,896” was a modification].)8
Because we did not “amend” the trial court’s order to “‘state what
it should have stated’” on the date of the original order (Chodos,
at p. 713), our decision in Vines I was a reversal, not a
modification.
8 Vines cites Felczer v. Apple Inc. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 406,
at page 409 for the proposition that interest on an award of costs
“begins on the date of the judgment or order that establishes the
right of a party to recover a particular cost item, even if the dollar
amount has yet to be ascertained.” But the issue in Felczer was
whether interest began to accrue on an award of prejudgment
costs on the date the judgment was entered or on a later date
when the court determined the precise amount of costs awarded.
(Id. at p. 410.) The court in Felczer did not address the issue in
this case: when interest accrues after an order awarding costs is
reversed on appeal.
18
C. The Trial Court Erred in Denying O’Reilly’s Motion
To Vacate the Renewal of Judgment
As noted,9 submitting a request for a renewal of the
judgment in this case was an odd way for Vines to ask the trial
court to increase the amount of interest on the award of
attorneys’ fees. O’Reilly, however, did not object to that
procedure in the trial court and does not argue on appeal the
procedure was erroneous.
In any event, a proper renewal of judgment “may be
vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an action on
the judgment, including the ground that the amount of the
renewed judgment . . . is incorrect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.170,
subd. (a); see Altizer v. Highsmith (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 331,
339.) O’Reilly had the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence it was entitled to relief under Code of Civil
Procedure, section 683.170, subdivision (a). (Rubin v. Ross (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 153, 161.) Where the trial court’s decision to deny
a motion to vacate a renewal of judgment rests on an incorrect
rule of law, we review the decision de novo. (Id. at pp. 161-162.)
As discussed, the trial court erred in ruling that our
decision in Vines I was a modification and that interest accrued
on the attorneys’ fees award from the September 9, 2019
attorneys’ fees order. O’Reilly paid the attorneys’ fees award and
interest accruing from June 29, 2022, which fully satisfied the
judgment. The renewal of judgment was for additional interest
accruing from September 9, 2019. Because Vines was not
entitled to that additional interest, the amount of the renewed
judgment was incorrect, and the trial court erred in denying
9 In footnote 3.
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O’Reilly’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 683.170, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITION
The order denying O’Reilly’s motion to vacate the renewal
of judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new
order granting the motion and vacating the renewal of judgment.
O’Reilly is to recover its costs on appeal.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
MARTINEZ, J.
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