Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. ( 2024 )

Filed 3/20/24; Modified and Certified for Pub. 4/18/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
LIZBETH BALDERAS, 2d Crim. No. B326759
(Super. Ct. No. 22CVO2246)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
FRESH START
HARVESTING, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Lizbeth Balderas appeals an order striking her complaint
for civil penalties for violations of the California Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698
et seq.) on behalf of herself and 500 other current and former
employees of defendant Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (Fresh
Start). The trial court ruled Balderas lacked standing to bring a
representative PAGA action on behalf of other employees because
she did not allege “an individual claim“ in the action. We
conclude Balderas, as an alleged aggrieved employee who was
subject to alleged Labor Code violations by Fresh Start, may
bring a “non-individual” or representative PAGA action on behalf
of herself and other Fresh Start employees, even though she did
not file an individual cause of action seeking individual relief for
herself in this action. We reverse.
FACTS
Lizbeth Balderas was a Fresh Start employee. In June
2022, she filed a complaint for civil penalties under PAGA
against Fresh Start. She alleged, “Ms. Balderas is not suing in
her individual capacity; she is proceeding herein solely under the
PAGA, on behalf of the State of California for all aggrieved
employees, including herself and other aggrieved employees.”
Balderas claimed that Fresh Start did not provide
employees with required meal break periods and rest periods,
and that Fresh Start provided inaccurate wage statements, made
untimely wage payments, and failed to pay wages at termination.
Fresh Start filed a motion to compel arbitration.
On its own motion, the trial court gave notice of its intent
to strike Balderas’s complaint. It said because she had not filed
an individual action seeking PAGA relief for herself, she lacked
standing to pursue a “non-individual” or representative PAGA
action on behalf of other employees.
In Balderas’s opposition to the trial court’s notice of intent
to strike her complaint, she wrote that she had “properly filed
this action in a purely representative capacity.” (Capitalization
& boldface omitted.) She argued the court was incorrectly relying
on language from a United States Supreme Court decision that
had incorrectly recited California law on PAGA standing.
The trial court issued an order striking her pleading.
DISCUSSION
Standing to Bring a Representative PAGA Action
2.
“California’s Labor Code ‘contains a complex scheme for
timely compensation of workers, deterrence of abusive employer
practices, and enforcement of wage judgments.’ ” (Piplack v. In-
N-Out Burgers (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1286.)
Because of “underenforcement of many Labor Code
provisions and ‘a shortage of government resources to pursue
enforcement,’ ” the Legislature enacted PAGA “to create new civil
penalties for Labor Code violations and ‘ “to allow aggrieved
employees” ’ ” to act as private attorneys general “ ‘ “to recover
[those] penalties.” ’ ” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 1104, 1113.)
PAGA is a remedial statute intended to protect employees
from employer misconduct. Remedial statutes must be broadly
interpreted to achieve the legislative goals. (In re Delila D.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, 974.) PAGA provisions must be
interpreted broadly to protect employees. (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1122.)
Class or representative PAGA actions play “ ‘an important
function in enforcing [the Labor Code] by permitting employees
. . . a relatively inexpensive way to resolve their disputes’ ” about
“unlawful” employer conduct. (Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)
“An employee who brings a PAGA action to recover civil
penalties acts ‘ “as the proxy or agent” ’ of the state.” (Adolph v.
Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) “ ‘PAGA is
designed primarily to benefit the general public, not the party
bringing the action.’ ” (Ibid.) PAGA default civil penalties are
intended to deter violations, rather than “ ‘compensate employees
for actual losses incurred.’ ” (Id. at p. 1117.)
3.
The statutory goal is furthered by extending broad
standing to aggrieved employees that does not depend on the
viability or strength of a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim. In
fact, the inability for an employee to pursue an individual PAGA
claim does not prevent that employee from filing a representative
PAGA action. California courts have consistently held that
“ ‘[p]aring away the plaintiff’s individual claims’ ” for one reason
or another, “ ‘does not deprive the plaintiff of standing to pursue
representative claims under PAGA.’ ” (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1122.)
These broad-standing policies that allow employees the
freedom to bring representative PAGA actions to challenge unfair
employer policies had not been questioned until 2022 when the
United State Supreme Court made some observations about
PAGA standing that conflicted with what the California
Legislature intended.
In Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) _ U.S. _ [213
L.Ed.2d 179, 200-201] (Viking River), the United States Supreme
Court wrote, “Under PAGA’s standing requirement, a plaintiff
can maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by
virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that action.”
(Italics added.) “When an employee’s own dispute is pared away
from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member
of the general public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to
maintain suit.” (Ibid., italics added.)
In reliance on this language, the trial court struck
Balderas’s “non-individual” representative PAGA action. It noted
that in her complaint Balderas alleged, “Ms. Balderas is not
suing in her individual capacity; she is proceeding herein solely
under the PAGA, on behalf of the State of California for all
4.
aggrieved employees, including herself and other aggrieved
employees” of Fresh Start. Noting that she did not file her own
individual PAGA claim, the court found under Viking River she
could not bring this representative PAGA action for penalties.
Balderas contends the trial court erred by relying on Viking
River because it was wrong on state PAGA standing
requirements, and its decision is not binding on California courts.
She is correct and the California Supreme Court agrees with her
position.
In Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
page 1119, our Supreme Court held Viking River was incorrect on
PAGA standing and its decision on that issue may not be followed
by California courts. The court wrote, “Because ‘[t]he highest
court of each State . . . remains “the final arbiter of what is state
law” ’ (Montana v. Wyoming (2011) 563 U.S. 368, 378, fn. 5 [179
L.Ed.2d 799]), we are not bound by the high court’s interpretation
of California law.” (Ibid., italics added.) “And although the high
court’s interpretations may serve as persuasive authority in cases
involving a parallel federal constitutional provision or statutory
scheme [citations], Viking River does not interpret any federal
provision or statute similar to PAGA.” (Ibid.) In her Viking
River concurrence, Justice Sotomayor wrote, “Of course, if this
Court’s understanding of state law is wrong, California courts, in
an appropriate case, will have the last word.” (Viking River
Cruises v. Moriana, supra, _ U.S. _ [213 L.Ed.2d 179, 201], italics
added.)
The Adolph court concluded that the Viking River
requirement of having to file an individual PAGA cause of action
to have standing to file a representative PAGA suit was incorrect.
There are only two requirements for PAGA standing. “The
5.
plaintiff must allege that he or she is (1) ‘someone “who was
employed by the alleged violator” ’ and (2) someone ‘ “against
whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” ’ ”
(Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1120.)
Balderas met the standing requirements. She alleged that
she 1) was an “aggrieved” employee of Fresh Start, and 2) was
subject to one or more Fresh Start violations. She alleged,
“[W]hen Employees including Ms. Balderas started work for
Fresh Start at around 6:00 a.m. or 7:00 a.m., they regularly were
not provided a meal period until after 5 hours of work for shifts
longer than 5 hours.” This delay in providing timely meal periods
for her and other employees violated their right to have “a meal
period within the first five (5) hours of work.”
Fresh Start claims more is required for standing than what
Balderas alleged. But our Supreme Court rejected this claim in
Adolph. The court declined “to impose additional requirements
not found in the statute.” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1120.) “A narrower construction of PAGA
standing would ‘thwart the Legislature’s clear intent to deputize
employees to pursue sanctions on the state’s behalf.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1122; see also Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc.
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924 [employee need not bring an individual
claim against her employer to have standing to pursue a PAGA
claim; it is sufficient to allege the employee suffered a Labor Code
violation].)
6.
DISPOSITION
The order striking the pleading is reversed. Costs on
appeal are awarded to appellant.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
CODY, J.
7.
James F. Rigali, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Workworld Law and Ruben Escobedo III for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Gillett Law, Gregory F. Gillett, and Jon-Erik G. Storm for
Defendant and Respondent.
Filed 4/18/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ex 2d Crim. No. B326759
rel. LIZBETH BALDERAS, (Super. Ct. No. 22CVO2246)
(Santa Barbara County)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND
v. CERTIFYING OPINION FOR
PUBLICATION
FRESH START [NO CHANGE IN
HARVESTING, INC., JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 20, 2024, be
modified as follows:
1. On page 1, the following two paragraphs are added to the
beginning of the opinion:
The California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) gives an employee the
unique power to act as a private attorney general to receive fees
for certain Labor Code violations.
Here we hold that an employee who does not bring an
individual claim against her employer may nevertheless bring a
PAGA action for herself and other employees of the company.
2. On page 1, the first paragraph (which will now be the third
paragraph in the opinion) is changed to read:
Lizbeth Balderas appeals an order striking her complaint
for civil penalties for violations of PAGA on behalf of herself and
500 other current and former employees of defendant Fresh Start
Harvesting, Inc. (Fresh Start). The trial court ruled Balderas
lacked standing to bring a representative PAGA action on behalf
of other employees because she did not allege “an individual
claim” in the action. Balderas, an alleged aggrieved employee
who was subject to alleged Labor Code violations by Fresh Start,
may bring a “non-individual” or representative PAGA action on
behalf of herself and other Fresh Start employees. We reverse.
3. On page 2, the fifth full paragraph under FACTS is
changed to read:
In Balderas’s opposition to the trial court’s notice of intent
to strike her complaint, she argued the court was relying on
language from a United States Supreme Court decision that had
incorrectly recited California law on PAGA standing.
4. On page 3, at the end of the third paragraph, “(Adolph)” is
added to the end of the citation as follows: (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1113 (Adolph).)
Thereafter, throughout the opinion, “Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc.” is changed to “Adolph.”
2.
5. On page 4, on line 2 of the first full paragraph, the words
“aggrieved employees that does not depend” are changed to
“aggrieved employees who do not depend.”
6. On page 4, on lines 3-4 in the first full paragraph, the
words “In fact” are deleted, so the sentence begins, “The inability
for an employee to pursue .…”
7. On page 4, on lines 3-4 of the second full paragraph, the
sentence ends after the words “had not been questioned until
2022.” The words “That was” are added to the beginning of the
next sentence so the sentence begins: “That was when the
United States Supreme Court ….”
8. On page 5, the first and second full paragraphs are
combined into one paragraph, and are changed to read:
Balderas contends the trial court erred by relying on Viking
River because it was wrong on state PAGA standing
requirements. In Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 1119, our
Supreme Court wrote, “Because ‘[t]he highest court of each State
. . . remains “the final arbiter of what is state law” ’ (Montana v.
Wyoming (2011) 563 U.S. 368, 378, fn. 5 [179 L.Ed.2d 799]), we
are not bound by the high court’s interpretation of California law.”
(Ibid., italics added.) “And although the high court’s
interpretations may serve as persuasive authority in cases
involving a parallel federal constitutional provision or statutory
scheme [citations], Viking River does not interpret any federal
provision or statute similar to PAGA.” (Ibid.) In her Viking
River concurrence, Justice Sotomayor wrote, “Of course, if this
Court’s understanding of state law is wrong, California courts, in
an appropriate case, will have the last word.” (Viking River
Cruises v. Moriana, supra, _ U.S. _ [213 L.Ed.2d 179, 201], italics
added.)
3.
9. On page 6, in the first line, the word “have” is changed to
“achieve” so the line reads: “to achieve standing to file a
representative PAGA suit was incorrect.”
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on March 20, 2024,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good
cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in the
Official Reports and it is so ordered.
There is no change in the judgment.
GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J. CODY, J.
4.