In re J.M. CA2/5 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/15/24 In re J.M. CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re J.M., et al., Persons Coming B329645
Under Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________ (Los Angeles County Super.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Ct. No. 23CCJP00562A-B)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy A. Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
J.M. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order exerting
jurisdiction over her son, its dispositional order removing her
daughter from her custody, and its finding of no reason to believe
that the daughter was an “Indian child” within the meaning of
the Indian Child and Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA). We decline to address the merits of mother’s challenge
to the juvenile court’s removal order and ICWA finding, which
are moot issues in light of the daughter’s return to mother’s care.1
We affirm the juvenile court’s order exerting jurisdiction over the
son.
FACTS PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother has two children at issue in this appeal—son (born
2008), and daughter (born 2012). Each has a different father.
Mother and daughter’s father (father) have been involved
in two prior dependency proceedings due to their domestic
violence, mother's alcohol abuse, and father's use of
methamphetamine. In each of those prior proceedings, daughter
was released to mother’s custody.
Son has lived with his father (nonoffending) at all relevant
times consistent with a custody order granting him sole physical
custody with visits for mother. Although a court had ordered
mother not to bring daughter’s father to mother’s visits with son,
mother disregarded that instruction, resulting in the requirement
that a professional monitor be present for visits. Mother has
called the police on multiple occasions to make false reports that
son was suicidal and home alone and that his father was not
feeding him. She has also called the police when son “did not
respond to her messages.” Mother sometimes sends son “long
1 We grant mother’s request for judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s minute order dated April 15, 2024.
2
messages speaking negatively about his father,” and he reported
participating in visits with mother because “he wants to avoid
issues with [her].”
In December 2022, mother struck daughter’s mouth. In the
past, mother has also struck daughter with sandals and belts,
pushed her to the ground, and caused bruises to her back.
Daughter reported that mother is “mean to her for no reason” and
“hits her often.”
In early January 2023, mother repeatedly punched father’s
face and hit him with a car, all in daughter’s presence (although
daughter did not see the car hit father).
On February 14, 2023, the Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the
juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over then 14-year-old son and
10-year-old daughter based on allegations that mother and father
have a history of engaging in domestic violence in daughter’s
presence and mother physically abused daughter, rendering
jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and, as to son, (j).
At the detention hearing on February 15, 2023, the juvenile
court ordered both children detained from mother and father,
with mother to have visits with each child three times per week.
Son remained where he had been, with his father. Daughter was
initially placed with son’s father, but was placed with paternal
aunt a few days later.
When the Department interviewed mother on March 9,
2023, mother expressed concern that the Department was only
asking about daughter, and not son—who mother claimed was
“struggling psychologically.” Mother reported that “she wanted
to keep [son] on the case because she wanted to reunify with him
3
since she was already going to complete court orders.” Mother
denied having a history of domestic violence with father, stating
they had never had any incidents. She also reported not knowing
why the Department was involved with her family. And she
denied ever hitting daughter, or hitting father’s face and striking
him with her car on January 3, 2023.
After the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on
April 13, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the allegations,2
removed daughter from both parents, ordered that son remain in
his father’s custody, and terminated jurisdiction over son upon
the juvenile court’s receipt of the juvenile custody order (filed
April 18, 2023). The court ordered monitored visits for mother
and father with daughter, and monitored visits with son for
mother, to be monitored by a professional monitor at mother’s
expense. The court also ordered reunification services for
mother, including domestic violence for perpetrators and
parenting classes.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in exerting
jurisdiction over son, in removing daughter from her custody, and
in finding no reason to believe that ICWA applied to daughter.
We decline to consider the latter two issues, which are moot in
view of daughter’s return to mother’s care.
Mother’s jurisdictional challenge also appears to be moot
given that the court terminated jurisdiction over son almost as
soon as it found such jurisdiction, and mother has not pointed to
any legal or practical consequences that are capable of redress.
2 The juvenile court sustained some of the allegations as
amended, but those amendments are not pertinent here.
4
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277.) We nonetheless exercise
our discretion to reach the merits of mother’s challenge,
particularly given that the Department did not raise mootness in
its respondent’s brief. (Id. at p. 282.) We review a juvenile
court’s finding of dependency jurisdiction for substantial
evidence, asking whether the record—when viewed as a whole
and drawing all inferences in support of the court’s finding—
contains “ ‘ “sufficient facts to support [that] finding.” ’ ” (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in exerting
jurisdiction over son because son “was unaware of the
circumstances of this case,” lived with his father, and was neither
physically abused nor exposed to domestic violence. Under
subdivision (j) of section 300,3 the juvenile court may exercise
jurisdiction over a child if: “The child’s sibling has been abused
or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and
there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or
neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall
consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of
the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the
abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent
or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative
in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.”
(§ 300, subd, (j).) Subdivision (j) of section 300 “ ‘does not state
that its application is limited to the risk that the child will be
abused or neglected as defined in the same subdivision that
describes the abuse or neglect of the sibling.’ ” (In re I.J., supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 774.) Thus, subdivision (j) may be sustained if
3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
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the sibling of an abused child is at risk of abuse or neglect as set
forth in subdivision (i), which provides: “The child has been
subjected to an act or acts of cruelty by the parent . . . .” (§ 300,
subd. (i).)
Mother does not challenge any of the jurisdictional findings
as they concern daughter, including its finding that mother and
father’s history of domestic violence and mother’s physical abuse
of daughter “endanger[] [daughter’s] physical health and safety.”
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over son. The record shows a certain unpredictability
in mother’s behavior—she hit father with her car because she
was upset at him for “parking in the wrong spot.” Daughter
reported that mother was “mean to her for no reason” and “hits
her randomly.” Daughter also explained that on one occasion
when she “was joking around with mother,” mother “became
upset and . . . slapped her on the mouth.” What is more, mother
has refused to recognize her problematic behavior. She has
denied ever hitting father or daughter, stated she does not know
why the Department is involved with her family, and explained
that she “does not need to participate in any services because she
and . . . father get along well.” (See In re A.F. (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [denial is a relevant factor for
determining whether a person is likely to modify behavior
without court supervision].)
Although son has resided with his father at all relevant
times, suggesting that son is not necessarily in grave danger of
physical harm, jurisdiction under section 300 subdivision (j) is
appropriate if son is at risk of being subjected to “acts of cruelty”
by his mother within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (i).
(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774 [subdivision (j) does not
6
confine risk that the child will be abused or neglected to the same
subdivision that describes the abuse or neglect of the sibling].)
The Legislature did not define “acts of cruelty” “due to the myriad
forms such conduct may take.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520,
548.)
On multiple occasions, mother has called the police to make
false reports about son’s wellbeing. As recently as October 2022,
mother called the police to falsely report that son was suicidal
and home alone. Mother sometimes sends son long and
“inappropriate” text messages speaking negatively about son’s
father. Mother’s unpredictability, her physical abuse of daughter
and violence against father, and her harmful behavior of making
false police reports concerning son and sending him inappropriate
texts, together comprise a substantial basis for finding that son is
at risk of being subjected to "an act of cruelty” by mother. (See In
re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1015 [finding act of cruelty
does not require proof that parent intended harm].)
Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over son under subdivision (j) of section
300, we decline to address whether the evidence also supports
jurisdiction under subdivisions (a) and (b). (In re Alexis E. (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 438, 45 [we may affirm the juvenile court’s
exertion of jurisdiction if substantial evidence supports any one of
the statutory bases alleged in the petition].)4
4 It is also worth noting that mother told the Department on
March 9, 2023, that she was worried about son because he was
“struggling psychologically,” and that “she wanted to keep [him]
in the case because she wanted to reunify with him since she was
already going to complete court orders.”
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order exerting jurisdiction
over son.
LEE, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KIM, J.

Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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