People v. Carter CA2/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/13/24 P. v. Carter CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, No. B327576
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A563462)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
DAVID NICHOLAS CARTER, AND DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant.
[No change in judgment]
The Court:
Appellant’s petition for rehearing, filed May 2, 2024, is
hereby denied.
It is further ordered that the opinion filed herein on April
18, 2024, is modified as follows:
On page 7, a footnote is inserted with the following
language:
Although Carter’s opening brief additionally asserted
section 3051 violated his right to equal protection by excluding
young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP from eligibility while
including juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP, he failed to
develop this argument or distinguish the cases that have
previously rejected it; he also did not mention it in his
supplemental brief. However, to the extent Carter continues to
assert he has an equal protection claim based on section 3051
treating young adults and juveniles with LWOP sentences
differently, we reject the claim. We agree with the courts that
have determined there is a rational basis to treat these two
groups differently in the context of section 3051, subdivision (h).
(See, e.g., People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1079,
review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193, 204 [“The Legislature had a rational basis to
distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life
without parole) based on their age”].)
All subsequent footnotes are renumbered accordingly.
There is no change in judgment.
EDMON, P. J. EGERTON, J. ADAMS, J.
2
Filed 4/18/24 P. v. Carter CA2/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B327576
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A563462)
v.
DAVID NICHOLAS CARTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jared Moses, Judge. Affirmed.
William Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott Taryle and Marc Kohm,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant David Nicholas Carter appeals
from an order denying his motion for a Franklin/Cook1 hearing
under Penal Code section 1203.01.2 Carter is serving a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole for offenses he committed
when he was 20 years old. Carter argues a provision of the youth
offender parole statute, section 3051, subdivision (h), violates the
guarantees of equal protection under the United States and
California Constitutions by excluding from parole consideration
individuals sentenced to life without parole for offenses they
committed between the ages of 18 and 25. Although Carter relied
on People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, in his appellate
briefing, while this appeal was pending, the California Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case and held
the section 3051, subdivision (h) exclusion does not violate equal
protection guarantees. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834(Hardin).) Hardin now forecloses Carter’s equal protection
argument. However, Carter also contends the section 3051,
subdivision (h) exclusion causes his sentence to violate the
California Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual
punishment. We disagree and affirm the trial court order.
1 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin); In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook).
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
In 1982, Carter broke into a neighbor’s home and sexually
assaulted, tortured, and killed her. Carter was 20 years old. A
jury convicted Carter of first degree murder (§ 187) and found
true the special circumstances that the murder occurred during
the commission of a burglary and attempted sodomy (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)), and was committed intentionally and with the
infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)).4 The trial court
imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP). Carter appealed. A panel of this court affirmed the
judgment in an unpublished opinion in 1986.
In 2022, Carter filed a post-judgment motion for a
Franklin/Cook proceeding. The trial court denied Carter’s
motion. The court found Carter previously filed an identical
motion, which was denied, and he was ineligible for relief due to
his conviction for murder with special circumstances and his
multiple sex-related offenses. Carter timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Carter argues the trial court erred in finding him ineligible
for a youth offender parole hearing under Franklin/Cook. In
3 We previously granted Carter’s request for judicial notice of
portions of our earlier nonpublished opinion, People v. Carter
(Sept. 19, 1986, B008850). We derive the factual background
from that prior opinion.
4 The jury also convicted Carter of other offenses: attempted
sodomy (§§ 664, 286 subd. (c)); penetration of genital or anal
openings by a foreign object (§ 289); and first degree burglary
(§ 459). The jury further found true allegations that Carter was
armed with and used a deadly weapon. (§§ 12022.3, 12022,
subd. (b).)
3
Franklin, the court held that an offender who will later become
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing is entitled to a
hearing to develop and preserve evidence of youth-related
mitigating evidence. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283–
284.) In Cook, the court held that an offender whose sentence is
final may obtain a Franklin hearing by filing a post-judgment
motion. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458–459.) Section 3051
governs eligibility for the hearing. Section 3051, subdivision (h)
excludes individuals “sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed
after the person attained 18 years of age.”
Carter acknowledges this statutory language excludes him.
However, he contends the denial of youth offender parole
hearings to persons sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed
between the ages of 18 and 25 is unconstitutional.5
I. Section 3051, Subdivision (h), Does Not Violate
Carter’s Constitutional Right to Equal Protection
Carter first contends the section 3051, subdivision (h)
LWOP exclusion, as applied to offenders whose crimes were
committed between the ages of 18 and 25, violates the equal
protection guarantees of the United States and California
Constitutions. The California Supreme Court has rejected this
argument.
5 Carter also asserts that the trial court erred in concluding
he was ineligible for a Franklin/Cook hearing based on his
convictions for sex-related crimes. The People agree but argue
Carter is nonetheless ineligible for relief under section 3051,
subdivision (h). As we conclude the trial court correctly found
Carter ineligible for relief under section 3051, subdivision (h), we
need not address his alternate argument.
4
In Hardin, our Supreme Court resolved a division among
the Courts of Appeal as to whether section 3051, subdivision (h),
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee
by irrationally discriminating against young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP for special circumstance murder. (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) In Hardin, as in this case, the
appellant (Hardin) was serving an LWOP sentence for a special
circumstance murder he committed between the ages of 18 and
25.6 (Ibid.) Hardin filed a motion to develop and preserve
evidence for later use in a youth offender parole hearing under
section 3051. (Id. at p. 840.) Hardin argued the section 3051,
subdivision (h) LWOP exclusion violates equal protection
principles. (Ibid.) The trial court rejected the argument, but the
Court of Appeal reversed. (Ibid.)
Our high court concluded the section 3051, subdivision (h)
LWOP exclusion of offenders whose crimes were committed after
the age of 18 is not irrational or constitutionally invalid.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 863–864.) The court reasoned
the statute reflects the Legislature’s permissible balancing of
“multiple considerations, including both concerns about
increasing opportunities for release for young adults able to show
growth and maturity and concerns about calibrating the level of
punishment appropriate for certain serious criminal offenses.”
(Id. at p. 857.) The court further rejected Hardin’s argument that
“the Legislature could not rationally conclude that a conviction
for special circumstance murder is a reliable indication of the
seriousness of an offense or the culpability of the offender, such
6 Hardin was 25 and Carter was 20. Because Carter’s
argument applies to offenders over 18 years of age but under 26,
we do not find this difference material.
5
that it could rationally decide to exclude the offender from
receiving the youth offender parole consideration to which other
young adults are statutorily entitled.” (Id. at p. 859.)
The court referenced the many decisions holding that
special circumstance murder is “sufficiently serious and morally
culpable as to justify imposing the most severe sanctions
available under the law, up to and including death,” and
determined it could not say “that the decision to deny a parole
hearing to an offender convicted of special circumstance murder
is irrational, even if it is possible that in certain cases some might
consider an individual offender convicted of multiple violent
crimes more culpable, in a holistic sense, than an individual
convicted of special circumstance murder.” (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at pp. 859, 863.) The court thus concluded Hardin did
not demonstrate “that Penal Code section 3051’s exclusion of
young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole is
constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either on
its face or as applied to Hardin and other individuals who are
serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance
murder.” (Id. at p. 839.)7
The court decided Hardin while this appeal was pending.
We invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing to address
the decision’s applicability to this case. (Gov. Code, § 68081.)
The People contend Hardin forecloses Carter’s equal protection
7 Although Hardin considered an equal protection claim
under the United States Constitution and Carter’s claim invokes
the state and federal constitutions, our Supreme Court saw “ ‘ “no
reason to suppose” that federal equal protection analysis would
yield a result different from what would emerge from analysis of
the state Constitution.’ [Citation.]” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 847, fn. 2.)
6
claim. Carter recognizes that Hardin “appears to foreclose relief
for appellant in this appeal with respect to his equal protection
violation claim . . . .” However, he does not concede the issue in
order to preserve any right to relief he may have in federal court
and because, at the time of his supplemental brief, the decision in
Hardin was not yet final. The decision is now final.
Hardin is binding authority we must follow. (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) We
therefore must reject Carter’s equal protection argument.
II. Section 3051, Subdivision (h), Does Not Subject
Carter to Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Carter next contends the Legislature’s denial of youth
offender parole hearings to offenders who committed their crimes
between the ages of 18 and 25, and are sentenced to LWOP,
renders his sentence cruel or unusual punishment under the
California Constitution. He acknowledges the LWOP sentence
was constitutionally valid at the time it was imposed. However,
his argument is based on the Legislature’s amendments to
section 3051, which Hardin summarized as follows: “When it
was first enacted in 2013, the statute applied only to individuals
who committed their crimes before the age of 18; the purpose of
the statute was to align California law with then-recent court
decisions identifying Eighth Amendment limitations on life
without parole sentences for juvenile offenders. In more recent
years, however, the Legislature has expanded the statute to
include certain young adult offenders as well. Under the current
version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a crime
committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole
hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration.
(Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b).) But not all youthful offenders are
7
eligible for parole hearings. The statute excludes . . . offenders
who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility
of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18. (Id.,
subd. (h).)” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 838–839.)
Carter asserts that since the Legislature has extended the
possibility of parole to certain offenders who were under 26 when
they committed their offenses, it has determined that youthful
offenders under the age of 26 are less culpable than those who
commit offenses after the age of 26. He therefore argues that
while his LWOP sentence might not meet the test for
disproportionate punishment standing alone (In re Lynch (1972)
8 Cal.3d 410, 424), the sentence has been rendered grossly
disproportionate by the Legislature’s “recognition of the possible
potential reduced culpability of offenders who commit their
offenses in question before they become 26 years old and the . . .
new provisions for giving some such offenders youth offender
parole hearings at some point.”8
We disagree. California courts have uniformly rejected the
argument that the imposition of LWOP sentences on young
adults violates state and federal protections against cruel and/or
8 Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution prohibits
“cruel or unusual punishment.” Carter does not assert an
argument under the United States Constitution. However,
“[t]here is considerable overlap in the state and federal
approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently, both
standards prohibit punishment that is “grossly disproportionate”
to the crime or the individual culpability of the defendant.’
[Citation.] ‘The touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733; see
also People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 938.)
8
unusual punishment for the same reasons such sentences are
cruel or unusual when applied to juvenile offenders. Carter
acknowledges one such case, People v. Argeta (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 1478 (Argeta). As he notes, in Argeta, a defendant
who was 18 years old when he committed his offenses argued his
sentence was the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence.
The defendant contended that, given his youth, the United States
and California Supreme courts’ findings that such sentences are
cruel and unusual when applied to juvenile offenders applied
equally to him. The Argeta court rejected the argument, citing
the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning that “while
‘[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject . . . to the
objections always raised against categorical rules . . . [, it] is the
point where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood.’ (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S.
551, 574; [Citation.].)” (Id. at p. 1482.) The Argeta court further
noted “a line must be drawn at some point. We respect the line
our society has drawn and which the United States Supreme
Court has relied on for sentencing purposes, and conclude
Argeta’s sentence is not cruel and/or unusual under Graham,
Miller, or Caballero.”9 (Argeta, at p. 1482.)
Carter attempts to distinguish Argeta on the ground that it
was decided before the Legislature enacted section 3051, thus
redrawing the “line referred to in Argeta . . . at 26 years of age,
with respect to mental maturity . . . .” This argument is
unavailing. The Legislature’s decision to extend parole
consideration hearings to certain young adult offenders is not an
indication that the underlying sentences those offenders face
9 Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48; Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262.
9
constitute cruel or unusual punishment in the absence of a parole
hearing, or that they are otherwise constitutionally invalid.
Further, even after section 3051 was enacted and subsequently
amended, numerous California courts have concluded LWOP
sentences, or their functional equivalent, are not cruel or unusual
punishment when imposed on young adult offenders. (E.g.,
People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 781–782 [rejecting
cruel and unusual punishment challenge to LWOP sentence as
applied to 21-year-old with autism spectrum disorder]; People v.
Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1031–1032 [rejecting
cruel and unusual punishment challenge to LWOP sentence as
applied to 18-year-old and trial court’s failure to consider his
youth]; People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1220–
1221 [rejecting cruel and unusual punishment challenge to
LWOP sentence as applied to 18-year-old]; see also People v.
Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 190–192 [the functional
equivalent of LWOP sentence is not cruel and unusual
punishment for 19-year-old]; People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
612, 617–618 [the functional equivalent of LWOP sentence is not
cruel and unusual punishment for 20-year-old].)
Indeed, we agree with the court in In re Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 427, 437–439 (Williams), which rejected an
argument similar to the one Carter makes here. In addressing
the appellant’s argument that an LWOP sentence imposed on any
21-year-old defendant constitutes cruel or unusual punishment,
the Williams court observed “our Supreme Court has essentially
rejected that very argument in the context of the death penalty.
In People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429 [ ], the court
acknowledged research that youths ages 18 to 21 share many of
the same cognitive and developmental deficiencies as adolescents
10
under age 18. Quoting from the court’s earlier opinion in People
v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 192 [ ], the court nonetheless held
that 18 is ‘ “the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to
rest.” ’ If the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of
death for 21 year olds, then most assuredly, it does not prohibit
the lesser LWOP sentence.” (Williams, at p. 439; see also People
v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234–1235 [imposing the death
penalty on 20-year-old does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment even considering scientific research and expansion of
section 3051].)
Accordingly, we reject Carter’s argument that the
section 3051, subdivision (h) LWOP exclusion renders his
sentence cruel or usual punishment in violation of the California
Constitution.
11
DISPOSITION
The order denying Carter’s motion for a Franklin/Cook
proceeding is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
12