People v. Group IX BP Properties CA2/4 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Group IX BP Properties CA2/4
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE ex rel., B322878
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV05624)
GROUP IX BP PROPERTIES,
LP, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with directions.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy,
Chief, Public Rights Branch, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Supervising
Deputy City Attorney, Rahi Azizi and Jonathan H. Eisenman,
Deputy City Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Larson, Stephen G. Larson, Jerry A. Behnke, Daniel R.
Lahana, and Ranja F. Rasul for Defendants and Appellants.
INTRODUCTION
In this nuisance abatement action, the People of the State
of California, acting by and through the City of Los Angeles (the
People), allege a gang-related public nuisance exists at a 116-unit
apartment complex in North Hollywood, commonly known as the
Vanowen Apartments. Defendants and appellants Group IX BP
Properties, LP, Group IX BP Properties, Inc., Regency
Management, Inc., PAMA Management, Inc., and Golden
Management Services Inc. (collectively, defendants) own and
manage the property.1
The People sought a preliminary injunction pending trial,
requesting the court mandate defendants immediately implement
several safety measures including, among others: ensuring the
property’s access gates can only be opened electronically with a
system that tracks and records each time a tenant comes and
goes from the property; replacing the property’s camera
surveillance system; removing graffiti within 48 hours of its
appearance; and hiring four armed private security guards to
patrol the property 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The trial
court granted the motion in part, and defendants appealed.
On appeal, defendants contend the trial court abused its
discretion by: (1) failing to address the element of duty—an
essential element for a public nuisance cause of action based on a
failure to act; (2) misapplying the causation element of a cause of
action for public nuisance; and (3) failing to acknowledge the
1 The People also sued two individuals, Swaranjit S. Nijjar
and Daljit K. Kler, who allegedly own and operate the property
through the corporate entities. The trial court denied the People’s
request for a preliminary injunction against the individuals. They
are, therefore, not parties to this appeal.
2
irreparable harm defendants would suffer from a preliminary
injunction. For the reasons discussed below, we reject these
contentions and affirm.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The property is a large apartment complex located at
13100-13211 Vanowen Street in North Hollywood, consisting of
12 two-story buildings surrounding several common courtyards.
It has a rear parking lot that runs along the entire south side of
the complex and abuts a public alley (the alley). Numerous
families, including more than 100 children, live at the complex.
Gang-related crime has been an issue in North Hollywood
for decades – going back even to the late 80’s. The property is
located within the territory that two rival gangs, the North
Hollywood Locos (Locos) and MS-13, fight over. This “turf-war”
has resulted in shootings, assaults with deadly weapons, and
vandalism at the property.
In an attempt to reduce the gang-related activity at and
around the property, representatives of the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) and the City Attorney’s Office met with
defendants or their representatives on four occasions in 2009,
2010, 2018, and 2019.3 Law enforcement provided defendants
2 After the close of briefing in this appeal, defendants sought
to raise an additional issue: whether the preliminary injunction
must be modified in light of Government Code section 53165.1,
which first became effective January 1, 2024. We decline to
resolve this issue, which was never presented to the trial court.
3 In 2017, the People filed a nuisance abatement action
against Nijjar and other entities based on their alleged
mismanagement and neglect of another large apartment complex
3
with a list of suggested improvements to the property to deter
crime, including installing fencing around the perimeter of the
property, hiring a security guard (24 hours a day/7 days a week),
installing and maintaining high intensity lighting in the common
areas, and installing additional gates with locks. Defendants
implemented only a fraction of the suggestions. Following
another outbreak of violence at the property in 2021, LAPD
determined that another meeting would be pointless.
In February 2022, the People filed a complaint alleging
defendants have owned, operated, and managed the property in a
manner that creates a public nuisance (Civ. Code, § 3479 et seq.)
and violates the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17200 et seq.) (UCL). The complaint alleges the “public
nuisance consists of, but is not limited to, the regular, menacing,
intimidating, violent, and disorderly presence of resident and
non-resident gang members and/or associates at the [p]roperty;
the occurrence of gunfire on the [p]roperty, including gunfire that
has resulted in injury and death to persons and damage to
property on and around the [p]roperty; the occurrence of
robberies and other crimes that take place on or emanate from
the [p]roperty; the occurrence of gang members and/or associates
setting off fireworks, playing loud music, double parking, and
blocking driveways at the [p]roperty; and the tendency of the
[p]roperty to attract gunfire from rival gangs because of the
known as the Chesapeake Apartments. (See People ex rel. v.
Pama V Properties, LP, et al. (Super. Ct., Central District, L.A.
County, No. BC683661.) The trial court in that case issued a
preliminary injunction against Nijjar and associated entities in
March 2018, around the same time as one of the meetings
between LAPD and defendants regarding the Vanowen
Apartments.
4
historical and current presence of gang members at the
[p]roperty.” As remedies for defendants’ alleged mismanagement
of the property, the People sought abatement of the alleged public
nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.
In April 2022, the People moved for a preliminary
injunction supported by declarations of several LAPD officers, a
property management expert, and two community members,
along with over 100 police reports of incidents on the property or
in the area.4
For example, the People submitted the declaration of
Baudelia Salas, an officer assigned to the North Hollywood
Division’s Gang Enforcement Detail. He opined that the Vanowen
Apartments are “the worst property in all of North Hollywood
Division when it comes to shootings and gang-related crime.” He
explained: “The main attraction for Locos gang members is the
[p]roperty itself: a private property with owners who have
allowed the Locos to use the [p]roperty as they please. They have
ample parking, multiple escape routes through unlocked
pedestrian gates, friendly apartment units to hide themselves
and their contraband, and plenty of surfaces to cover with gang
graffiti that is slow to be removed, except when crossed out by
rival gang members. They can also do all this in relative privacy,
because the [p]roperty has poor lighting and very few
surveillance cameras that they easily disable. Although the
activities of the Locos extend off the [p]roperty and into the alley,
sidewalks, streets, intersections and, neighboring properties, the
4 The People filed two virtually identical motions: one
against the defendants named in the original complaint, and a
second motion after the People amended their complaint to insert
the true name of Doe 1.
5
source of nearly all of it is the Vanowen Apartments themselves.
The gang members wouldn’t be gathering in such large numbers
in this area to begin with if they weren’t using the Vanowen
Apartments as their home base.”
Timothy Kirkpatrick, a gang detective in the North
Hollywood Division, opined that based on his 26 years of
experience in the LAPD (including 20 years in the North
Hollywood Division), most gangs seek out certain properties and
locations to use as “‘strongholds’ to perpetuate the gang’s
unlawful activities.” He explained that “[o]ften times, gang
strongholds are unsecured apartment buildings with easy access
and inadequate management or security. These tend to be
locations that are neglected by ownership and management for
years – where there are no locks or gates, where there is poor
lighting, and where graffiti is not promptly removed – allowing
the gang to [take over] and entrench themselves at the property.”
According to Kilpatrick, the property is “the single most
dangerous location in North Hollywood because of the rampant
gang activity that ownership and management have allowed to
occur there through years of neglect and mismanagement.”
Similarly, Carol Sawamura, a senior lead officer in the
North Hollywood Division since April 2007, opined the Vanowen
Apartments have been “a known North Hollywood Locos gang-
controlled location for many years,” and remain “the worst gang-
controlled property” in her basic care area. According to
Sawamura, because “[t]here is no other property in the entire
division generating anywhere near the same consistently high
level of gang-related shootings and other violent crimes[,]” “LAPD
has been devoting enormous resources to crime suppression
efforts at the [p]roperty.” Thus, “the nuisance criminal activity at
6
the [p]roperty has required LAPD to divert resources to the
[p]roperty, disproportionately, and away from other areas where
they are needed.”
With respect to private security at the property, Sawamura
explained defendants “occasionally” provide private security
through a company run by Mark Underwood. But Underwood
also provides security for defendants at different properties and
does not often visit the Vanowen Apartments. Several years ago,
defendants hired onsite security following an outbreak of
violence, but the guards only remained at the property for
approximately two weeks. Underwood relayed to Sawamura that
defendants could not continue stationing the guards there
because they were assigned to other properties and it was not
cost effective for them to remain at the Vanowen Apartments.
Underwood has expressed concerns that conditions at the
“[p]roperty [are] so bad that someone innocent would be killed
any day now.” In Sawamura’s opinion, the “level of security that
the [p]roperty owners have employed to date is woefully
inadequate to protect public safety at the [p]roperty.”
Regarding physical issues at the property, Sawamura
opined that the “open and unlocked pedestrian gates provide free
access to the [p]roperty to gang members; the outdated and
frequently vandalized security camera system does not
meaningfully prevent or deter crime at the [p]roperty; [and] the
[p]roperty’s lighting is inadequate[.]” It is Sawamura’s
impression that defendants have completely neglected the
property by simply leaving it in the “hands of an overwhelmed
resident manager who is isolated and completely unequipped to
resist the gang’s control of the [p]roperty.”
7
In opposition to the People’s motion, defendants principally
argued the “freely-accessible public alley behind the [p]roperty”
owned by the city – as opposed to the property itself – is “the real
problem” and source of the nuisance. Thus, according to
defendants, the People are unlikely to prevail at trial because
they cannot prove defendants created or assisted in the creation
of the purported nuisance, as required to prevail on a nuisance
claim. They also argued the LAPD crime statistics establish
violent crimes occur throughout North Hollywood and do not
occur more frequently at the property or the surrounding areas.
Defendants further noted they have made several property
improvements, including a new surveillance system, perimeter
lighting, and electronic key locks for the entry gates that may be
opened with a key fob issued only to tenants.
Defendants submitted several declarations in support of
their opposition. For example, Douglas Kane, a security
consultant, opined “one of the most profound impacts in lowering
crime in the area would be for the City to allow the property
owners to assume control of the alley” so that defendants could
“install electronic gates at both the west and east side of the
alley, limiting access to residents only[.]” Noemi Oregon, the
property manager, similarly declared that “[i]n [her] personal
experience, it is the [a]lley, and not the [p]roperty, that is the
center of gang activity in the area. Because the [a]lley is City
property, Management lacks the authority to patrol or tow cars
parked in the [a]lley. Gun violence in the area generally
originates off of the [p]roperty, often the [a]lley.”
Defendants also submitted declarations from 90 “Doe”
tenants at the property. Many of the declarations blame the alley
for the gang violence, not the property. For example, one tenant
8
states “[t]he gang members come from outside this property and
gather in the alley.” Another tenant states “I feel safe in this
property but not so much in the alley.”
After a hearing on the motion on July 7, 2022, the trial
court granted the People’s motion in part. It acknowledged the
existence of a “factual dispute over whether the gang presence on
the [p]roperty is caused by the conditions of the [p]roperty itself
or the availability of the abutting alley[,]” but found the People
“presented sufficient evidence concerning the conditions of the
Property as a substantial factor causing and facilitating the
ongoing presence of [Locos] members and the creation of the
nuisance and has established a reasonable probability of
prevailing on the [public nuisance] claim.” The court further
found defendants have “not established that issuing the
preliminary injunction will cause irreparable harm” and “that the
nuisance caused by gang presence at the [p]roperty is sufficiently
severe to warrant immediate mitigating efforts.” Based on these
findings, the court ordered defendants to implement several
security measures, including but not limited to, the following:
“[t]he [p]roperty must be properly closed off to the public”; gates
must operate through “some type of electronically controllable
and trackable system such as a keypad that can store
information about the person accessing the [p]roperty”; there
must be “proper lighting of all public areas, including the parking
lot, courtyards, and laundry room”; the property must have a
“proper, operating web-based video camera monitoring system
with a high-resolution, internet-connected, remotely viewable
video monitoring system that allows management to monitor the
[p]roperty and remove trespassing gang members”; defendants
“must assign parking spaces to tenants and issue serialized
9
hangtags”; defendants must employ private security with an
active license and “[a]t least four trained security officers must be
present at the [p]roperty seven days a week during the hours of
darkness throughout the year”; and a resident property manager
must be on duty and on the property during all regular business
hours.”5 The trial court further ordered counsel to meet and
confer to reach an acceptable form for the preliminary injunction
based on the court’s ruling.
Following the parties’ submission of proposed orders, the
court entered the preliminary injunction on August 12, 2022.
Defendants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
“[W]hether a preliminary injunction should be granted
involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the
plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of
harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of
interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528,
554.)
“Although preliminary injunctions are generally designed
to ‘“preserve the status quo pending a determination on the
5 Defendants note they implemented many of these security
measures before the trial court ruled on the People’s motion,
including but not limited to installing an electronic key fob
system, an upgraded video surveillance system, and enhanced
exterior lighting. Defendants did not, however, hire additional
security guards or an additional onsite manager based in part on
their argument that they would suffer irreparable harm given the
substantial cost of implementing those measures.
10
merits of the action”’ [citation], they are not so limited.”
(Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 1178, 1883-1184.) “A court also has the power to
issue a preliminary injunction that ‘“‘mandates an affirmative act
that changes the status quo’”’ [citation], but should do so only in
those ‘“‘extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly
established’”’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 1184.) “We ordinarily review a
trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of
discretion [citation], but ‘“‘more closely’”’ ‘scrutinize’ injunctions
that ‘“‘change[ ] the status quo’”’ [citation].” (Ibid.) Thus,
“[a]lthough a preliminary mandatory injunction is subject to
stricter review on appeal, [citation], ‘[t]he principles upon which
mandatory and prohibitory injunctions are granted do not
materially differ. The courts are perhaps more reluctant to
interpose the mandatory writ, but in a proper case it is never
denied’ [citation].” (Ryland Mews Homeowners Assn. v. Munoz
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 705, 712, fn. 4.)
“In assessing the trial court’s factual findings underlying a
preliminary injunction, we apply the substantial evidence
standard and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
court’s ruling.” (Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet
Labs, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p.1184.)
2. Governing Statutory Authority
A nuisance is defined, in relevant part, as “[a]nything
which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the
illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . .”
(Civ. Code, § 3479.) “A public nuisance is one which affects at the
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any
11
considerable number of persons . . . .” (Id., § 3480.) “Civil Code
section 3491 provides that the ‘remedies against a public
nuisance’ include ‘[a]batement.’” (People v. Padilla-Martel (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 139, 151.) “‘“‘An abatement of a nuisance is
accomplished in a court of equity by means of an injunction
proper and suitable to the facts of each case.’”’” (Ibid.)
The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice . . . .” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) The
UCL provides that “[a]ny person who engages . . . in unfair
competition may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction.” (Id., § 17203.) Thus, an injunction is an appropriate
remedy under both the public nuisance law and the UCL.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
Issuing a Preliminary Injunction
A. Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits
“The elements ‘of a cause of action for public nuisance
include the existence of a duty and causation.’” (Melton v.
Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542; see also Citizens for
Odor Nuisance Abatement v. City of San Diego (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 350, 359, fn. 9 (Citizens) [duty is an element of a
public nuisance claim when the plaintiff’s nuisance theory rests
on the defendant’s failure to act].) Defendants contend the trial
court abused its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction
without finding the People would likely prove these two essential
elements at trial. For the reasons discussed below, we are
unpersuaded.
12
1. Duty
Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion when
it found the People had a reasonable probability of success on the
merits “without even addressing the element of duty.”
Preliminarily, we note the trial court is not required to explain its
reasoning when it issues a preliminary injunction. (See Metro
Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 853, 858 [“The hearing on a preliminary injunction is
not the equivalent of a trial, and the court is not obligated to set
forth its reasoning. [Citation] The trial court’s [ ] order is entitled
to a presumption that it is correct, and any error must be
affirmatively shown”].)
In any event, although the trial court did not analyze
“duty” under a separate heading in its order (nor did defendants
in their opposition papers below), it did recognize the element of
causation may consist of “either an act or a failure to act under
circumstances in which the actor is under a duty to take positive
action to prevent or abate the interference.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court further found: (1) defendants own and operate the
property; (2) law enforcement officials notified defendants of the
unchecked gang activity related to the property and had meetings
with defendants regarding the issue in 2009, 2010, 2018, and
2019; and (3) law enforcement made abatement suggestions to
defendants, which defendants failed to meaningfully implement.
These findings are sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of
proving, at trial, that defendants have a duty to abate the alleged
nuisance on their property. (See Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide
(2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1553 [a landlord has an
“indisputable duty to take reasonable steps to maintain its
premises in a reasonably safe condition”]; see also Benetatos v.
13
City of Los Angeles (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1282 [“A
property owner who fails to take reasonable actions to prevent
criminal activity on the owner’s property may be subject to
nuisance liability if that criminal activity harms the surrounding
community”].)
Defendants nevertheless argue they do not owe a duty to
prevent crime off of the property, including in the alley. In
making this argument, defendants attempt to distort – or
perhaps, misapprehend – the People’s allegations and the trial
court’s preliminary injunction. The People sought a preliminary
injunction to abate an alleged nuisance on defendants’ property
(i.e., disorderly presence of resident and non-resident gang
members at the property –in the courtyards and parking lot –due
to defendants’ alleged mismanagement of the property), which
allegedly causes violence at and around the property. The trial
court granted the motion and ordered defendants to implement
safety measures with respect to their property based on its
finding that the conditions of the property itself were a
substantial factor causing the “ongoing presence of [gang]
members and the creation of the nuisance . . . .” That finding
distinguishes this case from the sole case defendants rely upon in
arguing they have no duty to prevent crime in the area. (See
Medina v. Hillshore Partners (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 477, 480-481
(Medina).)
In Medina, the decedent’s mother sued the owner of an
apartment complex that was a known gang hangout after gang
members encountered the decedent near the apartments, chased
him, and fatally shot him on a dead-end street. (Medina, supra,40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 479-480.) The appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant after it sustained
14
defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend. (Ibid.) The Medina
court concluded a landowner does not owe a duty “to protect
members of the public from gang members who congregate
around an apartment complex and assault individuals on
adjacent public streets.” (Id. at p. 481.) But the plaintiff in
Medina did not seek to abate a nuisance on the defendant’s
property, but rather sought to recover damages from the
apartment owner stemming from her son’s murder that occurred
exclusively on other property. (Id. at p. 482.) Thus, Medina
stands for the proposition that “‘premises liability is limited to
the premises.’” (Ibid.) That holding has no application here,
where the People seek to abate a gang nuisance they allege exists
on defendants’ property.
We acknowledge defendants claim the criminal activity
cited by the People “overwhelmingly occurs off the [p]roperty.”
But again, this argument misses the point. Even assuming a
large proportion of the criminal activity occurs off the property,
defendants have a duty to maintain their property to prevent
foreseeable crime that harms the surrounding community. (See
Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p.
1282; see also Barnes v. Black (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1478
[“A landowner's duty of care to avoid exposing others to a risk of
injury is not limited to injuries that occur on premises owned or
controlled by the landowner. Rather, the duty of care
encompasses a duty to avoid exposing persons to risks of injury
that occur off site if the landowner's property is maintained in
such a manner as to expose persons to an unreasonable risk of
injury offsite”].)
Defendants alternatively contend that even if they had a
duty to protect individuals from gang activity, the duty was met
15
by the numerous safety and security measures implemented at
the property. It is undisputed, however, that defendants
implemented additional security measures (including upgrading
the exterior lighting and video surveillance system, and installing
electronic locks accessible via a key fob on the pedestrian gates)
after the People moved for injunctive relief. Post-filing remedial
steps do not deprive courts of their injunctive powers. (See, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121,
133 [a defendant “‘that takes curative actions only after it has
been sued fails to provide sufficient assurances that it will not
repeat the violation to justify denying an injunction’”]; see also
People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior Court (Cahuenga’s The Spot)
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1385 [“While voluntary cessation of
conduct may be a factor in a court’s exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction to issue an injunction, it is not determinative; the
trial court must also decide if an injunction affecting future
conduct should be a part of the relief it grants”].) Thus, even
assuming defendants took some remedial action after the People
filed their complaint (the People dispute the extent of the
measures taken), the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering defendants to implement safety measures, some of
which may have already been taken.
In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s implied finding that the People will likely establish the
element of duty at trial. We therefore turn to the element of
causation.
2. Causation
To establish causation, a plaintiff must show “a ‘connecting
element’ or a ‘causative link’ between the defendant’s conduct
and the threatened harm.” (Citizens, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p.
16
359.) ““Public nuisance liability ‘does not hinge on whether the
defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor on
whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance; the critical
question is whether the defendant created or assisted in the
creation of the nuisance.”’” (Ibid., original italics, quoting Melton
v. Boustred, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 542.) “A plaintiff must
show the defendant’s conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in causing
the alleged harm.” (Citizens, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 359.)
Defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion by
misapplying the law relating to the element of causation. They
rely on Low v. City of Sacramento (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 826, 833
(Low) for the proposition that absent an affirmative act by
defendants, some evidence of ownership or control is necessary to
hold defendants liable for their alleged failure to act. But the Low
court merely held “that when a private owner maintains the
grassy parking strip between the sidewalk and street curb, he
exercises control over it, . . . ; thus, that [ ] owner is liable when
his failure to maintain it in reasonably safe condition causes
injury to a pedestrian.” (Ibid.) Consistent with Low, the trial
court in this case did not order defendants to make improvements
to the city-owned alley; rather, it ordered defendants to
implement safety measures on the property they own and control
based on its finding that the People presented sufficient evidence
demonstrating the “conditions of the [p]roperty itself” are “a
substantial factor causing and facilitating the ongoing presence of
[gang] members and the creation of the nuisance . . . .”6
6 Defendants also rely on Martinez v. Pacific Bell (1990) 225
Cal.App.3d 1557, but it is inapposite. It rejects an attempt to hold
the owner of a pay phone liable for criminal acts of third parties
17
Defendants seemingly ignore the trial court’s causation
finding and reiterate in their reply brief on appeal that they are
not arguing insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
causation finding. Rather, defendants’ position is that the trial
court erred “by entering a preliminary injunction against
[defendants] without first finding that they were the cause of the
nuisance at issue.” In other words, according to defendants, the
trial court held that “it did not need to resolve the question of
causation and that regardless of whether the cause of the
nuisance was the condition of the city-controlled [a]lley or the
condition of [defendants’] [p]roperty, [defendants] could be held
liable in either event.” But as discussed in more detail below,
viewing the trial court’s ruling as a whole, we disagree with
defendants’ interpretation of the trial court’s findings (or lack
thereof, according to defendants).
The trial court’s order states, in relevant part: “There is a
factual dispute over whether the gang presence on the [p]roperty
is caused by the conditions of the [p]roperty itself or the
availability of the abutting alley; however, as noted above,
liability under the [public nuisance law] does not depend upon
whether the defendant owns or controls the property. [Citation.]
The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence
concerning the conditions of the Property as a substantial factor
causing and facilitating the ongoing presence of [gang] members
and the creation of the nuisance and has established a reasonable
probability of prevailing on the [public nuisance] claim.”
Defendants’ position (i.e., that the trial court erroneously failed to
on adjacent public property. (Id. at p. 1559) In contrast, this
action seeks to require the defendants to abate criminal activity
on their own property.
18
resolve whether the property or the alley is the cause of the
nuisance) is understandable if the first sentence of the above-
quoted passage is read in isolation. But when read in conjunction
with the second sentence, it becomes apparent that the trial court
issued a preliminary injunction based on its finding that the
People presented sufficient evidence demonstrating the property
is a substantial factor causing the nuisance, despite
acknowledging the existence of a factual dispute regarding
causation, which will ultimately be resolved at trial.
Moreover, “[e]ven if the record demonstrates that the trial
court misunderstood or misapplied the law, the ruling must be
affirmed if it is supported by any legal theory.” (Hoover v.
American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193,
1201.) Thus, assuming arguendo that the trial court believed a
preliminary injunction is appropriate even without a finding that
the property (as opposed to the alley) is a substantial factor in
causing the gang presence, we must affirm if the ruling is
supported by any other theory. Here, the parties agree the
dispositive question is whether defendants “created or assisted in
the creation of the nuisance” (Citizens, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p.
359, italics omitted) and the trial court explicitly found the
People demonstrated the conditions of the property are a
substantial factor causing and facilitating the nuisance.
Defendants do not argue that finding is unsupported by
substantial evidence. We therefore conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in analyzing the causation element of the
public nuisance claim.
B. Balance of Harms
Turning to the second factor in deciding whether to issue a
preliminary injunction, defendants contend the trial court abused
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its discretion in concluding the balance of harms favors the
People.
As a threshold matter, we note the parties disagree on the
standard that applies in analyzing this factor. The People argue a
“more deferential standard applies[,]” citing the following rule:
“[W]here a legislative body has specifically provided injunctive
relief for a violation of a statute or ordinance, a showing by a
governmental entity that it is likely to prevail on the merits
should give rise to a [rebuttable] presumption” that the potential
harm to the public outweighs the potential harm to the
defendants. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63,
71 (IT Corp.).) Because public nuisance statutes and the UCL
authorize injunctive relief, the People argue they are entitled to a
presumption of public harm. Defendants counter a presumption
does not apply here, where the People do not allege a violation of
a specific city ordinance or regulation declaring particular
defined acts to be a nuisance per se, but rather allege a public
nuisance under the general nuisance statutes. We need not
resolve the issue here, however. As discussed below, even
assuming (without deciding) that a presumption of public harm
does not apply, we conclude the trial court was well within its
discretion in finding the balance of harms weighs in favor of the
People.
“The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding
whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the
harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause.” (IT Corp.,
supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 73.) As discussed above, the People
submitted several declarations from the LAPD, including one in
which the officer opined the property is the single most
dangerous location in North Hollywood, and another stating that
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if defendants “took control of the Vanowen Apartments back from
the . . . Locos by implementing desperately needed safety
measures, gang crime would be reduced not only on the
[p]roperty, but also in the entire surrounding neighborhood.” In
response, defendants contend they demonstrated irreparable
harm based on the “uncontradicted evidence” that the cost of
merely one aspect of the preliminary injunction – hiring four
security guards to patrol the property from sunset to sunrise –
would cost defendants between $1.5 million and $2.4 million
annually. But the only evidence cited in support of this statement
is a declaration by defendants’ security consultant, in which he
opines the cost of hiring four armed security guards to patrol the
property daily for 24 hours a day would range between $1.5
million and $2.4 million annually. And, even if the record
contained an uninflated estimate of hiring four security guards
from sunset to sunrise, defendants provide no evidence
demonstrating they cannot bear the cost of hiring security until a
hearing on the permanent injunction.7
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by concluding the balance of harms favors
the People and “the nuisance caused by gang presence at the
7 The People’s property management expert opined that the
value of the property is approximately $30 million and, based on
his review of one lease from 2018, the property generates
approximately $2 million annually in rental income. He further
declared that, based on media reports, the owners of the property
own a portfolio of properties comprised of 16,000 units in
California, worth approximately $1.3 billion.
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[p]roperty is sufficiently severe to warrant immediate mitigating
efforts.”8
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. On remand, the trial court is directed
to consider, after briefing and argument, whether any of the
terms of the preliminary injunction must be modified in light of
Government Code section 53165.1, effective January 1, 2024. We
express no view on that issue. The People are awarded their costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
ZUKIN, J.
8 Having concluded the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction based on the
People’s public nuisance claim (Civ. Code, § 3479 et seq.), we
need not decide if the preliminary injunction is also proper under
the UCL.
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