In re G.J. CA1/5 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/18/24 In re G.J. CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re G.J.,
A168579
A Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Humboldt County
___________________________________ Super. Ct. No. JV2200176)
HUMBOLDT COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
B.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
B.L. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights as to G.J. following a Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26 hearing.2 Mother contends the Humboldt County Department of
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it raises no
substantial issue of fact or law. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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Health and Human Services (the Department) failed to comply with the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
related state law (§ 224 et seq.) by not questioning extended family members
as to whether G.J. might be of Indian descent. Citing this court’s conditional
affirmance and remand for the limited purpose of compliance with ICWA and
California law in an appeal involving G.J.’s sibling (see Humboldt County
Department of Health v. B.L. (Aug. 22, 2023, A166846) [nonpub. opn.]), the
Department concedes that a limited remand for the same purpose is
warranted here. We agree and conditionally affirm the order terminating
Mother’s parental rights and remand for the limited purposes of compliance
with ICWA and state law.
The Department detained G.J. pursuant to a juvenile dependency
petition under section 300 (petition). In its detention report, the Department
noted that Mother was affiliated with the Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, and United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians.
However, the Department stated it did not believe ICWA applied based on an
inquiry made of these same tribes in a prior juvenile dependency case
involving G.J.’s sibling. Upon ordering G.J. detained, the juvenile court
found that ICWA did not apply.
In its jurisdiction report, the Department again stated that ICWA did
not apply. The report also referenced G.J.’s maternal grandmother but did
not mention any efforts to contact the grandmother about G.J.’s possible
Native American ancestry. The juvenile court sustained the petition.
In its disposition report, the Department noted that “[n]o new
information regarding [G.J.’s] Native American ancestry has been received.”
But the report made no mention of any efforts to ask the maternal
grandmother or three other maternal relatives identified in an attached
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Family Findings Efforts Report whether G.J. had any Native American
ancestry.
The juvenile court declared G.J. a dependent of the court, placed him in
foster care, and bypassed reunification services to the parents. The court
eventually terminated all parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of
adoption. In doing so, the court again found that ICWA did not apply.
Mother timely appealed.
On appeal, Mother only contends the Department failed to comply with
its duty of inquiry under ICWA because it did not attempt to locate or
interview G.J.’s extended family members about G.J.’s potential Native
American ancestry. The Department concedes that it did not do so and that a
limited remand is appropriate so it can comply with its duty of inquiry. We
agree.
ICWA establishes minimum federal standards that a state court must
abide by “before removing Indian children from their families and placing
them into foster care or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
1041, 1048.) ICWA’s requirements are incorporated in California’s statutory
scheme through section 224.2. Under that section, once a child is placed into
the Department’s temporary custody, the Department has a duty to inquire
whether the child is an Indian child, including “asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who
have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) If,
after the inquiry, there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child,
notice pursuant to ICWA must be sent to the relevant tribes under section
224.3, subdivision (a). (§ 224.2, subd. (f).)
The Department concedes it did not ask G.J.’s extended family
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members whether G.J. “is, or may be, an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)) and
that a limited remand is appropriate so it can make the required inquiry.
Based on this concession, the order terminating parental rights is
conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the
limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the inquiry provisions of ICWA
and section 224.2 and, if necessary, the notice provisions of section 224.3.
The juvenile court shall order that, within 30 days of the issuance of the
remittitur, the Department complete an inquiry into G.J.’s Indian ancestry
by interviewing all available extended family members and others who may
have an interest in the child. If on remand the court determines ICWA does
not apply, the termination order shall remain in effect. But if the court
determines ICWA applies, it shall vacate the termination order and proceed
in accordance with ICWA and related state law.
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CHOU, J.
We concur.
SIMONS, Acting P. J.
BURNS, J.
In re G.J. / A168579
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