Estate of Locklin CA2/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/18/24 Estate of Locklin CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
Estate of DOROTHY JEAN B322049
LOCKLIN, Deceased.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BP138469)
ZACHARY G. JONES, as
Personal Representative, etc.,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
FREDERICK COOLEY,
Objector and Appellant;
LYNN JACOBS et al.,
Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Small, Judge. Affirmed.
Decker Law, James Decker, and Griffin Schindler for
Objector and Appellant Federick Cooley.
Law Office of Steven A. Simons and Steven A. Simons for
Respondent Lynn Jacobs.
Cunningham, Treadwell & Bartelstone, James H.
Treadwell, and G. Richard Gregory III for Respondent TUP 1537
W37ST HOUSING LLC.
No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent Zachary G.
Jones.
_______________________________
Frederick Cooley, an heir of an estate, appeals from the
probate court’s order confirming the sale of the estate’s interest
in real property. We reject Cooley’s various contentions of error
and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
I. Locklin’s Estate
Dorothy Jean Locklin (Locklin) died intestate in June 2010.
At that time, she owned a 50 percent interest in a residential
property located at 1597 West 37th Street, Los Angeles,
California 90018 (referred to hereafter as the real property). Her
brother owned the other 50 percent interest in the real property.
Locklin’s interest in the real property was the only asset of her
estate.
On February 4, 2013, appellant Cooley, one of Locklin’s
sons, was appointed the administrator of Locklin’s estate. Later
in 2013, Henry Jacobs and Lynn Jacobs (a married couple)
acquired Locklin’s brother’s 50 percent interest in the real
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property.1 Locklin’s estate retained the other 50 percent interest
in the real property.
After around eight years as the administrator of Locklin’s
estate, Cooley was removed from the position.2 On September 3,
2021, the probate court appointed Zachary Jones, another of
Locklin’s sons, as the administrator of Locklin’s estate. The
letters of administration granted Jones “limited authority,”
meaning, for example, that he required court approval of a sale of
the estate’s real property.
II. Jones’s Petition for Order Confirming Sale of the
Real Property
Five months after his appointment as administrator of
Locklin’s estate, on February 8, 2022, Jones filed a Report of Sale
and Petition for Order Confirming Sale of Real Property (Report
and Petition)—the petition at issue in this appeal. Jones, who
was represented by counsel in his capacity as administrator of
Locklin’s estate, used the requisite Judicial Council forms for the
Report and Petition and attachments. Jones declared under
penalty of perjury that the information in the Report and Petition
1 It is not clear from the record in this appeal if there was a
preexisting relationship between the Jacobses and Locklin’s
brother and/or Locklin’s family.
2 The appellant’s appendix in this appeal does not include
documents relating to Cooley’s administration of Locklin’s estate
or his removal from the position. As discussed more fully below,
at a hearing on the petition at issue in this appeal, the probate
court noted that Cooley was removed as administrator “in part
because [he was not] administering the estate and moving things
forward,” i.e., he did not sell the real property and close the
estate during the eight-year period that he was the
administrator.
3
was true and correct. As explained below, the buyer agreed to
purchase the entire interest in the real property (the estate’s 50
percent interest and the Jacobses’ 50 percent interest), but the
Report and Petition describe the sale of the estate’s 50 percent
interest only (the portion of the sale requiring court approval).
As reflected in the Report and Petition, the appraised value
of Locklin’s 50 percent interest in the real property, at the time of
her death in 2010, was $115,000. The “[r]eappraised value
within one year before the hearing” was listed in the Report and
Petition as $435,000. Jones filed the requisite Inventory and
Appraisal form, on which the probate referee declared under
penalty of perjury on October 15, 2021 that he appraised the
estate’s 50 percent interest in the real property at $435,000. An
attachment to the Inventory and Appraisal form listed the
appraisal of the entire interest in the real property as $870,000.
Jones checked boxes on the Report and Petition form
indicating the reasons for the sale were (1) that it was necessary
to pay debts and expenses of administration, and (2) that the
“sale is to the advantage of the estate and in the best interest of
the interested persons.” The Report and Petition further indicate
that “to obtain the highest and best price reasonably attainable
for the property,” the real property “was published with
Metropolitan Newspaper, placed on the multiple listings[,] and
agent had several inquiries and showed property to several
interested buyers [sic].”
As set forth in the Report and Petition, on February 1,
2022, an entity called TUP 1597 W37ST HOUSING LLC (TUP)
agreed to purchase the real property in a private sale. The
purchase price of the entire interest in the real property is not
listed on the form. The purchase price of the estate’s 50 percent
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interest is listed as $400,000. TUP agreed to pay cash for the
real property, which was to be sold as is, with “no repairs of any
kind.”
III. Cooley’s Petition to Determine Ownership of the
Real Property and Objection to Petition for Order
Confirming Sale of the Real Property
On March 11, 2022, six days before the scheduled hearing
on Jones’s above-described petition, Cooley, as a self-represented
litigant, filed a verified petition to determine ownership of the
real property. In this appeal, Cooley does not challenge any order
related to his petition, but we discuss it because it provides
context for his objection to the confirmation of the sale of the real
property—the matter at issue in this appeal.
In his petition to determine ownership of the real property,
Cooley sought a judicial declaration that the estate “is the full
legal and beneficial owner” of the real property. He claimed the
Jacobses no longer owned an interest in the real property.
Cooley explained in his petition (and attached documents
demonstrating) that Locklin and her brother defaulted on the
property taxes in 2008, around five years before the Jacobses
acquired their 50 percent interest in the real property from
Locklin’s brother. Cooley alleged that in November 2014, during
the time he was the administrator of Locklin’s estate, and after
the Jacobses acquired their interest in October 2013, the real
property was the subject of a public auction by the Los Angeles
County Tax Collector. According to Cooley, the individual or
entity who bid on the real property at the auction “failed to
finalize the sale allowing the owners of the property an
opportunity to redeem it . . . by paying all current and defaulted
property taxes and other related fees.” As reflected in documents
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attached to Cooley’s petition, on June 4, 2015, Cooley presented a
cashier’s check, made payable to the Los Angeles County Tax
Collector, for $26,970.43, the amount of the delinquent taxes and
associated penalties, fees and costs. Cooley also paid an
additional $655.33 to the Los Angeles County Tax Collector for
fees associated with the transfer of the 50 percent interest in the
real property from Locklin’s brother to the Jacobses. The same
day, the Los Angeles County Tax Collector issued a Certificate of
Redemption, identifying the owners of the real property as
“JACOBS, HENRY AND LYNN E AND LOCKLIN, DOROTHY
DECD EST OF.”
Cooley asserted in his petition that “his redemption of the
property due to his full payment of the defaulted taxes, related
fees and the issuance of the Certificate of Redemption is evidence
of the Estate’s superior title[,] and Objectors Henry Jacobs and
Lynn Jacobs hold no title interest at all to the property.” In
resolving the present appeal, we need not evaluate this assertion
(which Cooley apparently did not raise in the probate court at
any time before he was removed as the administrator of Locklin’s
estate in 2021). We note that Jones, in his capacity as the
administrator of Locklin’s estate, did not dispute that the estate
owned a 50 percent interest in the real property and the Jacobses
owned a 50 percent interest in the real property (currently held
by Lynn Jacobs as Trustee of the Jacobs Family Trust).
On March 14, 2022, Cooley, as a self-represented litigant,
filed an objection to Jones’s petition for an order confirming the
sale of the real property. Therein, he included allegations about
the redemption of the real property, as set forth in his petition to
determine ownership of the real property and summarized above.
He reiterated his position that “payment to redeem the property
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is personal to the Estate[,] and Henry Jacobs and Lynn Jacobs
benefit nothing from the redemption or the issuance of the
‘Certificate of Redemption’ because they paid no money to
redeem.” (Bold font omitted.) He further explained that he
“objects to the confirmation of the sale of [the real property]
because [Jones] and his attorney . . ., threaten to sale [sic] the
[real property] and only claim 50% interest when the Estate owns
100% of the property.” He did not object to any specific term of
the sale (e.g., the price).
IV. March 17, 2022 Hearing on Jones’s Petition for an
Order Confirming the Sale of the Real Property
Cooley appeared at the March 17, 2022 hearing on Jones’s
petition, representing himself. Jones, as administrator of
Locklin’s estate, was represented by counsel. Cooley stated the
basis of his objection to confirmation of the sale as follows, in
pertinent part: “I’m objecting on the fact that he’s [Jones] only
claiming half of the proceeds for this sale and just handing it over
to some people that don’t own it.” Cooley claimed that 100
percent of the proceeds of the sale of the real property should go
to the heirs of Locklin’s estate. Without ruling on anything, the
probate court continued the hearing on Jones’s petition to May
20, 2022, the date scheduled for a hearing on Cooley’s petition to
determine ownership of the real property.
V. Cooley’s Petition to Quiet Title to the Real Property
On May 16, 2022, four days before the hearing scheduled
on the above-described petitions, Cooley, as a self-represented
litigant, filed a verified petition to quiet title to the real property.
The hearing on the quiet title petition was scheduled for August
20, 2022.
7
In the quiet title petition, Cooley asserted for the first time
that he, himself, owned a 50 percent interest in the real property
because he paid the defaulted property taxes and obtained a
certificate of redemption of the property. Thus, he claimed
Locklin’s estate owned a 50 percent interest, he personally owned
a 50 percent interest, and the Jacobses owned no interest in the
real property. He further claimed that Jones, an heir of Locklin’s
estate, had “no vested title interest in the real property” because
Jones failed to pay the property taxes, which were in default
while Jones maintained possession of the property.
VI. May 20, 2022 Hearing on Jones’s Petition for an
Order Confirming the Sale of the Real Property
Cooley appeared at the May 20, 2022 hearing, representing
himself. Jones, as administrator of Locklin’s estate, and Lynn
Jacobs, as Trustee of the Jacobs Family Trust, were also present
and represented by separate counsel. A realtor for the seller, a
realtor for the buyer, and representatives from the buyer also
attended the hearing.
Counsel for Jones and counsel for Lynn Jacobs indicated
their clients were aligned in their position that 50 percent of the
proceeds from the sale of the real property would go to the estate
and 50 percent to Lynn Jacobs as Trustee of the Jacobs Family
Trust. Consistent with Cooley’s petition to determine ownership
of the real property and Cooley’s objection to Jones’s petition for
an order confirming the sale of the real property, the probate
court stated its understanding that Cooley was claiming the
estate owned 100 percent of the real property (and the Jacobses
owned no interest). Cooley did not correct the court’s stated
understanding, notwithstanding his claim in his recently filed
petition to quiet title (set for hearing on August 20, 2022) that
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the estate owned a 50 percent interest and he personally owned a
50 percent interest. The following exchange occurred between
the court and Cooley:
“The Court: You were administrator of Dorothy’s estate for
eight years. You were appointed in 2013, and you were removed
--
“[Cooley]: Yes.
“The Court: -- in 2021, in part because you weren’t
administering the estate and moving things forward. [¶] My
question to you is this --
“[Cooley]: Well, that’s because --
“The Court: Let me ask you this question: If you thought
that the estate, Dorothy’s estate, owned a hundred percent of the
property and Lynn owned zero, why didn’t you do something
about that when you were at the helm? You have now, nine
years later --
“[Cooley]: I --
“The Court: Let me finish my question. [¶] Nine years
later, you’re saying, hey, guess what? Lynn Jacobs is not an
owner of this house. [¶] Why are you doing this now?”
Cooley responded that he spent several years trying to find
an attorney “to deal with Lynn Jacobs’s issue.” Once he found
one, the attorney quit when it became clear the probate court was
going to remove Cooley as administrator of Locklin’s estate.
Counsel for Jones and counsel for Lynn Jacobs urged the
probate court to confirm the sale of the real property and place
the proceeds in a blocked account pending resolution of Cooley’s
quiet title petition. Cooley stated: “I think what should happen
is the house shouldn’t be sold until we determine who is the
owner. We haven’t got there yet because you would be basically
9
denying the petition [to quiet title] before you actually heard it.”
Cooley then stated his belief that the estate owned a 50 percent
interest in the real property and Jones was not entitled to any of
it (but he did not express to the court his belief that he personally
owned the other 50 percent interest, as alleged in his recently
filed quiet title petition).
The probate court commented, “I see no reason not to have
the property sold today to these buyers, and the estate at least
gets money into the estate, that 50 percent that [Jones’s] petition
says belongs to the estate.” Cooley stated he did not understand
“the need to sell” the real property, representing that he had paid
Locklin’s only debt, her medical bills.
The probate court responded: “It is the job of the
administrator to administer estate assets in a way that’s fair for
everybody. When you were the administrator, the house was not
sold, and that was one of the reasons you got removed. Nothing
was happening. The estate was not being closed. [¶] There are
some estates in which the administrator of the estate, often with
the consent of other family members, agrees that there should be
some other disposition of the property. Some family member will
get it. Somebody will live in the house. It won’t be sold; it will be
kept in the family.[3] [¶] But in this particular case, the
administrator has determined it’s in the best interest of
everybody to sell the house, and that judgment strikes me as very
sensible. That way money comes into the estate, and when push
3 Based on the record before us and Cooley’s appellate
briefing, there is no indication Cooley wants to hold onto his
interest in the real property. Rather, he wants to delay the sale
until after the probate court determines ownership interests in
the real property.
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comes to shove, when it’s time for [Jones] to close out the estate,
something that you had an opportunity to do for eight years but
you didn’t, then . . . money can be distributed to the three heirs
[Cooley, Jones, and their sister], subject to you claiming [Jones]
shouldn’t get his third because of x, y, and z, and subject to
[Jones] saying [Cooley] shouldn’t get his third because of x, y, and
z, things he did.”
The probate court granted Jones’s petition for an order
confirming the sale of the real property to TUP (at a price of
$400,000 for the estate’s 50 percent interest), noting there were
“no overbidders.” The court explained that in overruling Cooley’s
objections, the court was “taking no position on [Cooley]’s quiet
title petition as it relates to the alleged interest in this property
of Lynn Jacobs.” The court ordered Jones to post an additional
bond in the amount of $300,000, and ordered counsel for Lynn
Jacobs to establish a blocked account where 50 percent of the sale
proceeds would be deposited.
The probate court ordered Jones’s counsel to prepare an
“order after hearing.” The court explained to Cooley that the
clerk would prepare a minute order summarizing the hearing,
and Jones’s counsel would prepare an order after hearing on a
Judicial Council form, “reflecting the confirmation of sale,” for the
judge’s signature.
The probate court continued Cooley’s petition to determine
ownership of the real property to July 12, 2022, and left Cooley’s
petition to quiet title on calendar for August 20, 2022.
VII. Probate Court’s Orders and Cooley’s Notices of
Appeal
On May 20, 2022, the same day as the hearing, the probate
court issued its minute order on Jones’s petition for an order
11
confirming the sale of the real property. The minute order states
that the court ordered Jones to prepare an order after hearing.
On May 23, 2022, before the order after hearing issued, Cooley
filed a notice of appeal (case No. B321355).
On June 21, 2022, the probate court entered the order after
hearing on the Judicial Council form titled Order Confirming
Sale of Real Property. The order, signed by the judge, indicates
the court made the requisite findings, including that “[g]ood
reason existed for the sale”; the “amount bid is 90% or more of
the appraised value of the property as appraised within one year
of the date of the hearing”; an “offer exceeding the amount bid by
the statutory percentages cannot be obtained”; and the personal
representative of the estate (Jones) “has made reasonable efforts
to obtain the highest and best price reasonably attainable for the
property.” The order also requires an additional bond in the
amount of $300,000 and states that “[n]et sale proceeds must be
deposited by escrow holder in a blocked account to be withdrawn
only on court order.” The order specifies the name and address of
the bank where the blocked account was set up. On July 5, 2022,
Cooley filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2022 Order
Confirming Sale of Real Property (the present appeal, case No.
B322049).
On August 1, 2022, this court dismissed Cooley’s appeal in
case No. B321355 (the first appeal filed on May 23, 2022), after
he defaulted by failing to pay the filing fee and failing to file a
case information statement. The remittitur in case No. B321355
issued on October 7, 2022.
Cooley, through retained appellate counsel, has filed
briefing in the present appeal, case No. B322049 (the second
appeal filed on July 5, 2022).
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DISCUSSION
I. TUP’s Motion to Dismiss the Present Appeal
Respondent TUP, the purchaser of the real property, filed a
motion to dismiss the present appeal, arguing: “Cooley filed two
successive Notices of Appeal from the same Order Confirming
Sale of Real Property in favor of the buyer of the real property,
TUP, but the first of those appeals was dismissed with prejudice
and the remittitur issued, affirming the order and making the
decision by the trial court on the confirmation of the sale of the
real property final. The two successive appeals were never
consolidated or even related. This reviewing court is without
jurisdiction to hear the pending appeal and cannot grant any
relief. The pending appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. In her
respondent’s brief, Lynn Jacobs, as Trustee of the Jacobs Family
Trust, also urges us to dismiss the present appeal for the same
reasons.
The motion to dismiss is not well taken, and we deny it.
Cooley’s first notice of appeal, filed on May 23, 2022, was
premature. The May 20, 2022 minute order states that the
probate court ordered Jones to prepare an order after hearing. “A
minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written
order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 86, 101.)
Cooley filed a second notice of appeal on July 5, 2022,
timely appealing from the probate court’s June 21, 2022 Order
Confirming Sale of Real Property, an appealable order. While the
second appeal (the present appeal) was pending, this court
dismissed Cooley’s first appeal because he was in default for
failure to pay the filing fee and failure to file a case information
statement. This court did not lose jurisdiction over the present
13
appeal from the June 21, 2022 appealable order when we
dismissed Cooley’s appeal from a prior nonappealable order.
TUP and Jacobs cite no authority demonstrating otherwise.
Estate of Sapp, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 86, cited by TUP in
its motion to dismiss and by Jacobs in her respondent’s brief, is
distinguishable. There, the appellant filed a notice of appeal
from a nonappealable order, a May 9, 2016 tentative decision.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on August 17, 2016,
after the appellant defaulted by failing to provide the appellate
court with an appealable order. Two weeks later, on September
2, 2016, the trial court issued its judgment. The appellant did
not file a notice of appeal from the September 2, 2016 judgment.
A month and a half later, on October 19, 2016, the remittitur
issued on the appellant’s dismissed appeal. The appellant filed a
motion to recall the remittitur, attaching the September 2, 2016
judgment, but the Court of Appeal found no good cause to recall
the remittitur. In a subsequent appeal from a different order and
judgment, filed on March 24, 2017, the appellant attempted to
challenge rulings that were only appealable from the September
2, 2016 judgment. The Court of Appeal stated in its opinion that
the dismissal of the appeal from the nonappealable May 9, 2016
tentative decision “had the effect of affirming the September 2,
2016 judgment,” and the appellant was “barred from challenging
the September 2, 2016 judgment . . . in this or any other appeal.”
(Id. at p. 100.)
Relying on Estate of Sapp, TUP and Jacobs argue that the
dismissal of Cooley’s appeal from the nonappealable May 20,
2022 minute order had the effect of affirming the June 21, 2022
Order Confirming Sale of Real Property. We disagree. Cooley
timely appealed from the June 21, 2022 appealable order, and
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that appeal (the present appeal) was pending when we dismissed
the appeal from the prior nonappealable order (unlike the
appellant in Estate of Sapp, who never appealed from the
appealable judgment). The dismissal of the premature first
appeal did not interfere with our jurisdiction over the pending
and valid second appeal.
II. Cooley’s Appeal
A. The Probate Court Did Not Err in Finding the
Sale Was to the Advantage of the Estate and in
the Best Interest of the Interested Persons
Under Probate Code4 section 10000, a personal
representative of an estate may sell real property of the estate
under certain, enumerated circumstances, including, “(a) [w]here
the sale is necessary to pay debts, devises family allowance,
expenses of administration, or taxes” or “(b) [w]here the sale is to
the advantage of the estate and in the best interest of the
interested persons.” Although Jones’s petition for an order
confirming the sale of the real property alleged both of these
circumstances, the probate court only made a finding that the
latter circumstance applied. Cooley contends “there was no
evidence supporting the [probate] court’s determination that the
sale of the [real property] was in everyone’s best interest” and,
therefore, it was error for the court to confirm the sale.
“It is well settled that ‘ “[a] judgment or order of the lower
court is presumed correct.” ’ [Citation.] An appellant must
affirmatively demonstrate error occurred and, when the appellate
record is silent on a matter, the reviewing court must indulge all
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate
Code.
15
intendments and presumptions that support the order or
judgment.” (Estate of Bonzi (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1101,
quoting Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) An
“order confirming the sale of real property should be affirmed on
appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support it,” and “the
determination of the sufficiency thereof lies in the sound
discretion of the probate court.” (Estate of Weaver (1958) 158
Cal.App.2d 367, 372.)
The probate court based its finding that the sale is to the
advantage of the estate and in the best interest of the interested
persons, in part, on a history of the case not reflected in the
appellant’s appendix before us. The court noted that one of the
reasons Cooley was removed as the administrator of Locklin’s
estate is that he failed to sell the real property—the only asset of
the estate—during the eight years he served as administrator.
Jones, as administrator of Locklin’s estate, wanted to sell
the estate’s interest in the real property to TUP. Lynn Jacobs, as
Trustee of the Jacobs Family Trust, wanted to sell her interest in
the real property to TUP. Jones and Cooley’s sister, the only
other heir of Locklin’s estate, did not raise an objection to the
sale.
Cooley did not express an interest in holding onto the real
property indefinitely. He only sought to delay the sale until after
the probate court determined the ownership interests. But he did
not show that going forward with the sale prejudiced his interest
in any way. For example, he did not assert that the sale price
was low or that Jones could secure a higher price if he delayed
the sale.
Under these circumstances, Cooley has not demonstrated
the probate court erred in finding that the sale is to the
16
advantage of the estate and in the best interest of the interested
persons.
B. Cooley Has Not Demonstrated That the Sale
Violated Section 10309
Under section 10309, “no sale of real property at private
sale shall be confirmed by the court unless” certain, enumerated
conditions are satisfied, including that the “real property has
been appraised within one year prior to the date of the
confirmation hearing” and the “valuation date used in the
appraisal . . . is within one year prior to the date of the
confirmation hearing.” (§ 10309, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) Cooley
contends it is “impossible to confirm if the appraisal complied
with the requirements of Probate Code section 10309” because
“nowhere on the appraisal document does it state the date on
which this appraisal allegedly occurred or what valuation date
was used for the appraisal.” He adds, “Without any such
evidence, the requirements to confirm the sale were not met, and
it was thus improper for the [probate] court to have made the
confirmation.” This contention lacks merit.
The Judicial Council form for the Report of Sale and
Petition for Order Confirming Sale of Real Property does not
require the petitioner to list the date of appraisal or date of
valuation. The form only requires the petitioner to fill in a dollar
amount for the “[r]eappraised value within one year before the
hearing,” which Jones did. In the June 21, 2022 Order
Confirming Sale of Real Property, the probate court made a
finding that the “amount bid [by TUP] is 90% or more of the
appraised value of the property as appraised within one year of
the date of the hearing.”
17
Substantial evidence supports the probate court’s findings
that the real property was reappraised within one year prior to
the date of the confirmation hearing and that the valuation date
used in the appraisal was within one year prior to the date of the
confirmation hearing. The hearing on the petition for an order
confirming the sale of the real property commenced on March 17,
2022 and was continued to May 20, 2022, when it concluded.
Less than a year before the hearing, on September 3, 2021, Jones
was appointed as administrator of Locklin’s estate. Thereafter,
he secured a reappraisal of the real property for purposes of a
sale. On October 15, 2021, the probate referee declared that he
appraised the real property; and an attachment to the Inventory
and Appraisal form lists the appraised value as $435,000 for a 50
percent interest and $870,000 for the entire interest in the real
property. At the time of Locklin’s death in June 2010, the
appraised value of the estate’s 50 percent interest in the real
property was $115,000. The reasonable inference from this
evidence is that the appraisal date and the valuation date
occurred after Jones was appointed as administrator of Locklin’s
estate, which was within one year prior to the date of the
confirmation hearing. We have no cause to disturb the order.
We note that Cooley did not question the appraisal or
valuation date in the probate court. Nor did he challenge the
appraised value of the real property.
C. The Probate Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Confirming the Sale Before Resolving
Cooley’s Quiet Title Petition
Cooley contends the trial court abused its discretion “when
it confirmed the sale without first resolving the issue of who held
title to the [real property], especially considering the lack of any
18
exigent circumstances necessitating the sale prior to Cooley’s
quiet title petition.” Cooley has not shown an abuse of discretion.
In confirming a sale, a court should exercise its discretion
“in view of all the surrounding facts and circumstances and in the
interest of fairness, justice and the rights of the respective
parties. [Citation.] The proper exercise of discretion requires the
court to consider all material facts and evidence and to apply
legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent, and just
decision.” (Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. Brown
Development Corp. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 268, 274.) “The status
of the litigation and the effect a sale would have on the parties
are both facts and circumstances the court must consider before
confirming a sale.” (Id. at p. 276.) The court should consider
whether an immediate sale of the property would result in the
loss of a party’s “opportunity to litigate its rights to the property.”
(Ibid.)
Here, the probate court considered whether the immediate
sale of the real property would interfere with Cooley’s quiet title
petition and determined it would not. Cooley’s only objection to
the sale was that Jones intended to give half the proceeds to
Lynn Jacobs. The court obviated this concern by ordering that 50
percent of the proceeds be deposited in a blocked account pending
resolution of Cooley’s quiet title petition. Cooley does not explain
how he was harmed by the sale.
Cooley relies on Estate of Bazzuro (1911) 161 Cal. 71 in
support of his contention that the probate court erred in not
resolving the quiet title petition before it confirmed the sale of
the real property. The case is readily distinguishable. There “a
cloud over the title” affected the property’s value, such that the
“property sold for less than one sixth of its real value, because of
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defects in the title.” (Id. at p. 76.) Here, in contrast, Cooley
neither claimed nor presented evidence below that the dispute
over ownership interests affected the price of the sale, and there
is no indication that it did.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the probate
court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the sale.
D. The Sale of the Property Did Not Violate a Stay
Cooley contends the sale of the real property to TUP is
“void” because it violated “an automatic stay.” He asserts that
the probate court could not enter the June 21, 2022 Order
Confirming Sale of Real Property because his notice of appeal,
filed on May 23, 2022, “resulted in an automatic stay and
divested the [probate] court of jurisdiction.” Not so. A premature
appeal from a nonappealable minute order cannot divest the trial
court of jurisdiction to enter the final, appealable order. Cooley
cites no authority holding otherwise, and we are aware of none.
Cooley raises other issues that are not properly before us in
this appeal. He contends that when he filed his second notice of
appeal (the present appeal) on July 5, 2022, an automatic stay
prevented the recordation of a grant deed transferring the real
property to TUP. He also contends that TUP’s subsequent sale of
the real property to a third party is void because TUP never
acquired good title to the property. In support of these
contentions, Cooley relies on documents that are attached to
TUP’s motion to dismiss, but are not part of the record on appeal.
We decline to take judicial notice of these documents on the
court’s own motion because they are not germane to our
resolution of this appeal. The matter before us is whether the
probate court erred in issuing the June 21, 2022 Order
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Confirming Sale of Real Property, and we have concluded it did
not, for the reasons explained above.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents TUP and Lynn Jacobs,
as Trustee of the Jacobs Family Trust are entitled to recover
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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