People v. Isaacs CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/22/24 P. v. Isaacs CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081791
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 16CR066230)
KAYVON JERMAINE ISAACS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Daniel Detienne, Judge. Affirmed.
Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Kayvon Jermaine Isaacs of first degree murder (Pen.
Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count 1), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a);
count 2), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and
misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (b); count 4). The jury found
that as to count 1, Isaacs personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and with
respect to counts 2 and 3, Isaacs personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.53,
subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)).
After we affirmed the conviction and remanded for resentencing, the
trial court denied Isaacs’s motion to dismiss the firearm enhancements
attached to counts 2 and 3. It then sentenced Isaacs to a total term of 50
years to life plus 13 years on the felonies and a concurrent six months on the
misdemeanor. The felony sentence consists of 25 years to life for the count 1
murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm use; a three-year lower term for
the count 2 carjacking plus 10 years for the firearm use; and a two-year lower
term for the count 3 assault plus 10 years for the firearm use, stayed under
section 654.
Isaacs contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
dismiss the firearm enhancements because it did not apply the correct legal
standard, and he asks this court to remand for resentencing. He claims the
trial court solely focused on the nature of the offenses themselves in finding a
danger to public safety, and it failed to consider how shortening his sentence
would put the public at risk. We disagree because the trial court recited the
proper standard, and its analysis does not show a departure from that
standard. We therefore affirm the judgment.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, Isaacs shot and killed his girlfriend in the presence of their
two-month-old child. (People v. Isaacs (Oct. 10, 2022, D079414) [nonpub.
opn.])2 Later the same day, Isaacs carjacked a woman at gunpoint. (Ibid.)
After affirming his 2021 conviction for those crimes, we remanded the matter
for resentencing due to recent legislative changes that applied retroactively.
(Ibid.)
The trial court resentenced Isaacs on March 3, 2023. At the hearing,
Isaacs moved to dismiss the firearm enhancements attached to counts 2 and
3 pursuant to section 1385. He claimed the multiple enhancements and his
mental illness were mitigating circumstances that warranted dismissal.
The trial court adopted its findings from the original sentencing
hearing, which included a determination that striking the firearm
enhancements was inappropriate based on the serious and violent nature of
the crimes and Isaacs’s criminal history. Isaacs was previously convicted of
burglary, possessing a firearm as a felon, and possessing ammunition as a
felon, and he violated probation twice. The court then denied the motion
under section 1385 as follows:
“The Court: . . . So 1385(c)(1) says, ‘the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so.’ And then 2 talks about the court exercising its
discretion. Says, ‘the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove any of
the mitigating circumstances that are listed in that
section,’ and [defense counsel] talked about two of them.
‘Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement
2 Respondent’s unopposed request for judicial notice of our file in Isaacs’s
prior appeal (case No. D079414) is partially granted pursuant to Evidence
Code section 452, subdivision (d). We take judicial notice of our prior opinion
and the reporter’s transcript from Isaacs’s original sentencing hearing.
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unless the court finds that the dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. Endanger
public safety means there is a likelihood that the dismissal
of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.’
“So I find it’s not in the furtherance of justice to
dismiss the enhancements. And the enhancements in this
case, they’re all gun enhancements. So those are serious
enhancements, obviously. I don’t think it’s in the
furtherance of justice to do so, and I do believe that it
would endanger public safety. Like I said, these are gun
enhancements, and count 1 and count 2 and 3 are separate
and distinct crimes.
“So count 1, Mr. Isaacs used a gun on his significant
other, shot her, I believe, in the head, right?
“[Prosecutor]: That’s correct.
“The Court: Virtually point blank or very close
range. And then count 2 was a separate crime, a completely
innocent victim who was carjacked and had a gun pointed
at her. And I don’t think it would be in the furtherance of
justice to dismiss those gun enhancements. . . .”
Following that, the trial court resentenced Isaacs, and he timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Guiding Principles
Section 1385 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is
prohibited by any initiative statute.
(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
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offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’
means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.
The mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) include
“[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case,” and “[t]he current
offense is connected to mental illness.” (§1385, subd. (c)(2)(B) & (D).)
We review a trial court’s decisions under section 1385 for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) A trial court
abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard. (People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) However, “ ‘The trial court is not
required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under section
1385’ [citations] and ‘is presumed to have considered all of the relevant
factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.’ ” (People v.
Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637; see also, People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 361 [“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume
that the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ”].)
B. Analysis
In ruling on Isaacs’s motion to dismiss the firearm enhancements, the
trial court quoted the relevant portions of section 1385. Specifically, it
confirmed that it shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice, it acknowledged the presence of multiple enhancements and mental
illness are two mitigating circumstances that weigh greatly in favor of
dismissal unless dismissal would endanger public safety, and it recited the
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statutory definition of “endanger public safety.” The court then stated
dismissing the enhancements is not in the furtherance of justice and would
endanger public safety. This shows the trial correct applied the correct legal
standard.
Although the court focused its discussion on the circumstances of the
crimes, that does not establish it applied the wrong legal standard. Indeed,
the circumstances of a crime may be relied upon to find future danger to the
public because they are relevant to the threat posed by a defendant and the
time of incarceration needed to protect the public from that threat. (See
People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299.)
Additionally, the court’s analysis was not limited to the circumstances
of the crimes as Isaacs contends. The court adopted its findings from the
original sentencing hearing, which included a determination that dismissal of
the firearm enhancements was inappropriate based on Isaacs’s escalating
criminal history. That history is relevant to the danger Isaacs would pose if
his sentence was reduced because it shows past attempts at rehabilitation
were unsuccessful. As such, the court’s consideration of Isaacs’s criminal
history is consistent with the applicable standard.
In short, the court stated the proper legal standard, and its analysis did
not depart from that standard. Isaacs has therefore failed to show the court
applied the wrong legal standard.
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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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