People v. Jauregui CA5 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Jauregui CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086247
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MF013816A)
v.
JUANITA DELGADO JAUREGUI, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D.
Oglesby, Judge.
Law Offices of Lawrence S. Strauss and Lawrence S. Strauss for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Chung Mi
Choi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Juanita Delgado Jauregui appeals from a conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon and inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.
Appellant’s sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on three years’ formal
probation with 120 days in custody. Appellant argues the trial court’s verdicts are
impermissibly inconsistent and must be reversed. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 7, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging appellant with assault with a deadly weapon, a car (Pen. Code
§ 245, subd. (a)(1);1 count 1), corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon the
victim (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2) and misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b);
count 3). The information additionally alleged two circumstances in aggravation as to
both counts 1 and 2—that the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subd. (a)(1)), and appellant was armed with
or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421, subd. (a)(2)).
The same day, appellant waived her right to a jury trial and a court trial took place.
The trial court found appellant guilty on counts 1 and 2, and not guilty on count 3. On
April 17, 2023, the court sentenced appellant. The court denied appellant’s motion for
reconsideration and found true the circumstances in aggravation. The court suspended
imposition of sentence on both counts, placed appellant on three years’ probation with
120 days in custody on count 1, and the same concurrent sentence on count 2.
1 Undesignated references to code are to the Penal Code.
2.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant dated the victim, C.M., for four years, and they had a son together. On
February 21, 2020, the son was six months old. C.M. had returned home from work and
gotten into an argument with appellant. Appellant grabbed a broom and threatened to hit
C.M.’s truck, to which C.M. responded that he was hungry and tired and just wanted to
go eat. Appellant responded “if you go, you’re going to see what’s going to happen to
your f[***]ing truck.”
C.M. put his son in a car seat because appellant told him, if he wanted to eat, he
can go alone and take his son with him. Ultimately, C.M. left the home without his son,
got into his truck and drove away. As he was making a left-hand turn, he was hit with
another car. The impact, which C.M. described as “tremendously ugly,” flipped his truck
over. C.M. was able to get out of his truck and saw the car that hit him was appellant’s,
and appellant was driving. C.M. removed appellant from her car, hugged her, and told
her everything was going to be ok.
C.M.’s infant son was not in the truck because appellant had left him back at the
home. C.M. suffered a broken rib and an impact to his head. California Highway Patrol
Officer Alejandro Zuniga investigated the collision. Zuniga concluded that the right side
of appellant’s car, a white Toyota, came in contact with the left rear side of C.M.’s truck
with “good force.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Verdict Was Not Impermissibly Inconsistent
Appellant argues the trial court could not have found insufficient evidence of
misdemeanor child endangerment, unless the facts showed that appellant left the home
first, and C.M. followed, leaving behind his son, and ultimately cutting appellant off and
causing the accident. We find no error and affirm.
A. Background
In denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court ruled as follows.
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“The law is clear in this area the Court doesn’t have, nor does any
trier of fact, have to accept the whole—the testimony of any witness whole
sale. They can select those facts with which they find the witness credible
and disregard those facts which they do not find credible. In this particular
case, however, the Court found both the victim and the investigating officer
to be credible.
“The inconsistency of verdict is based upon an analysis that
presumes that anyone leaving a child in a child seat and walking out of the
house to go on some errand, in this particular case to track down a husband
that she had an argument with, is inherently committing child abuse.
“This is a fun issue to talk about because there are different
standards historically for child abuse, and there are different standards of—
practically between rural and urban living and generational changes.… So
in this case where if a mother chooses to leave a child in a child seat on I
believe it was the table, I don’t inherently find that child abuse at the time
of the commission of the offense. As it subsequently turned out, that might
very well be how it turned out, but I’m not going to look at how it played
out at the time. I’m looking at it as it occurred, how an upset mom has to
chase down a boyfriend or husband to determine exactly what the problem
is.
“In this particular case, the evidence of the accident is un—is not
controverted at all. Your client hit the victim from the side, and her car
being lower than the pickup truck, which I believe was raised a little bit,
simply got underneath it and levered it over as opposed to a blunt force that
just blew the truck off of its path and pushed it onto its sides. With that and
those comments, the motion is denied.”
B. Legal Standard And Analysis
Appellant argues that “inconsistent verdicts are against the law,” citing City of San
Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 668.
Appellant is correct that inconsistent verdicts, where findings are contradictory on
material issues, are against the law in civil cases and are grounds for a new trial. (Id. at
p. 682.)
In criminal cases, “[i]t is well settled that, as a general rule, inherently inconsistent
verdicts are allowed to stand. [Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has
explained: ‘[A] criminal defendant … is afforded protection against jury irrationality or
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error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial
and appellate courts. This review should not be confused with the problems caused by
inconsistent verdicts. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the
courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] This review should be independent of
the jury’s determination that evidence on another count was insufficient.’ ” (People v.
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656.) “An inconsistency may show no more than jury
lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the validity of a verdict.”
(Ibid.)
If the verdict in this case was inconsistent, such inconsistency would not be
grounds for reversal. We find, however, the verdict is not inconsistent and is supported
by substantial evidence.
On appeal, this court “ ‘must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We “examine the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that
a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify
the fact finder’s findings, a contrary finding reasonably reconciled with the circumstances
does not warrant reversal of the judgment.” (In re L.K. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1438,
1446.) “ ‘Unless it is clearly shown that “on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support the [jury’s] verdict[s,]” we will not reverse. [Citation.]’ ”
(People v. Perez (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)
Section 273a, subdivision (b), governing misdemeanor child endangerment, states
“[a]ny person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce
great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
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thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of
any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or
willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or
health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
In People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, the defendant was convicted of
child endangerment in violation of section 273a, subdivision (b), when officers
conducting a search of the defendant’s residence discovered an infant child, six months to
one year old, laying unsecured on a three-foot tall bed with no railing or restraints. (Id. at
p. 770.) Officers also found drugs and paraphernalia throughout the residence, which
was filthy and smelled of animal feces. (Ibid.) The appellate court found both the
infant’s unsecured location on the bed and the condition of the residence constituted
ample evidence the defendant willfully engaged in conduct that placed the child’s person
and health in danger. (Id. at p. 772.)
The evidence presented in this case showed the six-month-old infant was placed in
a car seat and left inside appellant and C.M.’s home. It is reasonable for a trier of fact to
conclude, as the trial court did, that such an act does not rise to the level of willfully
causing or permitting a child to be placed in a situation where the child’s person or health
is endangered. There was no evidence presented that appellant intended the child to be
left for an extended period of time, that the child was otherwise in an unsafe or unsecured
condition, or that the residence was unsafe.
Appellant argues that based on the verdict, logic dictates she left the residence
first, and C.M. followed, leaving the child alone. Because circumstances reasonably
justify the trial court’s factual findings, appellant’s contrary hypothesis, even if
reasonably reconciled with the circumstances, does not warrant reversal of the judgment.
(In re L.K., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1446.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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