ProcureNet Limited v. Twitter CA1/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/25/24 ProcureNet Limited v. Twitter CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
PROCURENET LIMITED et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
A168426
v.
TWITTER, INC. et al., (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CGC23605843)
Defendants and Appellants.
Plaintiffs ProcureNet Limited and Gurbaksh Chahal sued Twitter, Inc.
and X Corp. (Twitter) for breach of contract. Plaintiffs alleged that they
established accounts on Twitter’s online platform, and paid Twitter over $1
million under contracts for advertising to promote the accounts, and that
Twitter breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the
advertising contracts by suspending their online accounts “without adequate
justification,” thus depriving plaintiffs of the benefit of the advertising they
had purchased.
Twitter filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-
SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 The trial court applied the
1 “ ‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public
participation.’ ” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 381, fn. 1 (Baral).)
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
1
familiar two-step process in its analysis of the anti-SLAPP motion,
concluding that although Twitter met its burden in the first step to show that
plaintiffs’ claims arose from Twitter’s protected activity, plaintiffs met their
burden in the second step to show their claims had at least minimal merit.
(See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni)
[describing the two-step process].) It denied the motion.
Twitter now appeals. Neither ProcureNet nor Chahal filed a
respondent’s brief, so we decide the appeal on the record, Twitter’s opening
brief, and Twitter’s oral argument.2 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Complaint for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing
Plaintiffs allege that Chahal and the company he founded, ProcureNet,
launched the BNN Breaking News Network (BNN), for which they created a
central global account, @BNNBreaking, as well as more than 200 country-
specific accounts on Twitter’s online platform. The accounts covered COVID-
19 and global breaking news. ProcureNet also created two “corporate
accounts” on Twitter’s platform, one for itself and one for a company it owns,
2 After Twitter filed its opening brief on appeal, plaintiffs filed a
request in the trial court for dismissal without prejudice of the entire action.
The trial court clerk entered the dismissal that same day. In a subsequent
filing in this court, Twitter affirmed its intent to proceed with its appeal,
asserting that the purported dismissal is void on its face because the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to act while the appeal of the anti-SLAPP motion
was pending. (See Curtin Maritime Corp. v. Pacific Dredge & Construction,
LLC (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 651 [trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss
complaint after notice of appeal from order denying anti-SLAPP motion was
filed; dismissal was therefore void on its face and did not moot the appeal].)
2
and two “non-profit accounts” to promote a foundation created by Chahal.
Chahal also created a personal account on the platform.
Plaintiffs allege they entered into contracts with Twitter pursuant to
which they spent over $1 million for advertisements on Twitter’s platform to
promote the accounts. The contracts consist of Twitter’s “Master Services
Agreement” and insertion orders, which plaintiffs refer to collectively as the
“Advertising Contracts.”3
Plaintiffs allege that in June 2022, Twitter suspended all the BNN
accounts, claiming that the accounts violated that platform’s rules against
manipulation and spam. According to plaintiffs, the BNN accounts had not
violated any of Twitter’s rules, and instead had been the victims of a “ ‘mass
reporting’ attack” that was triggered by BNN’s reporting on statements made
by Lloyd Austin, the United States Secretary of Defense. The attack involved
third parties filing large numbers of false complaints about the BNN
accounts in order to trigger Twitter’s automated systems, which would
suspend or remove the targeted accounts. Plaintiffs contacted Twitter’s
support team with information about what had occurred, and although some
accounts were restored, they were soon suspended again. In mid-July 2022,
Twitter acknowledged to plaintiffs that some of the BNN accounts had been
incorrectly flagged as spam, but those accounts were then once again
suspended about two weeks later. By the end of July 2022, a majority of the
BNN accounts were suspended. Although plaintiffs allegedly provided
Twitter with “objective proof of third-party attacks” and detailed the events
that had occurred, Twitter failed to respond.
3 According to plaintiffs’ complaint, each advertising campaign is
reflected in an “insertion order.”
3
Plaintiffs also allege that starting in October 2022 the non-profit
accounts, Chahal’s personal account, and the corporate accounts were
suspended after they became the object of third-party attacks, and that in
each case, Twitter failed to reinstate the accounts despite receiving
information from plaintiffs about the third party attacks.
Plaintiffs allege four causes of action against Twitter for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Advertising Contracts:
one each for the BNN accounts, the corporate accounts, the non-profit
accounts, and Chahal’s personal account. As to each cause of action,
plaintiffs allege Twitter repeatedly breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in the Advertising Contracts by suspending their
accounts “without adequate justification”; by preventing them from using the
accounts that the advertising was intended to promote; by “failing to
adequately or meaningfully address and consider” their appeals from the
suspension of the accounts; by “failing to ensure that all necessary measures
were being taken” to safeguard the accounts; and by failing to follow Twitter’s
own internal rules, policies, and procedures. The result, plaintiffs allege, is
that they were deprived of the benefit of the Advertising Contracts and were
damaged.
B. Anti-SLAPP Motion
Twitter filed an anti-SLAPP motion supported by an attorney
declaration attaching copies of Twitter’s Master Services Agreement, User
Agreement, Terms of Service, Rules and Policies, and Platform Manipulation
and Spam Policy.4 Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion was supported by a
declaration from Chahal.
4 The record before us does not include the insertion orders that
plaintiffs allege are part of the Advertising Contracts. Twitter did not
4
The trial court denied Twitter’s motion after a hearing, and this appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he anti-SLAPP statute is
‘designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the
exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.
[Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike a
claim “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).)’ [Citation.] [¶] Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-
step process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing
that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in
which the defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that
does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show that the claim has
‘at least “minimal merit” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this
showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
1008-1009.)
In the first step of the analysis, the defendant must “ ‘demonstrat[e]
that the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits one of the categories spelled
out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 88.) Those categories include “any . . . conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
provide any insertion orders with its supporting declaration, and plaintiffs
allege that they are unable to retrieve the insertion orders because the
advertised accounts remain suspended.
5
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
The second step of the analysis has been “described . . . as a ‘summary-
judgment like procedure.’ [Citation.] The court does not weigh evidence or
resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual
showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s
evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if
it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with
the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ ” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp.
384-395, fn. omitted.) In seeking to show that a claim has merit, a plaintiff
“ ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must
be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Monster Energy Co. v.
Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.)
We review an order denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 de
novo. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn.
3.) We conduct an independent review of the entire record, “ ‘draw[ing]
“every legitimate favorable inference” from the [anti-SLAPP] plaintiff’s
evidence.’ ” (Roche v. Hyde (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 757, 787 (Roche).)
B. Step One: Protected Activity by Twitter
In the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Twitter has the burden to
demonstrate that plaintiffs’ claims arise from protected activity in connection
with an issue of public interest. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) We
conclude that burden has been met, as reflected in the trial court’s order:
“ ‘Where, as here, an action directly targets the way a content provider
chooses to deliver, present, or publish news content on matters of public
interest, that action is based on conduct in furtherance of free speech rights
6
and must withstand scrutiny under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.’
(Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2014) 742 F.3d 414, 424].)
“Here, [plaintiffs] allege that [Twitter] violated the implied covenant of
good faith and fear dealing by banning [p]laintiffs’ Twitter accounts. This is
a challenge to [Twitter’s] editorial decisions over its platform, which is
protected free speech. (See O’Handley v. Padilla (N.D. Cal. 2022) 579
F.Supp.3d 1163, 1186-1187 [‘Like a newspaper or news network, Twitter
makes decisions about what content to include, exclude, moderate, filter,
label, restrict, or promote, and those decisions are protected by the First
Amendment.’].)
“Further, the challenged conduct concerns matters of public interest.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the account suspensions occurred soon after
[p]laintiffs reported on statements made by the U.S. Department of Defense’s
Secretary Lloyd Austin which ‘generated widespread discussion and debate.’
(Compl. ¶ 48.) Indeed, other portions of the complaint detail the topics about
which [p]laintiffs’ accounts made posts, as well as their popularity. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 35-41, 87.)”
Accordingly, we move to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
C. Step Two: Plaintiffs’ Probability of Success
1. Plaintiffs’ Theory of the Case
Relying on the principle that “ ‘[i]n every contract there is an implied
covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the
contract’ ” (Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 488, 500
(Kendall)), plaintiffs argued in the trial court that even though Twitter’s
Terms of Service, which are purportedly incorporated into the Master
7
Services Agreement, expressly allow Twitter to suspend user’s accounts “for
any or no reason,” Twitter was nonetheless required to exercise any
discretion it may have had to suspend plaintiffs’ advertised accounts in good
faith and in accordance with fair dealing, which it failed to do. To support
their allegations of Twitter’s lack of good faith, plaintiffs provided a
declaration from Chahal, who stated that plaintiffs did not violate any of
Twitter’s terms of service, rules, policies or guidelines; plaintiffs presented
evidence to Twitter that the accounts had been targeted by third party
attacks; Twitter largely ignored plaintiffs’ communications; and plaintiffs
paid Twitter over $2 million to advertise their accounts, none of which was
refunded.
In the trial court, plaintiffs emphasized that they do not challenge
Twitter’s “right to terminate a free account, devoid of advertising or monetary
consideration, based solely on” Twitter’s general Terms of Service. (Italics
omitted.) Instead, plaintiffs argue that by purchasing advertising from
Twitter for their accounts, they acquired rights and reasonable expectations
that go beyond the rights of ordinary users of free services from Twitter for
which no consideration is paid. Plaintiffs argue that given the existence of
the Advertising Contracts, Twitter cannot terminate plaintiffs’ accounts if the
plaintiffs did not violate any of Twitter’s rules.
2. Twitter’s Step-Two Anti-SLAPP Arguments
Twitter raises four arguments on appeal to support its position that
plaintiffs failed to show that their claims have a probability of success. First,
plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230); second, plaintiffs’ implied covenant of good faith
claims are precluded by express contract provisions reserving Twitter’s right
to remove accounts for any or no reason; and third, Twitter’s First
8
Amendment right to decide what content it will permit on its platform cannot
be waived by an implied contractual provision. Twitter’s fourth argument is
that even if we reject its first three arguments, we should reverse because
plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden under the anti-SLAPP
statute to come forward with admissible evidence of breach of the implied
covenant. We decline to reach Twitter’s third argument, which was not
raised in Twitter’s trial court briefs or at the hearing on Twitter’s motion.
(See Newton v. Clemons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [“ ‘[g]enerally, issues
raised for the first time on appeal which were not litigated in the trial court
are waived’ ”].) We consider Twitter’s other arguments in turn.
a. The Communications Decency Act as a Bar to the Claims
Under the CDA, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).) The CDA
expressly preempts state law claims that are inconsistent with that
provision: “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”
(Id. § 230(e)(3).) “Read together these two provisions ‘protect from liability
(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff
seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3)
of information provided by another information content provider.’ ” (Murphy
v. Twitter, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 12, 24 (Murphy).)
Here, there is no dispute that Twitter is a provider of an interactive
computer service. (See Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 25 [Twitter’s
platform meets the description of an interactive computer service].) Further,
plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the suppression of information that
plaintiffs themselves provided, rather than information provided by Twitter,
9
which means that the claims concern “ ‘information provided by another
information content provider’ ” within the meaning of the CDA. (Id. at p. 31.)
However, the CDA is a bar to liability only when the duty the plaintiff
alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct
as a publisher or speaker. (Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d
1096, 1107 (Barnes).) As the Barnes court explained, the CDA “creates a
baseline rule: no liability for publishing or speaking the content of other
information [content] providers.” (Id. at p. 1108.) But to the extent the
provider of an interactive computer service makes “a promise with the
constructive intent that it be enforceable, it has implicitly agreed to an
alteration in such baseline.” (Id. at pp. 1108-1109.) Here, the duty Twitter
allegedly violated derives from its Advertising Contracts with plaintiffs, not
from Twitter’s status as a publisher of plaintiffs’ content. In other words, as
in Barnes, plaintiffs “do[ ] not seek to hold [Twitter] liable as a publisher or
speaker of third-party content, but rather as the counter-party to a contract,
as a promisor who has breached.” (Id. at p. 1107.) The breach here allegedly
consists of a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in
the Advertising Contracts.
In arguing that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the CDA, Twitter relies
on cases addressing purported contract claims that arise from the alleged
failure of an interactive service provider to comply with and enforce its
general policies and terms of service. (Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp.
22, 29-30 [CDA bars claims alleging Twitter breached its user agreement];
see also Prager University v. Google LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1037
[CDA bars claims alleging breach of implied covenant in YouTube’s terms of
service].) These cases, however, do not address claims that a provider
10
breached a separate enforceable agreement for which consideration was paid,
like the Advertising Contracts here.
Plaintiffs here allege that Twitter breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied in the Advertising Contracts, which required Twitter
to exercise its discretion to suspend the advertised accounts in good faith.
Because plaintiffs do not seek to hold Twitter liable “from any non-
contractual conduct or capacity,” but instead “as the counter-party to a
contract, as a promisor who has breached” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p.
1107), the CDA does not bar plaintiffs’ claims.
b. Express Contract Terms as a Bar to the Claims
We assume, without deciding, that the Master Services Agreement,
which is part of each of the Advertising Contracts, incorporates the provision
in Twitter’s Terms of Service that Twitter may suspend accounts “for any or
no reason,” and that the provision applies to advertised accounts. (Plaintiffs
argued in the trial court that such incorporation would be procedurally and
substantively unconscionable, and we do not address that issue here.)
Twitter cites several cases to support its argument that because the Terms of
Service expressly give Twitter the discretion to suspend accounts for any or
no reason, plaintiffs’ implied covenant claims must fail, because plaintiffs
seek to use the covenant to vary the express terms of their contracts with
Twitter. (See Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-350
[covenant “cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting
parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement”];
California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 217
[trial court erred in concluding that a $3 fee violated the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing where the agreement at issue specified the $3
fee].)
11
Plaintiffs’ position, as stated in its trial court brief, is that even if
Twitter has the right to terminate their accounts without justification,
Twitter must exercise that right in good faith. Thus, contrary to Twitter’s
characterization of their claim, plaintiffs do not seek to vary the express
terms of the Advertising Contracts, but instead seek to enforce the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as it applies to those express terms. Plaintiffs
contend that although Twitter may have had the right to terminate their
accounts, Twitter violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
terminating their accounts shortly after plaintiffs paid over $2 million to
advertise the accounts, by refusing to consider plaintiffs’ evidence of third
party attacks on the accounts, by refusing to communicate with plaintiffs,
and by refusing to refund any of the money plaintiffs paid for advertising.
(See Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Development
California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 372 (Carma) [“The covenant of good
faith finds particular application in situations where one party is invested
with a discretionary power affecting the rights of another. Such power must
be exercised in good faith”]; Kendall, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 503 [“[i]t is not a
rewriting of a contract . . . to recognize the obligations imposed by the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, which duty is implied by law in every contract”];
Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 923 [“ ‘where a
contract confers on one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the
other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in good faith and in
accordance with fair dealing’ ”].)
We find it significant that Twitter’s argument focuses entirely on the
discretion it has reserved in its Terms of Service and downplays the purposes
of the contracts at issue in this case, which concern the purchase of
advertising from Twitter to promote accounts on Twitter’s platform. As our
12
Supreme Court has explained, “the scope of conduct prohibited by the
covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the purposes and the express terms
of the contract,” and although it may be “a simple matter to determine
whether given conduct . . . is either expressly permitted or at least not
prohibited,” it may be difficult to “decid[e] whether such conduct . . . is
nevertheless contrary to the contract’s purposes and the parties’ legitimate
expectations.” (Carma, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 373.) This is not a case like
Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, on
which Twitter relies, where the Court of Appeal concluded there was no
breach of the implied covenant as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 1120.) Wolf
stands for the proposition that “if the express purpose of the contract is to
grant unfettered discretion, and the contract is otherwise supported by
adequate consideration, then the [exercise of discretion] is, by definition,
within the reasonable expectation of the parties and ‘can never violate an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’ ” (Id. at p. 1121.) The
contract in Wolf was an agreement that gave defendant the right to use
characters from a novel in a wide range of contexts, and by its terms
defendant was under no obligation to exercise any or all of the rights granted
to it, and could assign or license the rights it acquired as it “ ‘s[aw] fit.’ ” (Id.
at p. 1112.) The purpose of the contract in Wolf was to give defendant
unfettered discretion to make use of the novel’s characters. But the purpose
of the Advertising Contracts here was not to give Twitter discretion—its
purpose, as alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint, was to buy advertising for
plaintiffs’ accounts on Twitter’s platform.
13
In short, at this preliminary stage of litigation we do not conclude that
plaintiffs’ implied covenant claims are barred by the express terms of the
Advertising Contracts.5
c. Plaintiffs’ Evidence
Twitter contends that even if we reject its other arguments, we must
reverse the challenged order because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to come forward with
admissible evidence that in suspending their accounts Twitter did not
exercise its discretion in good faith.
First, Twitter contends that allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint
constitute binding judicial admissions that preclude plaintiffs from showing
that Twitter suspended their accounts in bad faith. At issue are allegations
that Twitter informed plaintiffs that the BNN accounts were suspended for
violating platform rules; that Twitter’s support team engaged with plaintiffs
in “marathon exchanges” concerning the suspension of the BNN accounts;
that Twitter later restored some BNN accounts but then resuspended them
based on Twitter’s claims that the accounts were violating platform rules;
and that after plaintiffs sent “thousands” of emails to Twitter support, as well
as emails to certain Twitter executives and receiving “no meaningful
response,” Twitter refused to reinstate the accounts, claiming that BNN had
engaged in persistent spam activity.
This argument is unpersuasive in the face of Chahal’s declaration,
based on his personal knowledge, that plaintiffs did not violate any of
Twitter’s platform rules with respect to any of the suspended accounts; that
5 Because our decision, unlike the trial court’s, does not rest on a
determination that the Advertising Contracts would be illusory absent an
implied covenant, we need not address Twitter’s arguments as to that issue.
14
plaintiffs presented Twitter with what they considered “compelling evidence”
of third-party attacks on the suspended accounts; and that Twitter did not
timely respond to that evidence and ultimately refused to reinstate the
accounts. At this stage in the proceedings, that evidence, which we accept as
true and from which we draw all reasonable favorable inferences, is enough
to show that plaintiffs’ claims that Twitter acted in bad faith have at least
minimal merit. (Roche, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 787.) Plaintiffs’
allegations that Twitter claimed the accounts were in violation of the
platform’s rules are not admissions that defeat plaintiffs’ claims, because an
allegation that Twitter asserted that it had cause for suspending the accounts
does not equate to an allegation that Twitter in fact had cause for acting as it
did.
Twitter also argues that Chahal’s sworn statements that Twitter
suspended plaintiffs’ accounts “without cause or justification” lack
foundation. But Chahal’s statement that the accounts did not violate
Twitter’s rules supports an inference that Twitter lacked justification or
cause for suspending the accounts. Twitter argues that plaintiffs failed to
specify the “compelling evidence” they purportedly presented to Twitter that
their accounts had been subject to a third-party attack, and that Chahal’s
declaration does not show he has “personal knowledge of the inner workings
and procedures of Twitter.” True. Even so, Chahal’s declaration and the
inferences it supports suffice as evidence to show that plaintiffs’ claims have
the minimal merit required to survive an anti-SLAPP motion.
DISPOSITION
The challenged order is affirmed.
15
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A168426, ProcureNet Limited et al. v. Twitter, Inc. et al.
16