People v. Garcia CA2/4 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/25/24 P. v. Garcia CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B325388
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA381662)
v.
PETER IGNACIO GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David R. Fields, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Peter Garcia appeals from an order denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate
counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed a supplemental brief. We
review the contentions appellant raises in his supplemental brief
and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2012, appellant was charged in an amended information
with murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count one), evading an officer with
willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count two), and
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), count
three). As relevant here, the information further alleged in count
one that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subds.
(b), (c), and (d)).
The underlying facts presented at trial are discussed in
detail in this court’s prior nonpublished opinion, People v. Garcia
(June 18, 2015, B250582). We briefly discuss them here to
provide context for the trial court’s ruling. We otherwise do not
rely on this factual background in resolving the issues presented
in this appeal. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) It was undisputed at
trial that appellant shot the victim as she ran across the street,
hitting her in the back and fatally wounding her. It was also
undisputed that at some point earlier in the day, the victim shot
appellant’s sister in the leg, but the precise timing and location of
that shooting were subject to conflicting evidence at trial. The
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
prosecution’s case therefore focused on proving that appellant
chased and shot the victim with the malice required for murder,
while appellant argued that he acted in self-defense or defense of
others.
In October 2012, a jury acquitted appellant of murder on
count one, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and found true the
applicable enhancement that appellant personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury also convicted appellant on counts
two and three. Appellant admitted the allegations regarding his
prior serious felony convictions. The court sentenced him to 40
years to life. A different panel of this court affirmed appellant’s
conviction. (People v. Garcia, supra, B223214).
In January 2022, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2
The court appointed counsel for appellant. The People opposed
the petition, arguing that appellant was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because his jury was not instructed on the theories
of natural and probable consequences or felony murder. Instead,
the People asserted that the “sole theory of liability pursued by
the People at trial was that the petitioner harbored an intent to
kill when he personally used a firearm to shoot” the victim. The
People attached as exhibits this court’s opinion from appellant’s
direct appeal, the verdict forms, and the jury instructions from
the trial. Appellant did not file a reply brief.
The superior court denied the motion on the grounds that
appellant failed to demonstrate prima facie entitlement to relief.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
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At the hearing on the petition, the court noted that no jury
instructions were given regarding natural and probable
consequences, felony murder, or aiding and abetting. The court
concluded that appellant was the “direct perpetrator” and
therefore that he failed to make the requisite prima facie showing
for relief under section 1172.6.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s appointed attorney filed a brief raising no
issues and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court advised appellant of
his right to file a supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 231-232), and appellant did so. We evaluate the
arguments set forth in that supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232
[“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or
letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written
opinion”].)
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly engaged in
fact finding when concluding that he was not entitled to relief at
the prima facie stage. He does not elaborate on this contention,
apart from citing the general principles set forth in People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). We find no error. The trial
court expressly relied on the record, including the jury
instructions and verdict forms, to find that appellant was the
actual shooter and that the prosecution had not proceeded under
either a natural and probable consequences or a felony murder
theory. This was proper at the prima facie stage. (See Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [“[I]f the record, including the court’s
own documents, ‘“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
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the petition,”’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’” at the prima facie
stage.].)
Appellant also contends that the jury was instructed under
a natural and probable consequences theory. He attaches a copy
of CALCRIM No. 520, which identifies the elements of “First or
Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought.” The
instruction includes language that the defendant acted with
implied malice if “1. He intentionally committed an act; 2. The
natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to
human life; 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was
dangerous to human life; AND 4. He deliberately acted with
conscious disregard for human life.”
Although the instructions for implied malice murder
include the words “natural and probable consequences,” implied
malice and the natural and probable consequences theory are
distinct concepts. “Whereas implied malice is based on ‘the
“natural and probable consequences” of a defendant’s own act,’
the natural and probable consequences doctrine [abrogated by
Senate Bill 1437] was ‘a theory of vicarious liability under which
“[a]n aider and abettor [was] guilty not only of the intended, or
target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the target
crime actually commit[ted] (the nontarget crime)”’—including
murder— ““that [was] a natural and probable consequence of the
target crime.”’ [Citation.] ‘Because a nontarget murder “‘[was]
unintended, the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to
that offense [was] irrelevant and culpability [was] imposed
simply because a reasonable person could have foreseen the
commission of the [murder].”’’” [Citation.] (People v. Rivera
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 231–232, fn. omitted (Rivera),
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abrogated on another ground in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.)
Senate Bill 1437 “‘abolished the natural and probable
consequences doctrine’ as a theory of vicarious liability, [but] ‘it
maintained the viability of murder convictions based on implied
malice, and the definition of implied malice remains unchanged.’”
(Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 232.)
As such, although the jury here was instructed on the
elements of murder, including implied malice, the trial court did
not instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Similarly, the prosecution did not advance any theory
of accomplice liability, but argued only that appellant was
directly liable as the actual shooter. Nothing in the record
suggests appellant was charged or convicted under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or any other theory in which
malice was imputed to him. For these reasons, the trial court
was correct in concluding appellant was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J. MORI, J.
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