Cal. Specialty Insulation, Inc. v. Allied World Surplus Lines Ins. ( 2024 )

Filed 5/17/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
CALIFORNIA SPECIALTY B324805
INSULATION, INC.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
21STCV06969)
v.
ALLIED WORLD SURPLUS
LINES INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed.
Horvitz & Levy, Andrea L. Russi, Mitchell C. Tilner,
Karen M. Bray; Selman Leichenger Edson Hsu Newman &
Moore, Gregory J. Newman and Hee Sung Yoon for Defendant
and Appellant.
Berman Berman Berman Schneider & Lowary, Spencer A.
Schneider and Karen E. Adelman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
This case centers on a commercial general liability
insurance policy that Allied World Surplus Lines Insurance
Company (Allied World) issued to California Specialty Insulation,
Inc. (CSI). CSI filed an action for declaratory relief after Allied
World refused to defend and indemnify CSI against a negligence
claim following a construction site accident. The parties dispute
whether one of the policy’s exclusions from coverage for bodily
injury liability applies under these circumstances.
The policy excludes from coverage bodily injury to the
employees of any “contractor.” The term “contractor” is not
defined in the policy. Allied World contends the term is
unambiguous and the exclusion precludes coverage for the
negligence claim in question. CSI takes the opposite view. It
argues the term is ambiguous and the exclusion does not apply to
the negligence claim.
After the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, the trial court ruled in CSI’s favor, granting its motion
and denying Allied World’s. The court determined the term
“contractor” in the disputed exclusion was ambiguous, and
ultimately construed the term in CSI’s favor. We reach the same
conclusion as the trial court. The term “contractor” in the
disputed exclusion is ambiguous. Based on CSI’s objectively
reasonable expectations, the exclusion does not apply to the
negligence claim in question. Therefore, we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Negligence Claim
In 2017, a real property owner retained Air Control
Systems, Inc. (Air Control) to perform improvement work at a
building in Los Angeles. Air Control later retained CSI to install
duct insulation as part of the project.
In 2019, Jason Standiford, an Air Control employee, filed a
personal injury complaint against CSI, asserting one cause of
action for general negligence. Standiford alleged he suffered
physical injuries in 2017 when he fell 16 to 20 feet after a CSI
employee drove a scissor lift into a ladder he was standing on.
B. The Insurance Policy
At the time of Standiford’s accident, CSI was insured
through a commercial general liability insurance policy from
Allied World. Under the policy, Allied World agreed to “pay those
sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of ‘bodily injury’ . . . to which this insurance
applies.” The policy stated Allied World had a duty to defend CSI
“against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages,” but also that Allied
World had no duty to defend against a suit to which the policy did
not apply.
As an addition to the list of exclusions from coverage for
bodily injury liability, the policy set forth an endorsement titled
“Bodily Injury to Any Employee or Temporary Worker of
Contractors Exclusion” (Contractor Exclusion). Relevant here,
the Contractor Exclusion stated the policy did not apply to
“‘Bodily injury’ . . . to any ‘employee’ or ‘temporary worker’ of any
contractor or subcontractor arising out of or in the course of the
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rendering or performing services of any kind or nature by such
contractor or subcontractor.” Neither the endorsement nor the
policy as a whole defined the term “contractor.”
C. The Coverage Action
CSI tendered its defense in Standiford’s action to Allied
World. Allied World accepted the defense without reserving any
rights, and retained counsel filed an answer on CSI’s behalf.
Allied World later withdrew its defense, asserting the Contractor
Exclusion precluded any defense or coverage obligation.
In February 2021, CSI filed a complaint for declaratory
relief. CSI sought to establish that under the policy Allied World
had duties to defend and indemnify CSI in the Standiford action.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, for
which they stipulated to the relevant facts. In their motions, the
parties narrowed their dispute to whether the Contractor
Exclusion applied for purposes of the Standiford action.
The trial court granted CSI’s motion and denied Allied
World’s. The court determined the Contractor Exclusion did not
apply because the terms “contractor” and “subcontractor” were
ambiguous and meant, in line with CSI’s reasonable
expectations, “CSI’s contractor or subcontractor, i.e., a contractor
or subcontractor retained by CSI.” Because CSI did not retain
Air Control, the court continued, Standiford was not an employee
of a contractor or subcontractor within the meaning of the
exclusion and CSI was entitled to the declaratory relief it sought.
The court entered judgment in favor of CSI.
Allied World timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” (Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; see Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c) & (f).) We review a ruling on
summary judgment de novo. (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021)
12 Cal.5th 29, 39.)
This appeal requires us to interpret an insurance policy.
“In general, interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of
law that is decided under settled rules of contract interpretation.”
(State of California v. Continental Ins. Co. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 186,
194; accord, Yahoo Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. etc. (2022)
14 Cal.5th 58, 67 (Yahoo Inc.) [“‘“While insurance contracts have
special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary
rules of contractual interpretation apply.”’”].) “‘Our goal in
construing insurance contracts, as with contracts generally, is to
give effect to the parties’ mutual intentions. [Citations.] “If
contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.”
[Citations.] If the terms are ambiguous [i.e., susceptible of more
than one reasonable interpretation], we interpret them to protect
“‘the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured.’”
[Citations.] Only if these rules do not resolve a claimed
ambiguity do we resort to the rule that ambiguities are to be
resolved against the insurer. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The ‘tie-
breaker’ rule of construction against the insurer stems from the
recognition that the insurer generally drafted the policy and
received premiums to provide the agreed protection.” (Minkler v.
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Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2010) 49 Cal.4th 315, 321 (Minkler).)
“To further ensure that coverage conforms fully to the objectively
reasonable expectations of the insured, the corollary rule of
interpretation has developed that, in cases of ambiguity, basic
coverage provisions are construed broadly in favor of affording
protection, but clauses setting forth specific exclusions from
coverage are interpreted narrowly against the insurer. The
insured has the burden of establishing that a claim, unless
specifically excluded, is within basic coverage, while the insurer
has the burden of establishing that a specific exclusion applies.”
(Id. at p. 322.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary
Judgment in Favor of CSI
The parties agree that the property owner hired Air
Control to complete certain improvement work and that
Standiford was performing such work as an employee of Air
Control at the time of his accident. There is also no dispute that
Standiford’s negligence claim falls within the scope of the policy’s
general protection from bodily injury liability. But the agreement
ends there. Allied World argues it does not have a duty to defend
or indemnify CSI in Standiford’s action because the Contractor
Exclusion applies and thus precludes any defense or coverage
obligation. CSI contends the opposite is true.
The parties’ dispute turns on the language of the
Contractor Exclusion and specifically its term “contractor.” 1 CSI
1 While the trial court also addressed the undefined term
“subcontractor” in its summary judgment ruling, the parties focus
6
asserts the term is ambiguous and that its objectively reasonable
expectations, as the insured, establish that the exclusion does not
apply. Allied World argues the term is unambiguous and that,
even if it is ambiguous, CSI’s reasonable expectations support
application of the exclusion. The trial court agreed with CSI’s
position. We do as well.
1. The undefined term “contractor” in the
Contractor Exclusion is ambiguous
The Contractor Exclusion states in relevant part that the
policy does not cover “‘[b]odily injury’ . . . to any ‘employee’ or
‘temporary worker’ of any contractor . . . arising out of or in the
course of the rendering or performing services of any kind or
nature by such contractor . . . .” While the policy does not define
“contractor,” that alone does not make the term ambiguous.
(See State of California v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 55 Cal.4th
at p. 195.) Rather, the term is ambiguous only if “‘it is capable of
two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.’” (Ibid.)
Allied World contends the term “contractor” unambiguously
means anyone who has “contracted to work on a construction
project.” It cites dictionary definitions, arguing these show “the
ordinary and popular meaning of ‘contractor’ is a person who has
signed a contract to perform repair or improvement work,
typically on a construction project.” (See Coast Restaurant
Group, Inc. v. Amguard Ins. Co. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 332, 339
[“we may resort to dictionary definitions, taking care to ‘consider
the policy context in which the word or term was used and
solely on the term “contractor” before this court. Thus, we too
will limit our focus to the term “contractor.”
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attempt[ing] to put [our]self in the position of a layperson and
understand how he or she might reasonably interpret the
particular language’”].) CSI concedes Allied World’s definition is
reasonable, but argues the term “contractor” can also be
reasonably read as “anyone hired by the insured pursuant to
contract.” CSI contends this more narrow reading of the term is
consistent with the policy as a whole, particularly a separate but
similar exclusion from coverage for bodily injuries of employees
(but not contractors) of the insured. (See Minkler, supra,49 Cal.4th at p. 322 [“The existence of a material ambiguity in
the terms of an insurance policy may not, of course, be
determined in the abstract, or in isolation. The policy must be
examined as a whole, and in context, to determine whether an
ambiguity exists.”].) For its part, the trial court determined both
of these interpretations were reasonable, explaining the term
could also reasonably mean “any party to a contract” or “a person
in contractual privity with the insured.”
Allied World argues that, in crediting all four of these
interpretations as reasonable, the trial court strained to find
ambiguity and ultimately erred by failing to apply the “clear and
explicit” language of the exclusion. In making this argument,
Allied World focuses on the modifier “any,” contending its
placement next to “contractor” establishes the exclusion “is not
limited to a subset of contractors, such as those hired by CSI.”
Rather, Allied World argues, the full phrase “any contractor”
shows the exclusion applies to employees of “every contractor” or
“all contractors.” Emphasizing that point, Allied World asserts
the word “‘any’ illuminates the meaning of ‘contractor’” in so far
as the word “signals that injuries to an employee of a
8
‘contractor’—however reasonably defined—are excluded from
coverage.”
This argument is not persuasive. As an initial matter, we
disagree with Allied World’s suggestion that, regardless of the
precise definition of “contractor,” the exclusion will apply because
the exclusion states it applies to “any contractor.” For example, if
we find CSI’s preferred interpretation reasonable and agree with
its position that the term “contractor” means “anyone hired by
CSI pursuant to contract,” the exclusion does not apply.
Moreover, in stressing the importance of “any,” Allied World
avoids the primary issue of how to define “contractor.” Allied
World is correct that the phrase “any contractor” is
interchangeable with the phrases “every contractor” and “all
contractors.” But none of these phrases helps resolve the
ambiguity in so far as the term “contractor” remains undefined
and subject to multiple reasonable interpretations. (See North
American Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.
(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 627, 641 [explaining the word “any” did
not help interpret an undefined policy term, “capacity,” that “any”
modified].)
As for the definition of ”contractor,” each side acknowledges
that no published California case has interpreted the specific
exclusion language at issue here. In lieu of a California case, the
trial court found persuasive the analysis in U.S. Liability Ins. Co.
v. Benchmark Const. Services, Inc. (1st Cir. 2015) 797 F.3d 116(Benchmark). 2 In Benchmark, homeowners hired Benchmark as
2 The First Circuit applied Massachusetts law in Benchmark.
(Benchmark, supra, 797 F.3d at p. 119.) That law is without
meaningful difference from the California law we apply here. (Id.
at pp. 119-120.)
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a general contractor to renovate their home, as well as an
architect to design the renovation plans. (Benchmark, at p. 118.)
The architect in turn hired a painter, and the painter’s employee
was injured while working on the project. (Ibid.) After the
employee sued Benchmark for negligence, Benchmark tendered
its defense to its insurer, U.S. Liability Insurance Company
(USLIC). (Ibid.) In the ensuing coverage action, Benchmark and
USLIC disagreed on whether the undefined term “contractor”
was ambiguous in an exclusion that precluded coverage for
“‘Bodily injury’ to any . . . ‘employee’ . . . of any contractor . . .
arising out of . . . rendering services of any kind . . . for which any
insured may become liable in any capacity.” (Id. at pp. 118-119.)
USLIC argued that the term unambiguously meant “anyone with
a contract.” (Id. at p. 123.) Benchmark, on the other hand,
argued the term meant “someone with a contract with the
insured,” or rather someone it hired that was not a Benchmark
employee. (Ibid.) Facing these different interpretations, the
First Circuit determined the term was ambiguous because it was
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation: “We are
persuaded that reasonably intelligent people may differ about the
meaning of the word ‘contractor,’ and hence the word is
ambiguous. ‘Anyone with a contract’ is surely a reasonable
definition of the word ‘contractor,’ as the district court found, but
so is a more narrow definition focused on the contractual
relationship of the injured party and the insured.” (Id. at p. 124,
fn. omitted.)
The Contractor Exclusion, including its term “contractor,”
mirrors the relevant policy language in Benchmark. Both
exclusions preclude coverage for bodily injury suffered by an
employee of any contractor that occurs during the employee’s
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work for the contractor. Like the insurer in Benchmark, Allied
World contends “contractor” unambiguously means anyone
performing work with a contract. While that broad reading is
reasonable, so too is CSI’s more narrow interpretation that the
term means anyone CSI hired by contract other than its
employees. 3
Unlike Benchmark, which neatly fits the factual
circumstances here, the cases Allied World cites from other
jurisdictions are distinguishable. (See Capitol Specialty Ins.
Corp. v. Ortiz (S.D.Fla. Apr. 20, 2018, No. 17-23329-CIV)
2018 WL 7291057 (Capitol Specialty); Essex Ins. Co. v. RHO
Chemical Co., Inc. (N.D.Ill. 2015) 145 F.Supp.3d 780 (Essex).)
Capitol Specialty and Essex each involved a policy that excluded
coverage for bodily injury to employees of “any contractor.”
(Capitol Specialty, at p. *4; Essex, at pp. 785-786.) Like here, the
exclusions in Capitol Specialty and Essex used the term
“contractor” apparently without providing a definition. (Capitol
Specialty, at p. *4; Essex, at p. 786.) Neither court found the
term ambiguous. (Capitol Specialty, at p. *5; Essex, at pp. 789-
790.) But in each case, and unlike here, the insured had hired
the injured party’s employer. (Capitol Specialty, at p. *4; Essex,
at pp. 785, 791.) Thus, unlike CSI, the insureds in Capitol
Specialty and Essex were not able to argue the term “contractor”
could reasonably mean “anyone hired by the insured pursuant to
3 Allied World tries to distinguish Benchmark on the ground
that the First Circuit addressed a second ambiguity within the
disputed exclusion. We agree with the trial court, however, that
nothing in Benchmark shows this other ambiguity affected the
First Circuit’s resolution of the ambiguity in the term
“contractor.”
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contract.” Even with that meaning, the injured party’s employer
would constitute a contractor and the exclusion would apply. To
that end, the court in Capitol Specialty noted its decision was
consistent with Benchmark, explaining the insured defendants
“have not presented a reasonable interpretation [of the term
‘contractor’] that would provide coverage.” (Capitol Specialty, at
p. *5.)
Allied World also cites a different federal district court case
that came to the opposite conclusion as Benchmark insofar as it
determined the phrase “any independent contractor [or]
subcontractor” was not limited to independent contractors or
subcontractors hired by the insured. (See James River Ins. Co. v.
Keyes2Safety, Inc. (N.D.Ill. July 24, 2012, No. 11-901) 2012
WL 3023334, at p. *3.) The court in James River did not consider
whether the undefined terms “independent contractor” and
“subcontractor” were ambiguous, and instead followed the
Seventh Circuit’s direction that “clear and unambiguous” terms
“must be applied as written.” (Id. at p. *4, citing BASF AG v.
Great American Assur. Co. (7th Cir. 2008) 522 F.3d 813, 819.)
Notably, the district court in Benchmark found the term
“contractor” was unambiguous, and cited James River to support
its conclusion that “any contractor” meant “anyone with a
contract” because “[t]he term ‘any’ is plain and unambiguous and
the Court is not permitted to alter that meaning.” (See U.S.
Liability Ins. Co. v. Benchmark Construction Services, Inc.
(D.Mass. 2014) 31 F.Supp.3d 315, 321, revd. (1st Cir. 2015)
797 F.3d 116.) As discussed, and inherent in the First Circuit’s
reversal of that decision, when the word “any” modifies an
undefined term, its utility in defining that term is limited at best.
(See North American Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Fireman’s
12
Fund Ins. Co., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 641.) Ultimately,
because the term here is subject to multiple reasonable
interpretations, we, like the trial court, decline to follow
James River.
We also reject Allied World’s contention that CSI seeks to
improperly insert words into the Contractor Exclusion by
defining “contractor” as “anyone hired by CSI pursuant to
contract.” CSI is not rewriting the policy by offering a reasonable
interpretation of an undefined term. It is instead providing
reasonable meaning to policy language where that meaning is
otherwise uncertain. The same is true for every reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous term, including Allied World’s
reading of the term “contractor” to mean “anyone contracted to
work on a construction project” or anyone “who has signed a
contract to perform repair or improvement work, typically on a
construction project.”
In sum, the term “contractor,” as used in the Contractor
Exclusion, is susceptible of more than one reasonable
interpretation. These interpretations include the parties’
respective readings of “anyone performing construction work
pursuant to contract” and “anyone hired by CSI pursuant to
contract.” Because reasonable people may differ as to the
meaning of the term “contractor,” the term is ambiguous.
2. Based on CSI’s objectively reasonable
expectations, the Contractor Exclusion does not
apply in this case
To resolve the ambiguity in the term “contractor,” we must
interpret the term in a manner that protects the insured’s
objectively reasonable expectations. (Minkler, supra, 49 Cal.4th
13at p. 321.) To do that, we examine the term in context and
interpret the exclusion narrowly against the insurer. (Id. at
p. 322.)
As noted, CSI contends the term “contractor” means anyone
CSI hired other than its employees. CSI contends this narrower
reading of the term best aligns with its objectively reasonable
expectations as the insured. Namely, CSI explains that in
purchasing the policy it expected to be “protected from liability
for accidental bodily injury arising out of the conduct of its
insulation business, unless the injury was sustained either by a
CSI employee or by an employee of a CSI contractor.” For the
uncovered injuries, CSI notes, it maintained workers’
compensation insurance and had the ability to require the same
form of insurance be maintained by anyone it hired to perform
work on its behalf. In contrast, CSI continues, it “could not
exercise the same control over all contractors in the world and
thus had no objectively reasonable expectation that injuries to
contractors unrelated to CSI would be excluded from coverage.”
CSI contends these expectations are consistent with, and
supported by, the purpose of commercial general liability
insurance.
This logic once more echoes the analysis in Benchmark.
Faced with the same ambiguity, the First Circuit addressed the
insured’s reasonable expectations in light of the purpose of
commercial general liability insurance. (Benchmark, supra,797 F.3d at pp. 122, 124.) The court explained this form of
insurance is meant “‘to protect the insured against losses to third
parties arising out of the operation of the insured’s business,’”
emphasizing that “[t]he relationship of the injured party to the
insured is at the core of this type of ‘broad coverage.’” (Id. at
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p. 122, quoting 9A Couch on Insurance (3d ed. 2014) §§ 129:1,
129:2.) If “contractor” broadly meant “anyone with a contract,”
the court explained, it would make “‘a dice roll of every bodily
injury claim, based on whether the injured party happened to be
working under any contract no matter how attenuated to the
insured’s work.’” (Benchmark, at p. 124.) The court stated it was
“unable to discern any reason why the parties would have
contracted for coverage to depend on the coincidence of an injured
party’s contractual obligations in the world at large.” (Ibid.;
see also United States Liability Ins. Co. v. WW Trading Co., Inc.
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2018, No. 16-CV-3498 (CBA) (JO)) 2018
WL 6344641, at p. *14 [citing Benchmark while interpreting a
similar exclusion, and stating, “Why would an insurance policy
exclude coverage for individuals injured by [the insured] based
solely on whether they are an employee or contractor of a
random, third party (say Wal-Mart or Goldman Sachs)? The
Court can see no reason.”].)
The same analysis applies here. As the California Supreme
Court has stated, a commercial general liability policy is meant to
“‘“provide the insured with the broadest spectrum of protection
against liability for unintentional and unexpected personal injury
or property damage arising out of the conduct of the insured’s
business.”’” (MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2003)
31 Cal.4th 635, 654; see id. at p. 649 [the insuring language of a
commercial general liability policy “‘connotes general protection
for alleged bodily injury caused by the insured’” and “establishes
a reasonable expectation that the insured will have coverage for
ordinary acts of negligence resulting in bodily injury”].)
Consistent with that purpose, it would be objectively reasonable
for an insured to interpret an exclusion that removed coverage for
15
contractors’ employees’ bodily injuries as being limited to those
contractors that the insured hired and not contractors in the
world at large. As the court in Benchmark concluded, “[a]
reasonable insured would expect the contractual relationship
between the insured and the injured party to govern the
applicability of an employer’s liability exclusion to a given
injury.” (Benchmark, supra, 797 F.3d at p. 124.)
Defining the term “contractor” more narrowly also
comports with the policy as a whole. With this reading, the
Contractor Exclusion aligns with the separate “Employer’s
Liability Exclusion,” which states the policy does not cover work-
related bodily injuries of employees of the insured. Thus, read
together, the exclusions separately apply to preclude coverage for
injuries of employees of the insured (Employer’s Liability
Exclusion) and injuries of employees of the insured’s contractors
(Contractor Exclusion)—that is, as CSI points out, injuries the
insured can alternatively cover through its workers’
compensation insurance or the workers’ compensation insurance
of anyone it hires to perform work on its behalf. Moreover, as
CSI also points out, reading “contractor” to mean “anyone with a
contract,” as Allied World proposes, would render the Employer’s
Liability Exclusion surplusage because CSI would qualify as a
contractor for which the Contractor Exclusion would apply.
(See Yahoo Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 69 [“Courts will favor an
interpretation that gives meaning to each word in a contract over
an interpretation that makes part of the writing redundant”];
see also ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property &
Casualty Ins. Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1785 [“In
California, however, contracts—even insurance contracts—are
construed to avoid rendering terms surplusage”].)
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Allied World argues this surplusage concern is unfounded
because the policy does not refer to CSI as a “contractor” and
instead uses the words “you” and “your” to refer to the named
insured. But Allied World does not cite anything in the policy’s
provisions that precludes describing CSI with other terms. And
the language in the policy implies CSI is a “contractor.” For
example, under an “Additional Insured” endorsement, the policy
explains the insurance afforded to additional insureds does not
apply to bodily injury occurring after “[t]hat portion of ‘your work’
out of which the injury or damage arises has been put to its
intended use by any person or organization other than another
contractor or subcontractor engaged in performing operations for
a principal as a part of the same project.” (Italics added.) In this
context, the phrase “another contractor” clearly means a
contractor in addition to CSI.
In sum, based on the reasonable expectations of the
insured, “contractor,” as it is used in the Contractor Exclusion,
means “anyone hired by the insured pursuant to contract,” or
more simply, “CSI’s contractor.” Under this definition,
Standiford was not a contractor’s employee because CSI did not
hire his employer, Air Control. Therefore, the Contractor
Exclusion does not apply to preclude Allied World’s defense and
coverage obligations for purposes of Standiford’s negligence
claim.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. CSI is entitled to recover its
costs on appeal.
RAPHAEL, J. *
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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