Weiblen v. Bowie CA1/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/26/24 Weiblen v. Bowie CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CATHERINE WEIBLEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165577
v.
RONALD BOWIE, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FFL160059)
Defendant and Appellant.
Ronald Bowie appeals from a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) issued against him under the Domestic Violence Protection Act
(DVPA, Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) after an evidentiary hearing. Because he
fails to show error by the trial court, we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Request for Protective Order
In February 2022, Catherine Weiblen filed a request for DVRO against
Bowie, alleging under penalty of perjury that in the course of an argument
around Christmas 2021, Bowie pushed her, resulting in her slipping and
falling; that during another argument on January 29, 2022, he yelled at her,
threatened to pull a mounted TV onto her, and hit the door while continuing
to yell at her, which made her fear for her safety; and that after the second
incident Bowie harassed her by text and phone, and became angry and
aggressive, which made her afraid physical violence would follow.
1
The court issued a temporary restraining order, and scheduled a
hearing, which was continued to June 7, 2022. In advance of the hearing,
Bowie filed a response in which he stated under penalty of perjury that he
had not abused Weiblen and there had never been any domestic violence
between them.
B. June 7, 2022 Evidentiary Hearing
Weiblen represented herself at the hearing; Bowie was represented by
counsel at the hearing, but represents himself on appeal. Weiblen offered her
own testimony as well as testimony from her mother and the parties’
roommate. Bowie was his only witness.
1. Weiblen’s Testimony
In response to questions from the court, Weiblen stated that she did not
wish to add anything to her request at that time, and that she was still
seeking a protective order.
On cross-examination by Bowie’s counsel, Weiblen testified that she
and Bowie had dated for 13 years, but were no longer together, having ended
their relationship on January 29, 2022. At the time of the December 2021
and January 2022 incidents described in her request for order, she and Bowie
shared a home. She testified that around Christmas in December 2021, she
“slipped and fell when [Bowie] pushed me” in the chest. She suffered “just a
bruise.” She and Bowie had been arguing, but she could not recall what they
were arguing about; “possibly” it was about money. Bowie was not working
and received social security; she had a full-time job. She testified that she
and Bowie were “in each other’s personal space,” and that she had “pushed
him.” Their roommate came in after Weiblen fell and tried to break up the
argument, which was still going on. Weiblen admitted to pushing Bowie a
2
year or two before Christmas 2021, and 13 years ago at the “very beginning”
of their relationship.
Weiblen further testified that from December 2021 into January 2022
she and Bowie “argued about several things,” including a car accident he had
and a related insurance issue. She testified that “[t]he pressure was getting
angrier and was getting more often,” and that on January 29 they were
“arguing pretty heavily,” and Bowie started arguing with their roommate,
and “showed violence by punching a hole in the bedroom door.”
After the cross-examination, the court asked Weiblen whether she had
anything to add. Weiblen testified, “I still kind of fear [Bowie] being around,”
stating that Bowie was not “very physical with me, but it was just his actions
towards me, his anger, his unpredictability toward the end.”
2. Roommate’s Testimony
The parties’ roommate testified that around Christmas 2021 “there was
a lot of yelling and arguing” between Weiblen and Bowie, “and I heard it get
physical so I tried to get to them and stop them.” She testified that she came
out of her room, and saw Weiblen on the kitchen floor.
She testified that on January 29, 2022, Bowie and Weiblen were
arguing and Bowie came into her room “in a very irate manner and started
yelling at me.” Bowie and Weiblen were still yelling at each other between
the roommate’s room and Weiblen’s, and at some point Weiblen “yelled
something that got him to leave me alone for a second, and he went into her
room and he threatened to pull the TV off the wall on top of her.” He then
came back to the roommate’s room, and “got in my face.” She testified that
although Bowie did not hit her she “felt the threat of being hurt” so she fled
the house.
3
She testified that she never saw Bowie and Weiblen hit each other, but
they often argued. She had heard Bowie “arguing about the fact he felt he
shouldn’t have to pay anything to live there,” and that “he didn’t want any
bills in his name.”
3. Weiblen’s Mother’s Testimony
Weiblen’s mother testified that in February 2022, she received a text
from Weiblen stating that Bowie was at the house and would not leave her
alone. Weiblen’s mother told Weiblen to come to her house, but then, when
she heard nothing further from Weiblen, she called Weiblen and got no
answer. She testified that she was worried, and went to Weiblen’s house,
where she heard Bowie yelling. She banged on the door; Bowie let her in; and
Weiblen was crying.
4. Bowie’s Testimony
Bowie testified that there was never any domestic violence in his
relationship with Weiblen and that he never “laid a finger” on her. Asked
about the events of December 2021, he testified “There was no incident that
day,” and they were not arguing.
He also testified that on Christmas 2021 he pushed Weiblen out of the
way to stop her from running into him because she “ran in my face and [was]
screaming at me” after he asked her for the bills that were in his name.
He testified that from December 2021 to January 2022, he and Weiblen
had arguments, but he never threatened to harm her. He testified that over
the course of their relationship, Weiblen had hit him “maybe three, four
times,” and that he never argued with Weiblen about anything other than the
car accident, which occurred in November 2020. After the accident, he found
out that there was no insurance on his car, even though Weiblen had told him
there was insurance. He asked Weiblen for the policy, and she never gave it
4
to him. He also testified that he was upset because he was not receiving
information about bills that he was supposedly paying.
He testified that on the day Weiblen’s mother arrived at the house, he
was asking Weiblen “for all the bills that are in my name, I am paying for.”
5. Trial Court Ruling
At the close of testimony, the court heard argument from Bowie’s
counsel. Then the court stated that, “having heard the testimony today,
[and] having read the paperwork,” it found “sufficient basis to grant a
Restraining Order After Hearing.”
The court issued a restraining order against Bowie to remain in effect
for three years, and Bowie timely appealed. Weiblen has not filed a
respondent’s brief, and oral argument has been waived. Therefore, we decide
the appeal on the record and Bowie’s opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.220(a)(2).)
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
The DVPA was enacted “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse,
and sexual abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6220.)1 The DVPA authorizes the trial
court to issue an order “to restrain any person for the purpose specified in
Section 6220 if [evidence] shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable
proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) “Abuse” is defined to
include “any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to section
6320” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4)), and “is not limited to the actual infliction of
physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) Section 6320 authorizes the
court to issue an order enjoining several types of conduct including “striking,”
“threatening,” and “disturbing the peace of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd.
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Family Code.
5
(a).) “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct that, based
on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of
the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) The “conduct may be committed directly
or indirectly, including . . . by . . . telephone [or] text messages.” (Ibid.)
“We review an order granting a protective order under the DVPA for
abuse of discretion. ([In re Marriage of] Nadkarni [(2009)] 173 Cal.App.4th
[1483,] 1495.) In considering the evidence supporting such an order, ‘the
reviewing court must apply the “substantial evidence standard of review,”
meaning “ ‘whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted,’ supporting the trial court’s finding.
[Citation.] ‘We must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the
correctness of the trial court’s findings . . ., resolving every conflict in favor of
the judgment.’ ” ’ [Citation.]’ (Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1140, 1143.)” (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th
1416, 1424.)
B. Evidence to Support the Trial Court Order
Bowie argues on appeal that the trial court’s order is not supported by
substantial evidence, contending that the trial court erred by treating a
“common argument” as domestic violence; by ignoring evidence of abuse
perpetrated by Weiblen and evidence that would support denying the request
for order; and by disregarding purported inconsistencies between the
allegations in Weiblen’s request for order and testimony offered at the
hearing. The arguments lack merit.
A trial court is authorized to “issue a DVRO to prevent domestic
violence based upon reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (In re
Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 228.) The record
here includes evidence that in the course of one argument, which started over
6
“something small,” Bowie yelled and screamed at Weiblen and called her
names; that they “were both in each other’s personal space”; that she pushed
him; and that he pushed her so that she slipped and fell and suffered a
bruise. There was evidence that during a subsequent argument, Bowie
threatened to pull a mounted TV onto Weiblen, which made her fear for her
safety, and that he punched a hole in a door. There was evidence that Bowie
kept texting and calling Weiblen; that she regarded his conduct as harassing;
and that his “angry and aggressive” behavior made her afraid that he would
be physically violent. There was evidence that Bowie’s anger and
unpredictability made Weiblen afraid to be around him. All of this
constitutes substantial evidence that Bowie had abused Weiblen by
threatening her and disturbing her peace. (§§ 6203, subds. (a)(4), (b); 6300,
subd. (a); 6320, subds. (a), (c).) Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to
issue a DVRO against Bowie.
It is irrelevant that there may be evidence in the record that would
support a denial of Weiblen’s request for order. The issue before us is not
whether there is evidence to support a different finding from the one the
court made, but only whether there is some evidence in the record which, if
believed, would support the court’s finding. (Verrazono v. Gehl Company
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 636, 652.) Bowie fails to show that the trial court
abused its discretion in issuing the DVRO.
C. Purported Bias
Bowie argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court exhibited
bias toward him and his counsel, and that he was denied his constitutional
due process right to an impartial judge and a fair hearing. He contends that
the trial court committed misconduct by “persistently [making] discourteous
and disparaging remarks to defense counsel,” by improperly overruling his
7
counsel’s objections, by failing to entertain a legitimate objection, and by
taking inconsistent positions with respect to the need for offers of proof.
Bowie failed to raise any claims of bias or misconduct below, as he
acknowledges. “Only claims of ‘pervasive judicial bias’ are preserved in the
absence of an objection, on the ground that objection in that instance may be
futile.” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 799.) We have reviewed
the 46-page Reporter’s Transcript, and find no evidence of bias, much less
pervasive bias.
Bowie cites no specific example of a discourteous or disparaging remark
made by the trial court to his attorney, and we have found none. As for
objections to evidence, even if we assume that all the objections made by
Bowie’s counsel were well-taken, erroneous rulings by a trial court do not in
themselves constitute the appearance of bias. (Blakemore v. Superior Court
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 59.) We see no indication that the court’s adverse
legal rulings on the objections made by Bowie’s counsel reflect personal bias
or a failure by the trial court to apply the rules of evidence. “ ‘[W]e presume
. . . that the court . . . is able to distinguish admissible from inadmissible
evidence, relevant from irrelevant facts, and to recognize those facts which
properly may be considered in the judicial decisionmaking process.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526.) “These
presumptions are based on the difference between lay jurors and judges:
‘ “The juror does not possess that trained and disciplined mind which enables
him . . . to discriminate between that which he is permitted to consider and
that which he is not. Because of this lack of training, he is unable to draw
conclusions entirely uninfluenced by the irrelevant prejudicial matters within
8
his knowledge.” ’ ”2 (Ibid.) The fact that the trial court here may have heard
inadmissible evidence “is not sufficient to overcome these presumptions.”
(Ibid.) Bowie does not argue that the trial court relied on any improper
evidence or testimony in reaching its decision, and we see nothing in the
record to suggest that the trial court did so.
Nor does anything in the transcript suggest that the trial court failed to
rule on any objection. In the part of the transcript that Bowie cites to support
his contention, the court responded to a hearsay objection by stating, “Your
continuing objection is understood.” By this, the trial court was overruling
the objection, while recognizing counsel’s right to make the objection and
preserving the objections for appeal.
And we are not persuaded that the trial court demonstrated any
inconsistency or bias with respect to requiring offers of proof. When Weiblen
sought to introduce testimony from her mother, Bowie’s counsel asked for an
offer of proof, stating, “I never heard of this person.” The court agreed, and
Weiblen provided a brief explanation, which apparently did not entirely
satisfy the court, because the court then asked Weiblen a further question.
The answer to that question established relevance to the court’s satisfaction,
and the testimony was permitted. Later in the hearing, after Bowie’s counsel
had elicited extensive testimony from Bowie about financial issues between
Bowie and Weiblen, the court eventually interrupted, stating “This is about
domestic violence, this is not about a civil claim, so I am having a hard time
seeing the relevance.” After a brief colloquy, Bowie’s counsel said he would
link the testimony to an argument that occurred, and the court allowed the
2 The trial court alluded to this distinction between juror and judge
when it told Bowie’s counsel that although it understood the concerns
underlying his objections, “[t]his is not a jury trial, this is a trial before the
Court.”
9
examination to continue. Nothing about either exchange suggests bias on the
part of the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The June 7, 2022 restraining order is affirmed.
10
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.
_________________________
Mayfield, J.*
A165577, Weiblen v. Bowie
* Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
11