People v. Monroe CA2/6 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/26/24 P. v. Monroe CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B319165
(Super. Ct. No. 2017003525)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
ALAYNA MARIE MONROE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Alayna Marie Monroe appeals from the judgment after she
was found guilty at a court trial of misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter. She contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
find her guilty of this lesser included offense after acquitting her
of the greater offense pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1118. She
also contends the trial court erred when it considered evidence of
alcohol consumption, excluded expert testimony, and precluded
her from presenting evidence of a sudden emergency. We affirm.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alayna Monroe (Monroe) and her wife, Heather Monroe,2
celebrated New Year’s Eve in Hollywood. After they left the
nightclub, Monroe began driving them home to Simi Valley in
their Toyota Scion. Heather slept on the reclined front passenger
seat.
Monroe exited the 118 freeway at Sycamore. As she drove
southbound on Sycamore, she failed to stop for a red light and
entered the intersection with Cochran Street. She collided with a
Nissan Maxima that had a green light and was traveling
eastbound on Cochran. The front of the Scion hit the driver’s side
of the Maxima, injuring its driver and passenger. Both vehicles
suffered major damage.
The Scion was traveling at 38 miles per hour at the time of
the collision. It left no skid marks or brake marks. A bystander
removed Heather from the vehicle.
Heather suffered broken ribs, damage of the spinal cord
where it enters the skull and tearing of the aorta from the heart.
The parties stipulated she died from blunt force trauma in
connection with the collision.
Detective Corey Baker testified Monroe’s breath smelled of
alcohol, her eyes were bloodshot and watery, and she displayed
horizontal gaze nystagmus (the involuntary jerking of one’s eyes
when gazing to the side). Monroe stated she drank champagne
and a double shot of whiskey at the nightclub.
About an hour and forty minutes after the collision, Monroe
gave breath tests showing 0.078 and 0.077 percent alcohol. A
blood sample taken about half an hour later had an alcohol
2 To avoid confusion, we refer to Heather by her first name.
No disrespect is intended.
2
concentration of 0.082 percent. Based on the time of drinking,
driving pattern, objective symptoms, and test results, a forensic
scientist calculated her blood alcohol level at the time of the
collision as 0.114 percent, and concluded she would be impaired
while driving.
During his contact with Monroe on the day of the crime,
Detective Baker did not have probable cause to believe she was
under the influence. But after he spoke to the forensic scientist
and reviewed the blood alcohol results, Baker formed the opinion
she had been driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of
the collision.
The information charged Monroe with vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated, without gross negligence
(§ 191.5, subd. (b)).3 It also alleged that Monroe inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and proximately caused
bodily injury to more than one victim (the occupants of the other
vehicle) (Veh. Code, § 23558). The parties waived jury trial and
the case was tried to the court.
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, the court
tentatively granted the section 1118 motion for acquittal. The
court stated it had a reasonable doubt as to whether Monroe was
under the influence at the time of the collision based on whether
3 The charged offense is an alternative misdemeanor-felony
(“wobbler”) offense (§ 191.5, subds. (b) & (c)(2); see § 17, subds. (a)
& (b)), but for simplicity we refer to it as “felony vehicular
manslaughter.” We refer to the lesser included offense, vehicular
manslaughter without gross negligence and without an allegation
of intoxication (§ 192, subd. (c)(2)) as “misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter” because it is a straight misdemeanor. (§ 193,
subd. (c)(2); see § 17, subd. (a).)
3
her body had absorbed the alcohol. The court later granted the
section 1118 motion as to the felony and denied it as to the lesser
included offense of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (c)(2)).
After the defense case, the court found Monroe guilty of the
misdemeanor lesser included offense. The court placed Monroe
on probation for one year with terms including 180 days in jail.
The court stayed the jail time pending appeal.
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction to find lesser offense
Monroe contends the court had no jurisdiction to find her
guilty of a lesser offense after acquitting her of felony vehicular
manslaughter. We disagree.
In a court trial, section 1118 requires the court to acquit
the defendant of “one or more of the offenses charged” if the
prosecution has not proven the offense in its case-in-chief.
The trial court here confirmed that it acquitted Monroe
only of the charged offense, not the lesser included offense, and
therefore retained jurisdiction. When the court tentatively
granted the section 1118 motion, the prosecutor argued “the 1118
analysis doesn’t end with a yes, no,” but “turns to the lesser
includeds” [sic]. The court stated it was “unpersuaded to deviate
from [its] tentative ruling on the main charge, not the lesser
included.” The prosecution argued that if the section 1118
motion were granted, it “would then leave us with the issue of the
lesser included.” The court agreed. Defense counsel
acknowledged “we’re now going to have a misdemeanor case.”
The court granted the section 1118 motion “as to the felony count
and not as to the lesser included.”
When the court grants an acquittal at the end of the
4
People’s case, it retains jurisdiction to substitute a lesser
included offense for the trier of fact’s consideration. (People v.
Powell (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 304, 311 (Powell).) Powell allowed
the jury to convict for the lesser offenses of misdemeanor driving
under the influence of alcohol after the court granted a section
1118.1 motion acquitting the defendant of the charged wobbler
offenses of driving under the influence causing injury. (Powell, at
pp. 307, 310-311.) As here, the trial court in Powell stated its
intention to proceed on the lesser offenses “[a]s part of the same
colloquy” in which it found the evidence insufficient for the
charged offenses. (Id. at p. 313.)4
Monroe contends that Powell is inapposite because the
prosecution there inquired about amending the information to
add the lesser included offenses. (Powell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th
at p. 310.) But it is not necessary to amend an accusatory
pleading to add a lesser included offense. “[T]he stated charge
notifies the defendant, for due process purposes, that he must
also be prepared to defend against any lesser offense necessarily
included therein, even if the lesser offense is not expressly set
forth in the indictment or information.” (People v. Birks (1998)
4 Because Powell was a jury trial, section 1118.1 applied. It
requires the court to acquit at the end of the People’s case if the
evidence is insufficient under the appellate substantial evidence
standard. (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261.) The
corresponding provision for a court trial is section 1118, which
requires acquittal at the end of the People’s case if the court is
not convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Andre G.
(1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 62, 66.) The distinction between the two
sections is not relevant to whether the court has jurisdiction to
convict of a lesser offense after an acquittal on the greater
offense.
5
19 Cal.4th 108, 118.) Following a successful motion for acquittal
of a charged offense, “amendment of an accusatory pleading is
not necessary in order to convict a defendant of a necessarily
lesser included offense.” (People v. Meyer (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d
496, 507.)
Monroe also argues that Powell does not apply because the
section 1118.1 motion there was granted for only two counts and
the court retained jurisdiction to try additional charges pleaded
in the information. (Powell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.)
But the Court of Appeal did not rely on that circumstance when it
permitted trial on the lesser included offenses. Instead, it ruled
that the trial court was not prohibited “from taking even a single
breath between indicating an intent to dismiss and allowing the
prosecution to proceed” on lesser included offenses. (Id. at p.
313.) Here, as in Powell, the trial court acknowledged the
prosecution could proceed on the lesser included offense when it
acquitted Monroe of the charged offense. Because the court
informed the parties the acquittal was limited to the greater
offense and did not apply to the lesser included offense,
jurisdiction was proper.
Evidence of alcohol consumption
Monroe contends the trial court erred when, after
acquitting her of felony vehicular manslaughter, it denied her
motion in limine to exclude evidence she consumed alcohol. We
review de novo Monroe’s claim that admission of the evidence
was barred by issue preclusion and collateral estoppel. (People v.
Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1017; Johnson v.
GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507.)
Misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(2))
requires proof that (1) while driving a vehicle, the defendant
6
committed a misdemeanor or infraction, or committed “a lawful
act in an unlawful manner” (i.e., with ordinary negligence); (2)
the misdemeanor, infraction, or otherwise lawful act “was
dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its
commission”; and (3) it “caused the death of another person.”
(CALCRIM No. 593; People v. Bussel (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th Supp.
1, 6, 8-10.) Felony vehicular manslaughter additionally requires
proof of driving under the influence or with a blood alcohol level
of 0.08 percent or more. (People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569,
574, fn. 1.)
The prosecution’s theory was that Monroe was negligent
per se by running a red light (Veh. Code, § 21453, subd. (a)) or,
alternatively, by “ordinary negligence.” The trial court ruled that
alcohol consumption was relevant to Monroe’s “general caution
that night” and “general willingness to be careful.”
In our view, whether the trial court had a reasonable doubt
that Monroe was under the influence of alcohol for purposes of
felony vehicular manslaughter did not preclude it from
considering alcohol consumption as part of the evidence
regarding her negligence and running a red light. This is not a
case “where all of the essential elements of the crime of which the
defendant was acquitted are identical to some or all of the
essential elements of the crime of which he was convicted.”
(People v. Hamilton (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 124, 130.)
Evidence of alcohol use may be relevant to the negligence
element of vehicular manslaughter, even when the defendant is
not charged with vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.
(People v. Ho (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 408, 415.) In Ho, the trial
court properly admitted evidence the defendant consumed alcohol
and drugs the night before the accident in a prosecution for
7
vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence (§ 192, subd.
(c)(1)). The evidence there was relevant to gross negligence, even
though no alcohol registered in the defendant’s system 95
minutes after the fatal collision, and the police officer noticed no
signs of intoxication. (Ho, at pp. 411-415.) Here, Monroe had
alcohol in her system hours after the crash, which was relevant to
whether driving without stopping for the red light was dangerous
to human life. (See People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1038
[trier of fact should consider level of intoxication regarding
negligent driving].)
Collateral estoppel applies to “issues argued and decided in
prior proceedings” and “the decision in the former proceeding
must be final and on the merits.” (Lucido v. Superior Court
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) The doctrine applies to “ ‘an issue
“ ‘necessarily decided in [prior] litigation . . . in a subsequent
lawsuit.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Quarterman (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280,
1288.) The acquittal of felony vehicular manslaughter here did
not preclude evidence of intoxication in the same trial.
People v. Henley, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, upon which
Monroe relies, is inapposite. There, in ruling on a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6, the finding that
defendant personally used a firearm was erroneous because it
was contrary to the jury’s not-true finding on the allegation of
gun use. (Henley, at p. 1007.) But here, a reasonable doubt
whether Monroe met the level of intoxication necessary for felony
vehicular manslaughter was not inconsistent with the red light
violation. As the court noted, alcohol consumption was relevant
to Monroe’s “general caution that night” and “general willingness
to be careful.”
8
Expert testimony
Monroe contends the trial court erroneously excluded the
testimony of her biomedical engineering expert, Jamie R.
Williams, Ph.D., and her paramedic expert, John Everlove, on the
issue of guilt. “A trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether to admit expert testimony and its ruling will be reversed
on appeal only where the record reveals an abuse of discretion.”
(People v. Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1205.) There was
no abuse of discretion here.
Dr. Williams testified that if Heather had been sitting
upright, she would not have sustained the fatal injuries. She
concluded, however, that “if there was no collision . . . I would not
expect her to have sustained these injuries.”
Everlove testified the standard of care for removing a
patient from a vehicle to avoid neurological harm would include
using an immobilization collar, backboard, and the “jaw thrust
method” of pushing the jaw upward independent of the rest of the
head. But Everlove did not claim the bystander’s conduct caused
Heather’s injuries.
After hearing the proffered testimony of Dr. Williams and
Everlove, the court ruled, “nothing in [their] testimony supports a
finding that the defendant’s conduct was not a substantial factor
in causing the victim’s demise; therefore, the testimony, while
admissible on issues of possible mitigation, is not admissible on
the issue of defendant’s criminal liability.”
Dr. Williams’s testimony was properly excluded because it
did not negate Monroe’s negligence as a cause of death. The
defendant’s act need not be the sole cause of death, but need only
be a substantial, non-trivial factor in causing the death.
(CALCRIM No. 620; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 155-
9
156.) “This is true even if the victim’s preexisting physical
condition also was a substantial factor causing death.” (Catlin, at
p. 155; People v. Wattier (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948, 953 [victim’s
failure to wear seat belt irrelevant to vehicular manslaughter].)
Here, Monroe’s negligent driving through the red light caused the
collision, which was a substantial factor in Heather’s death, even
if Heather’s reclining position was also a factor. Heather’s
reclined position would not have resulted in her death if the trip
had reached its destination without the collision.
Nor was Everlove’s testimony relevant to guilt. “ ‘If a
person inflicts a dangerous wound on another, it is ordinarily no
defense that inadequate medical treatment contributed to the
victim’s death.’ ” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1215.)
The trial court properly excluded Everlove’s testimony on the
issue of guilt because it did not support a conclusion that the
collision was an insubstantial factor in causing Heather’s death.
We reject Monroe’s contention that exclusion of the expert
testimony denied her “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.’ ” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690
[error to exclude testimony of circumstances of confession].) The
purported defense here is that Heather’s death was not
“reasonably foreseeable.” (See People v. Nicolas (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1165, 1175.) But Dr. Williams’s testimony did not
establish that Heather’s death was an unforeseeable consequence
of Monroe driving through a red light into an intersection at 38
miles per hour, regardless of Heather’s reclining position. And
Everlove’s negligent treatment of the injury (if that occurred) “ ‘is
a foreseeable intervening cause’ ” that did not negate Monroe’s
conduct as a cause of death. (People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d
229, 240.)
10
Monroe also makes an undeveloped claim that exclusion of
the evidence undermined the “ ‘ “integrity of the fact-finding
process.” ’ ” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295
[cross-examination and impeachment of witness denied].) But
the Supreme Court has “never questioned the power of States to
exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that
themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if
the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted.”
(Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 690.) The proffered
testimony was not relevant to show the collision was not “a
substantial factor” in causing the death (People v. Catlin, supra,26 Cal.4th at p. 155), or any other fact relevant to guilt.
Sudden emergency doctrine
Monroe contends the “exclusion” of the sudden emergency
doctrine violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. We find no error.
“ ‘A person who, without negligence on [their] part, is
suddenly confronted with unexpected and imminent danger,
either to [themselves] or to others, is not expected, nor required,
to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of [them]
in the exercise of ordinary care, in calmer and more deliberate
moments. [Their] duty is to exercise only the care that an
ordinarily prudent person would exercise if confronted with the
same unexpected danger, under the same circumstances.’ ”
(People v. Boulware (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269, italics omitted
[driver swerved to avoid collision]; CALCRIM No. 593.)
Monroe contends she was confronted with a “sudden
emergency” because the victim regurgitated prior to impact. The
evidence established the victim vomited in the car, but not when
it occurred. Monroe identifies nothing in the record to show her
11
attention was diverted by the regurgitation. The court concluded
it was not a reasonable explanation for the collision because
Monroe never mentioned it during her “long and detailed
interview” with police. Instead, the only explanation she gave for
the accident was a claim the other car turned in front of her.
Monroe contends she was prevented from testifying about
the cause of the accident. But Monroe waived her right to testify
and the trial court found her waiver to be knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. Monroe said she did not testify based on the
court’s ruling allowing evidence of her alcohol consumption.
Because we conclude the trial court’s ruling regarding evidence of
drinking was not erroneous, Monroe’s tactical decision to not
testify did not “prevent” her from testifying.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed and order staying the jail term is
vacated.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P.J.
CODY, J.
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David R. Worley, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Richland & Associates and Felipa R. Richland for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and David F. Glassman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.