People v. Castaneda CA2/6 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/26/24 P. v. Castaneda CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B328158
(Super. Ct. No. 2020016395)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
JESUS ZAVALA
CASTANEDA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jesus Zavala Castaneda1 appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of committing two counts of lewd acts on a
child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,2 § 288, subd. (a)) and found
true allegations that the victim, V.M., was particularly
1 We note that appellant’s last name is spelled “Castaneda”
in the record and the parties’ briefs and “Casteneda” in the
abstract of judgment.
2
Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)) and that
Castaneda took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to
commit his crimes (id., rule 4.421(a)(11)). The trial court
sentenced him to eight years in state prison.
Castaneda contends: (1) the prosecutor’s closing argument
was deceptive, (2) there was insufficient evidence that count 1
occurred on a specific date, and (3) the trial court erred in
instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 regarding child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Molestation of V.M.
V.M. is Castaneda’s niece. She and her mother, M.C., lived
with Castaneda until December 2018, when V.M. was in the
seventh grade. After they moved, M.C. would drop V.M. off at
Castaneda’s house so she could take the bus to school.
In June 2019, Castaneda molested V.M. while she was
taking a morning nap. Castaneda came into the room she was
sleeping in, rubbed her feet, and moved his hand up her leg
towards her hips. He then moved his hand under her shirt,
massaged her breast, and started moaning. He looked at V.M.’s
crotch and asked her if she wanted him to touch her vagina.
V.M. declined. Castaneda had asked V.M. if she wanted him to
get food for her. V.M. said yes and waited for Castaneda to
return with it. Castaneda told V.M. not to tell anyone and that
he wouldn’t do it again.
V.M. said that Castaneda had massaged her breasts prior
to June 2019. She testified that Castaneda’s massages “would
start with [her] back and . . . go under [her] shirt. He would . . .
pass his hand through [her] bra strap . . . and then . . . would flip
[her] around and massage . . . [her] stomach and . . . breasts.”
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CSAAS expert
The prosecution’s expert, Dr. Lauren Maltby, testified that
CSAAS provides a framework to help understand the behaviors
of child abuse victims. These behaviors include accommodation,
including spending time with the abuser and relying on them to
meet certain needs, and delayed disclosure. Dr. Maltby did not
interview V.M. or any witnesses or attorneys about the facts of
this case, nor did she review any police reports. She said CSAAS
“should not be used as a way to measure or determine if a child
has been sexually abused.”
Verdict and sentencing
The jury convicted Castaneda of both counts of lewd acts,
concluding that he committed count 1 between November 1, 2018,
and June 12, 2019, and that he committed count 2 between June
1 and 12, 2019. The jury also found true that V.M. was
particularly vulnerable and that Castaneda took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence to commit his crimes. The trial
court sentenced him to eight years in state prison (the middle
term of six years for count 1, plus a consecutive two years for
count 2).
DISCUSSION
Prosecutor’s statements during closing argument
Castaneda first contends the prosecutor made deceptive
statements in his closing argument regarding CSAAS. He claims
the prosecutor “boldly asserted” V.M. was a victim of sexual
abuse because she acted consistent with CSAAS. The Attorney
General counters that Castaneda forfeited this contention by not
objecting during the trial court proceedings. We agree with the
Attorney General.
“ ‘ “ ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to this
[c]ourt than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other
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sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the
failure to make [a] timely assertion of the right before a tribunal
having jurisdiction to determine it.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Harrison
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1229.) “ ‘To preserve such a claim for
appeal, “a criminal defendant must make a timely and specific
objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to
disregard the impropriety.” ’ [Citation.] The lack of a timely
objection and request for admonition will be excused only if either
would have been futile or if an admonition would not have cured
the harm. [Citation.]” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 171
(Powell).)
Here, Castaneda did not object to any portion of the
prosecutor’s closing argument. Nor has he shown that it would
have been futile to object. His failure to do so forfeits the issue on
appeal. (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 171; People v. Seumanu
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328, fn. 7.)
Castaneda also forfeited his contention by failing to comply
with applicable rules of appellate procedure. “[A]n appellant
must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court
to search the record and the law books to test [their] claim. The
appellant must present an adequate argument[,] including
citations to supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the
record.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 547, 557.) This is because “the judgment challenged
on appeal is presumed correct,” requiring an appellant “to
affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) The California Rules of Court thus
require appellate briefs to “[s]tate each point . . . and support
each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”
and to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a
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citation to the volume and page number of the record where the
matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).)
Because he does not cite the record and his briefs are replete with
unsupported legal and factual assertions, Castaneda has further
forfeited his contention challenging the prosecutor’s closing
argument.
Date of offense for count 1
Castaneda next argues count 1 should be reversed because
there was insufficient evidence the offense occurred on a specific
date. He claims V.M. could not remember the specific incidents
of sexual abuse before the June 2019 incident. The Attorney
General maintains the prosecution need not establish the exact
date of the offense. The Attorney General is correct.
“The precise time at which the offense was committed need
not be stated in the accusatory pleading, but it may be alleged to
have been committed at any time before the finding or filing
thereof, except where the time is a material ingredient in the
offense.” (§ 955.) “ ‘The law is clear that, when it is charged that
an offense was committed “on or about” a named date, the exact
date need not be proved unless the time “is a material ingredient
in the offense” [citation], and the evidence is not insufficient
merely because it shows that the offense was committed on
another date.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 1013, 1022.) One exception is for evidence of an alibi
defense, which requires proof of an exact date for an offense.
(People v. Barney (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 490, 497.)
Here, count 1 alleged Castaneda committed a lewd act on
V.M. between November 2018 and June 2019. Because
Castaneda did not raise a defense of alibi or lack of opportunity
(People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1304), the specific
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date of that offense was not a “material ingredient” (§ 955). The
prosecutor thus did not have to establish the exact date of the
offense. Moreover, the jury instructions and corresponding
verdict forms were clear that count 1 was based on conduct
alleged to have occurred before June 2019. We presume the jury
understood the instructions. (People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107 (Coffman and Marlow).)
Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s finding that
the conduct underlying count 1 occurred before June 2019. V.M.
testified that the conduct underlying count 2 occurred in June
2019, after she and her mother moved out of Castaneda’s home.
She also testified that Castaneda massaged her breasts other
times before June 2019. That is consistent with count 1
occurring between November 2018 and June 2019. We thus
conclude a rational trier of fact could find Castaneda guilty of
count 1. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
CALCRIM No. 1193
The trial court instructed jurors pursuant to CALCRIM No.
1193: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Lauren Maltby.
[¶] . . . [¶] Dr. Lauren Maltby’s testimony about [CSAAS] is not
evidence that [Castaneda] committed any of the crimes charged
against him. [¶] . . . [¶] You may consider this evidence only in
deciding whether or not [V.M.’s] conduct was consistent with the
conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating
[her] believability.”
On appeal, Castaneda challenges the trial court’s use of
CALCRIM No. 1193, contending it allowed testimony regarding
CSAAS to be used as proof he molested V.M. Our division has
previously rejected similar arguments regarding this instruction
(see, e.g., People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473-474;
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People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504), and we do so
again given Castaneda’s attack on V.M.’s credibility. During
closing, for example, Castaneda argued that V.M.’s failure to
report the abuse to her mother was “significant.” He also argued
it was incredulous for V.M. to be abused and then accept food
from him.
The instruction was also proper. Dr. Maltby testified that
she had no knowledge about the facts of this case and that
CSAAS could not be used to prove Castaneda’s guilt. And the
trial court instructed jurors that they “alone must judge the
credibility or believability of the witnesses” and that they could
“disregard any [expert] opinion that [they found] unbelievable,
unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.” (See CALCRIM
Nos. 105, 332.) Again, we presume the jury understood and
followed these instructions. (Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34
Cal.4th at p. 107.) There was no error. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
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Anthony J. Sabo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Nancy J. Mazza for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.