People v. Baca CA6 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/20/24 P. v. Baca CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H050920
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. CR14981)
v.
DAVID ALLEN BACA,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of
Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
special circumstance murder committed in 1989 when he was 23 years old. According to
the record, defendant confessed to killing his aunt and sexually assaulting her dead body.
In 2023, defendant moved for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261, at which he could collect and preserve evidence pertaining to his youth at
the time of the offense. The trial court denied the motion because under Penal Code
section 3051, subdivision (h), a person “sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18
years of age” is not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing. Defendant’s sole
contention on appeal is that Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h) violates the equal
protection clauses of the United States and California constitutions, and the case should
be remanded for a Franklin hearing.
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), which was decided after the
completion of briefing in this case, the California Supreme Court found a rational basis
for Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h)’s exclusion of young adult offenders
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. We requested supplemental
briefs addressing the impact of Hardin on defendant’s claim of an equal protection
violation, and defendant correctly notes in supplemental briefing that this court is bound
to follow Hardin. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.) Defendant nonetheless argues that because Hardin conceded his equal protection
claim was subject to rational basis review, the Supreme Court’s use of that standard there
does not preclude us from applying defendant’s preferred strict scrutiny standard in this
case.
The question of what equal protection standard to apply was not discussed at
length in Hardin given the parties’ agreement on that issue. (See Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848.) But the California Supreme Court cited People v. Chatman
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, a case in which rational basis review was applied to evaluate the
constitutionality of a law prescribing different collateral consequences for different types
of criminal convictions. (Hardin, at p. 847.) The Supreme Court also quoted People v.
Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838, in which it stated that a defendant “ ‘does not have
a fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment[.]’ ” (Hardin, at pp. 847–848.)
We read the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardin as establishing that defendant’s equal
protection claim is properly subject to rational basis review, and we would reach the
same conclusion ourselves based on other Supreme Court precedent. As we are not
persuaded that a different standard should apply here, the result in Hardin is dispositive.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
2
____________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________
Bromberg, J.
H050920
People v Baca