Rossa v. Blue Bird Body Co. CA1/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/23/24 Rossa v. Blue Bird Body Co. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DANIEL ROSSA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A165728
v.
BLUE BIRD BODY COMPANY, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 18CIV05767)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Personal injury plaintiff Daniel Rossa appeals the trial court’s order
quashing service of summons on school bus manufacturer Blue Bird Body
Company (Blue Bird) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Blue Bird cross-
appeals the court’s ruling on its objections to some of Rossa’s evidence.
The trial court did not err concluding it lacks personal jurisdiction over
Blue Bird. Accordingly, we affirm.1
1We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background
because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know,
“the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness
of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
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DISCUSSION
Rossa is a California resident who brought suit against out-of-state bus
manufacturer Blue Bird and others for injuries he sustained when his leg
was severely injured by the retractable electrical steps of a bookmobile. Blue
Bird manufactured and sold the bus chassis out of state to a third party,
OBS, Inc., which modified the bus by installing the electrical steps and
converted it into a bookmobile before selling it in California to Rossa’s
employer. (Rossa v. Blue Bird Body Co. (June 29, 2021, No. A160544)
[nonpub. opn.] (Rossa I).)
This is the second time the personal jurisdiction issue has been before
us. Blue Bird moved to quash service of summons, contending it was not
amenable to suit in California. In the prior appeal, we reversed the trial
court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over Blue Bird and remanded Blue
Bird’s motion to quash for further proceedings. (See Rossa I, supra,
A160544.)
We presume the parties’ familiarity with the law and facts stated in our
prior opinion and summarize the opinion here briefly. As we explained, “a
state may exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant ‘if the
defendant has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum
[citation], and the litigation results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or
relate to” those activities.’ ” (Rossa I, supra, A160544.)
In reversing the trial court’s ruling in the prior appeal, we held first
that Rossa had satisfied the first prong of the jurisdictional analysis, by
showing Blue Bird had purposefully availed itself of a California forum.
(Rossa I, supra, A160544.) We rested this conclusion on undisputed evidence
that Blue Bird had a “significant and deliberate commercial presence” in
California, including evidence of three employees in California “including one
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who, by all accounts, appears to have been involved in repairing the very
vehicle at issue here,” evidence of Blue Bird’s nationwide online marketing,
and evidence of its network of relationships with authorized dealers and
service centers within California. (Ibid.)
But we remanded Blue Bird’s motion to quash for further proceedings
on the second prong of the jurisdictional analysis: that is, whether there is a
sufficient nexus between Blue Bird’s contacts with California and Rossa’s
lawsuit. (Rossa I, supra, A160544.)
We did so because the trial court had not reached that issue, and while
the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co.
v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351 (Ford Motor
Co.) had clarified the “arise out of or relate to” standard of the second prong.
(See Rossa I, supra, A160544.) We discussed and examined Ford Motor Co.
at length and, for brevity, incorporate that discussion. (Rossa I, supra,
A160544.)
On remand, following the completion of additional jurisdictional
discovery and the submission of further briefing, the trial court again granted
Blue Bird’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found
that “Blue Bird did appear to service or repair . . . the bookmobile” involved
in the accident; and in support, it cited emails referencing contacts with a
Blue Bird representative named “John Vaugh” about repairing the vehicle
when it broke down in December 2011 and January 2012. But the court
ruled that Rossa had failed to demonstrate that his claims arise out of or
relate to Blue Bird’s contacts with California, because “Rossa was not injured
by the same product—the retractable steps of a bookmobile—that Blue Bird
advertised, sold, serviced, or repaired in California.” It reasoned that the
steps were designed, manufactured and installed on the bus by a third party,
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and Blue Bird was not involved in those modifications. Thus, it reasoned,
“Blue Bird did not have ‘fair warning’ that [any] defect in the electrical
circuitry or battery of its buses could cause Rossa’s injury—i.e., an injury
caused by retractable steps installed on a Blue Bird bus—much less in
California.”
Rossa now appeals, arguing his claim relates to Blue Bird’s commercial
presence in California sufficient to satisfy the second prong. He relies upon
the undisputed evidence of Blue Bird’s nationwide advertising, nationwide
solicitation of business and authorized dealerships in California, and he also
argues that Blue Bird provided maintenance service to the very bus involved
in this accident.
Blue Bird asserts there is no admissible evidence that it serviced this
bus in California. It contends (in its cross-appeal) that the court erroneously
admitted emails showing that it did so, which was inadmissible hearsay. It is
unnecessary to consider Blue Bird’s evidentiary objections, however, because
even assuming the email evidence was properly admitted, we agree with the
trial court that Rossa failed to demonstrate his claims “arise out of or relate
to” Blue Bird’s California contacts.
We begin with where we left off before, which is the state of the law
since Ford Motor Co. was decided.
Blue Bird argues the trial court’s ruling should be upheld because,
unlike in Ford Motor Co., there is no evidence that it marketed and sold the
same model of bus chassis in California as the one involved here—a factual
assertion Rossa does not refute, and our review of the record confirms. That
is, it is undisputed that the bus involved here was a “Type-D” chassis; yet
there is no evidence indicating whether Blue Bird sells, advertises or services
that model in California. The record is totally silent about that.
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Although Rossa cites one federal district court opinion addressing the
“same model” legal issue, the only California authority to address whether
Ford Motor Co. requires such proof has concluded it does not. (Preciado v.
Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 983
(Preciado).) But it also did not say the subject is irrelevant. Preciado
concluded that, “although ‘[m]ost lower federal and state courts considering
case linkage in the context of a product liability claim have interpreted Ford
Motor Co. to require forum contacts pertaining to the specific product model
at issue in the litigation,’ ” the second prong may be satisfied under Ford
Motor Co. by proof of forum-related activity related to other models “if it [is]
reasonable [for the court] to presume that [the] other similar models . . .
sold . . . in California had the same alleged [product] defect” as the product at
issue. (Preciado, at p. 983.)
The parties have not addressed that legal standard in their appellate
briefing, nor did they introduce any evidence below relating to it. So, the
“similar model” theory of jurisdiction under Ford Motor Co. is unavailing to
Rossa.
The question thus comes down to whether Rossa’s other evidence is
enough to satisfy the “related to” prong. The linchpin of Rossa’s jurisdictional
position, as noted, is his reliance on evidence that Blue Bird provided
maintenance service in the forum state (i.e., California) to the very vehicle
involved in this case.2 But Rossa has not developed a coherent argument,
2 As summarized by the trial court, “Blue Bird did appear to service or
repair other parts of the bookmobile. Between December 2011 and
January 2012, Blue Bird was referenced in communications between the
County, OBS, and others regarding problems with the bookmobile. The
emails described the bookmobile as ‘broke[n] down,’ and indicated that Blue
Bird had been asked to ‘look at’ the problems. The emails also reference
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supported by legal authority and analysis, demonstrating that such
additional facts, if proved, are sufficient to satisfy the required nexus
between Blue Bird’s California contacts and Rossa’s claim for the personal
injury caused by the failure of the retractable steps. There is dictum
indicating that in some circumstances providing maintenance services to a
model of vehicle not sold in the forum state might suffice to establish such a
nexus. (See Preciado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 984 [where personal injury
plaintiff failed to present evidence “the same or similar [bus] chassis”
involved in accident was sold in California, nexus requirement not met
because plaintiff showed no “other connection” between defendant’s in-state
contacts and lawsuit such as “evidence that [defendant] was involved in
servicing that chassis in California”], italics added.) But Rossa failed to
establish such circumstances here.
To begin with, Rossa did not provide any evidence that Blue Bird ever
provided, or was even asked to provide, maintenance service for the
retractable steps or the electrical system that powered the steps that caused
the injury.
Further, we agree with the trial court that Rossa’s evidence that OBS
powered the retractable steps “by connecting them to a battery and circuity
[that was] designed, manufactured, and sold by Blue Bird” does not establish
that nexus. As that court stated, Blue Bird’s evidence showed it (1) “did not
design, manufacture, advertise, or sell buses with retractable steps” and (2)
“had no role whatsoever in the installation of the retractable steps.”
Specifically, it “provided no advice or guidance to OBS regarding its
contacts with Blue Bird representatives, including ‘John Vaugh,’ regarding
warranty repairs and billing.” Rossa does not dispute the trial court’s
characterization of his evidence.
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modifications to the bus and chassis purchased from Blue Bird,” “did not
provide any warranty coverage for the retractable steps . . . and did not
service or repair those steps.” Nor was there any evidence that it encouraged
its customers to install retractable steps on its buses, “designed the electrical
system for its bus and chassis to accommodate retractable steps” or promoted
or encouraged “any modifications to its buses, much less the modification—
the powering of retractable steps using the bus’s electrical circuitry and
battery—at issue in Rossa’s claims.” Even if Rossa had shown, which he did
not, that a defect in the circuitry or battery was an independent cause of his
injury, “he still could not establish a substantial nexus between his claims
and Blue Bird’s California activities” because there was “no evidence that
Blue Bird had any idea that the circuitry and battery for its bus would be
used to power retractable steps” or “designed or manufactured its buses with
such an installation in mind.” For these reasons, the trial court concluded,
“Blue Bird did not have ‘fair warning’ that a defect in the electrical circuitry
or battery of its buses could cause Rossa’s injury—i.e., an injury caused by
retractable steps installed on a Bird Bus—much less in California.”
Rossa has not shown error in the trial court’s thorough analysis of the
issue. We find unpersuasive his comparison of this case to Daimler Trucks
North America LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 946, which
upheld personal jurisdiction over an Oregon truck manufacturer for injuries
sustained by a California resident while driving a long-haul truck in
Oklahoma. Although the accident occurred out of state, the fact that the
plaintiff was a California resident and had begun his travel there weighed in
favor of exercising specific jurisdiction, as well as the fact that the defendant
marketed its truck brand in California, including the same model involved in
the accident, for precisely the type of use involved in the case (i.e.,
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intercontinental long-haul trips “that emanate from California to other states
and back”). (Id. at pp. 951, 957, 958; see also id. at p. 959.) The appellate
court thus concluded that the lawsuit “relate[d] to” defendant’s in-forum
activities. (Id. at p. 959.) Unlike the vehicle manufacturer in Daimler
Trucks, as we have explained, there is no evidence Blue Bird marketed its
buses for precisely the type of application involved here: that is, for
reconfiguration using after-market, third-party electrical components of any
kind much less retractable steps.
Rather, we agree with the trial court that this case is more akin to the
supplier of a component part who had no reason to foresee that a downstream
use of its product in the forum would cause injury in a manner unrelated to
the manufacturer’s limited commercial presence in the forum state. (See LG
Chem, Ltd. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348,
365-370.)
In short, we are persuaded by the trial court’s thorough analysis of the
“related to” issue, which we adopt and affirm.
Having thus concluded that Rossa failed to show his claims “relate to”
Blue Bird’s forum-related contacts, it is unnecessary to address whether the
exercise of specific jurisdiction would violate notions of “ ‘fair play and
substantial justice’ ” and thus be unreasonable, a point we did not address in
our prior opinion and that would otherwise be Blue Bird’s burden to show.
(See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 476-477;
Dongxiao Yue v. Wenbin Yang (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 539, 549-550.) And it is
equally unnecessary to address Blue Bird’s cross-appeal challenging the trial
court’s rejection of its challenges to Rossa’s evidence.
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DISPOSITION
The order granting Blue Bird’s motion to quash is affirmed. Appellant
Rossa shall recover his costs.
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STEWART, P. J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
MILLER, J.
Rossa v. Bluebird Body Co. (A165728)
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