Campbell v. L.A. Unified School Dist. ( 2024 )

Filed 5/1/24; certified for publication 5/21/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
JOHN SANDY CAMPBELL, B320442
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV33808
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.
John Sandy Campbell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Anthony Julian Bejarano, Marcos Fredrick Hernandez and
Nazli Alimi for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________
In September 2021, John Sandy Campbell sued her former
employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District, over events
leading up to her dismissal in August 2017.
The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer and gave
Campbell leave to amend.
Campbell’s amended complaint claims the District racially
discriminated against her and retaliated against her for
whistleblowing, in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5 and
1106 and Government Code section 12940 (the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (the Act)). The District again demurred,
arguing Campbell had not complied with the Government Code’s
claim presentation requirement and the statute of limitations
barred her cause of action under the Act.
The trial court again sided with the District and sustained
this demurrer without leave to amend on the basis of Le Mere v.
Los Angeles Unified School District (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237 (Le
Mere) and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(1)(C).
Campbell did not provide a reporter’s transcript or a settled
statement of the hearing.
We independently review the trial court’s ruling and apply
the familiar standard for demurrers. (See Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
The trial court was right.
A plaintiff suing a public entity for damages must timely
present a written claim to the entity before filing suit. (Le Mere,
supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) Generally, this claim
presentation requirement is an element of a valid cause of action
against a public entity. (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 1104, 1119 (Willis).) Government Code section
911.2, subdivision (a), requires a plaintiff to submit a government
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claim within six months or one year of the accrual of a cause of
action, depending on the type of claim. Failing to present a
timely claim, or to seek leave to file a late claim, bars the suit.
(See Le Mere, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.)
Campbell’s operative pleading seeks actual and punitive
damages. Campbell concedes the claim presentation requirement
applies here. Citing Government Code sections 910.8 and 911,
which concern insufficient government claims, Campbell appears
to argue substantial compliance is enough and she substantially
complied with this requirement.
Assuming for purposes of analysis her interpretation of
these provisions is correct, Campbell did not demonstrate she
substantially complied with the claim presentation requirement.
Simply noting that she previously submitted various racial
discrimination and whistleblower complaints is not enough.
(E.g., Willis, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123, fn. 11, citations
omitted [“Willis maintains the Labor Commissioner complaint
put City ‘on notice’ of his retaliation claim. But he does not cite
authority for the proposition, and service of a complaint with
the state Labor Commissioner does not comply with Government
Claims Act presentation requirements for purposes of a claim
against City. Nor is it the equivalent of ‘substantial compliance’
with the Act.”].) And it is not enough to say the District already
knew of the circumstances surrounding Campbell’s claims. (See
Le Mere, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.)
The record appears to contain only Campbell’s pre-
complaint inquiry to the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing, dated August 21, 2017, and related
correspondence.
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Campbell has not shown that any of her complaints went to
the right people or contained the information required by statute.
(See Gov. Code, § 910 [setting out the required contents of a
government claim]; id. § 915, subd. (a) [requiring service of a
claim against a local public entity to be made on the “clerk,
secretary or auditor thereof” or to the “governing body”]; see also
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [we presume the
judgment is correct; appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
error].) Further, Campbell’s amended complaint did not plead
compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (See Willis,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1119 [“a complaint failing to allege
facts demonstrating timely presentation of a claim or that such
presentation was excused is subject to a general demurrer for not
stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action”].)
Campbell alternatively appears to contend she is exempt
from presenting any government claim. But she cites no
authority for this point and fails to explain why Le Mere is not
controlling regarding her whistleblower claim.
Regarding Campbell’s other claim for violation of the Act,
Campbell’s amended complaint shows this claim is time-barred.
The attachments to this pleading show Campbell, in 2017,
initiated a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment
and Housing, which investigated and closed Campbell’s case after
finding insufficient evidence. The Department provided
Campbell a Right to Sue notice dated October 9, 2018. The notice
told Campbell she had one year to file a civil action. Campbell
did not sue until September 2021. Her suit was untimely. (See
Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(1)(C).)
Campbell argues the trial court abused its discretion in not
considering Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103 (Jolly),
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and the discovery rule saves her lawsuit because she could not
have known earlier who perpetrated certain wrongful acts
against her or the animus behind these acts. Campbell largely
omits record citations. Her 2017 pre-complaint inquiry to the
Department named the administrators who committed
transgressions against her and described the supposed racial
animus and hostile workplace.
“A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’
necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated
by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of
wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide
whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion
exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she
cannot wait for the facts to find her.” (Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at
p. 1111.) Campbell had enough information here. In any event,
she sued the District for employment-related acts resulting in her
termination, not any individual she recently discovered.
(Campbell also sued the “Los Angeles Board of Education,” but
the trial court apparently changed this name to “Los Angeles
Unified School District of Education.”)
The trial court properly sustained the District’s demurrer
without leave to amend. Campbell’s appellate brief does not
argue any amendment could cure the defects.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment and order sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend and award costs to the respondent.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
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Filed 5/21/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
B320442
JOHN SANDY CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV33808)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED OPINION
SCHOOL DISTRICT, FOR PUBLICATION
[No change in judgment]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 1,
2024, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published
in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
There is no change in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________
STRATTON, P. J. GRIMES, J. WILEY, J.