In re Pablo A. CA2/4 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/21/24 In re Pablo A. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re PABLO A., A Person B327164
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 20CCJP05129
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
T.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Dismissed.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Aileen Wong, Senior Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Mother, T.F., appeals from the juvenile court’s order
removing the child, Pablo. A., from her, releasing the child to
father, Juan A., under supervision of the Department of Children
and Family Services (Department), and ordering monitored visits
for mother. After mother filed this appeal, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction and entered an order granting mother
and father joint legal custody, but ordered father sole physical
custody of Pablo A. and monitored visits for mother (the exit
order). Mother neither appealed from the exit order nor the order
terminating jurisdiction.
After mother filed her opening brief on appeal, but before
briefing was complete, the Department moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that it is moot. We preliminarily denied the
motion to dismiss the appeal but, on further consideration, we
agree the appeal is moot, and we decline to exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal as moot.
DISCUSSION
“A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the party
seeking redress], to grant him [or her] any effect[ive] relief.”’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be
met. First, the [party] must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the [party] seeks. [Citation.] [¶] This rule
applies in the dependency context. [Citation.] A reviewing court
must ‘“decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events
in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether
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[its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent
proceeding.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute. [Citation.]
As a rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion to review
a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence
of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material
question remains for the court’s determination.’” (D.P., supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 282.) Specific to the dependency context, our
Supreme Court has held that courts should consider the
following factors when deciding whether to review a moot appeal:
(1) whether the challenged order “‘could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other consequences for
[the appellant][ ]”’” (id. at p. 285); (2) whether the order was
“based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct[ ]” (id.
at pp. 285-286); and (3) “why the appeal became moot.” (Id. at p.
286.) “The factors above are not exhaustive, and no single factor
is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Ibid.)
Mother challenges the November 2022 order removing the
child from her custody and giving her monitored visitation, and
the court’s finding in April 2022 that continued jurisdiction was
necessary. She argues the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it removed the child from her custody solely because she
failed to participate in services, and the court should have
terminated jurisdiction in April 2022 because no facts in the
record supported a finding that conditions existed that would
justify dependency jurisdiction. In February 2023, however, the
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juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and issued a custody order
granting the parents joint legal custody, with father retaining
sole physical custody of Pablo A., and monitored visits for
mother.1 We agree with the parties that mother’s appeal is moot
because mother did not appeal the later orders terminating
dependency jurisdiction and awarding father sole physical
custody with monitored visitation for mother. (See, e.g., In re
Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 [“[I]n addition to the
appeal from the jurisdiction finding, an appeal from the orders
terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody is necessary for
this court to be able to provide effective relief”].)
The sole justification mother offers to reach the merits of
her moot appeal is that the issue raised is “important” and it is
likely to be repeated but will evade review due to the speed with
which dependency cases are resolved. If we adopted this rational,
however, we would be hard pressed to identify a moot
dependency appeal that, according to mother, would not warrant
discretionary review on the merits. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 284 [“A key feature of the juvenile court is expeditious
resolution of pending cases.”].)
Mother’s appeal does not present circumstances that
generally warrant discretionary review of a moot case, such as an
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the likelihood
of recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a
material question that remains for the court’s determination.
(See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Nor does it involve a
1 The court stayed its order terminating jurisdiction pending
receipt of the juvenile custody order. The court received the
juvenile custody order the following week and lifted its stay of the
order terminating jurisdiction.
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challenged finding that could potentially impact future
dependency proceedings or one that is particularly pernicious or
stigmatizing. (Id. at pp. 285-286.) Indeed, mother does not
challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. Rather, her
appeal is limited to a removal order which has since been
superseded by an exit order that mother did not appeal.2
Our Supreme Court explained “no single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal” and ultimately, “a court
should be guided by the overarching goals of the dependency
system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’
with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the
safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the
child.’” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Reaching the merits in
this case would not advance the goals of the dependency system.
Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to review
mother’s appeal.
2 We note that mother is not without a remedy. Under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 302, subdivision (d), she
may seek modification of the exit order if she can “demonstrate
‘there has been a significant change of circumstances since the
juvenile court issued the order and modification of the order is in
the best interests of the child.’” (In re Rashad D., supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 165, fn. 7.)
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
ZUKIN, J.
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