Azar v. Azar CA1/3 ( 2023 )

Filed 10/11/23 Azar v. Azar CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
INDRAWOUS AZAR, et al.
Plaintiffs and Respondents, A166609
v. (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 18CIV01833)
SHIBLI AZAR, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
This case concerns an interfamilial dispute over the ownership of a
residential property located in San Bruno (“the property”). Indrawous
(known as “Andy”), his brother Simon Azar, and Andy’s wife, Nadia Azar, are
the plaintiffs in this case; we refer to Andy and Simon collectively as
“plaintiff brothers.”1 A third brother, Shibli Azar, and his wife Naifeh Azar,
are the defendants.
Following a bench trial, the court granted judgment in favor of plaintiff
brothers on their cause of action for a resulting trust; the court found plaintiff
brothers were the real (beneficial) owners of the property and that defendants
1
To avoid confusion, and with no disrespect, we refer to the family
members by their first names.
1
held legal title as trustees with no ownership interest. Because Simon
waived any beneficial interest in the property, the legal title was quieted and
confirmed to beneficial owner Andy and Nadia as his wife. The court also
found, in pertinent part, that the resulting trust cause of action was not
barred by the statute of limitations.
On Naifeh’s prior appeal, we reversed the judgment as the statement of
decision included impermissible and/or irreconcilable findings concerning the
resolution of two material issues: (1) Shibli’s apparent authority to act for
Naifeh; and (2) Naifeh’s intent to purchase the property in trust for Andy and
Simon. (Azar v. Azar (dec. Feb. 25, 2021, A159261) [nonpub. opn.].) Because
the court’s decision on these two issues could not be separated from its
rulings on the timeliness and merits of the resulting trust cause of action, we
did not address Naifeh’s challenges to those rulings. (Id. at p. 2.) We
directed the trial court to issue a new statement of decision and judgment,
noting our decision should not be read as expressing any opinion as to how
the trial court should resolve the material issues submitted by the parties,
including Naifeh’s intent and Shibli’s apparent authority to act for Naifeh.
(Id. at p. 8.)
The case was remanded to the trial court and reassigned to a new judge
as the judge who previously handled the matter had retired. A hearing was
convened on July 12, 2022, at which plaintiffs and defendants were
represented by counsel, to discuss the process moving forward. Following
argument, the court found all parties had agreed no further evidentiary
hearing was necessary for the court to issue an amended statement of
decision.
On August 22, 2022, the trial court issued its final statement of
decision and judgment (one document), again imposing a resulting trust in
2
favor of plaintiff brothers and finding that defendants held legal title as
trustees with no ownership interest. Because Simon waived any beneficial
interest in the property, the legal title was quieted and confirmed to
beneficial owner Andy and Nadia as his wife. The court also found, in
pertinent part, that (1) the resulting trust cause of action was not barred by
the statute of limitations, and (2) in light of the imposition of a resulting trust
the court made no findings on a cause of action for breach of contract
premised on the parties’ alleged 1981 contract for the exchange of certain
properties.
Naifeh filed a timely notice of appeal from the August 22, 2022
judgment. Having considered her arguments, we conclude she has not
demonstrated any basis for reversal and shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
This action was commenced in 2018 to resolve a dispute over the
ownership of the property, which had been purchased in 1976. Defendants
never took possession of the property or lived in the house. Instead, plaintiff
brothers moved into the house along with other family members and used it
as their home for the next 40 plus years. At the time this lawsuit was filed,
Andy and his wife Nadia were still living in the house.
Statement of Decision
The trial court’s final statement of decision detailed the findings in
support of its conclusion that plaintiff brothers met their burden of showing,
2
Because the record on appeal consists solely of a clerk’s transcript with
limited documents, and with no reporter’s transcripts of the original bench
trial or the July 12, 2022 remand hearing, our factual and procedural
background is taken from our prior opinion (Azar v. Azar (dec. Feb. 25, 2021,
A159261) [nonpub. opn.]) and the trial court’s final statement of decision
under review on this appeal.
3
by clear and convincing evidence, that they were the real (beneficial) owners
of the property under a resulting trust theory.
In the 1970s, Shibli and Naifeh lived and worked in the San Francisco
Bay Area. Shibli’s brothers, Andy and Simon, lived in Michigan and decided
to move their families to the Bay Area. In December 1976, Andy (then
unmarried), Simon and his wife and children, the brothers’ mother, and two
sisters moved to San Bruno.
Before the move to the Bay Area, Simon and Shibli agreed Shibli and
his wife Naifeh would obtain a loan to purchase a house (with title in their
names) to be used by Andy and Simon as it would be difficult for Andy and
Simon to obtain a home loan. In November 1976, Shibli purchased the
property, a house in San Bruno. In January 1977, a grant deed for the
property was recorded in the names of Shibli and Naifeh as husband and
wife. The purchase price was $69,000; Shibli made a $13,800 cash down
payment and took out loans.
Considering the evidence in full, the court found the property was
purchased for Andy and Simon and their families and that it was the intent
of the parties to eventually transfer title to Andy and Simon. The court found
Naifeh’s testimony – that defendants had purchased the house for their own
use and intended to use it as their personal residence, despite having just
recently purchased a new house – not credible. And it found Shibli’s
testimony – that he did not purchase the property for Andy and Simon –
unreliable due to very limited recall; his testimony was sprinkled with
statements such as “ ‘I don’t know’ ” and “ ‘I don’t remember’ ”, and he had
“total blanks on what transpired.” Shibli’s actions were also in conflict with
any notion that the property was not for Andy and Simon's use as Shibli
4
consistently told the parties, his mother, and several of plaintiffs’ children,
that he (Shibli) was going to transfer title to Andy and Simon.
The parties disputed the source of the $13,800 cash down payment and
the source of funds expended on the property over the relevant 40-year
period. The brothers had a history of loaning money to each other “without
anything in writing or specific expectations of repayment.” The court found
Simon had provided sufficient funds (on behalf of himself and Andy) to Shibli
to cover the down payment and that Shibli’s testimony that the down
payment came entirely from his grocery store was not credible. The court
also found that if Shibli used some of his own money toward the down
payment, those funds were a repayment of previous loans from Simon and,
therefore, credited as a payment made by Simon.
The court found that, except for a brief time shortly after Andy and
Simon moved into the property, plaintiffs had made all the mortgage,
property tax, home insurance, utility, and remodeling payments; this finding
was supported by extensive documentation. In contrast, Naifeh had virtually
no documentation in support of her claim that she made extensive payments
for the property. “It was this testimony by Naifeh that [led] the court to
question the credibility of all of her testimony.”
In 1981, and after family disharmony caused by previous unsuccessful
attempts to transfer title, the parties reached an agreement. Andy, Simon,
and Shibli, with Naifeh present and not objecting, agreed that Shibli and
Naifeh would sign over title to the property. In return, Andy and Simon
would release their ownership interest in an apartment located in San
Francisco. Andy and Simon followed through on their part of the agreement,
but defendants never executed the deed to transfer the property. Two years
later, defendants’ attorney recorded the deed plaintiff brothers had executed
5
for the San Francisco property, and Shibli continued to promise that he
intended to have the property transferred to Andy and Simon.
The trial court found “a conflict between what the Plaintiffs alleged
occurred and what the parties intended and what the Defendants alleged
occurred and what the parties intended. [Plaintiff brothers] had significant
documentation and corroboration of their position; while Defendants had
scarcely any credible or reliable documentation or corroboration of their
position. In fact, it appears that defendants engaged in intentional
falsehoods concerning their payments of expenses on the [San Bruno]
property. For this reason, the court has discounted the testimony from
defendants and found that, by clear and convincing evidence, plaintiffs[’]
allegations are supported by the evidence.”
The trial court specifically addressed the two material issues
mentioned in our prior opinion: (1) Naifeh’s intent to purchase the property in
trust for Andy and Simon; and (2) Shibli’s apparent authority to act for
Naifeh,3 as follows:
“The parties dispute whether Naifeh intended to purchase the property
in trust for Plaintiff brothers. They further dispute whether Shibli’s
promises and actions can bind Naifeh, who purportedly (and secretly)
objected to any agreement or understanding Shibli had with Plaintiffs in
regard to holding the property for Plaintiffs, and ultimately transferring title
to them. Both questions are answered by the conduct of the parties. Naifeh
remained silent in the presence of Shibli and Plaintiffs when they discussed
the subject of transferring title. She never spoke up with any objection.
3
Accordingly, we reject Naifeh’s argument, made for the first time in her
reply brief, that the trial court failed to address the issues mentioned in our
prior appeal.
6
“The Court finds that both Shibli’s and Naifeh’s actual intent was to
hold title to the property for the benefit of Plaintiffs, and to eventually
transfer the property to Plaintiffs. This intent is inferred by both Shibli’s and
Naifeh’s conduct over the relevant 40-year period, during which time
Plaintiffs resided in and made all payments toward the subject property.
Naifeh testified that, because she feared for her safety from Shibli, she
remained silent in the presence of Shibli and Plaintiffs when they discussed
the subject of transferring title. The Court does not find Naifeh’s testimony
regarding her purported fear for her safety to be credible. Rather, the Court
finds that any silence on Naifeh’s part during discussions about the
property’s beneficiary ownership, and during Shibli’s
statements/representations that Defendants were holding title for Plaintiffs,
and that Defendants intended to eventually convey title to Plaintiffs, was not
due to any fear or reluctance to speak, but rather, it was because Naifeh
consented to and agreed with [Shibli’s] comments that the Property would be
conveyed to Plaintiffs. (Underlining and italics in original.)
“The Court further finds that Shibli had apparent/ostensible authority
to act for Naifeh as her agent, and to bind her to the agreement he made with
[his] brothers to purchase and hold the property in trust, and to eventually
convey title to them as the real (beneficial) owners. To be clear, the Court
does [not] conclude that Shibli had apparent/ostensible authority to speak or
act for Naifeh merely by virtue of them being married, which . . . itself would
be insufficient to speak or act for her. Rather, the Court reaches this finding
based on Naifeh’s conduct over the roughly forty-year period, in which she
repeatedly remained silent, and expressed no disagreement in the face of
Shibli’s repeated statements and representations that Shibli and Naifeh were
holding the property for Plaintiffs and would eventually convey title to
7
Plaintiffs. Naifeh must have known that her failure to express disagreement
with Shibli’s promises and representations would lead any reasonable person
in Plaintiffs’ position to believe that Naifeh agreed with Shibli’s statements,
and that Naifeh had the same intention. (See Lovetro v. Steers (1965) 234
Cal.App.2d 461, 475.) (Underlining in original.)
“Thus, this Court finds that Naifeh repeatedly and intentionally led
Plaintiffs to believe that Shibli was speaking for her and expressing her
intention as well. If Naifeh truly did not agree with Shibli’s repeated
representations to Plaintiffs and others about the Property (which, again, the
Court does not find credible), then Naifeh would have had a duty to speak up
and express such disagreement, because she would have known that her
failure to do so would be very misleading to Plaintiffs, or to any reasonable
person in their position. As stated, the Court finds she did not express any
disagreement because she in fact agreed with Shibli’s representations and
statements.” (Italics in original.)
After making additional rulings which will be discussed below to the
extent they are necessary to resolve Naifeh’s appellate arguments, the trial
court concluded by explaining that any outcome other than a finding of a
resulting trust in favor of plaintiff brothers and conveyance of title to them,
“would be highly inequitable” and an “improper result.” “In the present case,
Defendant Naifeh Azar claims that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to receive
the title to the subject property, because she did not consent to the agreement
to transfer the property to Plaintiffs. Essentially, she believes that she is
entitled to retain the subject property, despite Plaintiffs having made (except
for a brief period) all of the first and second mortgage payments, all of the
property tax payments, all of the home insurance payments, and all of the
utility payments for the property over a forty-year period. In other words,
8
Defendant believes she may retain the benefits of all of Plaintiffs’ financial
contributions to the property and the property itself by refusing to transfer
the title thereto. This is a classic case of a Resulting Trust, and the intent of
the holders of title (Defendants) is inferred by their conduct over the forty
years Plaintiffs have treated the property as their own. [¶] If Defendants
were allowed to retain title to the subject property in the face of the instant
facts, this would result in a clear case of unjust enrichment, a profoundly
inequitable and demonstrable wrong.”
DISCUSSION
Our review of this appeal is significantly impaired by Naifeh’s
submission of an incomplete record and appellate briefs that fail to comply
with our California Rules of Court. Naifeh, “[a] party proceeding in propria
persona ‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but
no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (First
American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.)
Naifeh has perfected her appeal using a clerk’s transcript; she has filed
no reporter’s transcript or settled statement of the initial bench trial or the
July 12, 2022 remand hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122 [clerk’s
transcript], 8.130 [reporter’s transcript], 8.137 [settled statement].) The
“trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law [in its final statement of
decision] therefore are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence and
are binding upon us, unless the judgment is not supported by the findings or
reversible error appears on the face of the record.” (Krueger v. Bank of
America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.)
Additionally, Naifeh’s briefs are rife with factual assertions
unsupported by any record citations “in dramatic noncompliance with
appellate procedures.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246;
9
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [each appellate brief must “[s]upport
any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page
number of the record where the matter appears”].) Naifeh also raises
numerous legal arguments without any legal authority or cogent analysis as
to how or why the court erred or how she was prejudiced by the court’s
rulings. We will disregard unsupported factual assertions and treat as
forfeited any legal arguments made without record citations and/or cogent
arguments and citations to legal authority. (See, e.g., Tellez v. Rich Voss
Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“[w]hen an appellant
asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as forfeited”]; Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics,
Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267 [“plaintiffs make numerous factual
assertions in their briefs without record citation” but “[w]e are entitled to
disregard such unsupported factual assertions”].)
Moreover, and before the remand hearing, Naifeh filed a supplemental
trial brief and related request for judicial notice of certain documents. The
July 12, 2022 minute order indicates the court disregarded the supplemental
trial brief and related request for judicial notice as all the issues raised in
that brief were “irrelevant and not within the scope” of our order on remand.
On appeal, Naifeh contends the court abused its discretion by doing so.
However, we cannot meaningfully review Naifeh’s claim of error as we have
no record of what occurred at the remand hearing and she has presented no
argument supported by legal authority demonstrating how she was
prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, we deem the claim of error
forfeited and disregard Naifeh’s arguments premised on the factual
assertions in her supplemental trial brief and the documents that were not
judicially noticed in the trial court. (See Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126
10
Cal.App.3d 147, 154 [appellate court cannot review “evidence” contained in
trial briefs]; The Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators
Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 355 [appellate court did not
consider a party’s appellate arguments that depended on documents for
which the trial court denied a request for judicial notice ].)
With these limitations in mind, we now discuss some of the issues
presented in Naifeh’s briefs.
I. RESULTING TRUST CAUSE OF ACTION
The law applicable to the imposition of a resulting trust is well settled.
“[T]he relationship between resulting trustee and beneficiary arises where
one, in good faith, acquires title to property belonging to another. The law
implies an obligation on the part of the one in whom title has vested to hold
the property for the owner’s benefit and eventually convey it to the owner.
The trustee has no duties to perform, no trust to administer, and no purpose
to pursue except the single purpose of holding or conveying the property
according to the beneficiary’s demands.” (Estate of Yool (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 867, 874; see Bainbridge v. Stoner (1940) 16 Cal.2d 423, 428
(Bainbridge).) In other words, “[t]he duties of a resulting trust[ee] are not
active; a resulting trustee merely holds legal title for the beneficiary and, at a
proper time, is bound to make a proper conveyance.” (Seabury v. Costello
(1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 640, 646, citing Bainbridge, at p. 428.)
“ ‘Where the legal title rests in one person, to establish a resulting trust
for the benefit of another against a presumption in favor of the legal title, the
evidence must be clear and convincing, especially when an attempt is made to
establish a resulting trust after the lapse of many years or where parol
evidence alone is relied upon.’ ” (G.R. Holcomb Estate Co. v. Burke (1935) 4
Cal.2d 289, 299.)
11
A. Trial Court’s Final Statement of Decision Reflects Substantial
Evidence Supports Factual Findings
Throughout her briefs, Naifeh asserts the trial court should have
accepted the testimony and evidence proffered by defendants. Without a
reporter’s transcript of the original bench trial, “the judgment must be
conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. . . . The effect of
this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no
reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the
sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)
In addition, based on our review of the portions of the trial transcript
referenced in the trial court’s final statement of decision, we find the court
acted well within its discretion in accepting plaintiffs’ testimony and evidence
and rejecting defendants’ testimony as not being credible.
We see no merit to Naifeh’s contentions that the trial court
impermissibly applied “alleged Palestinian cultural values denying property
rights to women,” and ignored “the rights of women and wives to make
financial decisions” under California law. The court found Naifeh’s intent to
hold the property in trust for plaintiff brothers was inferred solely from her
own conduct over the course of the relevant 40 years during which time
plaintiff brothers (and later Nadia as Andy’s wife) exclusively possessed and
resided in the property making all financial expenditures (except for certain
mortgage payments incurred when Andy and Simon first came to California);
Naifeh failed to object to plaintiffs treating the property as their own; and
Naifeh was silent during family discussions when Shibli made repeated
statements and representations that the property belonged to Andy and
Simon and title would be transferred to them. The trial court made no
findings premised on either Naifeh’s status as Shibli’s wife or the parties’
12
cultural views concerning a husband’s right to speak for his wife concerning
financial matters.
B. Resulting Trust Is Not Barred by Statute of Frauds Requirement of a
Writing for the Sale or Transfer of Real Estate
We see no merit to Naifeh’s argument that a resulting trust could not
be imposed in this case as a matter of law because it violated the requirement
of a writing for the sale or transfer of real estate as codified in Civil Code
sections 1091 and 1624.4
The statutory requirement of a writing as expressed in the law cited by
Naifeh does not apply to an estate in real property that is the subject of a
resulting trust implied by law. As long ago explained by our Supreme Court:
“The trust in this case arises purely by operation of law, and results from the
acts and agreements of the parties. In such cases the trust need not be
created by writing, or proved by written evidence, for it comes clearly within
the exception of the [statute of frauds]. . . . [F]rom the facts that the
purchase was made with the money of the plaintiffs, and the conveyance
made to the defendant, the law implies that the title thus conveyed is held in
trust for the person furnishing the money, and thus the trust is created by
operation of law. . . . The law is well settled that in cases like the present the
trust can be proved by parol evidence.” (Bayles v. Baxter (1863) 22 Cal. 575,
579.) In other words, “[t]he fact that transferee and payor of the purchase
price, and the claimant, made an oral agreement that the former was to hold
4
Civil Code section 1091 reads in pertinent part: “An estate in real
property, . . ., can be transferred only by operation of law, or by an
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by
his agent thereto authorized by writing.” Civil Code section 1624, in
pertinent part, lists several “contracts” that are “invalid, unless they, or some
note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to
be charged or by the party’s agent.”
13
the property in trust for the latter which was unenforceable under the statute
of frauds or otherwise, does not prevent a resulting trust from arising.
Indeed, such agreement supports the inference or presumption that the payor
did not intend that the transferee should have the beneficial interest.” (Viner
v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 270 (Viner), disapproved on another ground
in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010.)
C. Evidence of Plaintiff Brothers’ Financial Contributions Supports
Imposition of Resulting Trust
We see no merit to Naifeh’s argument that a resulting trust could not
be imposed in this case as a matter of law because plaintiffs presented no
evidence establishing the precise amount or proportion of consideration they
contributed to the purchase of the property and plaintiff brothers made only
partial mortgage payments.
Naifeh supports her argument with a citation to Lloyds Bank
California v. Wells Fargo Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1038 (Lloyds), which is
factually distinguishable. In Lloyds, the appellate court found the resulting
trust was not supportable as the purported beneficial owners made no
attempt to submit evidence of the original purchase price or their individual
financial contributions. (Id. at p. 1044.) Unlike that case, the trial court here
found plaintiffs had submitted clear and convincing evidence demonstrating
a “classic case” for the imposition of a resulting trust, based on their financial
contributions to the purchase price including payment of the entire down
payment and payment of the first and second mortgage payments (except for
a brief time) as well as payment of all maintenance expenses over the more
than 40 years when they exclusively possessed and resided in the residence
and treated the property as their own. We disregard Naifeh’s citation to an
14
unpublished opinion, namely Meyer v. Jeffries (Dec. 10, 2019, E070773), in
violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a).
Nor is there any merit to Naifeh’s related argument that no resulting
trust arises unless the beneficial owner pays the purchase price before or at
the time of the conveyance. As explained by our Supreme Court in Viner,
supra, 26 Cal.2d 261, it is not always necessary that the beneficial owner pay
the purchase price before or at the time of the conveyance because a resulting
trust may be imposed where the trustee agrees to finance the purchase price
in the form of a loan from the trustee to the beneficial owner. (Id. at pp. 269–
270.) Moreover, it is not necessary that there be an express agreement that
the beneficiary repay the loan, as an agreement to repay the loan “may be
implied,” with the trustee of the resulting trust holding the legal title as
security for the loan. (Id. at p. 270.) Here, at the time of the commencement
of the action seeking the transfer of title, Naifeh’s need to retain legal title as
security for the mortgage loans had been rendered moot as the loans had
been paid off in November 1985 and May 2006.
Hence, we conclude the trial court appropriately imposed a resulting
trust based on the parties’ conduct both before and after the purchase of the
property. The court found the only reasonable inference that could be drawn
from the evidence, which included the 40-year period in which plaintiffs
resided in and made all the payments toward the property (except for a brief
time), was that both Shibli and Naifeh intended to hold the property in trust
for the benefit of plaintiffs and to transfer title to them. The court also found
that “Naifeh’s silence” during the 40-year period and “ Shibli’s assurances to
everyone that his and Naifeh’s intent was to eventually transfer the
property” to plaintiffs further supported the imposition of a resulting trust.
We see no error in the trial court’s imposition of a resulting trust.
15
D. Resulting Trust Was Not Imposed in Violation of Law Governing
Community Property
Naifeh argues the imposition of a resulting trust was in violation of the
law governing community property and the transmutation of community
property (Fam. Code, §§ 852, 853). According to Naifeh, the property was
purchased with community assets; as a result, she was an owner of an
undivided one-half interest in that property and Shibli could not transfer her
interest without her consent.
However, the trial court rejected Naifeh’s position that defendants had
purchased the property with their own funds and for their own use as
community property. The court found it was never community property;
rather it was held in trust for plaintiff brothers, and therefore “ ‘[t]he
property that we called community property,’ ” was “ ‘impinged by a trust.’ ”
(Anderson v. Broadwell (1931) 119 Cal. App.130, 141 (Anderson).) Property
acquired during a marriage on or after January 1, 1975, by either husband or
wife, or both, including real property situated in this state, is subject to the
general community property presumption. (See In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th
903, 924; Fam. Code, § 7605.) This law “does not, however, include property
held in trust by a spouse [or spouses] for a third person.” (Dreher v.
Rohrmoser (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 196, 199 (Dreher); see Bassett, William W.,
Cal. Community Property Law (2022 ed; Sept. 2022 update), Shared Property
Rights in the Community Property System; IV. Contingent Future Interests,
§3:41 Legal title in trust [“[l]egal title held in trust by a husband or wife for
5
Family Code section 760 currently reads: “Except as otherwise provided
by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a
married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is
community property.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10, operative January 1, 1994.)
16
the benefit of third parties is not community property,” citing in fn. 1 to
Dreher, supra, 134 Cal.App.2d 196 and Anderson, supra, 119 Cal. App. 130].)6
In sum, plaintiff brothers “had the right to interpose any equitable
claim which [they] possessed directed to the issues raised by [the complaint],”
and “there was no error in admitting evidence showing the circumstances
under which the property here was deeded to [defendants].” (Dreher, supra,
134 Cal.App.2d at p. 199.) The trial court’s factual findings (discussed ante)
clearly classified the situation “as a voluntary resulting trust, continuing in
nature as reflecting the intention of the parties at the time of its creation.”
(Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 447; see Bainbridge, supra, 16
Cal.2d at p. 428.) Having found the legal title had been taken in the names
of both defendants in trust for the plaintiff brothers, the court’s imposition of
a resulting trust created a new relationship between the parties –one of
trustees and beneficiaries – as a matter of law. The plaintiff brothers’ “right
to obtain the legal title” merely became “an incident to” their recognized
equitable title as beneficiaries of the resulting trust. (Love v. Watkins (1871)
40 Cal. 547, 571.)
Once the trial court entered judgment granting a resulting trust in
favor of plaintiff brothers (Andy and Simon) as the real (beneficial) owners,
Naifeh was a trustee who held legal title for them. The court quieted title in
the names of the beneficial owner Andy and Nadia as his wife; Simon’s name
6
Family Code section 760 derived from Civil Code former section 164,
enacted in 1872 and later Civil Code former section 5110, added in 1969. At
the time Anderson supra, 119 Cal. App. 130 was decided in 1931 and Dreher,
supra, 134 Cal.App.2d 196 was decided in 1955, Civil Code former sections
162 and 163 defined separate property of the spouses, and Civil Code former
section 164 read: “All other property acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife or both, including real property situated in this state . . . is
community property.” (Stats. 1927, ch. 487, § 1; Stats. 1941, ch. 455, § 1; see
Dreher, at p. 199.)
17
is not on the title as he waived any interest in the property. (See Juranek v.
Juranek (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 276, 281 [in an action to impose a resulting
trust as to property ownership between family members, the trial court could
amend the complaint to conform to proof and direct title to be quieted in the
names of certain plaintiffs and allow “the withdrawal of another member of
this family” who had sued as a co-plaintiff].)
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT VIOLATED
We find no merit to Naifeh’s argument that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by its finding that the resulting trust cause of action was not
barred by the four-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure
343.7 As the trial court correctly explained: “The statute of limitation[s] for a
resulting trust does not run against a [beneficiary’s] right to enforce the trust
until the beneficiary has knowledge of repudiation or breach of the trust. (13
Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Trusts, § 153, p. 744.)
The statute begins to run upon a demand by the trustee[ ] or repudiation by
the trustor. (Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 240–241.) There was
neither an absolute or final demand for performance by plaintiffs nor an
absolute or final repudiation by defendants. Therefore, the Statute of
Limitations is not a bar to this cause of action.”
Naifeh asks us to consider certain factual assertions not supported by
any record citations, and the cases of McCosker v. McCosker (1954) 122
Cal.App.2d 498 and Rubinstein v. Minchin (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 115. As
already noted, reversible error cannot be demonstrated by assertions of fact
not supported by record citations or by citation to cases without a reasoned
7 Code of Civil Procedure section 343 reads: “An action for relief not
hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action . . . accrued.”
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argument as to why we should follow those cases. (See Allen v. City of
Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Regents of University of California
v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826–827, fn. 1.)
We also find unavailing Naifeh’s assertion that the trial court’s citation
to Martin, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 228, is not relevant as it concerned a
constructive trust and not a resulting trust. In resolving the case before it,
the Martin court found that although the trial court could employ the remedy
of a constructive trust to compel the defendant to convey a property interest
for which the plaintiff had paid, the judgment could also be affirmed on the
basis of a resulting trust since the express findings of the court would support
the imposition of such a trust. (Id. at p. 238.) Indeed, the Martin court went
on to hold that, “[e]ven if the facts pleaded and proved by plaintiff would not
sustain the judgment on the theory of constructive trust, they were sufficient
to uphold recovery under the resulting trust theory since that theory does not
contemplate any factual situation different from that established by the
evidence in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 239.) As the Martin court discussed the
statute of limitations governing both constructive trusts and resulting trusts
(id. at pp. 240–241), the trial court’s citation to that case was appropriate.
III. Fifth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract
The trial court imposed a resulting trust and therefore granted no relief
on the complaint’s fifth cause of action for breach of contract, a claim
premised on allegations that in 1981 the parties had entered into a separate
contract for the exchange of titles to the San Bruno and San Francisco
properties and defendants had breached that agreement by failing to transfer
the San Bruno property title to plaintiffs. Because we are upholding the trial
court’s grant of relief premised on a resulting trust theory, we do not address
Naifeh’s arguments concerning the fifth cause of action.
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IV. Conclusion
We have made a concerted effort to address Naifeh’s arguments. Any
issue not specifically mentioned is omitted due to her failure to present the
issue in compliance with the rules governing the adequacy of a record and the
contents of briefs.
DISPOSITION
The August 22, 2022 judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs and respondents
are awarded costs on appeal.
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_________________________
Petrou, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
A166609/Azar et al., v. Azar et al.
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