Shick v. Forooghieh CA2/8 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/23/24 Shick v. Forooghieh CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
PARIS SHICK, B323432
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22VERO01001
v.
ALI FOROOGHIEH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura Streimer, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Ali Forooghieh, in pro.per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Paris Shick, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
In a long-running dispute between neighbors that resulted
in dueling petitions for civil harassment restraining orders (Code
Civ. Proc.,1 § 527.6), Ali Forooghieh appeals the issuance of a
restraining order against him.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Forooghieh and Paris Shick, next door neighbors whose
houses are separated by driveways, have been feuding for several
years. On May 10, 2022, Forooghieh filed a request for a civil
harassment restraining order; Shick followed with his own
request on May 31, 2022. Both men obtained temporary
restraining orders. The two restraining order petitions were
heard together.
I. Forooghieh’s Direct Testimony
Forooghieh presented evidence the court ultimately found
sufficient to support the issuance of a restraining order against
Shick, including that at one point Shick threatened to put
Forooghieh “in the hospital.”2
On direct examination, Forooghieh described what he
believed was Shick’s harassment of him via placement of Shick’s
trash cans in the street. Forooghieh told the court that on April
28, 2022, prior to trash pickup, Shick’s blue trash can “was
inching close to [Forooghieh’s] driveway.” He testified, “I find all
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
2 Shick did not appeal, and in his respondent’s brief, he
acknowledges the restraining order against him was properly
granted.
2
their trash cans adjacent to my property, and one of them was
almost blocking my driveway.” Forooghieh testified the Shicks
brought their trash cans “right to where the slope is where you
want to back out of your driveway.” At first he claimed he had to
move the trash cans to leave his driveway; when the court
commented on the driveway’s apparent width, Forooghieh
admitted he could back straight out but claimed the cans
sometimes obstructed his vision.
According to Forooghieh, Shick was sitting in his car on
April 28, 2022. Forooghieh testified he dragged Shick’s trash can
across the street so it was opposite Shick’s house. Shick rolled
down his window and profanely insulted Forooghieh, then exited
the car and approached Forooghieh while cursing and delivering
a colloquial insult meaning he would beat Forooghieh up. Shick
began filming Forooghieh, who moved another one of Shick’s
trash cans across the street. Shick’s adult son moved the trash
cans back from across the street to a location adjacent to
Forooghieh’s driveway.
II. Shick’s Direct Testimony
Shick testified that in December 2021 Forooghieh wrote
him a threatening email about his trash cans. After Shick
responded that his trash cans were on a public street, Forooghieh
sent an email threatening to sue. Shick told Forooghieh not to
contact him and to stay away from him because Shick had
children at home and his wife was ill.
Shick testified that in April 2022, his gardeners reported
Forooghieh threatened that if they put Shick’s trash cans on or
next to his driveway, he would kill them. Shick said he
instructed the gardeners to stay away from Forooghieh’s
property. Shick submitted a letter from a landscaping company
3
describing Forooghieh’s threats to kill the gardeners over trash
can placement.3
According to Shick, on the morning of April 28, 2022, he
was sitting in his car when Forooghieh, screaming, approached.
Shick testified Forooghieh blocked his way by placing Shick’s
green trash can in front of his car, and said, “If you put your
trash can by my driveway, I shoot you and I kill you.”
Forooghieh, cursing, grabbed Shick’s blue trash can and broke
the lid. At this point, Shick testified, he began to record
Forooghieh; in the video Forooghieh could be seen moving one of
Shick’s trash cans. Shick called the police and made a report.
Shick testified that on May 12, 2022, his wife sent him a
text message stating Forooghieh was standing on a ladder next to
his house and watching her while she was outside by the pool.
Shick’s wife photographed Forooghieh on the ladder; this
photograph was received into evidence.4
Shick testified that on Tuesday nights Forooghieh parked
his car on the street in front of Shick’s house, so that Shick’s
3 Forooghieh objected to the introduction of the document,
and the court received it over his objection. However, the court
later stated it would not give “much weight at all” to the
landscaping company letter because it was not signed and there
was no heading on the letter. The court said, “Quite frankly, this
letter just lacks credibility from the court’s perspective.”
4 Forooghieh told the court he was installing an electric
conduit when the photograph was taken. After Shick testified his
wife did not know how long Forooghieh had been watching her,
the court said it did not need her to testify and declined to make
findings with respect to the photograph or the claim that
Forooghieh was watching Shick’s wife.
4
gardeners, who worked on Wednesday mornings, had nowhere to
put his trash cans for Thursday collection. Shick testified the
gardeners had to put his trash cans in front of the home of his
other next-door neighbors.
III. Cross-Examination of Shick
While cross-examining Shick, Forooghieh made factual
representations to the court and answered questions posed by the
court about his conduct. Forooghieh read from the December
2021 email he had sent to Shick: “Paris, please stop placing your
trash cans by my driveway. I shouldn’t have to move your trash
cans to drive in and out of my property. There is no reason to
continue creating nuisance for your neighbors.”
Forooghieh then read from Shick’s response: “Do not
contact me. Do not text me. Do not talk to me or any of my
family members. This is harassment. Stop harassing me and my
kids.”
The court asked Forooghieh how the placement of the trash
cans, which could be seen in a photograph presented to the court,
interfered with his ability to use his driveway. Forooghieh
responded that the image showed “the best-case scenario” of
where Shick placed his trash cans. Forooghieh said that a week
after the April 2022 incident, the cans were placed as shown in
the photo, but then “the trash cans start moving mysteriously
towards the edge of the driveway, then one of them falls, then the
lid falls, then the trash truck comes and drops one. So from
Wednesday to probably Saturday or Sunday, I have to be aware
of what they’re doing with their trash cans. They’re forcing that
edge of their property to be their trash—they designated that
edge of the property as their trash can. They can easily put the
5
blue car in the front and put the trash next to their driveway, but
they won’t.”
Forooghieh attempted to present evidence that Shick had
built a pathway on the property of the neighbor on the other side
of Shick’s house, and he kept that pathway unobstructed, but the
court stopped the questioning as irrelevant and advised
Forooghieh, “We’re not going to have a back-and-forth about who
gets to use which piece of the public street. That’s not
harassment. If your neighbor parks in front of your house on the
public street . . . that’s not harassment.” Forooghieh argued that
Shick was encroaching on another neighbor’s property, and the
court responded, “What’s before this court is how the two of you
have interacted with one another. I don’t really care if he’s
building the Taj Mahal on his neighbor’s front yard. That’s not
your business. And if he’s choosing not to park in front of the Taj
Mahal because he doesn’t want to, and he chooses to park in front
of your house, that’s also none of your business.”
Forooghieh questioned Shick about Shick’s claim that
Forooghieh broke the lid of Shick’s trash can, and the men
disagreed as to whether the video showed the lid broken or intact.
The court acknowledged the factual dispute and indicated the
trash can may already have been broken when Forooghieh moved
it. The court asked Forooghieh whether the trash can he was
seen pushing in the video was Shick’s. Forooghieh responded
that it was the city’s property, and the court observed trash cans
may be city property but are assigned and leased to property
owners.
Forooghieh questioned Shick about the placement of his
cars in a photograph, telling the court Shick and his wife parked
“[a]djacent to [Forooghieh’s] property.” The court estimated the
6
distance between the Shicks’ car and Forooghieh’s driveway in
the photograph was three to four feet, while Forooghieh said it
was “[m]aybe two” feet. The court asked Forooghieh what he
meant by “adjacent,” and Forooghieh answered, “Right at the
edge of my property. They maintain control over that piece of
property. That’s what I am getting at. They move the blue car
back and forth so that nobody can park in front of it and nobody
can park behind it.”
Forooghieh told the court Shick’s gardener would place
trash cans by Shick’s driveway, but then Shick “reserves the two
spots, and then two hours later removes his car and moves the
trash cans back to where his car used to be. So by force, they
maintain that place for their trash cans.” Forooghieh argued
Shick was harassing him by moving his (Shick’s) trash cans to
occupy Shick’s street parking spot when he left home.
The court sustained Shick’s relevance objection and asked
for evidence Shick was intentionally harassing Forooghieh with
his cars. Forooghieh said, “The trash bins are now empty, and lid
has been placed in front of my property. So I have to go pick up
the lid and put it back on.” Forooghieh said he knew Shick
placed the lid in front of Forooghieh’s property because he
(Forooghieh) had been sending him cease and desist letters
telling him “to stop playing games with trash cans.” The court
pointed out that trash collectors pick up the cans, and lids fall off
frequently. Forooghieh insisted, “They keep bringing it to the
edge of my property and make sure the lid falls off.”
Forooghieh wanted to question Shick about a passage in
Shick’s declaration in which Shick described the April 28, 2022
incident and referred to attached exhibits, with the statement,
“video will be played at trial.” Forooghieh asked where the video
7
was that showed he threatened to shoot and kill Shick. Shick’s
counsel advised the court they had played for the court the video
that was taken that day.
IV. Shick’s Son’s Declaration
Shick’s counsel asked the court if it wanted Shick’s son,
who had submitted a declaration in support of the request for a
restraining order, to testify. The court reviewed the declaration
and asked Forooghieh if he wanted to question Shick’s son.
Forooghieh declined, stating he could prove the declaration
wrong. Forooghieh told the court he could not have begun
harassing the Shick family in “early 2020” as the declaration
claimed, because his lease agreement for a Texas residence
proved he did not return to Los Angeles from Texas until April
2020. The court said, “I don’t know if that’s going to help you,
because ‘early 2020’ could have been January, February, or
March.”
V. Court’s Ruling
First addressing Forooghieh’s petition, the court discussed
the evidence concerning Shick’s conduct and found it sufficient to
support a restraining order against him. Next, the court turned
to Shick’s petition. Forooghieh’s anger at what he believed to be
Shick’s attempts “to claim as his own several feet of asphalt,” the
court said moving cars around is a common practice in
neighborhoods where there are multiple cars per household.
People “jockey their cars around. . . . They sometimes have to
move their cars in and around the gardeners’ schedules and in
and around the trash can schedules. It just happens. It’s not
clear to me at all that he was doing anything other than utilizing
a public street, but I did observe you pushing his trash cans, and
8
although, as you argue, they’re city property, they’re leased to the
individuals to whom they’re assigned.” The court said
Forooghieh’s “manhandling of those trash cans, pushing them up
and down the street, pushing them closer to his property because
you felt that they were interfering with a couple feet of asphalt
that came between this friendship is harassing. And, certainly,
it’s an inconvenience to this family” to have to retrieve trash cans
Forooghieh pushed across the street. Finally, the court stated,
“Frankly, based on your anger and what appears to be your
absolute obsession with this couple of feet of asphalt, I find
credible also Mr. Shick’s claim that at one point in time you
threatened to put him in the hospital.”
The court issued mutual two-year restraining orders, with
the restraining order against Forooghieh also protecting Shick’s
wife and children. Forooghieh appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a person who
has been subjected to harassment may seek a temporary
restraining order and an order prohibiting harassment after
hearing. Harassment is defined in the statute as “unlawful
violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
A credible threat of violence is “a knowing and willful
statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable
person in fear for the person’s safety or the safety of the person’s
immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”
9
(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) The statute defines a course of conduct as
“a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose,
including following or stalking an individual, making harassing
telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing
correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not
limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail,
facsimile, or email.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)
On review of a civil harassment restraining order, we
determine whether the factual findings, express and implied, are
supported by substantial evidence; the determination whether
the facts, construed in the petitioner’s favor, are legally sufficient
to constitute civil harassment is reviewed de novo. (Harris v.
Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497.)
“Evidence of even one credible witness ‘is sufficient for
proof of any fact.’ ” (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 334; see Evid. Code, § 411.) On appeal, it
is not our role to reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicting
evidence, or to redetermine the credibility of witnesses.
(Williamson v. Brooks (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1300
(Williamson).) Instead, “[w]e look at the evidence in support of
the successful party, disregarding any contrary showing, and we
resolve all conflicts in favor of the respondent, indulging in all
legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict if
possible. [Citation.] When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, we do not substitute our
deductions for those of the finder of fact. [Citation.] We must
affirm if substantial evidence supports the trier of fact’s
determination, even if other substantial evidence would have
10
supported a different result.” (Canister v. Emergency Ambulance
Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 394.)
II. Appellant’s Arguments
It is difficult to distinguish and understand Forooghieh’s
arguments on appeal for several reasons. First, he fails to comply
with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)’s requirement
that each point be stated under a separate heading or subheading
summarizing the point. Second, his brief is filled with “ ‘general
assertion[s], unsupported by specific argument.’ ” (Jewish
Community Centers Development Corp. v. County of Los Angeles
(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 700, 716.) Rather than “cognizable legal
argument in support of reversal of the judgment,” (Needelman v.
DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762), most of
Forooghieh’s arguments are brief blanket statements about what
the evidence showed or what the trial court allegedly believed,
followed by an unexplained reference or references to the
reporter’s transcript. We are left with the task of attempting to
determine whether and how each citation supports his assertions.
However, “[o]ne cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it
up to the appellate court to figure out why” or how. (Niko v.
Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) “It is not our place to
construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and
defeat the presumption of correctness.” (Benach v. County of Los
Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).)
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Forooghieh argues the court erred in concluding both men
had met their burdens to support their petitions for restraining
orders in light of the court’s statement early in the proceedings
that neither’s testimony alone would be sufficient. He claims
11
Shick did not provide substantial evidence to support his
accusations, and the evidence proved Shick’s allegations “were
contrived, and rejected by the court.” These statements are
followed by a list of record citations and no discussion. This
argument is inadequate to present any issue for our review. “An
appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to
support his contentions. This burden requires more than a mere
assertion that the judgment is wrong.” (Benach, supra,149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.)
Additionally, Forooghieh has forfeited any challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence by failing to accurately discuss the
record. A party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a particular finding must summarize the evidence on
that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it
is insufficient. (In re Marriage of Marshall (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
477, 487.) An appellant “ ‘who cites and discusses only evidence
in [their] favor fails to demonstrate any error and waives the
contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the
judgment.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620.)
Despite the forfeiture of this issue, we have reviewed the
record on appeal and conclude the evidence is sufficient to
support the issuance of a restraining order against Forooghieh.
Shick testified Forooghieh threatened to shoot and kill him, and
Shick’s son testified by declaration that Forooghieh told Shick,
“[I]f you place your trash cans by my drive way I will shoot and
kill you!” Shick also testified to Forooghieh’s ongoing campaign
of harassment over trash can placement and parking.
Forooghieh admitted moving Shick’s trash cans. We understand
Forooghieh disputes Shick’s claims, but the court resolved the
conflicts in the evidence by concluding Forooghieh had
12
threatened and harassed Shick, and we may not reweigh the
evidence on appeal. (Williamson, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1300.)5
B. Factual Error
Forooghieh argues the court mistakenly believed he
threatened to put Shick in the hospital, when in fact this was the
threat Shick made to him. While it is clear from the court’s
remarks that the court understood each man’s conduct, in the
course of delivering its rulings, the court mixed up the actual
language of the two threats and erroneously attributed the less
serious threat to Forooghieh: The court said Forooghieh
threatened to put Shick in the hospital, when the evidence was
that he threatened to shoot and kill Shick.
Forooghieh claims that “absent the court’s mistaken belief
that appellant threatened to put Shick in the hospital, there was
no evidence that appellant ever made a credible threat of violence
5 Forooghieh’s briefing is directed toward attacking the
evidence against him and challenging its sufficiency to support
the issuance of the restraining order, and he does not appear to
argue that the facts, when construed in Shick’s favor, were
legally insufficient to constitute civil harassment. Such an
argument, if made, would be meritless. Were we to
independently review the court’s determination that the facts
were sufficient to constitute harassment, we would conclude they
were. Forooghieh made a credible threat of violence against
Shick, a knowing and willful statement that served no legitimate
purpose and would place a reasonable person in fear for the
person’s safety or the person’s immediate family. (§ 527.6,
subd. (b)(2).) A credible threat of violence that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose, is civil harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
13
against him, or harassed him within the meaning of . . . section
527.6.” (Boldface and underscoring omitted.) As discussed above,
substantial evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
Forooghieh engaged in harassment and threatened Shick with
violence. Given the substantial evidence supporting the court’s
findings and the court’s demonstrated understanding of the
contentions and evidence, the court’s misstatement of the precise
wording of Forooghieh’s threat of physical violence was neither
indicative of any larger misattribution of Shick’s conduct to
Forooghieh nor prejudicial in any way.
C. Dismissal of the Petition
Forooghieh asserts the court abused its discretion by not
dismissing Shick’s petition “upon verifying respondent’s
accusations were all false.” (Underscoring omitted.) He argues
Shick’s “evidence and testimony refuted his claims” of vandalism,
death threats, threats to the gardeners, spying on Shick’s wife,
interfering with Shick’s trash pickup, and shouting obscenities in
early 2020. Forooghieh provides no argument or authority
supporting his contention that Shick’s testimony and evidence
proved Forooghieh’s claims false. Instead, Forooghieh lists for
each topic one or more citations to the reporter’s transcript and a
fragmentary quotation of something said during the hearing.
This is insufficient. Appellants are required to explain the
relevance of facts cited in their briefs (Okorie v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600, disapproved
on other grounds by Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11
Cal.5th 995, 1012, fn. 2) and to present “meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts
in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a
point is asserted without argument and authority for the
14
proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires
no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ” (In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
Additionally, most of the passages Forooghieh lists do not
conclusively refute Shick’s allegations. For instance, Shick
described the April 28, 2022, confrontation in a declaration, and
at the end of the description, he identified several sources of
evidentiary support, including a video recording. The video was
played at the restraining order hearing, and both men testified
Shick had begun recording after the confrontation was already
underway. Focusing on the declaration’s phrase, “video will be
played at trial,” Forooghieh attempted to cross-examine Shick
about which video showed him doing all Shick had described in
that paragraph of the declaration. Forooghieh argued in the trial
court (and presumably contends on appeal as well, although he
does not set forth an argument), that the video did not depict the
alleged threat and “there is no proof or evidence that I ever said
to anybody that I’m going to shoot and kill them.” However, as
previously discussed, there was evidence that Forooghieh
threatened to shoot and kill Shick, and the court credited that
evidence. The absence of video proof of each detail listed in that
paragraph of Shick’s declaration does not, as a matter of logic,
conclusively demonstrate his account was false.
Similarly, the court’s question to Shick, “Sir, you put your
trash bin out on Tuesday for pickup on Thursday?” is not
evidence, and it does not refute Shick’s allegation that
Forooghieh interfered with his trash cans. In the same vein,
Forooghieh’s lease on a residence in Texas until April 2020 does
not disprove the allegation that early in 2020 he yelled
obscenities at the Shicks. The end date of a lease does not
15
establish a person’s location at all times, and even if Forooghieh
was not at his home until April 2020, that does not establish the
allegation was false, as “early 2020” is a broad term, and we
cannot say as a matter of law that April cannot be considered
early in a year.
It is true that the court found the letter from the gardeners,
though admissible, lacked credibility; the court declined to make
findings on the issue of Forooghieh watching Shick’s wife because
there was no evidence how long he had been watching her; and it
expressed some doubt as to whether Forooghieh broke the trash
can lid, but this did not warrant the dismissal of the entire
petition where the court credited the evidence of other harassing
and threatening conduct by Forooghieh. Forooghieh has not
established error here.
D. Criminal Liability
Forooghieh asserts that the court should have held Shick
and his family “responsible” for a list of actions: signing false
declarations, making false police reports, giving false testimony,
fabricating evidence, and filing a fraudulent petition for a
temporary restraining order. After each listed item, Forooghieh
provides a string of record citations without explanation or
argument; he then quotes three Penal Code sections without
discussion. This is insufficient to present an issue for our review.
(In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
Moreover, the court’s findings indicate the court did not
believe the declarations and testimony were false, the Shicks
made false police reports, or the petition for a temporary
restraining order was fraudulent. Although the court found the
letter from the landscaping company lacked credibility and
accorded it little weight, the court ruled it admissible and did not
16
find it was fabricated. We may not reweigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (Williamson,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1300.)
E. Protection of Family Members
Section 527.6, subdivision (c) provides, “In the discretion of
the court, on a showing of good cause, a temporary restraining
order or order after hearing issued under this section may include
other named family or household members.” Forooghieh asserts
it was error to include Shick’s wife and sons as parties protected
by the restraining order because “[n]o evidence was presented to
prove any concern for safety of respondent or his family members.
All declarations associated with respondent’s accusations in his
petition were found to be deficient including the declarations of
his son and wife.”
Forooghieh’s claim there was no evidence of a safety
concern is belied by the evidence he made a credible threat of
violence against Shick and fails to demonstrate an absence of
good cause to include the other family members in the
restraining order. As for the contention that the declarations
supporting Shick’s petition “were found to be deficient,” we did
not locate, nor did Forooghieh direct us to, any such finding in
the record. Forooghieh lists a string of record citations rather
than a legal argument, and the citations direct this court to the
same passages of the record that he has already brought to our
attention: his criticism of Shick’s declaration because no video
depicted each action alleged in the declaration about the April 28,
2022 incident; the factual dispute over whether Forooghieh broke
the trash can lid, in which the court indicated Shick’s accusation
that Forooghieh broke it may have been mistaken; the court’s
conclusion there was insufficient evidence to make findings
17
regarding the allegation of Forooghieh watching Shick’s wife; and
Forooghieh’s belief that his Texas lease refuted the claim that he
yelled obscenities at the Shicks in early 2020. None of these
passages establishes error in including Shick’s family in the
restraining order.
F. Alleged Court Negligence
In a one-sentence argument followed by another list of
record citations, Forooghieh states the trial court was negligent
in granting protective orders “to individuals who participated in
making false claims of criminal conduct” based on a mistaken
“belief a restraining order for violence will mitigate years-long
behaviors that eventually led to [Shick’s] violation of the TRO
against him.” The court did not find Shick and his family had
made false claims of criminal conduct; rather, the court
concluded, after hearing evidence, that Forooghieh had harassed
Shick and made a credible threat of violence against him.
Forooghieh disagrees with the court’s conclusions, but as
discussed above, they are supported by substantial evidence.
Our review of the record does not support Forooghieh’s
assertion that the court issued the restraining order against
Forooghieh with the intent of “mitigating” or otherwise impacting
Shick’s behavior. To the contrary, the court issued the
restraining order against Forooghieh to protect Shick from future
harassment by Forooghieh.
G. Basis for Restraining Order
Forooghieh argues the court abused its discretion by
granting a restraining order against him for “moving
respondent’s trash bins away from his driveway.” (Underscoring
omitted.) This is not an accurate description of the court’s factual
18
findings. The court concluded that (1) Forooghieh was not merely
moving trash cans away from his driveway but manhandling
them and moving them up and down the street, creating a
nuisance and inconvenience for the family that rose to the level of
harassment; and (2) Forooghieh had threatened Shick with
violence. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3) [harassment includes “a credible
threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct
directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose”].)
H. Misattribution of Conduct
Forooghieh alleges the court “mistakenly attributed” to him
the “systematic harassment” Shick was committing. He argues
Shick’s restraining order request was based on alleged threats
and vandalism, not harassment by Forooghieh’s movement of his
trash cans; and Shick did not claim the movement of his trash
cans posed a nuisance. Setting forth his view of the evidence—
that Shick harassed him with his trash cans and attempts to
reserve parking on the street—Forooghieh claims Shick was the
person engaging in harassment, and he concludes the court must
have erroneously attributed Shick’s harassing conduct to him.
Contrary to his assertion, Forooghieh’s conduct with
Shick’s trash cans, including moving them and allegedly breaking
a trash can lid, was very much at issue and discussed at length in
the restraining order proceedings. Shick may not have used the
word “nuisance,” but his allegations of harassment encompassed
Forooghieh’s behavior with the trash cans. Shick described
Forooghieh’s treatment of the trash cans in his declaration
supporting his request for a restraining order, and his son’s
declaration recounted Forooghieh’s movement of the Shicks’ trash
cans while screaming at Shick and threatening violence. At the
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hearing, Shick testified Forooghieh blocked his car with one trash
bin and moved others during the April 28, 2022 altercation; and
Shick’s video, also played at the hearing, depicted Forooghieh
moving a trash can.
We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing and find no
evidence the court mistakenly attributed any of Shick’s actions to
Forooghieh beyond its minor misstatement of the actual words of
Forooghieh’s threat of violence, which we have already discussed.
Both Shick and Forooghieh discussed at length how Shick’s trash
cans had been handled, and the court noted it saw Forooghieh
pushing Shick’s trash can in the video played at the hearing. It is
clear from the court’s remarks, both during the hearing and when
delivering its ruling, that the court was correctly attributing
Forooghieh’s conduct to Forooghieh.
I. “Early 2020”
Forooghieh alleges the court “erred in mistakenly believing
that an individual living in Texas from 2019 until April 2020 can
be in Los Ang[e]les, in ‘January, February, and March’ of 2020,”
and states he did not live in California at the time Shick’s son
declared he was harassing the family. (Underscoring omitted.)
This refers to a point discussed above, Forooghieh’s belief that his
Texas lease agreement proved he did not return to Los Angeles
until April 2020, and therefore he could not have harassed the
Shicks in early 2020 as stated in the declaration of Shick’s son.
The court’s statement that the lease was not as helpful to
Forooghieh as he believed it was because “ ‘early 2020’ could have
been January, February, or March,” indicates only that it
questioned whether the lease was as definitive as Forooghieh
believed. The court never made a finding about when the
harassment began or where Forooghieh was prior to April 2020,
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nor was any such finding necessary. We note again that “early”
is a general term that does not rule out an April date, and an out-
of-state lease does not prove one was never at one’s California
home during the lease term. More importantly, even if the court
possessed the belief Forooghieh ascribes to it, he does not explain
how this demonstrates error in granting the restraining order.
The date the harassment began is not determinative; even if
Forooghieh could not have harassed the family prior to April
2020, this only conclusively demonstrates a date in a declaration
was incorrect. It does not show that the declaration was false in
its entirety, the harassment did not occur, or there was
insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the restraining
order.
J. Record Preservation and Failure to Consolidate
Forooghieh states the court erred “in not preserving the
record, [and] by failing to consolidate both petitions heard on July
18,[ ]2022 trial.” (Underscoring omitted.) He asserts his petition
for a restraining order was continued to July 18, 2022, resulting
in both petitions for a restraining order being heard on that date.
Next, he describes his difficulties in securing the record for
appellate review, contending the trial court only preserved
documents relating to Shick’s petition; he (Forooghieh) paid fees
a second time to complete the record; and the appeal was delayed
almost nine months because the trial court did not preserve the
documents in both cases.
Whatever the accuracy and merits of these contentions,
Forooghieh does not argue they demonstrate any error in the
court’s ruling granting Shick’s petition for a restraining order,
much less that had the court consolidated the matters or
preserved documents after the hearings the outcome of Shick’s
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restraining order petition would have been different. This is fatal
to his claim. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [“it
is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the
burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment”]; Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)
K. Effect on Shick of Restraining Order Against
Forooghieh
Forooghieh asserts the court erroneously believed issuing a
restraining order against him would prevent Shick from
“intimidating behavior,” but we do not see that in the record. The
court issued mutual restraining orders: one against Forooghieh to
protect Shick from future harassment by Forooghieh, and the
other against Shick to protect Forooghieh from future
harassment by Shick. As Forooghieh notes, the court
acknowledged Shick’s provocative behavior, but nothing in the
court’s comments suggests it granted the restraining order
against Forooghieh because of, or with the intent of changing,
Shick’s behavior.
Forooghieh next states, without elaboration or citation to
the record, that the court recognized Shick’s evidence lacked
credibility and all Shick’s allegations were refuted by his own
evidence. These categorical statements, devoid of analysis and
unsupported by reference to facts in the record, fail to present
any issue for our review or to support Forooghieh’s argument
about the court’s intent in granting the restraining order against
him. We are not obligated to make arguments for litigants, and
we disregard conclusory arguments failing to disclose the
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reasoning by which litigants reached the conclusions they ask us
to adopt. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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