People v. Juarez CA2/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Juarez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B330153
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA107261)
v.
ROMEO JUAREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lana S. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A.
Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In January 2023, appellant Romeo Juarez was convicted by
a jury of first degree residential burglary with a person present, a
specific intent crime. Three witnesses testified that, during and
after the incident, Juarez seemed “off” and “out of it.” Based on
this testimony, Juarez requested the trial court instruct the jury
with CALCRIM No. 3426, which states that a jury may consider a
defendant’s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the
defendant could have formed the requisite intent. The court
refused, finding there was no evidence that Juarez was
voluntarily intoxicated. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352,
the court also denied Juarez’s request to play footage from an
officer’s body camera, which Juarez contended was further
evidence of his intoxication.
On appeal, Juarez contends the trial court erred in both
these decisions. He argues that the testimony that he seemed
“off” and “out of it” sufficed to warrant an instruction on
voluntary intoxication, and that the body camera footage was
relevant and not unduly prejudicial. We disagree and therefore
affirm.1
1 Juarez also urges us to “analyze the prejudicial effect of
the two errors together,” contending that “if a single error alone
is not sufficient to require reversal, reversal is required when the
two errors are viewed cumulatively.” Because we find Juarez
failed to demonstrate either error, his claim of cumulative
prejudice also fails.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In October 2022, Juarez was charged by information with
one count of violating Penal Code section 459—first degree
residential burglary with a person present. He pleaded not
guilty. A jury trial occurred over three days in January 2023.
A. First Day of Trial
Leslie Adler testified that, in September 2022, after she
returned to her Marina del Rey home, she opened the sliding
glass door in her living room to let in some air, locked the sliding
screen door, and went to the bathroom. While in the bathroom,
she heard a noise that she assumed was her husband and dog
returning home; she believed her dog was waiting outside the
bathroom door for her to emerge, as was his custom. However,
after she exited the bathroom, she did not see her dog, and went
to the garage to look for him. After entering the garage, she saw
that her husband’s car was not there, and then she heard a noise
and saw Juarez rifling through the family’s tools. Leslie3 asked
Juarez who he was; Juarez responded by holding up a pair of bolt
cutters and asking, “Can I have th[is]?” Leslie said, “No,” and
asked who Juarez was and how he got in. Juarez responded,
“Well, I’m not the first one,” which caused Leslie to believe there
might be someone upstairs in the house. Leslie left the garage,
closing and locking the door to the garage behind her. She then
exited the home and called 911. As she was on the phone with
2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history
relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3 Because two of the witnesses share a surname, we refer to
them by their first names.
3
911, she noticed the screen door in the living room had been
damaged.4
While Leslie was waiting for the police to arrive, she saw
her husband Michael driving home and waved at him to come
toward her, knowing that he would normally park in the garage.
When Michael got to her, she informed him that someone had
broken into their home and was still in the garage; Michael told
her he had already opened the garage door. Michael parked and
exited his car, ran to the street where the garage was, and saw
Juarez walking out of the garage, carrying Michael’s toolbox and
a backpack. Michael asked what Juarez was doing with his stuff.
Juarez stated, “What’s the big deal? You’re rich. You can just . . .
buy more.”
B. Second Day of Trial
1. Body Camera Footage
At the start of the second day of trial, the People informed
the court that Juarez’s counsel intended to play video footage
from an officer’s body camera, and that the People objected to this
both for lack of foundation and lack of relevance. Juarez’s
counsel countered that the footage was relevant because it
showed Juarez “was drunk at the time” and also showed his
“demeanor.” Specifically, Juarez’s counsel claimed the video
4 A picture of the damaged sliding screen door was
admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2. The screen portion of the
door appeared disconnected from the left and bottom sides,
creating a gap wide enough for a person to enter. While the
exhibit was not included in the appellate record, we obtained it
from the superior court and, on our own motion, augment the
record with it.
4
would show Juarez’s “slurred speech” and inability to stand up
while “face planted into the dirt.” The court viewed the proffered
footage and excluded it under Evidence Code section 352, stating:
“I can’t tell that he [Juarez] is intoxicated. . . . It just shows him
being arrested. You can’t see his face at any point in time.” After
the court stated it could not tell how Juarez’s “face got planted on
to the ground” and “can’t tell that the voice or his words are
slurred” and thus “d[id]n’t see the probative value,” Juarez’s
counsel offered to “play more of the video where you can.” The
court refused the request, stating it had already ruled.5
5 The video footage was marked for identification as Exhibit
A-1, but not admitted into evidence. Although Juarez failed to
include the footage in the appellate record, we obtained the
exhibit from the superior court and, on our own motion, augment
the record with it. It is 70 seconds long and begins with Juarez
face down in a mostly barren garden-like area next to a rough
wall, with officers placing handcuffs around his wrists.
Throughout the video, officers repeatedly ask Juarez to stand up,
and he refuses, saying (as best as we can discern) things such as:
“No, I can’t unless you understand it’s safe.” “If they say it’s cool,
it’s cool.” “Go figure out what’s happening. If it’s cool, it’s cool.
No, if it’s cool, it’s cool. If not, my mom is going to die. And then
my parents are going to kill each other and then you’re going to
have two [unintelligible] dead.” “If you let my [unintelligible] die,
you guys are bitches, man.” “Nah, dude, leave me where I am,
it’s cool.” At approximately 63 seconds in the video, officers begin
hauling Juarez to his feet, and the footage ends with him
standing upright and two officers holding him on either side.
While Juarez was not always intelligible, he did not sound as if
he were slurring his words. Nor did we perceive him being
unable—as opposed to refusing—to stand up.
5
2. Leslie Adler
On cross-examination, Leslie testified that Juarez seemed
“off” and “out of it” to her that day. While she did not know
whether he was intoxicated, she had a conversation with a police
officer about him being drunk, or on drugs or some other
substance, but also stated that his behavior “might have been
normal for him.” When a police officer tried to handcuff Juarez,
it appeared that Juarez resisted by pulling away, and then fell
over and “face planted” into the plants and dirt, where he stayed
“for a while.” At this point, Juarez’s counsel informed the court
that he would “like to play the video.” The court held a
discussion at sidebar with both counsel, reiterating that it had
already excluded the footage, and had not changed its mind. The
prosecutor added that the evidence should be excluded under
Evidence Code section 352 “for a wide variety of reasons,”
arguing that the footage showed the officers using force without
foundation for why Juarez was resisting arrest, and also showed
Juarez “crying out in pain” and being “distraught” but only after
the completion of the crime and thus did not demonstrate his
state of mind at the time of the crime. The prosecutor concluded
that whatever limited probative value the footage had was
“clearly . . . outweighed by the prejudice of seeing [Juarez] in this
state using the use of force [sic].” The court agreed.
3. Michael Adler
Michael testified that, on the day in question, he was
driving home and, as he neared his home, he opened the garage
door with his remote. He then learned from Leslie that an
individual had broken into the home and was still in the garage;
Michael parked his car and saw Juarez exit the garage with
Michael’s tool chest. Michael asked Juarez what he was doing
6
with his tool chest; Juarez “mumbled something” in response.
Michael shoved Juarez, who fell to the pavement, losing his grip
on the tool chest; Michael retrieved it. Michael stood over Juarez
and told him not to move. After Juarez got up and began walking
toward an adjacent property, Michael noticed Juarez was
carrying a backpack. Michael followed him and asked to see
what was in the backpack. When Juarez stated his “stuff” was in
the backpack, Michael threatened to push him down again and
Juarez handed the backpack over; inside the backpack were
Michael’s bolt cutters.
On cross-examination, Michael agreed that Juarez seemed
“off,” “out of it,” and not “quite right.” However, Michael testified
he did not know whether Juarez was drunk and could not say his
speech was slurred.
4. Ian Clark
Clark testified that he had been a police officer for 17 years
and was one of the officers who responded to the incident in
question and who detained Juarez. Clark opined that Juarez “did
not seem normal” that day, stating that he was “talking to
himself,” was “aggressive” and “not fully compliant when
confronted by our armed officers,” and was “difficult to
communicate with.” Clark elaborated that Juarez “might answer
a question with an odd homey kind of impression [sic] or not at
all” or “talk in circles.” However, Clark did not smell alcohol on
Juarez’s breath and his behavior was not what Clark would
associate with drunkenness. Clark stated he could not state
whether Juarez was “high,” because he “lack[ed] the expertise to
tell the difference between someone who has[,] say[,] long term
narcotics damage and someone who is currently high.” Clark
7
explained that long-term narcotics users would “exhibit some
behaviors and patterns of speech that the defendant did.”
C. Third Day of Trial
1. Jury Instructions
During a discussion about jury instructions, the court
refused to include CALCRIM No. 3426 (Voluntary Intoxication),
finding there was no evidence that Juarez voluntarily ingested
any alcohol. Defense counsel countered that the testimony that
Juarez “appeared to have been high” was enough evidence for a
jury to infer Juarez was intoxicated. The court disagreed,
reiterating “there was absolutely no evidence that the defendant
was intoxicated or that he voluntarily consumed alcohol” and
refused to include the requested instruction.
2. Closing Arguments
During closing arguments, Juarez’s attorney argued that
Juarez did not necessarily intend to commit theft when he broke
into the Adlers’ home because “he was certainly out of his mind
at the time.” Counsel stated that he did not know if Juarez “was
drunk or high or going through some kind of episode” or if he had
“long term damage . . . from long-term drug use,” but all
witnesses testified that Juarez was “extremely off,” talking to
himself and responding to unasked questions.
3. Verdict and Sentence
After less than an hour of deliberation, the jury found
Juarez guilty. The court sentenced him to the upper term of six
years but suspended the sentence and placed him on three years
8
of probation on the condition that he attend a residential
treatment program. Juarez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Instruct
on Voluntary Intoxication
“A defendant is entitled to . . . an instruction [regarding
voluntary intoxication] only when there is substantial evidence of
the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and the intoxication
affected the defendant’s ‘actual formation of specific intent.’ ”
(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 (Williams).)
Juarez argues the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
using CALCRIM No. 3426 because “the uncontradicted evidence
of three witnesses was that Mr[.] Juarez’s conduct was that of
someone who was under the influence of some intoxicating
substance.” “[A]ssertions of instructional error are reviewed de
novo.” (People v. Shaw (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833, 838.) We
discern no error.
CALCRIM No. 3426 is entitled “Voluntary Intoxication”
and instructs the jury that it is permitted to “consider evidence, if
any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only . . . in deciding
whether the defendant acted . . . with” the specific intent
required for the crime. The instruction goes on to explain that
“[a] person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes
intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or
other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating
effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.”
Juarez cites to the witnesses’ testimony that Juarez was
“off” and “out of it” and “didn’t seem quite right.” At most, such
evidence may have supported an inference that some condition
9
was affecting Juarez’s behavior or cognition. But to support the
giving of CALCRIM No. 3426, the jury would have needed to
infer that Juarez’s not-quite-right behavior stemmed from
intoxication instead of mental illness, long-term drug use, or
some other cause; that Juarez voluntarily became intoxicated;
and that Juarez knew or willingly assumed the risk that the
substance he allegedly ingested would have an intoxicating effect.
There was no evidence to permit the jury to make these
inferences. (See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 677 [witness
testimony that defendant was “probably spaced out” on morning
of crime insufficient to warrant instructing the jury on voluntary
intoxication].)
Moreover, even if the witnesses’ testimony sufficed for a
jury to conclude Juarez was intoxicated, there was no evidence to
permit the jury to conclude that the alleged intoxication affected
Juarez’s formation of the requisite specific intent. (See People v.
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 847–848 [although there was
evidence defendant was intoxicated, was feeling the effects of
intoxication, “ ‘did not appear to be in a normal behavior [sic],’ ”
and appeared “dazed” when arrested, voluntary intoxication
instruction unnecessary because “evidence of the effect of
defendant’s alcohol consumption on his state of mind is
lacking”].)
Juarez fails to demonstrate the court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3426.
B. The Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Admit the
Body Camera Footage
“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.”
(Evid. Code, § 350.) Additionally, “[t]he court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
10
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Juarez contends the court erred in refusing to admit the
body camera footage because it was both relevant and more
probative than prejudicial. “A trial court’s determination
regarding relevance is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 591.) Similarly, the
determination as to whether the probative value of evidence is
substantially outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice or
misleading the jury is “ ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the
trial judge who is the best position to evaluate the evidence.’ ”
(People v. Miramontes (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1097.) “A
trial court’s exercise of its discretion under section 352 ‘ “must
not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1337,
italics omitted.)
Having reviewed the video footage, we cannot find that the
court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner in refusing to permit the footage to be played to the jury.
The video began with Juarez already on the ground, without
showing how he got there. While some of Juarez’s statements on
the video seemed nonsensical, he was not slurring his words—
any unintelligible portions are reasonably attributed to the
position of his face (which was in the dirt) relative to the camera.
And the footage ends with the officers hauling Juarez to his
11
feet—there is no evidence that Juarez was unable to stand.6
Thus, we hold the trial court acted well within its discretion in
finding both that the video footage was not relevant and that, in
any case, any potential relevance was substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission would create substantial
danger of undue prejudice from seeing Juarez in this state
(handcuffed and face down on the ground) without context of how
he got there.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
6 Moreover, given that he was standing in the Adlers’
garage when Leslie first encountered him, and was able to exit
the garage under his own power, it would be reasonable to
conclude that any difficulty in standing that Juarez later
encountered was due to being shoved to the ground by Michael,
as well as “face-planting” into the ground while resisting arrest,
and then having his hands cuffed behind his back.
12