In re M.B. ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 1/31/24
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    In re M.B., a Person Coming Under
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,                                 A166408
    Plaintiff and Respondent,            (San Francisco County Super. Ct.
    v.                         No. JW186158)
    M.B.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    In this juvenile wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions
    Code1 section 602, defendant M.B. admitted committing attempted murder
    and related enhancement allegations. The juvenile court committed M.B. to
    a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) pursuant to section 875. The court
    specified a four-year “baseline term of confinement” (§ 875, subd. (b)), as well
    as a “maximum term of confinement” of 22 years to life (id., subd. (c)). The
    court ordered that M.B.’s precommitment credits be applied against the
    maximum term of confinement (id., subd. (c)(1)(C)).
    On appeal, M.B. presents three main challenges to the court’s orders,
    all pertaining to the court’s rulings as to confinement terms and the
    1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
    Code.
    1
    application of credits.2 First, he contends the court lacked jurisdiction to
    modify an earlier order setting the maximum term of confinement at four
    years. Second, M.B. argues in the alternative that, even if the court had
    jurisdiction, the indeterminate 22-years-to-life maximum term it set is
    unauthorized, because the longest term permitted by statute is a determinate
    term of 22 years. And, because the court had discretion to set a “maximum
    term of confinement” (§ 875, subd. (c)) that was lower than the 22-year
    statutory maximum, M.B. asserts that a remand is necessary for the court to
    exercise its discretion in selecting the maximum term of confinement.
    Finally, in his third set of arguments, M.B. claims equal protection principles
    require that his precommitment credits be applied against his four-year
    baseline term (rather than against the maximum term of confinement).
    In response, the Attorney General argues the court had jurisdiction to
    make the challenged rulings and properly applied M.B.’s precommitment
    credits. As to the maximum term of confinement set by the court under
    section 875, the Attorney General concedes that the 22-years-to-life term is
    unauthorized and that the maximum term permitted by statute is 22 years.
    The Attorney General also agrees the juvenile court had discretion to set a
    maximum term of confinement that is lower than the 22-year statutory
    maximum.3 The Attorney General contends, however, that this court should
    simply modify the maximum term of confinement to 22 years, and that no
    remand is necessary because it is clear from the record that the court
    intended to impose that term.
    2 M.B. does not challenge the court’s decision to commit him to the
    SYTF.
    3 Based on this latter concession, we need not address M.B.’s argument
    that a construction of section 875 that precluded the exercise of such
    discretion would violate equal protection principles.
    2
    We conclude the court had jurisdiction to enter the challenged order,
    and we reject M.B.’s argument that equal protection principles require
    application of precommitment credits against the baseline term. We will
    modify the court’s order to specify the maximum term of confinement is 22
    years, and we will otherwise affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On November 3, 2021, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed an
    amended wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) alleging M.B. had committed
    attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664,
    187, subd. (a); count 1); aggravated mayhem (id., § 205; count 2); five counts
    of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (id., § 245, subd. (b); counts 3
    through 7); discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (id., § 246.3,
    subd. (a); count 8); and unlawful possession of a firearm by a minor (id.,
    § 29610; count 9).4 On each count, the petition alleged M.B. was over 16
    years old at the time of the offenses (§ 707, subd. (a)(1)).
    As to the attempted murder count, the petition alleged M.B. personally
    used a firearm, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and
    personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
    (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)). The aggravated mayhem count was
    enhanced by an allegation that M.B. personally and intentionally discharged
    a firearm causing great bodily injury (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)). For all the
    assault with a firearm counts, the petition alleged M.B. personally used a
    4 In addition to the November 2021 petition at issue in this case, M.B.
    was the subject of earlier wardship proceedings beginning in 2018. We also
    note that, in April 2021, as part of the proceedings in the present case but
    prior to the filing of the operative amended petition, the San Mateo juvenile
    court denied a motion by the People to transfer the matter to adult court.
    The juvenile court found M.B. was a “fit and proper subject to remain in [the]
    Juvenile Justice System.”
    3
    firearm (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to one of the assault with a firearm
    counts (count 3) and the attempted murder count, the petition alleged M.B.
    personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (id., § 12022.7,
    subd. (a)).
    The allegations in the wardship petition arose from a shooting on
    August 21, 2020, on a public bus in Daly City.5 M.B. was seated on the bus.
    When the victim boarded the bus, M.B. pulled out a handgun and fired five
    times at the victim, hitting him in the abdomen. Other passengers were “in
    the line of fire of the discharged bullets.”
    M.B. and a female companion fled, running past the fallen victim and
    off the bus. Police later found them “hiding in thick vegetation near Highway
    35/Northbound Highway 1 onramp.” The victim “underwent emergency
    surgery for a single gunshot wound to the lower left abdomen, where 1/10th
    of his colon was removed, and he was treated for damage to his bowels.” M.B.
    was 16 years, 11 months old at the time of the shooting.
    On November 3, 2021 (the same day the amended petition was filed),
    M.B. admitted committing attempted murder and the allegations in
    connection with that count that he was over 16 years old at the time of the
    offense, that he personally used a firearm, and that he personally inflicted
    great bodily injury, in exchange for the striking of the premeditation and
    deliberation allegation and the dismissal of the other counts and allegations.
    On April 26, 2022, the San Mateo County Juvenile Court transferred
    the matter to San Francisco County for disposition based on M.B.’s residency
    in San Francisco.
    5 We derive this summary of the underlying incident from the probation
    officer’s dispositional report.
    4
    At the August 24, 2022 dispositional hearing, the San Francisco County
    Juvenile Court redeclared wardship and committed M.B. to an SYTF. The
    court set M.B.’s baseline term of confinement at four years, commencing, by
    stipulation, on July 6, 2022. The court set the maximum term of confinement
    at 22 years to life. The court stated it would reserve ruling on the application
    of precommitment credits and the baseline term.
    The court’s written order issued after the August 24 hearing included
    the following findings:
    “13. The maximum period of confinement that could be
    imposed pursuant to [section 875, subdivision (c)] is: 22 years to life.
    “14. Having considered the individual facts and
    circumstances of the case, the court orders that the maximum
    period of confinement is: 22 years to life.
    “15. The youth shall receive credit for time served in the
    amount to be determined by the court. This issue is reserved
    pending the court’s determination (at the review hearing on
    9/6/22).
    “16. The baseline term of confinement based on the most
    serious recent adjudicated offense is 4 years, commencing 7/6/22
    pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The issue of baseline
    term is reserved by the court.”
    After the August 24 hearing, the parties filed briefs addressing the
    question of how M.B.’s precommitment credits should be applied. M.B.
    argued the credits should be applied against the baseline term of
    confinement, while the prosecutor contended the credits should instead be
    applied against the maximum term of confinement. The parties’ briefs
    5
    focused in part on the decision in In re Ernesto L. (2022) 
    81 Cal.App.5th 31
    (Ernesto L.), a case we discuss further below.
    At a hearing on September 14, 2022, the court ruled M.B.’s
    precommitment credits would be applied against his four-year baseline term
    in the SYTF. The court also modified certain portions of its August 24 order,
    specifically findings 13 and 14 (which, as noted, dealt with the “maximum
    period of confinement”). The court’s new finding 13 states the “maximum
    period of confinement to which the minor is exposed by statute is 22 years to
    life.” The new finding 14 states that, “[h]aving considered the individual
    facts and circumstances of the case,” the “maximum custodial term is four
    years.”
    The next day (September 15, 2022), the court—on its own motion—
    stayed the September 14 “order regarding credit for time served” and set a
    hearing for reconsideration of the order. The court’s stay order stated: “The
    issue of interest to the court is whether the recent opinion in the case of
    Ernesto L. is relevant to the ‘maximum term of confinement’ described in
    [section 875].”
    On September 26, 2022, defense counsel filed a written objection to the
    court’s reconsideration of the September 14 order applying M.B.’s
    precommitment credits to the baseline term. Counsel argued that, because
    the order was valid and had been entered in the minutes, the court had lost
    jurisdiction to modify it.
    On September 27, 2022, after a hearing, the court vacated the
    September 14 order and reinstated the August 24 order (including
    findings 13 and 14 pertaining to the “maximum period of confinement”). The
    court applied M.B.’s precommitment custody credits against “the maximum
    period of confinement as described under [section 875, subdivision (c)].” In
    6
    response to defense counsel’s objection, the court concluded it had power to
    act because its ruling on September 14 had resulted in an unauthorized
    disposition.
    M.B. appealed the August 24 and September 27 orders.6
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Additional Background: Juvenile Justice Realignment,
    Section 875, and the Terms Imposed by the Juvenile Court
    Until recently, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
    Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was “the state’s most restrictive placement
    for its most severe juvenile offenders . . . .” (In re Miguel C. (2021)
    
    69 Cal.App.5th 899
    , 902; see In re J.B. (2022) 
    75 Cal.App.5th 410
    , 413.)7 “[I]n
    2020 the Legislature passed ‘juvenile justice realignment’ through Senate Bill
    No. 823 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337).” (In re J.B., at p. 413,
    fn. 3.) The Legislature’s juvenile justice realignment program has included
    the transfer of DJJ’s responsibilities to California’s counties beginning on
    July 1, 2021 (§ 736.5, subd. (a)) and the closure of DJJ on June 30, 2023 (id.,
    subd. (e)). The stated purpose of these changes is “[t]o ensure that justice-
    involved youth are closer to their families and communities and receive age-
    appropriate treatment.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(b); In re Miguel C., at
    p. 907.)
    6 We will refer to the three orders entered in August and
    September 2022 as the August 24 order, the September 14 order, and the
    September 27 order.
    7 “The DJJ is also known as the Department of Corrections and
    Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). [Citation.] DJJ and
    DJF are used interchangeably in case law.” (In re J.B., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 413, fn. 1.) “The DJJ was previously known as the California Youth
    Authority.” (In re Miguel C., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 906, fn. 4.)
    7
    As part of the legislative shift from DJJ to county-level commitments,
    section 875 took effect on May 14, 2021 with the enactment of Senate Bill
    No. 92 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12). Section 875
    provides that, commencing July 1, 2021, a juvenile court may commit a ward
    to an SYTF under certain circumstances. (§ 875, subd. (a).)8 The court must
    set both a “baseline term of confinement” (baseline term) (id., subd. (b)) and a
    “maximum term of confinement” (id., subd. (c)). Subdivision (b) of section 875
    states the baseline term is to be “based on the most serious recent offense for
    which the ward has been adjudicated” and “shall represent the time in
    custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the
    ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to a period of probation
    supervision in the community.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
    Pending the development of offense-based classifications by the
    Judicial Council, the court must set the baseline term using the “discharge
    consideration date guidelines” applied by the DJJ prior to its closure. (§ 875,
    subd. (b)(1), citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30807–30813.) Under those
    guidelines, attempted murder is a “category two” offense, resulting in a
    baseline term of four years. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30807, subd. (a),
    30808, subd. (a)(12).) The court may “modify the initial baseline term with a
    deviation of plus or minus six months.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) The baseline
    term is also subject to modification in later progress review hearings. (Id.,
    subds. (b)(1), (e).) As noted, the court here set a four-year baseline term.
    Subdivision (c) of section 875 requires that the court also set a
    “maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and
    circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward
    8 As noted, M.B. does not challenge the court’s decision to commit him
    to an SYTF.
    8
    under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve
    rehabilitation.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).) Under section 875, subdivision (c)(1),
    the maximum term of confinement is “the longest term of confinement in a
    facility that the ward may serve subject to” three limitations. (Ibid.) First, a
    ward committed to an SYTF is not to be held in secure confinement beyond
    23 years of age (or 25 years of age for more serious offenses) or two years
    from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(A).)
    Second, the maximum term of confinement “shall not exceed the middle term
    of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same
    offense or offenses,” with additional directives as to how a court is to proceed
    if it elects to aggregate the period of confinement on multiple counts or
    multiple petitions. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B); accord, § 726, subd. (d)(1), (3), (5) [this
    cap applies when a ward is placed in “physical confinement,” which includes
    placement in an SYTF under § 875].) Third, section 875, subdivision (c)
    specifies that “[p]recommitment credits for time served must be applied
    against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this
    subdivision.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(C).)
    Subdivision (c)(2) of section 875 additionally provides: “For purposes of
    this section, ‘maximum term of confinement’ has the same meaning as
    ‘maximum term of imprisonment,’ as defined in” section 726,
    subdivision (d)(2).9 In turn, section 726, subdivision (d)(2) defines
    9 Subdivision (c) of section 875 provides in full:
    “(1) In making its order of commitment, the court shall additionally set
    a maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and
    circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward
    under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve
    rehabilitation. The maximum term of confinement shall represent the
    9
    “ ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ ” to mean “the middle of the three time
    periods set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the
    Penal Code, but without the need to follow the provisions of subdivision (b) of
    Section 1170 of the Penal Code or to consider time for good behavior or
    participation pursuant to Sections 2930, 2931, and 2932 of the Penal Code,
    plus enhancements which must be proven if pled.”
    The parties agree that since M.B. admitted committing attempted
    murder (but did not admit the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
    premeditated), his maximum term of confinement could not exceed 22 years
    longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward may serve subject to
    the following:
    “(A) A ward committed to a secure youth treatment facility under this
    section shall not be held in secure confinement beyond 23 years of age, or two
    years from the date of the commitment, whichever occurs later. However, if
    the ward has been committed to a secure youth treatment facility based on
    adjudication for an offense or offenses for which the ward, if convicted in
    adult criminal court, would face an aggregate sentence of seven or more
    years, the ward shall not be held in secure confinement beyond 25 years of
    age, or two years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later.
    “(B) The maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the middle
    term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the
    same offense or offenses. If the court elects to aggregate the period of
    physical confinement on multiple counts or multiple petitions, including
    previously sustained petitions adjudging the minor a ward within
    Section 602, the maximum term of confinement shall be the aggregate term
    of imprisonment specified in subdivision (a) of Section 1170.1 of the Penal
    Code, which includes any additional term imposed pursuant to Section 667,
    667.5, 667.6, or 12022.1 of the Penal Code, and Section 11370.2 of the Health
    and Safety Code.
    “(C) Precommitment credits for time served must be applied against
    the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.
    “(2) For purposes of this section, ‘maximum term of confinement’ has
    the same meaning as ‘maximum term of imprisonment,’ as defined in
    paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 726.”
    10
    under sections 875, subdivision (c)(1)(B) and 726, subdivision (d)(2). The 22-
    year maximum consists of the seven-year midterm for attempted murder
    (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), 190), plus 10 years for the
    firearm enhancement (id., § 12022.53, subd. (b)) and three years for the great
    bodily injury enhancement (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)), plus one year each (one-
    third the midterm) for findings in prior proceedings that M.B. committed
    assault with a deadly weapon and second degree robbery (id., §§ 245,
    subd. (a)(1), 213, subd. (a)(2), 1170.1, subd. (a)).
    As noted, the court instead determined (based on the prosecutor’s
    calculation and without objection by the defense) that the maximum term
    that could be imposed was 22 years to life.10 This statutory maximum is
    stated or incorporated in each of the court’s orders (as finding 13). And,
    within that limitation, the court, based on consideration of the “individual
    facts and circumstances of the case” (as finding 14), initially imposed a
    “maximum period of confinement” of 22 years to life at the August 24
    hearing; the court replaced that term with a “maximum custodial term” of
    four years at the September 14 hearing; and the court reinstated the 22-
    years-to-life maximum term of confinement at the September 27 hearing.
    B. The Court Had Authority to Modify Its Orders
    The parties rely on In re Eugene R. (1980) 
    107 Cal.App.3d 605
    (Eugene R.), as well as cases involving adult criminal sentencing, to contend
    10 The prosecutor reached this total by including in the calculation the
    term of seven years to life that applies to attempted premeditated murder
    (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 3046, subd. (a)), rather than the seven-year
    midterm that applies to attempted murder (id., §§ 664, subd. (a), 187,
    subd. (a), 190). It appears counsel and the San Francisco Juvenile Court
    (which, as noted, received the case for disposition when it was transferred
    from San Mateo County) were unaware that M.B. had not admitted the
    premeditation allegation.
    11
    the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to make certain modifications to its
    disposition orders (although they differ as to which changes were
    permissible). We disagree and conclude the juvenile court had authority to
    make the challenged modifications.
    1. The Parties’ Arguments
    M.B. argues the court lacked jurisdiction on September 27 to modify
    the four-year maximum term of confinement it set at the September 14
    hearing (finding 14), because that term was “lawful” and M.B. “had already
    begun his SYTF commitment.” He argues the court’s earlier modification of
    the August 24 order on September 14 was permissible, because the 22-years-
    to-life maximum term of confinement in the August 24 order was an
    unauthorized term. M.B. urges this court to reverse the September 27 order
    and direct the juvenile court to reinstate the September 14 order.11
    The Attorney General counters that on September 27 the court
    “properly vacated the September 14 order because the portion of that order
    changing the maximum term of confinement was void for lack of fundamental
    jurisdiction”—i.e., the court lacked jurisdiction on September 14 to change
    the August 24 order setting the maximum term of confinement at 22 years to
    life. The Attorney General bases his jurisdictional argument on the fact M.B.
    began his SYTF commitment on August 24.
    Although acknowledging the 22-years-to-life maximum term of
    confinement set in the August 24 order was unauthorized, the Attorney
    General contends that defect did not make the August 24 order facially void
    (instead making it only voidable), and therefore that portion of the August 24
    11 M.B. notes that, if the September 14 order is reinstated, the 22-
    years-to-life “maximum exposure term” in that order (finding 13) should be
    modified to 22 years.
    12
    order was not modifiable on September 14. In the Attorney General’s view,
    the September 14 order purporting to change the maximum term of
    confinement was void, and the court therefore had jurisdiction on
    September 27 to vacate the void September 14 order and reinstate the
    August 24 order.12
    2. Section 775 Authorizes Juvenile Courts to Modify Prior
    Orders
    Section 775—a statute that neither party cites—authorizes a juvenile
    court presiding over a delinquency proceeding to modify its prior orders.
    Section 775 states: “Any order made by the court in the case of any person
    subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside,
    as the judge deems meet and proper, subject to such procedural requirements
    as are imposed by this article.”
    The statute confers authority to make both clerical and substantive
    changes. “Under section 775, ‘the juvenile court may modify an order that
    contains a clerical error, [and] may also reconsider the substance of a
    previous order the court considers to have been erroneously, inadvertently or
    improvidently granted.’ ” (In re K.W. (2020) 
    54 Cal.App.5th 467
    , 473 (K.W.).)
    The juvenile court’s authority continues after disposition. (In re D.N. (2022)
    
    14 Cal.5th 202
    , 207 [addressing challenge to juvenile court orders governing
    a minor who was placed on probation; “After disposition, the juvenile court
    retains the authority to modify its orders regarding a minor under its
    jurisdiction (§ 775), and a parent, the minor through a guardian ad litem, or
    another person having an interest in the minor may petition the court for a
    modification (§ 778).”].)
    12 The Attorney General agrees that, on appeal, the maximum term of
    confinement should be reduced to 22 years.
    13
    We and other appellate courts construing a parallel statute that applies
    in juvenile dependency proceedings—section 385—have held a juvenile court
    may exercise its modification authority sua sponte. (In re G.B. (2014)
    
    227 Cal.App.4th 1147
    , 1160 [construing § 385; “A juvenile court has the
    authority to change, modify, or set aside a previous order sua sponte if it
    decides that a previous order was ‘erroneously, inadvertently or
    improvidently granted.’ ”]; accord, Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006)
    
    144 Cal.App.4th 92
    , 116, 110 (Nickolas F.) [construing § 385].) The wording
    of sections 775 and 385 is “word-for-word identical,” so “authorities
    construing section 385 are persuasive in construing section 775.” (K.W.,
    supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.) We conclude sua sponte modifications are
    permissible under section 775.
    As noted, section 775 states the authority to modify a prior order is
    “subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this article,” i.e.,
    article 20 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Sections 776 and 779.5 are
    the sections in article 20 that appear to directly restrict the court’s authority
    to sua sponte modify a disposition order committing a ward to a county
    SYTF.
    Section 776 provides: “No order changing, modifying, or setting aside a
    previous order of the juvenile court shall be made either in chambers, or
    otherwise, unless prior notice of the application therefor has been given by
    the judge or the clerk of the court to the probation officer and prosecuting
    attorney and to the minor’s counsel of record, or, if there is no counsel of
    record, to the minor and his parent or guardian.” Read in conjunction with
    section 775, this section indicates that the juvenile court may modify its
    orders if it gives prior notice to the interested parties.
    14
    Here, in our view, the court complied with section 776’s notice
    requirement when it entered the September 27 order now challenged in this
    appeal, including its ruling vacating the maximum term of confinement set in
    the September 14 order and reinstating the August 24 order. As noted, in a
    written order filed on September 15 (one day after entering the September 14
    order), the court notified the parties it was staying that order and setting a
    review hearing to reconsider its findings. The court stated in part that it was
    interested in whether a specified case (Ernesto L.) was relevant to the
    maximum term of confinement under section 875. And the court then
    allowed expansive argument on the issue at the September 27 hearing.13
    Section 779.5 (the other relevant section in article 20) states the
    standard that must be met, and the procedures that must be followed, to
    “modify or set aside” an order of commitment to an SYTF, specifically to end
    a ward’s placement in an SYTF. Section 779.5 states: “The court committing
    a ward to a secure youth treatment facility as provided in Section 875 may
    thereafter modify or set aside the order of commitment upon the written
    application of the ward or the probation department and upon a showing of
    good cause that the county or the commitment facility has failed, or is unable
    to, provide the ward with treatment, programming, and education that are
    13 As to the court’s earlier modification—its September 14 change to the
    August 24 order—the court similarly entertained substantial oral argument
    at the September 14 hearing. It is true that, on August 24, the court only
    specifically reserved ruling on the questions of precommitment credits and
    the baseline term of confinement. We need not determine whether the court
    gave adequate notice, prior to the September 14 hearing, that it might modify
    the maximum term of confinement. Any noncompliance with section 776’s
    notice requirement before the court modified the maximum term of
    confinement at the September 14 hearing (from 22-years-to-life to four years)
    was rendered harmless by the court’s subsequent restoration of the 22-years-
    to-life maximum term at the September 27 hearing.
    15
    consistent with the individual rehabilitation plan described in subdivision (d)
    of Section 875, that the conditions under which the ward is confined are
    harmful to the ward, or that the juvenile justice goals of rehabilitation and
    community safety are no longer served by continued confinement of the ward
    in a secure youth treatment facility. The court shall notice a hearing in which
    it shall hear any evidence from the ward, the probation department, and any
    behavioral health or other specialists having information relevant to
    consideration of the request to modify or set aside the order of commitment.
    The court shall, at the conclusion of the hearing, make its findings on the
    record, including findings as to the custodial and supervision status of the
    ward, based on the evidence presented.” (Italics added.)
    The language of section 779.5 makes clear it establishes the standard
    and procedures for recalling an order of commitment to an SYTF, i.e., the
    applicant (the ward or the probation department) must show the SYTF is not
    meeting the ward’s rehabilitative needs. (§ 779.5 [requiring a showing that
    the facility is not providing appropriate “treatment, programming, and
    education”; that the conditions of confinement are “harmful to the ward”; or
    that the “goals of rehabilitation and community safety are no longer served
    by continued confinement” in the SYTF].) We do not read section 779.5 as
    providing for application of these unique standards when a juvenile court
    exercises its more general modification authority under section 775 to revise
    an SYTF commitment order to correct what it has recognized to be a legal
    error. In our view, as discussed, under section 775, the court may correct
    clerical errors and may reconsider substantive aspects of the order such as
    the maximum term of confinement, if the court determines (as it did almost
    immediately in the present case) that those orders were “ ‘erroneously,
    16
    inadvertently or improvidently granted.’ ” (K.W., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 473 [describing court’s authority under § 775].)
    Other sections in article 20 of the Welfare and Institutions Code also
    address modification of a court’s order, but they do not change our conclusion
    the court had authority here to modify its order sua sponte to reinstate the
    maximum term of confinement it had originally set. (E.g., §§ 777 [procedures
    applicable for changing order based on alleged probation violation], 778
    [petition procedure to be followed when a “parent or other person having an
    interest in a child who is a ward of the juvenile court or the child himself or
    herself through a properly appointed guardian” seeks to modify a prior order
    “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence”], 779 [procedures
    for modifying an order committing a ward to the Youth Authority].)
    3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Lose Jurisdiction to Modify
    Its Orders
    In support of their arguments about whether the juvenile court had
    jurisdiction at certain points in the proceeding, the parties rely primarily on
    case law addressing adult criminal sentencing. In the adult criminal context,
    our Supreme Court has explained: “Under the general common law rule, a
    trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once
    execution of the sentence has commenced.” (People v. Karaman (1992)
    
    4 Cal.4th 335
    , 344.) This general rule is subject to statutory exceptions
    allowing later resentencing in certain circumstances. (E.g., Pen. Code, §§
    1172.1, 1170.18, 1170.126; see Karaman, at pp. 351–352 [Pen. Code, § 1170,
    former subd. (d), the predecessor to Pen. Code, § 1172.1, “creates a statutory
    exception to the common law rule that the trial court loses jurisdiction to
    resentence a defendant upon commencement of execution of his or her
    sentence”].)
    17
    Noting M.B. had begun his SYTF commitment when the juvenile court
    modified its dispositional orders on September 14 and September 27, the
    parties rely on Eugene R., supra, 
    107 Cal.App.3d 605
     to argue the court no
    longer had jurisdiction to make certain of the challenged modifications. In
    Eugene R., the juvenile court committed the minor to the Youth Authority
    and set the maximum term of confinement at three years, 10 months, with
    credit for 124 days served. (Id. at p. 611.) The court then gave notice on its
    own motion that it would hold a hearing to review the minor’s “ ‘maximum
    commitment time and days in custody.’ ” (Ibid.)
    The appellate court in Eugene R. held the juvenile court lacked
    jurisdiction to modify the original commitment order. (Eugene R., supra,
    107 Cal.App.3d at p. 612.) The Eugene R. court cited cases holding that in
    adult criminal matters, “where a defendant has commenced serving the
    sentence, the court has no jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence as
    pronounced and formally entered in the minutes in an attempt to revise its
    deliberately exercised judicial discretion unless the sentence was improper on
    its face.” (Ibid.)
    The Eugene R. court then explained its reasoning for applying this rule
    to juvenile delinquency proceedings, stating in part: “The foregoing
    procedural rule should also apply to juvenile matters. Although denominated
    as civil in nature, the courts have long recognized and emphasized that
    original section 602 and supplementary juvenile proceedings are quasi-
    criminal in nature. Ramifications of a section 602 hearing include a possible
    finding that the alleged criminal conduct is true, resulting in a substantial
    loss of personal freedom.” (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 612.) The
    Eugene R. court also noted that, under the California Rules of Court, the
    general rules governing criminal appeals apply to juvenile appeals, to enable
    18
    the expeditious handling of juvenile matters. (Id. at pp. 612–613.) The court
    stated: “When we apply the jurisdictional rule in controversy to juvenile
    proceedings, the cited legislative policy is promoted and the criminal
    appellate rules are followed. To conclude otherwise and allow collateral
    modification based upon another judge’s view of abuse of discretion would
    inevitably promote ‘judge-shopping’ and sanction delay.” (Id. at p. 613.)
    The Eugene R. court rejected the Attorney General’s argument in that
    case that the juvenile court could modify the judgment pursuant to
    section 775 at any time that the court had continuing jurisdiction over the
    minor, stating: “Granted the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over
    the minor; however, such jurisdiction must be properly activated by petition
    or application and cannot be exercised on the court’s own motion without
    procedural statutory authority.” (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at
    p. 613.)
    In support of its conclusion that section 775 does not authorize a
    juvenile court to modify its orders sua sponte, the Eugene R. court cited the
    language of section 775 and stated: “Article 20, sections 775 through 779
    read together, does not authorize the juvenile court to modify a previous
    order on its own motion. If such power was inherent or provided for by
    section 775, then the Judicial Council and the Supreme Court would not have
    enacted [California Rules of Court,14 former rule 1391(d); now rule 5.560(f)]
    in the narrow manner written providing for the correction of only clerical
    14 Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
    19
    errors in judgments, orders and the record by the court at any time on its own
    motion.”15 (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 613.)
    We decline to follow Eugene R. For three reasons, we think it is a
    mistake in the juvenile context simply to borrow the common law
    jurisdictional prohibition against revisiting an adult criminal sentence once
    the sentence has commenced.
    First, we note that juvenile delinquency proceedings and adult criminal
    proceedings serve different purposes. “The purpose of juvenile proceedings
    remains markedly different from that of adult proceedings. The state’s
    purpose in juvenile proceedings is a rehabilitative one distinguishable from
    the criminal justice system for adults, which has a purely punitive purpose
    separate from its rehabilitative goals. [Citation.] The proceedings are
    intended to secure for the minor such care and guidance as will best serve the
    interests of the minor and the state and to impose upon the minor a sense of
    responsibility for his or her actions. The purpose of imprisonment pursuant
    to criminal law is punishment. [Citation.] While part of the juvenile justice
    system does include punishment in certain cases, it does not change the
    primary purpose of juvenile proceedings from that of preserving and
    promoting the welfare of the child. In juvenile law, ‘. . . the reference to
    punishment did not alter the overall rehabilitative aspect of the juvenile
    justice system.’ ” (In re Myresheia W. (1998) 
    61 Cal.App.4th 734
    , 740–741.)
    In light of these differences, it does not follow that the rule prohibiting the
    court from modifying a criminal sentence that has commenced being served
    applies to juvenile proceedings simply because juvenile proceedings are
    15 Rule 5.560(f) provides:“Clerical errors in judgments, orders, or other
    parts of the record may be corrected by the court at any time on the court’s
    own motion or on motion of any party and may be entered nunc pro tunc.”
    20
    quasi-criminal in nature or because a rule of court “expressly provide[d] for
    the application of the general rules relating to criminal appeals to all juvenile
    appeals.” (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 612.)
    Second, we are not persuaded by Eugene R.’s conclusion that
    section 775 does not authorize a court to sua sponte modify its order, a
    conclusion Eugene R. reached on the ground that the language in former rule
    1391(d) (currently rule 5.560(f)) would not have been enacted in the “narrow
    manner written providing for the correction of only clerical errors in
    judgments . . . .’’ (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 613.) The
    Eugene R. court thus suggests that if the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
    modify its orders sua sponte, the rule would have been written to provide for
    such modifications. But since the express language of section 775 already
    allowed the court to modify its orders with respect to a juvenile over whom it
    had jurisdiction, it was unnecessary to include this provision in rule 5.560(f).
    Moreover, the correction of clerical errors is a ministerial task that does not
    require the exercise of discretion. Modifications in a juvenile court’s orders
    that involve more than the correction of clerical error may, however, involve
    an exercise of discretion and thus require notice to the parties and the
    opportunity to be heard. This may explain why the court’s power to correct
    these two different types of errors are not contained in the same rule or
    statute. In any event, it does not follow from rule 5.560(f) that section 775
    does not mean what it says, that “[a]ny order made by the court in the case of
    any person subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified,
    or set aside . . . .” (§ 775.)
    Third, the Eugene R. holding was disavowed, or at least limited, in the
    closely analogous juvenile dependency context by the court that originally
    issued it. (See Nickolas F., 
    supra,
     144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115–116, fn. 20.) In
    21
    Nickolas F., the court held that, under section 385 (the analogue of
    section 775 that applies in dependency proceedings), “the juvenile court has
    the authority . . . to change, modify or set aside its prior orders sua sponte”
    (Nickolas F., at p. 116), if it provides the parties with notice and an
    opportunity to be heard (id. at p. 98). In reaching this conclusion, the
    Nickolas F. court relied in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Le
    Francois v. Goel (2005) 
    35 Cal.4th 1094
    , 1104–1108, which addressed the
    authority of a court to modify its own interim orders. (Nickolas F., at pp. 98,
    110–111.)
    In a footnote, the Nickolas F. court noted its prior holding in Eugene R.
    that in delinquency matters, “section 775 limited the court’s authority to
    modify its previous orders sua sponte to the correction of clerical error . . . .”
    (Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115–116, fn. 20.) Noting
    sections 385 and 775 are identical to each other, the Nickolas F. court stated
    Eugene R.’s holding “has been called into question” by Le Francois and other
    authority. (Nickolas F., at pp. 115–116, fn. 20.) The Nickolas F. court
    concluded: “To the extent Eugene R. is interpreted to apply to dependency
    cases, we decline to follow the holding.” (Ibid.)
    We agree the interpretation of sections 775 and 385 should align on
    this point. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude section 775, like
    section 385, confers authority on a juvenile court to modify its prior orders
    sua sponte, after providing the parties with notice and an opportunity to be
    heard (see Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 98), a view we have
    already adopted with respect to section 385 (In re G.B., supra,
    227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160). (See K.W., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 473
    [§§ 775 and 385 are identically worded, so “authorities construing section 385
    are persuasive in construing section 775”].)
    22
    At oral argument, prompted by the tentative opinion we issued in this
    case, M.B.’s counsel urged this court to adopt in part the result reached in
    Eugene R., and to do so based on double jeopardy principles. Specifically,
    counsel argued that, once a juvenile commitment has begun, double jeopardy
    protections bar a juvenile court from modifying the commitment order in a
    way that increases the ward’s term of confinement. According to counsel,
    that is what occurred here when the court in its September 27 order changed
    a four-year maximum term of confinement (which it had specified on
    September 14) back to the 22-years-to-life maximum term of confinement
    that it had originally imposed on August 24.16
    We do not agree that double jeopardy principles require limiting the
    statutory authority of a juvenile court under section 775 to modify a
    disposition or commitment order. “The ‘protection against double jeopardy
    applies to juvenile offenders as well as to adults.’ [Citation.] Jeopardy
    attaches in a juvenile delinquency proceeding ‘when the first witness is sworn
    at the adjudicatory phase of the jurisdictional hearing.’ ” (In re Pedro C.
    (1989) 
    215 Cal.App.3d 174
    , 180; see In re Abdul Y. (1982) 
    130 Cal.App.3d 847
    , 856 [adjudicatory hearing is “ ‘one at which a minor is exposed to a
    finding of truth of allegations contained in a petition filed pursuant to
    [§ 602]’ ”].) But “[m]odification of a dispositional order in the exercise of the
    court’s continuing jurisdiction over a ward does not constitute double
    jeopardy.” (In re Glen J. (1979) 
    97 Cal.App.3d 981
    , 987; see In re Steven S.
    (1999) 
    76 Cal.App.4th 349
    , 353; Pedro C., at p. 181.)
    16 In counsel’s view, the court’s prior change (on September 14) did not
    violate double jeopardy, because on that occasion the court reduced the
    original 22-years-to-life maximum term of confinement to four years.
    23
    Here, M.B. was not subjected to a further adjudicatory hearing.
    Neither the attempted murder count (which M.B. admitted during earlier
    proceedings in San Mateo County) nor the other counts alleged against him
    (which were dismissed at that time as part of the negotiated disposition) were
    relitigated. Instead, the juvenile court made modifications only to its
    dispositional order. We find no double jeopardy violation on this record.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the juvenile court had authority
    under section 775 to modify its SYTF commitment order and to enter the
    September 27 order that is now challenged in this appeal. The scope of this
    power to revisit prior orders extends to matters of form and substance. As
    noted above, a juvenile court may correct clerical errors and “ ‘may also
    reconsider the substance of a previous order the court considers to have been
    erroneously, inadvertently or improvidently granted.’ ” (K.W., supra,
    54 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.) But the court’s authority is not unlimited. The
    statement in section 775 that a modification is permissible when the judge
    deems it “meet and proper” has been construed as a requirement that “the
    judge must find good cause” (K.W., at p. 473). “And that finding is subject to
    appellate review. It has been held that ‘the court must have substantial
    reasons’ for modifying a prior order under section 775; should it do so, ‘the
    question . . . would be of whether or not the court had abused its discretion
    . . . .’ ” (Id. at pp. 473–474.) Here, it is clear from the record that, when the
    court reconsidered and modified certain aspects of its dispositional order, it
    was simply making a diligent effort to comply with the law (i.e., a relatively
    new statute, section 875). The court acted promptly, and it gave the parties
    24
    notice and an ample opportunity to be heard. Any good cause requirement is
    fully satisfied.17
    Some courts, to be sure, have stated that, “ ‘[d]espite its apparent
    breadth, section 775 “does not authorize the court to make substantive
    changes or modifications that otherwise exceed the court’s jurisdiction.” ’ ”
    (In re Hunter W. (2023) 
    88 Cal.App.5th 358
    , 370, italics added.) This
    jurisdictional limiting principle does not affect our conclusion here. There is
    no question the juvenile court had a statutory jurisdictional basis to act. In
    Hunter W., the court held that section 775 and related statutes did give the
    juvenile court “continued jurisdiction over the matter,” although they did not
    alter principles of finality for purposes of retroactivity of ameliorative
    legislation under In re Estrada (1965) 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    . (Hunter W., at pp. 365,
    367–368, 371 [for Estrada purposes, a dispositional order in a juvenile
    delinquency case is final once direct review of that order has been
    exhausted].) No such issue is presented here—no party sought retroactive
    application of an ameliorative statute after the disposition order became
    final. Instead, as noted, the juvenile court modified the disposition order on
    its own motion and did so shortly after the order was entered.
    17 In the context of an adjudication made at a jurisdictional hearing,
    where a court must make true findings if the allegations have been proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt, the K.W. court held “section 775 does not give the
    juvenile court the authority to reduce or modify an adjudication, in the
    absence of circumstances showing that the original adjudication was
    somehow flawed—e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel or new evidence.”
    (K.W., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) The court did not make that sort of
    modification here. Instead, the court modified aspects of its dispositional
    order, specifically its rulings pertaining to the maximum term of confinement
    and the application of credits. In any event, for the reasons we have
    discussed, we conclude any good cause requirement is satisfied under the
    circumstances here.
    25
    Because the court had jurisdiction to enter the September 27 order
    reinstating the August 24 order, we now turn to M.B.’s remaining challenges
    to those orders.
    C. The Maximum Term of Confinement
    As an alternative to his jurisdictional argument, M.B. contends that
    the court abused its discretion in setting the 22-years-to-life maximum term
    of confinement under section 875, subdivision (c) and that the case must be
    remanded for a new dispositional hearing.18 The Attorney General counters
    that the maximum term of confinement need only be modified to 22 years and
    that no remand is needed.
    As discussed, the parties agree the 22-years-to-life maximum term of
    confinement set by the court was unauthorized because M.B. did not admit
    the attempted murder was premeditated. The maximum term permitted by
    statute was instead 22 years. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
    The parties also recognize the court had discretion under section 875,
    subdivision (c) to set a maximum term of confinement for M.B. that was less
    than the 22-year maximum allowable by statute. Section 875,
    subdivision (c)(1) states the maximum term of confinement is to be “based
    upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or
    continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed
    appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.” (Italics added.) The maximum term
    of confinement “shall not exceed” the middle term of imprisonment that could
    be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
    18 M.B. does not challenge the four-year baseline term set by the court
    under section 875, subdivision (b).
    26
    Similar language in section 731, which governed commitments to the
    DJJ prior to its closure,19 has been held to mean a juvenile court has
    discretion to set a maximum term of confinement that is shorter than the
    term that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. (In re
    Julian R. (2009) 
    47 Cal.4th 487
    , 495 (Julian R.) [“Succinctly put, the juvenile
    court must consider the crime’s relevant ‘facts and circumstances’ in
    determining whether the minor’s maximum commitment period should be
    equal to or less than the maximum confinement term for an adult.”]; § 731,
    subds. (b), (c).) We agree with the parties that section 875 likewise allows a
    juvenile court to impose a maximum term of confinement in an SYTF that is
    equal to or less than the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed
    on an adult convicted of the same offense. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).)20 Here, the
    court had discretion to set a maximum term of confinement that was equal to
    or less than the 22-year statutory maximum.21
    19 Section 731 states it will remain in effect until the final closure of the
    DJJ (§ 731, subd. (c)), which occurred on June 30, 2023 (§ 736.5, subd. (e)).
    20 Section 875, subdivision (c) may not be free from ambiguity on this
    point. As discussed above, subdivision (c)(2) of section 875 appears to equate
    the “ ‘maximum term of confinement’ ” (by reference to § 726, subd. (d)(2))
    with the maximum term of exposure permitted by statute (i.e., the middle
    term that would apply to an adult, with specified adjustments). But when
    read in conjunction with subdivision (c)(1) of section 875—which expressly
    states the maximum term of confinement is to be based on the relevant “facts
    and circumstances” (id., subd. (c)(1)) and “shall not exceed” the middle term
    (id., subd. (c)(1)(B))—we conclude the statute confers discretion on the
    juvenile court to impose a maximum term of confinement that is equal to or
    less than the middle term that could be imposed on an adult.
    21 And, of course, M.B.’s actual time spent in confinement will likely be
    shorter, as it is subject to the separate cap in section 875,
    subdivision (c)(1)(A) prohibiting confinement “beyond 25 years of age, or two
    years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later.”
    27
    The parties dispute whether the juvenile court understood the scope of
    its discretion in setting the maximum term of confinement. In our view, the
    record supports the Attorney General’s position that the juvenile court
    understood and exercised its discretion in setting that term.
    As the Attorney General points out, the court stated in its hand-signed
    August 24 order (which it reinstated on September 27) that it had
    “considered the individual facts and circumstances of the case” in setting the
    maximum term of confinement (finding 14). This express statement supports
    a conclusion on review that the court did exercise its discretion under the
    statute in setting the maximum term of confinement. (See Julian R., supra,
    47 Cal.4th at pp. 492, 499 [under § 731, even on a silent record, reviewing
    court will presume juvenile court “exercised its discretion in setting a
    maximum period of physical confinement that was measured against both the
    ceiling set by the maximum adult prison term and a possibly lower ceiling set
    by the relevant ‘facts and circumstances’ ”]; id. at p. 499, fn. 4 [noting that, in
    light of a newly revised Judicial Council form requiring the juvenile court to
    acknowledge its consideration of the crime’s facts and circumstances, “in the
    future a court’s exercise of its discretion will be evident”].)
    We also note that, during the third hearing on the matter (on
    September 27), the prosecutor stated section 875, subdivision (c) required the
    court to first determine the total amount of time M.B. could spend in physical
    confinement (finding 13) and then exercise its discretion to impose all or a
    portion of that time (finding 14). This was not a case in which either party
    argued the court was required to set a maximum term of confinement that
    was identical to the maximum term allowable by statute.
    Finally, although this fact is less directly relevant to the court’s
    determination of the maximum term of confinement under section 875,
    28
    subdivision (c), the court stated, both orally and in its written order, that it
    had considered M.B.’s background and individual circumstances in
    determining under section 875, subdivision (a) that an SYTF commitment
    was appropriate. These circumstances included the severity of the offense;
    M.B.’s delinquent history; whether the programming, treatment, and
    education in an SYTF would be appropriate for his needs; whether a less
    restrictive placement could achieve the goals of rehabilitation and community
    safety; and M.B.’s “age, his developmental maturity, his mental and
    emotional health, sexual orientation, identity and expression and any
    disability or special needs affecting the safety or suitability committing
    [M.B.] to a term of confinement in a Secure Youth Treatment Facility.” (See
    § 875, subd. (a).) The court thus had in mind factors that may also have been
    relevant when it set a maximum term of confinement based on the “facts and
    circumstances” of the case.
    M.B. argues the record of the oral proceedings at the three hearings
    reflects the juvenile court did not clearly understand the different terms it
    needed to impose under section 875. In particular, M.B. suggests the court’s
    statements show it did not understand it had the discretion to set a
    maximum term of confinement that was below the maximum term permitted
    by statute. While the court did express some uncertainty at times, we are not
    persuaded the record on this point requires a remand for a new dispositional
    hearing. (Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 498–499 [trial court order is
    presumed to be correct, and reviewing court must “ ‘apply the general rule
    “that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
    applicable law” ’ ”].)
    For example, at the August 24 hearing, in a statement highlighted by
    M.B., the court stated: “So let me set the maximum confinement time under
    29
    section 875(c), and that maximum period of confinement that could be
    imposed on [M.B.], pursuant to that statute, is 22 years to life.” The court
    was correct to begin with the maximum term that could be imposed under the
    statute (which, as noted, was actually 22 years), but its written order makes
    clear it did consider the “facts and circumstances” of the case in deciding to
    set that term.
    Also at the August 24 hearing, after stating that the maximum period
    of confinement that could be imposed was 22 years to life, the court stated: “I
    am not quite sure how to answer—to determine what the maximum period of
    confinement is. I guess the maximum period—I don’t know whether this is
    a—this finding I have to make is with respect to the life term or with respect
    to the baseline term.” The clerk stated, “I believe it’s the life term, Your
    Honor,” and the court continued, “I guess I’m assuming that the maximum
    period of confinement is the life term, and, therefore, the maximum period, as
    I’ve already indicated, is 22 years to life.”
    Although it is not entirely clear, we agree with the Attorney General
    that this passage may show only that the court “briefly believed there was a
    third term—a maximum period of confinement—and expressed confusion as
    to whether that period of confinement encompassed the maximum term of
    confinement or the baseline term.” In any event, we are not persuaded these
    passages clearly show the court did not understand it had discretion to set a
    maximum term of confinement that was less than the maximum term
    permitted by statute.
    M.B. also notes that, at the September 27 hearing, the court stated that
    it was reconsidering its September 14 order (where it had set a four-year
    maximum term of confinement) because it had “failed to comply with
    mandatory provisions governing the length of punishment.” But this may
    30
    have meant the court believed it had misapplied the statute on September 14
    in selecting a four-year maximum term of confinement, rather than a belief
    that it had no discretion to impose a maximum term of confinement that was
    less than the statutory maximum. Similarly, the court asked during the
    September 27 hearing whether the maximum term of confinement it set
    under section 875, subdivision (c) should simply be the middle term
    referenced in section 726, subdivision (d)(2). The prosecutor answered (as
    noted above) that section 875, subdivision (c) required the court to determine
    both the “maximum potential time” and “how much of that total time the
    Court’s going to set at maximum confinement time . . . .”
    Neither these nor the other record passages identified by M.B.
    persuade us that the court did not understand it had discretion to set a
    maximum term of confinement, based on the “facts and circumstances” of the
    case (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)), that was either equal to or lower than the maximum
    term permitted by statute. As it stated in its written order, the court
    determined, based on those “facts and circumstances,” that the appropriate
    maximum term of confinement was the same as the maximum term allowed
    by statute (findings 13 and 14).22
    22 The court’s express statement that it had considered the “facts and
    circumstances” of the case in setting the maximum term of confinement, as
    well as the prosecutor’s statement the court could set a maximum term of
    confinement that was lower than the maximum allowed by statute,
    distinguish this case from In re Sean W. (2005) 
    127 Cal.App.4th 1177
    , cited
    by M.B. In Sean W., the appellate court remanded for an exercise of
    discretion as to the maximum term of confinement under section 731, stating,
    “[t]he court, counsel, and the probation department indicated no awareness of
    court discretion in setting the maximum term of confinement.” (In re Sean
    W., at p. 1182; id. at p. 1179, 1188–1189.) That was not the case here. And,
    as noted, under Julian R., even on a silent record, we would presume the
    trial court understood and exercised its discretion. (Julian R., supra,
    47 Cal.4th at pp. 499, 492.)
    31
    As discussed, the court was mistaken as to what the statutory
    maximum was—it was 22 years, rather than 22 years to life. For the
    foregoing reasons, we will modify the court’s August 24 order (as reinstated
    by the September 27 order) so that both the maximum period of confinement
    allowable by statute (finding 13) and the maximum term of confinement
    actually set by the court (finding 14) are 22 years (rather than 22 years to
    life).
    D. Equal Protection Principles Do Not Require the Application of
    M.B.’s Precommitment Credits to the Baseline Term
    As noted, section 875, subdivision (c) provides that, when a ward is
    committed to an SYTF, the court must set a maximum term of confinement
    and apply the ward’s precommitment credits to that term. (§ 875,
    subd. (c)(1)(C) [“Precommitment credits for time served must be applied
    against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this
    subdivision.”].) The juvenile court here, in its operative September 27 order,
    directed that M.B.’s precommitment credits be applied against the maximum
    term of confinement it had set under section 875, subdivision (c) (i.e., a term
    of 22 years to life, which we are reducing to 22 years).
    M.B. argues on two grounds that equal protection principles require the
    application of his precommitment credits against the four-year baseline term
    of confinement that the court set under section 875, subdivision (b). First, he
    contends a failure to apply credits against the baseline term would treat
    wards committed to a county SYTF unequally in comparison to wards
    committed to the DJJ, because “the baseline term at an SYTF is the
    functional equivalent of the maximum term of confinement at DJJ.” Second,
    he claims a failure to apply credits against the baseline term violates equal
    protection by penalizing wards whose cases take longer to resolve. We reject
    both arguments.
    32
    1. Legal Standards
    The right to equal protection is violated when “the government . . .
    treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some
    justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 
    4 Cal.5th 277
    , 288.) The degree of
    required justification depends on the classification at issue. Distinctions that
    involve suspect classifications (such as race) or affect fundamental rights are
    subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only if they are necessary to
    achieve a compelling state interest. (Ibid.) But when “a statute involves
    neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, it need only meet minimum
    equal protection standards, and survive ‘rational basis review.’ ” (People v.
    Turnage (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 62
    , 74.) Under that standard, “equal protection of
    the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the
    disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (Ibid.)
    We review equal protection claims de novo. (People v. Yang (2022)
    
    78 Cal.App.5th 120
    , 125.)
    2. Alleged Equal Protection Violation Based on Differential
    Treatment of Wards Committed to DJJ and to County
    SYTFs
    In support of his first equal protection argument (alleging differential
    treatment of wards based on whether they are committed to the DJJ or to an
    SYTF), M.B. relies on the recent decision by Division One of this court in
    Ernesto L., supra, 
    81 Cal.App.5th 31
    . There, the appellate court held that,
    when a ward is committed to the DJJ, the ward’s precommitment credits
    must be applied against the term Ernesto L. called the “maximum custodial
    term” set by the juvenile court under section 731, subdivision (b) “ ‘based
    upon the facts and circumstances,’ ” rather than against the term Ernesto L.
    called the “maximum exposure term” set by section 726, subdivision (d)(1).
    (Ernesto L., at p. 34.)
    33
    The Ernesto L. court explained the two terms at issue in that case.
    First, in general, “if a minor is removed from a parent’s physical custody after
    being adjudged a ward of the court, the dispositional order must ‘specify that
    the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of
    the middle term of imprisonment’ that could be imposed on an adult
    convicted of the same offense. [(§ 726, subd. (d)(1).)]” (Ernesto L., supra,
    81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) But for DJJ commitments in particular, “the
    juvenile court has discretion, ‘based upon the facts and circumstances,’ to set
    an even lower maximum term of physical confinement. (§ 731, subd. (b).)”
    (Ibid.) As noted, Ernesto L. held that, when a ward is committed to the DJJ,
    a juvenile court must apply precommitment credits against “the actual
    maximum term set under section 731” (the maximum custodial term), rather
    than against “the theoretical maximum term under section 726” (the
    maximum exposure term). (Id. at pp. 34, 41.)
    In reaching this conclusion, Ernesto L. interpreted section 731’s
    requirement that a minor “not be confined” in excess of the maximum
    custodial term set by the court to refer to both precommitment and
    postcommitment physical confinement. (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 41–42; § 731, subd. (b) [ward committed to DJJ “shall not be confined in
    excess of the term of confinement set by the committing court”].) The
    Ernesto L. court concluded this result followed from the reasoning of the
    California Supreme Court in In re Eric J. (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 522
    , which had
    held similar language in former section 726 referred to both precommitment
    34
    and postcommitment physical confinement. (Ernesto L., at p. 41, citing
    Eric J., at p. 536.)23
    M.B. argues that, “[b]ecause an SYTF commitment has now replaced a
    DJJ commitment,” the application of precommitment credits should be
    similar in the two schemes. But as we read them, the statutes governing
    SYTF commitments and the application of precommitment credits in that
    context already do operate in the way Ernesto L. determined the statutes
    should operate in the DJJ context.
    First, in both settings, section 726, subdivision (d)(1)—which generally
    applies when a minor is removed from the physical custody of a parent after
    being adjudged a ward—provides the dispositional order must “specify that
    the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of
    the middle term of imprisonment” that could be imposed on an adult
    convicted of the same offense. (§ 726, subd. (d)(1), italics added; Ernesto L.,
    supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) Section 726 defines “ ‘[p]hysical
    confinement’ ” to include both DJJ and SYTF placements, among other
    things. (§ 726, subd. (d)(5).)24 The maximum period of confinement
    permitted by statute—the middle term of imprisonment that would apply to
    23 In its July 2022 opinion, the Ernesto L. court stated it was publishing
    its holding about the application of precommitment credits in the DJJ context
    because of its disagreement with a different Court of Appeal decision on that
    point (In re A.R. (2018) 
    24 Cal.App.5th 1076
    ), although the Ernesto L. court
    “recognize[d] that most juveniles can no longer be committed to DJJ, which is
    set to close on June 30, 2023. (§ 736.5, subds. (b)–(c), (e).)” (Ernesto L.,
    81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34, fn. 2.)
    24 Section 726, subdivision (d)(5) states:“ ‘Physical confinement’ means
    placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile
    home pursuant to Section 730, or in a secure youth treatment facility
    pursuant to Section 875, or in any institution operated by the Department of
    Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice.” (Italics added.)
    35
    an adult—is thus the same under section 726 for both types of
    commitments.25 And section 875 states this same limitation for SYTF
    commitments in particular. (§ 875, subd. (i); see id., subd. (c)(1)(B).)
    Second, as discussed, the specific statutes governing DJJ and SYTF
    commitments—sections 731 and 875 respectively—give the juvenile court
    discretion, “based upon the facts and circumstances,” to set a maximum term
    that is lower than the maximum permitted by statute. (§§ 731, subd. (b)
    [“maximum term”], 875, subd. (c)(1) [“maximum term of confinement”];
    Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 495 [§ 731]; Ernesto L., supra,
    81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34 [§ 731].) Sections 731 and 875 describe this
    maximum term in identical language, stating the term is to be “based upon
    the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or
    continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed
    appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.” (§§ 731, subd. (b), 875, subd. (c)(1).)
    Finally, in both settings, precommitment credits are to be applied
    against the potentially lower maximum term set by the court. As discussed,
    for DJJ commitments, Ernesto L. held precommitment credits must be
    applied to this actual maximum term (what it called the “maximum custodial
    term”), concluding that result is compelled by the requirement in section 731,
    subdivision (b) that a ward must “not be confined” in excess of that term.
    (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 41–42.) And for SYTF
    commitments, section 875, subdivision (c) specifies precommitment credits
    “must be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant
    to this subdivision” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C)), i.e., the maximum term set by the
    25 M.B.’s suggestion that section 726 applies to DJJ commitments but
    that SYTF commitments are governed by “a separate dispositional scheme”
    that only involves section 875 is incorrect.
    36
    court “based upon the facts and circumstances” (id., subd. (c)(1), which may
    be lower than the maximum permitted by statute.
    Section 875, subdivision (c) thus directs that, for SYTF placements,
    precommitment credits are to be applied in the same way Ernesto L. held
    they should be applied in the DJJ setting. As the Attorney General points
    out, there is no disparate treatment that could give rise to an equal
    protection problem.26
    M.B. contends, however, that in the SYTF context, the baseline term set
    under section 875, subdivision (b) is the “functional equivalent” of the
    maximum custodial term that is set for DJJ commitments under section 731.
    He argues that therefore, to be consistent with Ernesto L. and prevent an
    equal protection violation arising from the disparate treatment of wards
    committed to SYTFs and to DJJ, his precommitment credits must be applied
    against the four-year baseline term.27
    We disagree. In our view, the functional equivalent of the maximum
    custodial term for DJJ commitments (§ 731, subd. (b); Ernesto L., supra,
    81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34) is the maximum term of confinement set in the SYTF
    context under section 875, subdivision (c). As noted, sections 731 and 875
    26 Because DJJ and SYTF wards are not treated differently, we need
    not address the parties’ arguments as to whether the two groups are
    similarly situated, or as to which legal standard—strict scrutiny or rational
    basis—should be used to analyze any alleged disparate treatment.
    27 There was some temporal overlap between the DJJ and SYTF
    commitment schemes. Although DJJ closed on June 30, 2023 (§ 736.5,
    subd. (e)), M.B. notes that, at the time of his SYTF commitment in 2022, he
    was eligible for a DJJ commitment because a motion to transfer his case to
    adult court had been filed prior to the closure of DJJ (id., subds. (b)–(c)). He
    also notes some wards who were initially committed to DJJ may have been
    subsequently transferred to an SYTF after DJJ’s closure (see §§ 875,
    subd. (b)(2), 736.5, subd. (d)).
    37
    describe those terms using identical language—in each case, the term is a
    maximum to be set by the court “based upon the facts and circumstances of
    the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the
    jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.”
    (§§ 731, subd. (b), 875, subd. (c)(1).) And precommitment credits must be
    applied against those analogous maximum terms. (Ernesto L., at pp. 41–42;
    § 875, subd. (c)(1)(C).)
    In contrast, the baseline term under section 875, subdivision (b), is not
    a maximum term. Instead, it “represent[s] the time in custody necessary to
    meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to prepare the
    ward for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the community.”
    (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) Pending the development of offense-based classifications
    by the Judicial Council, the baseline term is to be set using (with some
    permitted deviation) the “discharge consideration date guidelines” applied by
    the DJJ prior to its closure (found in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30807–30813).
    (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
    Accordingly, even if it were necessary to identify functional equivalents
    as to each aspect of the now-phased-out DJJ and current SYTF schemes—
    and we do not think that is the case, since the Legislature is free to change
    the juvenile justice system over time—we agree with the Attorney General
    that the closest analogue of the SYTF baseline term is the set of DJJ
    discharge consideration date guidelines that are temporarily to be borrowed
    in setting the baseline term. Those guidelines existed alongside the court’s
    duty to set a maximum term for a ward committed to the DJJ under
    section 731, subdivision (b), just as a court that now commits a ward to an
    SYTF must set both a baseline term and a maximum term of confinement
    under section 875, subdivisions (b) and (c).
    38
    M.B. argues there are differences between the application of the
    discharge consideration date guidelines in the DJJ context and the baseline
    term in the SYTF setting. Specifically, he notes that, under the applicable
    regulations, a parole consideration date is not “a fixed parole release date.”
    (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 30815, subd. (a).) In contrast, he argues, a baseline
    term creates “a presumptive release date.” He relies on section 875,
    subdivision (e)(3), which states that, at a “probation discharge hearing” to be
    held at the conclusion of the baseline term, the court “shall order that the
    ward be discharged to a period of probation supervision in the community
    under conditions approved by the court, unless the court finds that the ward
    constitutes a substantial risk of imminent harm to others in the community if
    released from custody.” In that circumstance, the ward may be retained in
    an SYTF for up to one additional year. (§ 875, subd. (e)(3).) M.B. argues
    that, in light of this provision, the baseline term is “akin to a fixed release
    date from an SYTF,” except in “exceptional circumstances” where the court
    finds the ward’s release would endanger the community.
    Although the parties debate how frequently courts are likely to make
    the findings necessary to deny probation under section 875, subdivision (e)(3),
    we need not consider that question. We are not persuaded that any
    differences between the SYTF baseline term and the DJJ parole
    consideration guidelines somehow transform the baseline term into the
    equivalent of a maximum term. As discussed, the SYTF scheme has its own
    detailed provisions governing the setting of a maximum term of confinement
    (§ 875, subd. (c); see id., subd. (i)), and the fact that other provisions may
    allow a ward to be released before the expiration of that term does not change
    that maximum. And, even if M.B. is correct that the probation discharge
    provisions in section 875, subdivision (e) make the SYTF scheme more
    39
    favorable than the DJJ parole discharge system, that does not create an
    equal protection issue requiring application of precommitment credits to the
    baseline term.
    We also disagree with M.B.’s reading of Ernesto L. As noted, that
    case’s holding requiring application of precommitment credits against the
    maximum term set by the court (rather than against the maximum term
    permitted by statute) was based on the text of section 731, subdivision (b),
    which specifies a ward committed to DJJ must “not be confined” beyond the
    maximum term set by the court. (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 41–42.) Ernesto L. did not announce a general rule that precommitment
    credits must be applied to any term that may be said, in M.B.’s phrasing, to
    be “akin to a fixed release date.” In the SYTF context, it is the section 875,
    subdivision (c) maximum term of confinement that sets the limit on the
    length of a ward’s confinement; the section 875, subdivision (b) baseline term
    is not described as, and does not function as, a maximum term. No equal
    protection problem arises from applying precommitment credits to the
    maximum term set by the court under both schemes. (§§ 731, subd. (b), 875,
    subd. (c)(1)(C).)
    Finally, M.B. suggests section 875 does not prohibit the application of
    precommitment credits against the baseline term. But we think it is clear
    the application of precommitment credits against the baseline term is not
    intended. Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) expressly states precommitment
    credits are to be applied against the maximum term of confinement (and does
    not state they are to be applied against the baseline term). And other
    provisions of the statute provide for application of credits to the baseline term
    in specified circumstances, not including credits for time spent in
    precommitment custody. (§ 875, subds. (f)(2) [if a ward is transferred from an
    40
    SYTF to a less restrictive placement and then back to an SYTF, the baseline
    term is to be “adjusted to include credit for the time served by the ward in the
    less restrictive program”], (b)(2) [youth who are transferred from the DJJ to
    an SYTF shall receive credit against the baseline term “for all programs
    completed or substantially completed” at the DJJ].) The court here correctly
    applied M.B.’s precommitment credits against the maximum term of
    confinement, rather than against the baseline term.
    3. Alleged Equal Protection Violation Based on the Length of
    Time Cases Take To Resolve
    M.B. contends the failure to apply precommitment credits against the
    SYTF baseline term would violate equal protection “by penalizing wards
    whose cases take longer to resolve.” He notes the length of time a case takes
    may depend on a number of variables, such as the complexity or closeness of
    the matter or how busy a given court is. M.B. observes that a ward who
    spends about two years in precommitment custody (as M.B. did) and then
    serves a four-year baseline term in an SYTF will spend more total time in
    custody than a ward who spends two months in precommitment custody and
    then serves a four-year SYTF baseline term. Finally, M.B. asserts that
    application of precommitment credits against the maximum term of
    confinement is an “illusory” benefit “because, as a result of the age
    limitations on confinement set forth in section 875, most ward[s] never near
    their maximum periods of confinement.” (See § 875, subd. (c)(1)(A) [age
    limitations].) As a result, M.B. asserts, the time spent in precommitment
    custody is “ ‘dead time.’ ”
    We do not agree that application of precommitment credits to the
    maximum term of confinement is an illusory benefit. In some cases, a ward’s
    maximum term of confinement may end before the ward reaches the
    applicable age limit, so the application of precommitment credits to the
    41
    maximum term of confinement will shorten the amount of time the ward
    spends in custody. In addition, section 875 provides that, during a ward’s
    term of commitment to an SYTF, the court is to hold a progress review
    hearing at least every six months. (§ 875, subd. (e)(1)(A).) At the hearing,
    the court “shall evaluate the ward’s progress in relation to the rehabilitation
    plan and shall determine whether the baseline term of confinement is to be
    modified.” (Ibid.) At the hearing, the court may also order that the ward be
    assigned to a less restrictive program. (Ibid.) A ward who has served
    significant precommitment time or who can show significant rehabilitative
    progress made during that time may be able to show (in conjunction with
    other factors, including rehabilitative progress while in an SYTF) that he or
    she is a good candidate for a shortened baseline term or a transfer to a less
    restrictive program.
    In any event, M.B.’s arguments about the perceived deficiencies of the
    statutory provisions governing precommitment credits do not establish an
    equal protection violation. There is no basis to conclude that wards receive
    disparate treatment under the rule that precommitment credits are to be
    applied against the maximum term of confinement rather than against the
    baseline term. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C).) The two sets of SYTF wards identified
    by M.B. as the foundation of his equal protection claim—“those whose cases
    resolve slowly and those whose cases resolve quickly”—are treated equally.
    For both sets of wards, precommitment credits are applied to their maximum
    terms of confinement. (Ibid.) Neither group has their baseline terms reduced
    based on precommitment credits. Both are potentially eligible for discharge
    to probation upon completion of their baseline terms. (Id., subd. (e)(3).) And
    for both groups, the precommitment credits apply to a maximum term of
    42
    confinement they may not reach because they may age out of the SYTF by
    that time. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(A).)
    To the extent a ward may in some instances spend more total time in
    custody than another ward with a similar baseline term, that is because of
    the numerous variables that can affect the length of precommitment custody,
    not because section 875 provides for the unequal application of credits.
    Unlike the schemes at issue in People v. Sage (1980) 
    26 Cal.3d 498
    , 507–508
    and People v. Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 129, 136–138 (cases cited by
    M.B.), section 875 does not deny credits to certain groups while granting
    them to others. There is no disparate treatment here and no equal protection
    violation.
    III. DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s August 24, 2022 disposition order, as modified and
    reinstated by the juvenile court on September 27, 2022, is modified as
    follows:
    (1) “the maximum period of confinement that could be imposed” under
    section 875 (finding no. 13 on the attachment to the August 24, 2022 order) is
    modified to 22 years (rather than 22 years to life); and
    (2) the maximum term of confinement set by the court based on “the
    individual facts and circumstances of the case” (finding no. 14 on the
    attachment to the August 24, 2022 order) is modified to 22 years (rather than
    22 years to life).
    In all other respects, the August 24, 2022 order, as modified and
    reinstated by the juvenile court on September 27, 2022, is affirmed. In
    particular, the court’s ruling in the September 27, 2022 order that
    precommitment credits for time served are to be applied against the
    43
    maximum term of confinement set by the court under section 875,
    subdivision (c) is affirmed.
    STREETER, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    GOLDMAN, J.
    SMILEY, J.*
    * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,
    assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    44
    Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco
    Trial Judge: Hon. J. Anthony Kline
    Counsel:      Sangeeta Sinha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M Lawrence, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Donna M Provenzano,
    Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Victoria
    Ratnikova and Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorneys General,
    for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    In re M.B. – A166408
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A166408

Filed Date: 1/31/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/1/2024