People v. Oliva CA2/8 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/28/24 P. v. Oliva CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B329696
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA110580)
v.
RAMON RUESGA OLIVA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Jose Jordan & Associates and Jose R. Jordan for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Ramon Ruesga Oliva appeals
from the denial of his motion to vacate pursuant to Penal Code
section 1473.7. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of an
assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 30605, subd. (a)). In January 2016,
at a hearing at which defendant was represented by counsel and
was assisted by a Spanish language interpreter, he pled no
contest to the weapons charge.
In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the
court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on
three years of formal probation. Defendant was ordered to serve
15 days of community service and three days in jail. He was
given credit for time served.
Defendant successfully completed probation. In 2018,
defendant obtained an order reducing the conviction to a
misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b).
In 2019, defendant obtained an order setting aside his plea,
vacating his conviction and dismissing the case pursuant to
section 1203.4. The expungement pursuant to section 1203.4 has
no effect on federal immigration consequences. (People v.
Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 560.)
In August 2022, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
plea and vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code
section 1473.7, supported by his declaration, a declaration from
his present counsel and several exhibits. Defendant argued he
did not meaningfully understand the legal ramifications of his
plea and that his former counsel did not fully inform him of the
specific immigration consequences of the plea offer.
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At the start of the hearing on defendant’s motion, defense
counsel advised the court that he and the prosecutor “have come
to an agreement on the motion and we’d like–I believe that they
will be joining with the motion. And I believe they will be adding
a count.” But the court said the motion to vacate would have to
be adjudicated before there would be any basis for discussing a
new disposition.
The parties then submitted on their papers. The court
denied defendant’s motion. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Accurate information about immigration consequences
allows “many noncitizen defendants . . . to plead to a conviction
and sentence that satisfy the prosecution and court, but that
have no, or fewer, adverse immigration consequences than the
original charge.” (Pen. Code, § 1016.2, subd. (d).) To promote
this outcome, California law provides that “[t]he prosecution, in
the interests of justice, and in furtherance of the findings and
declarations of Section 1016.2, shall consider the avoidance of
adverse immigration consequences in the plea negotiation
process as one factor in an effort to reach a just resolution.”
(§ 1016.3, subd. (b).) The Legislature has also enacted
section 1473.7, which “allows noncitizens who have served their
sentences to vacate a conviction if they can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that their conviction is ‘legally
invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [their] ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th
311, 316.)
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Despite this clear legislative and judicial emphasis on the
importance of immigration consequences in plea agreements in
the interests of justice, the trial court here refused to even
consider what was apparently a joint prosecution and defense
agreement that defendant should be permitted to withdraw his
plea and plead to a new, immigration-neutral offense. The record
before us offers no information about the parties’ agreement,
because the trial court would not even permit the parties to
describe their agreement on the record. However, it seems
reasonable to assume, as we do here, given the context of this
matter and the nature of the hearing, that the added count to
which the parties had agreed was an immigration-neutral
offense. Defendant’s counsel on appeal stated in his opening brief
that he had “convinced the People to stipulate to a grant of the
motion to vacate in question, after which Appellant would plea[d]
out to a different offense, one that would not entail adverse
immigration consequences.” For the trial court to refuse to
consider the parties’ agreement was an abuse of its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Ramon Ruesga Oliva’s motion to vacate
is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to consider any proposed agreement between the
prosecution and the defense to vacate the plea and enter a new
plea and, if the proposed agreement is not accepted by the court,
hold a new hearing on Oliva’s motion to vacate.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.
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