Vaughan v. Canning CA2/5 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 10/16/23 Vaughan v. Canning CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    MICHAEL A. VAUGHAN,                                             B311985
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                                      18SMCV00399)
    JOHN CANNING,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
    Schwimer Weinstein, Michael E. Schwimer, and Mitchell E.
    Rosenweig for Defendant and Appellant.
    Bailey Law Corporation and William R. Bailey for Plaintiff
    and Respondent.
    Defendant and Appellant Michael Vaughan (Vaughan) and
    plaintiff and respondent John Canning (Canning) are erstwhile
    friends who grew apart and ultimately were embroiled in conflict.
    After a heated disagreement at Vaughan’s home about politics,
    Canning changed Vaughan’s computer password and thereby
    prevented Vaughan from accessing his business files. Vaughan
    sued Canning for damages attributable to the password change
    and Canning responded with an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ.
    Proc.,1 § 425.16), contending the lawsuit sought to suppress his
    political speech and litigation-related activity. We consider
    whether the trial court correctly rejected these arguments and
    denied the anti-SLAPP motion.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.     The Facts as Alleged in the Operative Complaint
    Vaughan, a public insurance adjuster, taught his friend
    Canning the business of public insurance adjusting and allowed
    Canning to use his home office and equipment to conduct
    Canning’s business. Vaughan also occasionally gave Canning
    work to help Canning earn extra money.
    In July 2018, Canning was at Vaughan’s home and the two
    got into a heated argument about “politics” (the record does not
    permit being any more specific). Vaughan asked Canning to
    leave, but Canning initially refused and verbally threatened
    Vaughan. Canning only left the premises after Vaughan’s adult
    son intervened. The following day, Vaughan and Canning
    resumed normal friendly relations.
    1
    Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
    Code of Civil Procedure.
    2
    Months later, in October 2018, the scenario was largely
    repeated: Canning and Vaughan had a “political argument” at
    Vaughan’s home, Vaughan asked Canning to leave, Canning
    refused and pushed Vaughan, and Canning departed only after
    Vaughan’s adult son intervened.
    Soon thereafter, Vaughan learned Canning paid a visit to
    Vaughan’s attorney and told the attorney about the fight the two
    men had and his (Canning’s) intention to sue Vaughan. Vaughan
    also discovered Canning had secretly changed the password to
    Vaughan’s computer, rendering Vaughan unable to access his
    business files. As a result, Vaughan was prevented from
    contacting clients, meeting deadlines, and performing work he
    had been contracted to perform. Vaughan contacted Canning and
    asked for the new password, but Canning refused to provide it.
    In November 2018, Canning purported to provide Vaughan
    with the password through their respective attorneys, but the
    password Canning provided (DrtyDblRbrHole69) did not work.
    Vaughan was accordingly unable to access his files for more than
    30 days.
    B.     Court Proceedings on the Complaint
    Vaughan filed the original complaint in this action in
    December 2018 and an amended complaint (the operative
    complaint) in May 2020.2 The operative complaint alleges seven
    causes of action: conversion; intentional interference with
    prospective economic advantage; intentional interference with
    2
    Canning filed a complaint against Vaughan in January
    2019 that alleged seven causes of action arising in part out of the
    same altercations. The cases were ordered related.
    3
    contract; negligent interference with prospective economic
    relations; breach of fiduciary duty; unfair business practices; and
    inducing breach of contract. Vaughan sought damages, including
    punitive damages, and a permanent injunction against Canning
    barring him from engaging in any wrongful act or practice
    described in the complaint.
    Canning filed a section 425.16 special motion to strike the
    operative complaint. The motion argued the claims in the
    operative complaint arose out of Canning’s political speech, which
    Canning contended was protected activity under section 425.16,
    subdivision (e)(4), and out of Canning’s visit to Vaughan’s
    attorney, which Canning contended was protected activity under
    section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). Canning also argued Vaughan
    could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his
    substantive claims because they are barred by the litigation
    privilege, preempted by the Federal Copyright Act, and devoid of
    adequate factual support.
    Vaughan opposed the anti-SLAPP motion and maintained
    none of his claims arose from anti-SLAPP protected activity.
    Vaughan explained his causes of action were all predicated on
    Canning’s surreptitious password change that interfered with his
    business, not the political arguments they had at Vaughan’s
    home or Canning’s visit to Vaughan’s attorney—which were at
    best incidental allegations. Vaughan also argued he could
    establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claims,
    but he submitted no evidence to that effect.
    After holding a hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial
    court denied the motion, finding none of the claims arose from
    protected activity. The court explained the allegations
    concerning the parties’ arguments and Canning’s visit to
    4
    Vaughan’s attorney were just background facts and the complaint
    could not be read as attempting to hold Canning liable for
    constitutionally protected speech or pre-litigation activity.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Vaughan’s lawsuit is obviously not a SLAPP (strategic
    lawsuit against public participation) and the arguments Canning
    offers to claim that it is are not serious arguments. Vaughan’s
    claims arise from Canning’s act of changing Vaughan’s password
    and subsequent refusal to provide the new password. (Park v.
    Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 1057
    , 1062 [“A claim arises from protected activity when that
    activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim”].) Vaughan’s
    claims do not arise from, or otherwise premise liability on,
    Canning’s unspecified “political” argument with Vaughan,
    Canning’s conversations with Vaughan’s attorney, or the
    substance of Canning’s password change itself.3
    A.     Protected Activity under the Anti-SLAPP Statute
    “[I]n ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should
    consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions
    by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form
    the basis for liability.” (Park, supra, 
    2 Cal.5th at 1063
    ; accord,
    3
    Because we hold Canning did not carry his burden to
    establish Vaughan’s complaint arises from activity protected by
    section 425.16, we need not (and do not) discuss whether
    Vaughan has a probability of prevailing on any of his claims.
    (Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 
    72 Cal.App.5th 802
    , 823.)
    5
    Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 995
    , 1010,
    1015 [anti-SLAPP analysis begins with a consideration of the
    elements of each claim, “the actions alleged to establish those
    elements, and whether those actions are protected”].) Whether a
    claim is based on protected activity turns on “whether the ‘“core
    injury-producing conduct”’ warranting relief under the cause of
    action is protected activity.” (Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst
    Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 
    15 Cal.App.5th 686
    , 698.)
    There are four categories of protected activity under the
    anti-SLAPP statute. Canning’s appellate brief invokes the
    subdivision (e)(2), (e)(3), and (e)(4) categories, which encompass
    (respectively) statements in connection with an issue under
    review by a judicial body, statements in a public forum in
    connection with an issue of public interest, and conduct in
    furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free
    speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
    interest. The second of these invocations (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3))
    is forfeited for failure to argue the point below. (Flatley v. Mauro
    (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 299
    , 321, fn. 10; Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting
    Inc. (2013) 
    221 Cal.App.4th 1510
    , 1526; Bently Reserve LP v.
    Papaliolios (2013) 
    218 Cal.App.4th 418
    , 436.)
    B.     None of Vaughan’s Claims Arises from the Parties’
    “Political Argument” or Canning’s Conversation with
    White
    The anti-SLAPP statute applies only where protected
    “speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of,
    and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some
    different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 
    2 Cal.5th at 1060
    ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6
    
    6 Cal.5th 610
    , 620 [a defendant’s first-step burden requires a
    showing “that the ‘conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been
    injured falls within one of the four categories described in
    subdivision (e) [of section 425.16]’ [citation], and that the
    plaintiff’s claims in fact arise from that conduct”].) Accordingly,
    we first identify the allegations that supply the elements of a
    plaintiff’s claims because, as already mentioned, “[a]llegations of
    protected activity that merely provide context, without
    supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the
    anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 376
    ,
    394.)
    In his opening brief on appeal, Canning contends that
    because each enumerated cause of action in Vaughan’s complaint
    incorporates all of the allegations in the complaint, “each of the
    substantively factual contentions in Vaughan’s FAC arise out of”
    Canning’s protected speech—including, as relevant here, the
    political argument between Canning and Vaughan, and
    Canning’s statements to White threatening to sue Vaughan.
    While Canning is correct that the causes of action incorporate the
    relevant factual allegations, the mere incorporation of allegations
    referencing protected activity does not by itself establish the
    claims arise from protected activity. (E.g., Olivares v. Pineda
    (2019) 
    40 Cal.App.5th 343
    , 352 [finding “incorporated allegations
    of protected activity merely provide[d] context and are not the
    basis for [the] plaintiffs’ claim for recovery”]; Kajima Engineering
    and Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 
    95 Cal.App.4th 921
    , 931-932 [“[c]omplaints generally incorporate
    prior allegations into subsequent causes of action” and mere
    incorporation by reference does not taint causes of action that do
    not arise from protected activity].)
    7
    The injury producing conduct alleged in each of Vaughan’s
    claims against Canning is Canning’s act of changing Vaughan’s
    password without his consent and refusing to give Vaughan the
    new password, thereby preventing Vaughan from accessing his
    files. The “specific acts of alleged wrongdoing” (Bergstein v.
    Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 
    236 Cal.App.4th 793
    , 804)
    do not involve Canning’s argument with Vaughan or Canning’s
    direct or indirect communications with White. Vaughan’s claims
    thus do not arise from those allegations, which—at the very
    most—“merely provide context.” (Baral, 
    supra,
     
    1 Cal.5th at 394
    ;
    see also Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 1012.)
    In his reply brief, Canning for the first time addresses the
    elements of Vaughan’s causes of action and argues the
    allegations regarding his communications with Vaughan’s
    attorneys are necessary to supply the element of wrongfulness or
    malice to Vaughan’s claims, and to his prayer for punitive
    damages.4 As an initial matter, we need not address arguments
    raised for the first time in reply. (People v. Tully (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 952
    , 1075 [“It is axiomatic that arguments made for the
    first time in a reply brief will not be entertained because of the
    unfairness to the other party”].) Regardless, to the extent that
    Canning’s argument is a response to rhetoric employed in
    4
    Canning mentioned his communications with White
    supported Vaughan’s prayer for punitive damages in passing in
    his opening brief, without any citation to authority. That brief
    reference does not require us to consider this point any further as
    “issues not addressed as error in a party’s opening brief with
    legal analysis and citation to authority are forfeited.” (Golden
    Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 
    53 Cal.App.5th 733
    , 786.)
    8
    Vaughan’s respondent’s brief (i.e., his assertions that Canning’s
    actions were malicious), it is the allegations of the complaint and
    the elements of Vaughan’s causes of action that matter, not
    language in his appellate brief.5
    C.     Canning’s Change of Vaughan’s Password Is Not
    Protected under Subdivision (e)(4)
    Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) is a “catchall” provision,
    which requires a two-stage analysis. (FilmOn.com Inc. v.
    DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 133
    , 149.) “First, we ask what
    ‘public issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in question
    implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the
    speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask what functional relationship
    exists between the speech and the public conversation about
    some matter of public interest. It is at the latter stage that
    context proves useful.” (Id. at 149-150.)
    The “first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech
    or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be
    understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a
    private dispute.” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 1238
    , 1253.)
    The second step “requires us to determine whether a functional
    5
    Additionally, we disagree with Canning’s assertion that,
    absent the allegations he contends should have been stricken, the
    complaint substantively alleges “nothing more than an employee
    who innocently changed a password during the regular course of
    his employment.” If nothing else, the complaint also alleges
    Canning refused to provide Vaughan with the new password,
    thereby preventing him from accessing his files for approximately
    one month. In context, it defies credulity to characterize the
    changing of Vaughan’s password as an innocent action.
    9
    relationship exists between the speech in question and the public
    conversation about the issue of public interest.” (Bishop v. The
    Bishop’s School (2022) 
    86 Cal.App.5th 893
    , 906.) The speech
    cannot merely “‘refer to a subject of widespread public interest;
    the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the
    public debate.’” (FilmOn, supra, 
    7 Cal.5th at 150
    .) In evaluating
    this step, we “must consider the particular context of the speech,
    including the speaker’s identity; the ‘purpose’ of the speech; the
    nature of the audience and the intended audience; and the
    ‘timing’ and ‘location’ of the communication.” (Murray v. Tran
    (2020) 
    55 Cal.App.5th 10
    , 30.)
    Canning contends his act of changing Vaughan’s password
    was an act of political protest protected under section 425.16,
    subdivision (e)(4). The nature of Canning’s purported political
    protest, like the specifics of the “political argument” between
    Canning and Vaughan, is unspecified. We therefore cannot make
    any meaningful assessment at the first stage of FilmOn analysis:
    yes, the public may be interested in politics, but that is far too
    general a statement of the asserted issue of public interest in
    play and Canning’s anti-SLAPP evidence does nothing to clarify
    things. But we shall assume for argument’s sake that Canning
    has cleared the first FilmOn hurdle because it is obvious he has
    not cleared the second. As great as the public’s interest may be
    in politics, that interest cannot reasonably be said to extend to
    Canning’s surreptitious change of a computer password while a
    guest at his former friend’s home.6
    6
    There are neither allegations nor evidence in the record
    that establish any functional relationship between Canning’s act
    of changing Vaughan’s password (or the language of the incorrect
    password he later provided to Vaughan through counsel) and any
    10
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying Canning’s anti-SLAPP motion is
    affirmed. Vaughan is awarded costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    BAKER, Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    MOOR, J.
    KIM, J.
    public conversation about politics. Similarly, there is no
    allegation or evidence indicating the incorrect password Canning
    communicated to Vaughan through their respective counsel was
    publicized beyond those few individuals. That Canning might
    have communicated some opaque private message to Vaughan
    through the wording of the false password does not contribute to
    any public debate. Additionally, the record does not reflect any
    purpose to the conduct beyond impacting Vaughan.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B311985

Filed Date: 10/16/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2023