People v. Coddington ( 2023 )

Filed 10/17/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A166124
v.
JAMES MCKENZIE (Del Norte County
CODDINGTON, Super. Ct. No. CRF16-9495)
Defendant and Appellant.
The trial court granted appellant James McKenzie Coddington’s
request to have a sentencing enhancement for a prior prison term struck
under legislation passed following his conviction under a plea agreement.
Coddington argues for the first time in this appeal that he was entitled to
seek further reductions of his prison term under recent legislation affecting
other aspects of his conviction. We agree, and we therefore remand to the
trial court for a full resentencing.
We also agree with respondent, however, that if the court on remand
indicates it is inclined to further reduce Coddington’s sentence, the
prosecution may withdraw its assent to the plea agreement. (People v.
Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 704 (Stamps).) Although the Legislature
clearly intended that the striking of a sentencing enhancement for a prior
prison term would not provide a basis for rescinding a plea agreement, this
intent cannot be understood to govern other possible sentence reductions
merely because they happen to occur during the same resentencing. Thus, if
1
Coddington successfully seeks additional reductions on remand, he will be
subject to the resulting consequences to the plea agreement under Stamps.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Coddington has an extensive criminal history. The case establishing
the basis of this appeal arose in connection with an incident in October 2016
in which he attacked a fellow inmate at the Del Norte County Jail. As a
result of the incident, Coddington was charged by felony information with one
count of assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(4))1 and one count of making a criminal threat (§ 422), both with a
special allegation of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The information
contained three additional allegations: that Coddington previously had been
convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a), “serious felony allegation”), that
he had a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, “prior strike allegation”), and that
he had served three prior prison terms (former § 667.5, subd. (b), “prison
priors”).
In May 2017, Coddington pleaded guilty to the count of assault with
force likely to cause great bodily injury, and admitted the special allegation of
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
specified.
2
great bodily injury.2 He also admitted two enhancements as alleged in the
information—the serious felony allegation (§ 667, subd. (a)), and the prior
strike allegation (§ 1170.12)—and one of the three prison priors (former
§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The indicated sentence was 13 years. Had Coddington
been convicted on all charges in the original complaint, he faced up to
17 years, four months, calculated as follows: four years on the assault charge
(the upper term of four years, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), plus eight months for
criminal threats (one-third the midterm of two years, §§ 422, subd. (a), 1170,
subd. (h), 1170.1, subd. (a)), doubled because of the strike (§ 1170.12,
subd. (c)(1)), plus five years for the prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)), plus
three years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Based on the plea, the trial court sentenced Coddington to 13 years in
prison, calculated as follows: the lower term of two years for the assault
conviction (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), doubled because of the prior strike allegation
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus three years for the great bodily injury allegation
2 As part of the plea, three other cases were also resolved. In one,
Coddington had faced the possibility of about six years in prison for charges
relating to evading a peace officer, unlawfully taking a vehicle, possessing a
firearm as a felon, and possessing drugs in jail, assuming he received
consecutive sentences of one third the midterm, doubled based on his prior
serious felony conviction. (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, subd. (a), 10851; §§ 18,
subd. (a), 1170, subd. (h), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 4573.6, 29800, subd. (a)(1).)
Because Coddington entered a plea in the instant case, this separate case
was instead dismissed with a “Harvey waiver,” meaning the trial court could
consider the dismissed charges in sentencing. (People v. Harvey (1979)
25 Cal.3d 754, 758–759.) In the two other cases, Coddington was accused of
felony violation of post-release community supervision (PRCS, § 3455). When
the trial court sentenced Coddington in this case, the court found him in
violation of PRCS, ordered him to time served, and terminated him from
PRCS in those cases.
3
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), plus five years for the serious felony allegation (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), plus one year for the prison prior.
By motion filed in the trial court in August 2022, Coddington moved to
be resentenced to remove his one-year prison-prior enhancement. His motion
was based on two laws relating to prison priors that were enacted after his
conviction. The first, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 136), amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2020, to
eliminate sentence enhancements for prison priors unless the prior term was
for a sexually violent offense. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375,
380 (Burgess); see Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) The second, Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 483), was enacted in 2021, and it
extended Senate Bill No. 136 to all persons, such as Coddington, currently
incarcerated in jail or prison. (People v. Kimble (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 582,
588, pet. rev. filed Aug. 23, 2023, S281526; Burgess at p. 380; see Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3.) As a result of these enactments, section 1172.75,
subdivision (a),3 renders legally invalid any prison prior imposed before 2020
except where the prison prior was for a sexually violent offense. Other than
seeking to remove his one-year prison-prior enhancement, Coddington did not
seek any further sentencing relief.
At a brief hearing on the motion, the trial court vacated Coddington’s
one-year prison-prior sentencing enhancement. This reduced Coddington’s
sentence from 13 years to 12 years, which was the entire relief Coddington
had requested. Proceeding without an attorney, Coddington filed a notice of
appeal.
3 The statute was previously numbered section 1171.1. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12; Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
p. 380.)
4
II.
DISCUSSION
Coddington argues that the trial court failed to provide him with a full
resentencing hearing, meaning a hearing in which he could have sought
further sentencing relief under at least two other statutes that were enacted
after his conviction. We agree he may seek further sentencing relief on
remand.
Coddington acknowledges that his trial counsel sought to remove only
his one-year prison-prior enhancement.4 He nevertheless contends that he
did not forfeit the ability to seek further sentencing relief and, alternatively,
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel if we conclude otherwise.
We do not reach the ineffective-assistance claim, because we decline to find
forfeiture under the circumstances. (See People v. Monroe (2022)
4 The Attorney General initially questioned whether the trial court had
the authority to provide this relief, since section 1172.75 describes a process
where the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) identifies eligible defendants, as opposed to defendants initiating the
resentencing process. (See Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384
[§ 1172.75 does not contemplate individual defendants seeking relief by
motion and instead provides specific procedure whereby trial court’s review is
triggered by receipt of information from the CDCR or county correctional
administrator].) The Attorney General later wrote to the court withdrawing
this argument. The letter stated that respondent learned that the CDCR has
identified some eligible defendants in “at least one lengthy list of names,
rather than in individual letters to the superior court,” and that resentencing
in some cases was initiated based on that list. The Attorney General does not
specifically state that is what happened here. But we note that at the
hearing on Coddington’s motion, in response to the trial court’s question
about why Coddington was not personally appearing, his trial attorney stated
that “a lot of these things are being handled just by the prison notifying the
inmates that they are available, and they normally send these things in in
pro per. He’s asked me to appear for him.” This suggests at least some
CDCR involvement in the process.
5
85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400 (Monroe) [appellate court has authority to consider
issue not preserved for review].)
Turning to the merits, when a sentence is subject to recall, “the
resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and
not just the portion subjected to the recall.” (People v. Buycks (2018)
5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) Coddington relies on this general “full sentencing rule,”
along with the language of the statute making retroactive the elimination of
prison priors. The statute provides that when resentencing occurs, the trial
court shall apply “any other changes in law that reduce sentences” when
striking a prison prior (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)). Thus in Monroe, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th 393, as here, the trial court struck a one-year prison prior
under Senate Bill No. 483. (Monroe at p. 398.) On appeal, the defendant
argued that the trial court also should have exercised its discretion to strike a
firearm enhancement that is not at issue here. (Id. at pp. 398–399.) And he
argued, as Coddington argues here, that on remand he was entitled to have
the trial court consider striking his five-year serious felony conviction under
Senate Bill No. 1393. (Monroe at pp. 398–399.) Division Two of this court
agreed that the defendant was entitled to have the trial court exercise its
discretion to dismiss both the firearm enhancement and the five-year
enhancement under Senate Bill No. 1393. (Monroe at p. 399.) Monroe held
that the legislation, while not independently available to final judgments,
was available during a resentencing under section 1172.75 since the statute
requires (subd. (d)(2)) the trial court to apply “ ‘any other changes in law that
reduce sentences.’ ” (Monroe at pp. 401–402; see also People v. Kimble, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 588 [“if the statutory conditions are met, Senate Bill
No. 483 entitles a defendant with a qualifying enhancement to a full
resentencing”].)
6
Coddington points to two other legislative amendments that could
potentially reduce his sentence. The first one, Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393), amended sections 667, subdivision (a)
and 1385, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2019, to give courts discretion
to dismiss or strike a prior serious felony allegation. (Stamps, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 699; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 965; see
Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2.) Under this amendment, the trial court has the
discretion to strike Coddington’s serious felony allegation, reducing his
sentence by five years. The second one, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 81), effective January 1, 2022, amended section 1385
“to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether
to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.”
(People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674; see Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)
Under this amendment, the trial court has new guidance in deciding whether
to strike his enhancements.
Although Coddington may seek further sentencing relief on remand, he
will not necessarily be entitled to retain the other benefits of his plea
agreement if he is successful. As respondent notes, the defendant in Monroe
was sentenced after a jury trial and thus not under a plea agreement as was
Coddington. (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 396.) “[L]ong-standing law
limits the court’s unilateral authority to strike an enhancement yet maintain
other provisions of the plea bargain.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701.) In
Stamps, the defendant was sentenced under a plea agreement to nine years
in prison after facing charges that would have made him subject to the 25-
year-to-life provisions of the Three Strikes Law (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).
(Stamps at p. 693.) The Supreme Court agreed that Senate Bill No. 1393
granting trial courts discretion to strike a serious-felony enhancement
7
applied to the defendant. (Stamps at p. 699.) But the court explained that
the defendant was not entitled to have the trial court on remand consider
striking the enhancement “while otherwise maintaining the plea agreement
intact.” (Id. at p. 700.)
Stamps was persuaded by the approach announced in People v. Ellis
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 925: “ ‘Senate Bill No. 1393 does not entitle
defendants who negotiated stipulated sentences “to whittle down the
sentence ‘but otherwise leave the plea bargain intact[.]’ ” ’ . . . . ‘Senate Bill
No. 1393 compels the conclusion that defendant is entitled to seek the benefit
of change in the law.’ (Ellis, at pp. 943–944.) . . . . [O]n remand, ‘the trial
court may simply decline to exercise its discretion to strike the enhancement
and that will end the matter.’ (Id. at p. 944.) ‘In other cases, the trial court
might conclude, upon the defendant’s request, that it is in the interest of
justice to strike the enhancement. In such cases, it bears repeating that “in
the context of a negotiated plea the trial court may approve or reject the
parties’ agreement, but the court may not attempt to secure such a plea by
stepping into the role of the prosecutor, nor may the court effectively
withdraw its approval by later modifying the terms of the agreement it had
approved.” . . . “ ‘ “Such withdrawal is permitted, for example, in those
instances where the court becomes more fully informed about the case
[citation], or where, after further consideration, the court concludes that the
bargain is not in the best interests of society.” ’ [Citation.] However, once a
court withdraws its approval of a plea bargain, the court cannot ‘proceed to
apply and enforce certain parts of the plea bargain, while ignoring’ others.
[Citation.] Instead, the court must retore the parties to the status quo ante.”
[Citations.] Thus, while there may be cases in which the trial court will elect
to strike the serious felony conviction enhancement, it is not without
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consequence to the plea bargain.’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 706–
707.)
Simply stated, Stamps held that the defendant should be given the
opportunity if he desired to seek the court’s exercise of discretion on remand.
(Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.) But if the court indicated it was inclined
to exercise its discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence, the prosecutor
could either agree to modify the bargain or withdraw its assent to the plea
agreement and restore the case to the status quo ante. (Ibid.) The trial
court, too, was entitled to withdraw its previous approval of the plea
agreement. (Ibid.)
Coddington did not risk losing the benefits of his plea agreement by
seeking the elimination of his prison prior. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 707.) This is because when the Legislature made Senate Bill No. 483
retroactive, it specifically declared in an uncodified section that it was “the
intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence as a result of the act
that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind
a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1; see also Stamps, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 702–704 [entering a plea agreement does not insulate the
parties from a law the legislature expressly intends to apply to them].)
The trial court here followed Senate Bill No. 483’s clear directive in striking
the prison prior but otherwise leaving intact the plea agreement.
This same principle will not apply if Coddington seeks further
sentencing relief on remand. In arguing to the contrary, Coddington points to
Senate Bill No. 483’s statement of legislative intent and says that it applies
not just to the elimination of prison priors, but also to the portion of the
statute that directs the trial court to apply any changes in law that reduce
sentences or provides judicial discretion to do so. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
9
Resentencing pursuant to the section “shall not result in a longer sentence
than the one originally imposed.” (Id., subd. (d)(1); see Monroe, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) Coddington essentially argues that these
provisions overrule Stamps for all other sentence reductions that are granted
in connection with a request to eliminate prison priors. We are not
persuaded.
To begin with, the uncodified statement in Senate Bill No. 483 that the
law shall apply to “any changes to a sentence as a result of the act” cannot be
read to expand the scope of the legislation beyond which it was intended.
Statements of intent, contained in the uncodified section of statutes, “ ‘do not
confer power, determine rights, or enlarge the scope of a measure.’ ”
(Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 925.)
The legislative history and purpose of Senate Bill No. 483 was to eliminate
prison priors. Nothing in that history suggests that the Legislature—in
eliminating prison priors, including those that were entered under a plea
deal—wanted to overrule Stamps as to the resentencing of all enhancements
of all defendants who accepted a prison prior under a plea deal.
As respondent points out, the codified statement of legislative purpose
provides that Senate Bill No. 483 was enacted “so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
The statute advances this intent by nullifying prison priors, regardless of
whether they were imposed following a plea or a jury trial. We agree with
respondent, though, that this intent would be thwarted with an
interpretation categorically preventing prosecutors from withdrawing assent
to a plea bargain for other changes reducing sentences that were part of a
plea bargain. Under such an interpretation, prosecutors would have no
Stamps remedy when a defendant is being resentenced, even though they
10
would retain such a remedy for defendants being sentenced prospectively.
The two enactments Coddington now says apply to him—Senate Bills
Nos. 1393 and 81—involve trial court discretion, as opposed to a categorical
elimination of sentencing enhancement. Coddington does not argue that
these separate bills included a legislative intent to allow unilateral
modification of an agreed-upon term. Taken together, Coddington’s
interpretation would produce, not eliminate, sentencing disparities.
We also agree with respondent that the legislative history does not
support Coddington’s view that Senate Bill No. 483 was meant to overrule
Stamps for all sentence reductions that are granted in connection with a
request to eliminate prison priors. As we have said, the Legislature first
eliminated most prison priors (Senate Bill No. 136), and later enacted Senate
Bill No. 483 to make the change retroactive. The full uncodified section thus
states: “The Legislature finds and declares that in order to ensure equal
justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing, it is the intent of the
Legislature to retroactively apply [an unrelated sentencing change] and
Senate Bill No. 136 of the 2019–20 Regular Session to all persons currently
serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence
enhancements. It is the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a
sentence as a result of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for
a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
This focus on the retroactivity of Senate Bill No. 136 indicates the
Legislature was clearly concerned with eliminating prison priors, the sole
subject of Senate Bill No. 136. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest for Senate
Bill No. 483 states that the legislation would declare prison priors “to be
legally invalid” and would state the intent of the Legislature to prohibit the
11
rescission of a plea agreement based on eliminating them.5 While these
statements indicate a clear intent to “overturn long-standing law that a court
cannot unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 701), they were limited to the context of prison priors.
Coddington should be provided an opportunity to argue for a further
sentence reduction with the understanding that if the trial court is inclined to
exercise its discretion, such a determination may affect the prosecution’s
ability to withdraw from the plea agreement. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 707, 709.)
III.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the superior court to allow Coddington an
opportunity to seek relief under Senate Bills Nos. 81 and 1393, as well as any
other legislation that may reduce his sentence.
5 See Stats. 2021, ch. 728 Summary Digest. On the court’s own motion,
it takes judicial notice of the Legislative Counsel’s Digest. (Evid. Code,
§§ 455, subd. (a), 459, subd. (c); Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v.
Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 35.)
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_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Bowen, J.*
*Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Contra Costa, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
People v. Coddington A166124
13
Trial Court: Superior Court of Del Norte
Trial Judge: Hon. Darren McElfresh
Counsel:
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D.
Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Katie L. Stowe, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
People v. Coddington A166124
14