Estate of Gleason CA2/7 ( 2023 )

Filed 10/17/23 Estate of Gleason CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
Estate of CAROLE GLEASON, B320039
Deceased. (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 18STPB03024)
JAMES L. LEESTMA, as
Successor Administrator,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
PATRICIA GLEASON
WILLIAMS et al.,
Objectors and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel Juarez, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Michael Mogan and Michael Mogan for
Objectors and Appellants.
Schindler Eyrich and John F. Eyrich for Petitioner and
Respondent.
__________________________
Patricia Gleason Williams and her daughter, Nakia
Woodson, appeal from the probate court’s order requiring them to
(1) transfer real property to James L. Leestma as administrator
of Carole Gleason’s estate; (2) pay a surcharge of $350,000 to the
estate (with a second $350,000 surcharge satisfied by
reconveyance of the real property); and (3) pay attorneys’ fees and
costs to Leestma and two heirs—Kenji Gleason and Arthur
Gleason.1 On appeal, Williams and Woodson contend Woodson’s
due process rights were violated because she was not timely
served with Leestma’s Probate Code section 8502 petition prior to
trial, and the probate court abused its discretion in denying her
request for a trial continuance. They also argue there was not
substantial evidence to support the surcharges the court imposed
against them for bad faith under section 859 and Williams’s
breach of fiduciary duty under section 9601. Further, they
maintain the probate court abused its discretion in granting
attorneys’ fees and costs to Leestma, Kenji, and Arthur. They
also object to the probate court’s statement of decision. We
affirm.
1 We refer to the Gleasons by their first names to avoid
confusion.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Probate Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Administrators of Carole Gleason’s Estate
On September 15, 2017 Carole died without a will. Carole
was survived by her four adult children: Williams, Kenji, Kevin,
and Paschell Gleason. Arthur is the father of the four children;
at the time of Carole’s death, she and Arthur were divorced. At
that time, Carole owned a house located on South Hobart
Boulevard in Los Angeles (Hobart property).
On May 2, 2018 the probate court granted Paschell’s
petition for letters of administration and appointed her the
administrator of Carole’s estate. In September and November
2018 Kevin executed two assignments of his interest in the estate
($18,000 each) to Advance Inheritance, LLC as consideration for
two cash advances of $10,000 each. After Paschell died in
January 2019, the court granted Williams’s petition for letters of
administration and appointed her as successor administrator on
March 18, 2019.3
On July 24, 2019 Advance Inheritance, through its attorney
James L. Leestma,4 filed a petition to remove Williams as
administrator, to require Williams to sell the Hobart property
and provide an accounting, and for reimbursement of its
attorneys’ fees and costs. On the same date, Advance Inheritance
3 Paschell died intestate and did not have a spouse, partner,
or any children at the time of her death. On July 22, 2021 the
probate court found Arthur was entitled to inherit Paschell’s
share of Carole’s estate.
4 Leestma is an attorney, investor, and president of Advance
Inheritance.
3
filed a petition requesting the probate court appoint Leestma as
successor administrator. On December 12, 2019 Leestma
recorded a lis pendens on the Hobart property.5
On January 17, 2020, after hearing testimony and
argument by the attorneys, the probate court removed Williams
as administrator; ordered Williams to file a final accounting;
granted Advance Inheritance’s request for attorneys’ fees and
costs; and appointed Leestma as successor administrator.
On April 20, 2020 Williams filed a first account, in which
she included a creditor’s claim of $16,293 by Woodson, which she
had allowed prior to her removal as administrator. Williams
stated in her account with respect to Woodson’s claim, “$15,000 of
this amount represents funds paid on behalf of Kevin Gleason to
James Leestma’s company Advanced [Inh]eritance LLC. The
other $1,293 represents homeowners insurance paid for [the
Hobart property].”
B. Leestma’s Section 850 Petition and Williams’s Petition To
Remove Leestma
On August 13, 2020 Leestma, as successor administrator,
filed a petition (section 850 petition) requesting the probate court
(1) determine the estate’s ownership of the Hobart property
(§ 850, subd. (a)(2)(C) & (D)); (2) direct transfer of the Hobart
property to the estate (§ 856); (3) quiet title; and (4) award double
5 The notice of recording of lis pendens was filed in the
probate court on August 14, 2020. The proof of service stated the
document was served by mail on all interested parties, including
Williams, Woodson, and Williams’s attorney, Michael Mogan,
who later also represented Woodson.
4
damages and attorneys’ fees and costs (§ 859). Leestma argued
Williams transferred the Hobart property to a trust established
by Williams with no consideration and without court approval or
notice of proposed action to interested parties. The section 850
petition and notice of hearing were served on Williams, Woodson,
and Williams’s attorney, Michael Mogan, among others.
In her September 11, 2020 response and affirmative
defenses to the section 850 petition, Williams argued she
conveyed the Hobart property to Certified Holding Trust “to
enable a bank to lend money to such trust to make improvements
on the [p]roperty to benefit all beneficiaries of the estate.”
Williams alleged as her fifth affirmative defense that Certified
Holding Trust owned title to the Hobart property, and she sought
affirmative relief to quiet title against Leestma.
On March 25, 2020 Williams filed a petition to remove
Leestma as the successor administrator. In her October 20, 2020
supplement to the petition, Williams requested an evidentiary
hearing to resolve her petition and Leestma’s section 850
petition. She asserted, “[T]he title of the real estate was
transferred to a trust to obtain bank financing such financing
which was not possible while the property was in the name of the
estate.” She further stated that “her two siblings were well
aware of her attempts to secure financing before such transfer
and did not object.”
On October 28, 2020 Kenji filed a verified response to
Williams’s supplement in support of her petition to remove
Leestma as administrator in which he denied knowledge of
Williams’s attempts to secure financing. Kenji also stated he was
not aware of Williams’s transfer of the Hobart property from the
probate estate to a trust and did not consent to the conveyance.
5
On July 9, 2021 Leestma filed a supplement to his
section 850 petition, naming Woodson as a respondent in her
capacity as the trustee of Certified Holding Trust. On July 22
Woodson, represented by Mogan, filed her response and
affirmative defenses to the section 850 petition. Woodson stated
that Williams transferred the Hobart property to the trust to
obtain a loan to make improvements on the property to benefit all
beneficiaries. She alleged on information and belief that Kenji
and Kevin were fully aware and did not object to the transfer of
title. Woodson stated further there was consideration for the
conveyance because as the trustee she repaid Kevin’s debt to
Leestma and paid off the debt incurred to make improvements to
the Hobart property. Woodson also alleged as her fifth
affirmative defense that Certified Holding Trust held title to the
Hobart property, and she sought affirmative relief quieting title
against Leestma.
C. The Trial Testimony
At the July 27, 2021 court trial on the section 850 petition,
Leestma testified on his own behalf and called Williams and
Woodson as witnesses.6
6 Following the trial on the section 850 petition, the court
held a trial on Williams’s petition to remove Leestma as successor
administrator. Because Williams does not appeal the probate
court’s denial of her petition to remove Leestma, we discuss only
the trial testimony relating to the section 850 petition.
6
1. Williams’s appointment as successor administrator
and transfer of the Hobart property
Williams testified that on March 19, 2019 the probate court
appointed her as successor administrator of Carole’s estate.
Williams acknowledged she read and signed a form advising her
of the duties and liabilities of a personal representative,
including the duties to “‘keep estate assets separate’” and to “not
spend any of the estate’s money unless [she] received permission
from the court or [had] been advised to do so by an attorney.”
The form further stated that if Williams did not “obtain the
court’s permission when it is required [she] may be removed as
personal representative or [she] may be required to reimburse
the estate from [her] own personal funds, or both.”
Williams testified that when she was the administrator,
she spoke with Kenji and Kevin about making repairs to the
Hobart property. Williams did not discuss the matter with her
father (Arthur), and she opposed his petition for entitlement to
the estate “[b]ecause [her] dad had stated time and again that he
didn’t want to have anything to do with the house.”
Williams acknowledged that on April 11, 2019, as executor
of Carole’s estate, she signed a grant deed conveying the Hobart
property to Certified Holding Trust, which Williams had created
in early 2019.7 Woodson was the trustee and sole beneficiary of
the trust. Woodson, who graduated from law school but was not
a licensed attorney, helped prepare the trust document for
Certified Holding Trust and the grant deed conveying the Hobart
property to the trust. Williams admitted the estate did not
7 Williams acknowledged the probate court appointed her as
administrator, not executor.
7
receive any consideration for the conveyance of the Hobart
property to the trust. Williams denied she transferred the
Hobart property, in effect, to disinherit Kevin and Kenji. She
claimed “they both were aware,” but she admitted she did not
have the written consent of Kevin, Kenji, or Arthur to transfer
the Hobart property out of the estate. Woodson testified Kevin
orally consented to the transfer of the property to Certified
Holding Trust because he did not have the money to pay the debt
he owed to Leestma. According to Woodson, Kenji also consented
to the transfer because he did not have “money to do anything.”
Both Williams and Woodson testified the Hobart property
was transferred to Certified Holding Trust to obtain a loan to pay
for improvements to the property. Woodson applied for a loan of
$371,000. She testified Williams, Kevin, and Kenji agreed to
split $200,000 of the loan proceeds, with the remaining $150,000
designated for repairs of the Hobart property and $21,000 to pay
off Advance Inheritance.8 But Williams and Woodson were
unable to get a loan. Further, they could not complete repairs to
the Hobart property because the lis pendens was recorded on the
property. Williams admitted she hired a contractor to demolish
the kitchen and bathroom, but no improvements to the Hobart
property were ever made.
8 Woodson testified she did not speak with Arthur about the
loan because at that time he had not yet filed his petition to
determine entitlement to the estate. Further, the last time
Woodson spoke with Arthur, “he told [her], Kenji, [Williams] and
Kevin he wanted nothing to do with the property.”
8
2. Removal of Williams as administrator
Leestma testified that on July 24, 2019 he filed a petition
on behalf of Advance Inheritance to remove Williams as
administrator of Carole’s estate. From August 5 to 9 Woodson
called and exchanged emails with him, with a copy to Williams,
offering to pay $36,000 to Advance Inheritance to satisfy Kevin’s
debt in exchange for withdrawal of Leestma’s petition. Woodson
paid $15,000 toward one of the $18,000 assignments on
September 15, 2019. Neither Woodson nor Williams informed
Leestma that the Hobart property had been transferred out of
Carole’s estate.
Woodson recorded the grant deed on August 29, 2019.
Williams admitted that at the time of the recording, she was
aware of the petition to remove her as administrator. On
December 5, 2019 Leestma sent an email to Williams (with a
copy to Woodson and others), in which he informed Williams that
she had violated her fiduciary duty by removing the sole estate
asset without notice to the interested parties and their lawyers.
Leestma testified he “never received an email [in response]
indicating that she would return the Hobart property to the
estate.”
Leestma testified that immediately after the January 17,
2020 hearing on Advance Inheritance’s petition to remove
Williams as administrator, he asked Woodson in the court
hallway to return the Hobart property to the estate, and she
refused. In her testimony, Woodson denied this conversation
took place, instead recounting that Leestma told her, “I’m taking
the family house. I’m going to make sure you guys get nothing,”
and “the attorneys’ fees will outweigh everything.” Williams
9
testified Leestma told her, “Ms. Williams, I am sorry for your
loss, but I’m going to make sure that you don’t get a dime of it.”
3. Leestma’s appointment as successor trustee and his
efforts to return the Hobart property to the estate
On February 4, 2020 the probate court issued letters of
administration to Leestma as successor administrator. On
February 7 Leestma, as successor administrator, sent Williams
and Woodson a letter by mail and email, demanding they return
the Hobart property to the estate. Neither Williams nor Woodson
agreed to return the property. On July 8 and August 14
Leestma’s attorney sent letters to Mogan requesting return of the
Hobart property to the estate. Neither Mogan nor his clients
(Williams and Woodson) at any time agreed to return the
property to the estate.
According to Leestma, the probate referee determined the
value of the Hobart property was $350,000. Leestma testified
that before and after his appointment as administrator, he
received an offer of $375,000 to purchase the Hobart property,
but the estate could not sell the property because it had been
transferred out of the estate. As of the trial date, the property
had not yet been transferred back into the estate. Williams
admitted she did not return the Hobart property to the estate
because she wanted to keep the property. Woodson opined, based
on her experience as a Nevada real estate salesperson, that the
value of the Hobart property was less than $200,000 “because
unfortunately we started demolition.” Further, she refused to
transfer the Hobart property back to the estate because she was
the bona fide purchaser. According to Woodson, the
consideration for the purchase was the $15,000 she paid to
10
Advance Inheritance to satisfy Kevin’s assignment of his interest
to the company.
D. Statement of Decision and Order
On December 14, 2021 the probate court issued a proposed
statement of decision on Leestma’s section 850 petition and
Williams’s petitions to approve her first account and remove
Leestma as administrator. On December 22 Williams and
Woodson filed joint objections, arguing the probate court did not
state the factual and legal bases for its decision and its findings
and rulings were ambiguous.
On January 7, 2022 the probate court issued its final
statement of decision. The court overruled Williams and
Woodson’s objections, explaining, “In large part, the objections
were disagreements with the court’s adjudicated points. On
those issues, the court relies on the evidence in the record.
Where Respondents claim Leestma’s filings were untimely, the
court simply disagrees based on the court record of filings. Apart
from that, Respondents mostly argued that they had found
ambiguities in the court’s analysis or a failure on the part of the
court to address issues. In preparing this Statement of Decision,
the court reviewed its analyses and the breadth of issues covered
as well as all of Respondents’ issues as raised in trial and in their
objections to the Proposed Statement of Decision. While the
court need not raise every single issue, as Respondents would
have it, the Proposed Statement of Decision and this Statement
of Decision encompass all significant and material issues that the
court must adjudicate to resolve the issues before it. Where the
court did not address a particular issue, it was either subsumed
by other issues raised or irrelevant to the overall adjudication.”
11
The court also rejected the argument Woodson was not provided
proper notice of Leestma’s section 850 petition, relying on “the
evidence of service.”
The probate court found Williams, as administrator,
violated her fiduciary duty to marshal and preserve the estate as
required under section 9601, subdivision (a). The court rejected
Williams and Woodson’s argument they were bona fide
purchasers, finding “they failed to pay value for the transfer,
gave no notice, and their actions cannot be found to be in good
faith.” The court also rejected the argument that the transfer of
the Hobart property to Certified Holding Trust was temporary.
The court reasoned, “Had it been temporary for the obtaining of a
loan (a loan that never materialized), once Gleason Williams was
removed, the property should have been returned to the estate.
Instead, Gleason Williams argued, alternatively it appears, that
she and Woodson should remain owners of the property outright.”
The court found, “Gleason Williams’ transfer of the property
without proper notice, as required in her capacity as
administrator, without consideration, and without consent by the
heirs, and without any plausible reason, qualify as actions in bad
faith. Respondents’ consistent refusal to return the property to
the decedent’s estate, even after Gleason Williams was removed
for those actions, and even currently, solidifies the finding of bad
faith.”
The court imposed a constructive trust (Civ. Code, §§ 2223,
2224) and ordered Williams and Woodson to transfer the Hobart
property to Leestma as successor administrator of the estate.
Pursuant to section 859, the court surcharged Williams and
Woodson $700,000 (twice the $350,000 property value) with
$350,000 satisfied by the return of the Hobart property to the
12
estate and the remaining $350,000 payable to the estate. The
court also ordered Williams and Woodson to pay attorneys’ fees
and costs to Leestma ($66,782), Kenji ($7,497), and Arthur
($17,242) pursuant to section 859.
On February 24, 2022 the probate court entered an order
requiring Williams and Woodson to (1) transfer the Hobart
property to Leestma as administrator; (2) pay a surcharge of
$350,000 to the estate (with the other $350,000 surcharge
satisfied by reconveyance of the Hobart property); and (3) pay
attorneys’ fees and costs to Leestma, Kenji, and Athur. Williams
and Woodson timely appealed from the February 24, 2022 order.9
DISCUSSION
A. Williams and Woodson Did Not Appeal from the Order
Denying in Part Williams’s Account
As discussed, in her first account Williams approved
Woodson’s creditor’s claim, which included $15,000 that Woodson
paid on behalf of Kevin to Advanced Inheritance to partially
satisfy one of Kevin’s assignments of his interest in the estate in
exchange for a $10,000 cash advance. In its statement of
decision, the court denied Woodson’s creditor’s claim, explaining
“[t]here was insufficient evidence that the partial assignment
was a debt or liability of the estate.” The court approved
Williams’s account in part, conditioning approval on Williams
and Woodson’s return of the Hobart property to the estate. On
9 Although the notice of appeal states the appeal is taken
from a February 25, 2022 order, it is clear from context Williams
and Woodson intended to appeal from the February 24 order.
13
February 24, 2022 the court entered an order granting in part
and denying in part Williams’s first account.
On appeal, Williams and Woodson contend the probate
court erred in sustaining Leestma’s objections to Williams’s first
account and denying Woodson’s claim. But we lack jurisdiction to
consider the issue because Williams and Woodson did not appeal
from the February 24, 2022 order granting in part and denying in
part Williams’s first account. Williams and Woodson only attach
to their April 11, 2022 notice of appeal the February 24, 2022
order granting Leestma’s section 850 petition, and they likewise
attach that order to their civil case information statement.
Further, the April 11, 2022 notice of appeal states the
appeal is authorized under section 1300, subdivisions (e), (g), and
(k).10 (See §1300, subds. (e) [order “[f]ixing, authorizing,
allowing, and directing payment of compensation or expenses of
an attorney” is appealable], (g) [order “[s]urcharging, removing,
or discharging a fiduciary” is appealable], (k) [order
“[a]djudicating the merits” of a section 850 claim is appealable].)
The notice of appeal does not state the appeal includes an order
made appealable under section 1300, subdivision (b), which lists
an order “[s]ettling an account of a fiduciary,” or subdivision (c),
which lists an order “approving or confirming the acts of a
fiduciary.”
Williams and Woodson contend we have jurisdiction to
review the order on Williams’s account because they appealed
from the statement of decision in their February 9, 2022 notice of
appeal (case no. B318601) and included the statement of decision
10 The notice of appeal mistakenly cites to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1300 instead of Probate Code section 1300.
14
as an attachment. However, “a statement of decision is not
treated as appealable when a formal order or judgment does
follow.” (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 894, 901; accord, Marshall v. Webster (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 275, 280.) We therefore dismissed Williams and
Woodson’s appeal in case no. B318601 on September 13, 2022,
after Williams and Woodson failed to file a response to our July
21, 2022 order advising them of our intent to dismiss the appeal
as taken from a nonappealable order.
B. The Probate Court Did Not Violate Woodson’s Due Process
Rights or Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Woodson’s
Request for a Trial Continuance
1. Probate court proceedings
On July 13, 2021 Woodson filed an ex parte application
seeking to continue the trial and reopen discovery. Woodson
argued she had shown good cause for a continuance because she
was not served with Leestma’s supplement to the section 850
petition at least 16 court days before the July 27, 2021 trial,
citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b).
Leestma argued in opposition that he did not know Woodson was
the trustee of Certified Holding Trust despite requests for
Williams to provide this information until Williams disclosed this
in her July 7, 2021 deposition; Woodson had notice of the section
850 petition since she was served with it in August 2020;
Williams and Woodson asserted the same defenses and shared
the same attorney (and Williams and Mogan were served with
the section 850 petition); Woodson failed to identify any
additional discovery or documents she needed for trial; and Code
of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), did not apply. On
15
July 15, 2021 the probate court denied the ex parte application
without prejudice.
2. Woodson’s due process rights were not violated
On appeal, Woodson contends she was deprived of due
process because she was not served until July 11, 2021 for a trial
that occurred 12 court days later on July 27. Woodson argues
Leestma failed to serve her with the section 850 petition and
notice of hearing at least 30 days before the hearing as required
under section 851, subdivision (a). (§ 851, subd. (a) [“At least 30
days prior to the day of the hearing, the petitioner shall cause
notice of the hearing and a copy of the petition to be served . . . on
all of the following persons where applicable: [¶] (1) The
personal presentative, conservator, guardian, or trustee as
appropriate. [¶] (2) Each person claiming an interest in, or
having title to or possession of, the property.”].)11
Woodson was provided timely notice of the section 850
petition pursuant to section 851, subdivision (a). The proof of
11 Woodson also argues, as she did in the trial court, that she
was entitled to 16 court days’ notice prior to trial under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b). That
section requires that “all moving and supporting papers shall be
served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing” (plus
five days when notice is mailed). However, Probate Code section
1000, subdivision (a), specifies that the Code of Civil Procedure
rules apply “[e]xcept to the extent that [the Probate Code]
provides applicable rules.” Because Probate Code section 851,
subdivision (a), governs notice for a Probate Code section 850
petition and hearing, Code of Civil Procedure section 1005,
subdivision (b), does not apply.
16
service by mail shows the section 850 petition and notice of
hearing were served on Woodson by mail on August 14, 2020 (as
well as on Williams, Certified Holding Trust, and Mogan).
Although Woodson is correct that she was not specifically named
in the 850 petition, the petition named the “Trustee of the
Certified Holding Trust” (capitalization omitted), and stated
Leestma was “su[ing] Certified Holding Trust through
Respondent Patricia Gleason Williams or other trustee.”
Further, the petition named ROES 1 through 20 as respondents
and alleged “ROES 1-20 participated in and assisted Respondent
Patricia Gleason Williams in the wrongful takings and breaches
of fiduciary duties.”
Therefore, as of August 19, 2020 (five days after mailed
notice), Woodson was on notice that Leestma’s section 850
petition sought an order (1) voiding the April 11, 2019 grant deed;
(2) directing Williams and Certified Holding Trust and its trustee
to transfer the Hobart property to Leestma as successor
administrator; (3) declaring Williams and Certified Holding Trust
and its trustee as constructive trustees; and (4) awarding
reasonable attorneys’ fees. Further, on July 8, 2021 Leestma
served the supplement to the section 850 petition on Woodson
and Mogan by mail and email, specifically naming Woodson as a
respondent in her capacity as the trustee of Certified Holding
Trust. Woodson therefore had 11 months to prepare prior to the
July 27, 2021 trial on the section 850 petition.
3. The probate court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Woodson’s request for a trial continuance
Requests for a trial continuance are governed by
rule 3.1332 of the California Rules of Court (rule 3.1332).
17
“Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for
a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court
may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good
cause requiring the continuance.” (Rule 3.1332(c); see Qaadir v.
Figueroa (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 790, 813; Reales Investment, LLC
v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 463, 468.) Among the
circumstances the court may consider as good cause is where a
newly added party “has not had a reasonable opportunity to
conduct discovery and prepare for trial” (rule 3.1332(c)(5)(A)) or
“[a] party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony,
documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts”
(rule 3.1332(c)(6)). “The trial court must consider all relevant
facts and circumstances surrounding the continuance, including:
‘[t]he proximity of the trial date’ (rule 3.1332(d)(1)); ‘[t]he length
of the continuance requested’ (rule 3.1332(d)(3)); ‘[t]he
availability of alternative means to address the problem that
gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance’
(rule 3.1332(d)(4)); ‘[t]he prejudice that parties or witnesses will
suffer as a result of the continuance’ (rule 3.1332(d)(5)); and
‘[w]hether the interests of justice are best served by a
continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions
on the continuance’ (rule 3.1332(d)(10)).” (Qaadir, at p. 813.)
“‘The decision to grant or deny a continuance is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial
court’s exercise of that discretion will be upheld if it is based on a
reasoned judgment and complies with legal principles and
policies appropriate to the case before the court. [Citation.] A
reviewing court may not disturb the exercise of discretion by a
trial court in the absence of a clear abuse thereof appearing in
the record.’” (Reales Investment, LLC v. Johnson, supra,
18
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 468; accord, Qaadir v. Figueroa, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 814.)
Woodson contends the probate court abused its discretion
in denying her request for a trial continuance. However, she
failed to make an affirmative showing of good cause, as required
under rule 3.1332(c). In her ex parte application, she argued only
that she was “requesting a 90 day continuance so she can
propound written discovery upon James Leestma as success[o]r
administrator and also so she is able to adequately prepare for
trial especially when such inordinate damages are sought.”
Woodson failed to identify in her ex parte application (or on
appeal) what discovery she needed to propound to Leestma.
Further, as discussed, she and Williams, who were sued for the
same conduct and shared an attorney, had 11 months in which to
propound discovery and prepare for trial. In the absence of any
showing as to what Woodson still needed to do to prepare for
trial, the probate court acted well within its discretion in denying
her ex parte application for a trial continuance.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Order Requiring
Williams and Woodson To Convey the Hobart Property and
Imposing Surcharges for Bad Faith Conduct and Breach of
Fiduciary Duty
1. Standard of review
“On appeal from a judgment based on a statement of
decision after a bench trial, we review the trial court’s
conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for substantial
evidence.” (McPherson v. EF Intercultural Foundation, Inc.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 243, 257; accord, Estate of Young (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 62, 75-76.) “‘In a substantial evidence challenge
19
to a judgment, the appellate court will “consider all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving
conflicts in support of the [findings].”’” (Kao v. Joy Holiday
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 199, 206; accord, Estate of Young, at p. 76.)
“We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial
court’s credibility determinations.” (Estate of Young, at p. 76;
accord, In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 94.)
“‘“The ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of
fact could have found for the respondent based on the whole
record.”’” (McPherson, at p. 257; Estate of Young, at p. 76.)
2. Governing law
Section 850, subdivision (a)(2), authorizes the personal
representative or any interested person to file a petition for a
court order “[w]here the decedent died in possession of, or holding
title to, real or personal property, and the property or some
interest therein is claimed to belong to another” or “[w]here the
decedent died having a claim to real or personal property, title to
or possession of which is held by another.” (§ 850, subd. (a)(2)(C)
& (D).) “‘[T]he statutory scheme’s purpose is to effect a
conveyance or transfer of property belonging to a decedent or a
trust or another person under specified circumstances, to grant
any appropriate relief to carry out the decedent’s . . . intent, and
to prevent looting of . . . estates.’” (Dudek v. Dudek (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 154, 170-171; accord, Estate of Ashlock (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1073 [“Section 850 et seq. ‘provides a
mechanism for court determination of rights in property claimed
to belong to a decedent or another person.’”].)
20
Upon a showing that a transfer or conveyance should be
made, the probate court “shall make an order authorizing and
directing the personal representative or other fiduciary, or the
person having title to or possession of the property, to execute a
conveyance or transfer to the person entitled thereto, or granting
other appropriate relief.” (§ 856.) An order under section 856 “is
prima facie evidence of the correctness of the proceedings and of
the authority of the personal representative or other fiduciary or
other person to make the conveyance or transfer, and the order
vests the person obtaining the order with the right to the
possession of the property according to the terms of the order, ‘as
if the property had been conveyed or transferred in accordance
with the terms of the order.’” (Estate of Young, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 86; see § 857.)
“A petitioner may recover property under section 856 and
seek additional relief under section 859.” (Estate of Ashlock,
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073.) Section 859 provides for
double damages upon a showing of bad faith: “If a court finds
that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken . . . property
belonging to . . . the estate of a decedent, . . . the person shall be
liable for twice the value of the property recovered by an action
under this part. . . . The remedies provided in this section shall
be in addition to any other remedies available in law to a person
authorized to bring an action pursuant to this part.” Although
“section 859 is punitive in nature” (Conservatorship of Ribal
(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 519, 525), “double damages are not the
equivalent of ‘punitive damages, and the proof required for
punitive damages is not required.’” (Ibid.; accord, Hill v.
Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1287, 1291.) “The
section 859 penalty is imposed when an interested party
21
establishes both that the property in question is recoverable
under section 850 and that there was a bad faith taking of the
property.” (Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103, 112;
accord, Conservatorship of Ribal, at p. 525.)
Because section 859 does not define “bad faith,” we look to
the definition of bad faith as used in analogous statutory
provisions. For example, section 15642, subdivision (d),
authorizes an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to a
trustee where a petition to remove the trustee is filed in bad
faith. The Court of Appeal in Bruno v. Hopkins (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 801, 823 (Bruno), in affirming an attorneys’ fees
award in favor of the trustee where a trust beneficiary filed a bad
faith petition to remove the trustee, explained, “‘Bad faith
involves a subjective determination of the contesting party’s state
of mind—specifically, whether he or she acted with an improper
purpose.’” (Accord, Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219,
233-234 [applying same definition of bad faith in interpreting
section 17211, subdivision (a), which authorizes an award of
trustee compensation and litigation costs where a beneficiary
contests a trustee’s account in bad faith]; see Gemini Aluminum
Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc. (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1263 [Civil Code section 3426.4’s
authorization for recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees for a claim
of misappropriation of trade secrets made in bad faith requires
inquiry into a party’s subjective state of mind in filing the action:
“‘Did he or she believe the action was valid? What was his or her
intent or purpose in pursuing it? . . . .’ ‘“[B]ad faith” means
simply that the action or tactic is being pursued for an improper
motive.’”].) “‘“A subjective state of mind will rarely be susceptible
of direct proof; usually the trial court will be required to infer it
22
from circumstantial evidence.”’” (Bruno, at p. 823; accord,
Powell, at p. 234.)
A personal representative “is required to use ‘ordinary care
and diligence’ in managing and controlling the estate.” (Estate of
Bonaccorsi (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 462, 468; see § 9600, subd. (a)
[“The personal representative has the management and control of
the estate and, in managing and controlling the estate, shall use
ordinary care and diligence. What constitutes ordinary care and
diligence is determined by all the circumstances of the particular
estate.”].) Section 9061, subdivision (a), authorizes a probate
court to impose a surcharge on a personal representative who
causes losses to the estate by a breach of fiduciary duty. (Ring v.
Harmon (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 844, 852 [beneficiary of an estate
may recover for breach of fiduciary duty where “the
representative has entered a transaction that benefits third
parties at the expense of the estate and its beneficiaries”]; Estate
of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971, 988.) Section 9601,
subdivision (a), specifies: “If a personal representative breaches a
fiduciary duty, the personal representative is chargeable with
any of the following that is appropriate under the circumstances:
[¶] (1) Any loss or depreciation in value of the decedent’s estate
resulting from the breach of duty, with interest. [¶] (2) Any
profit made by the personal representative through the breach of
duty, with interest. [¶] (3) Any profit that would have accrued to
the decedent’s estate if the loss of profit is the result of the breach
of duty.” (Accord, Ring, at p. 852.)
23
3. Substantial evidence supports the probate court’s
order directing Williams and Woodson to transfer the
Hobart property and awarding double damages
against Williams and Woodson for bad faith conduct
and Williams’s breach of fiduciary duty
Williams and Woodson contend the probate court erred in
(1) directing them to reconvey the Hobart property; (2) imposing
double damages against Williams and Woodson under
section 859; and (3) surcharging Williams for breach of fiduciary
duty under section 9601. The court’s order was based on its
findings that Williams and Woodson acted in bad faith and
Williams breached her fiduciary duty. The court found Williams
failed to provide notice to the other heirs of her proposed action to
transfer the property; she failed to obtain prior court approval;
she failed to obtain the written consent of the other heirs; and
Woodson provided no consideration for the transfer. Further, the
court found Williams and Woodson intended to keep the Hobart
property for themselves and denied the heirs their share in the
proceeds. Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings.12
Ample evidence supports the probate court’s finding
Williams transferred the Hobart property to Certified Holding
Trust without providing any written notice to Leestma, Kenji, or
Arthur. Sections 10510 and 10511, read together, required
Williams to provide notice to the other heirs of the proposed
transfer before conveying the Hobart property to the trust.
12 We do not reach the court’s finding that Williams failed to
obtain prior court approval because we conclude the trial court’s
other findings support its determination Williams acted in bad
faith.
24
Chapter 3, article 2 of the Probate Code, titled “Powers
Exercisable Only After Giving Notice of Proposed Action,”
includes sections 10510 and 10511. Section 10511 provides that a
personal representative with full authority has the power to sell
or exchange real property of the estate. And section 10510 states
the “personal representative may exercise the powers described
in this article” (article 2) “only if the requirements of Chapter 4”
(titled “Notice of Proposed Action Procedure”) are satisfied.13 The
inclusion of section 10511—authorizing the personal
representative to sell estate property—in article 2, listing powers
exercisable “only after giving notice of proposed action”
(capitalization omitted), shows the Legislature’s intent to require
the personal representative to provide notice prior to a sale of
13 Section 10580, subdivision (a), specifies that “[a] personal
representative who has been granted authority to administer the
estate under this part shall give notice of proposed action as
provided in this chapter prior to the taking of the proposed action
without court supervision if the provision of Chapter 3
(commencing with Section 10500) giving the personal
representative the power to take the action so requires.”
Williams and Woodson in their appellants’ opening brief cite
without analysis section 10503, which is titled “Sale of Property
of Estate; Court Confirmation of Sales Not Required;
Limitations.” Although the section states “the personal
representative may sell the property either at public auction or
private sale, and with or without notice” (italics added), this
section (in article 1 containing “General Provisions”) delineates
the manner of sale of property, not whether notice of the proposed
action must be given (governed by articles 2 and 3). There may
be circumstances where notice need not be given, but this is not
one of them.
25
real property.14 By contrast, article 3 titled “Powers the Exercise
of Which Requires Giving of Notice of Proposed Action Under
Some Circumstances” does not include the sale of property,
instead including sections governing other actions such as the
power to enter into contracts. (See § 10532.)
As the California Law Revision Commission (Commission)
explained in its comment to the 1990 reenactment of
section 10511, “The power described in Section 10511 may be
exercised only if the requirements of Chapter 4 (commencing with
Section 10580) (notice of proposed action procedure) are satisfied.
See Section 10510.”15 (54 West’s Ann. Prob. Code (1991 ed.) foll.
14 We treat the transfer as a sale given Williams and
Woodson’s position that they transferred the property for
consideration and did not need to return it.
15 The Legislature first enacted section 10511 in 1987
(Stats. 1987, ch. 923, § 93), and it repealed and reenacted the
statute in 1990, with no changes (Stats. 1990, ch. 79, §§ 13-14,
operative July 1, 1991). The Commission’s 1987 comment to
section 10511 explained, “Section 10511, together with Section
10510, restate without substantive change a portion of
subdivision (a) of former Section 591.6 (powers of personal
representative) and subdivision (b)(1) of former Section 591.3
(notice of proposed action required). . . . The power described in
Section 10511 may be exercised only if the requirements of
Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 10580) (notice of proposed
action procedure) are satisfied. See Section 10510.”
(Communication from California Law Revision Commission
Concerning Assembly Bill 708, at p. 46.) The legislative history
for Assembly Bill No. 708 (Reg. Sess. 1986-1987) shows the
Legislature adopted the recommendations of the California Law
Revision Commission for various Probate Code sections,
26
§ 10511, p. 32; see Ross et. al., Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The
Rutter Group 2023) ¶¶ 9:30, 9:31 [personal representative may
sell or exchange of real property under section 10511 “only
pursuant to the statutory notice of proposed action
procedures”].)16
including section 10511. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 708 (1986-1987 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 13,
1987, p. 2 [“The bill resulted from extensive studies and
recommendations by the Law Revision Commission.”]; Assem.
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 708 (1986-1987
Reg. Sess.), as amended April 23, 1987, p. 6 [noting legislation
was sponsored by Commission].) Where the Legislature adopts a
statute “exactly as the Law Revision Commission proposed, these
comments are persuasive evidence of the Legislature’s intent.”
(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 129; accord, Gormley v.
Gonzalez (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 72, 80 [“In determining the
legislative intent of a statute, it is proper to look to comments by
the Commission, which are persuasive evidence of the intent of
the Legislature in enacting the Commission’s recommendations,
particularly where, as here, the Legislature adopted the
Commission’s recommendation without change.”].)
16 Section 10585 requires the notice of proposed action be in
writing: “(a) The notice of proposed action shall state all of the
following: [¶] (1) The name, mailing address, and electronic
address of the personal representative. [¶] (2) The name,
telephone number, and electronic address of a person who may be
contacted for additional information. [¶] (3) The action proposed
to be taken, with a reasonably specific description of the action.
If the proposed action involves the sale or exchange of real
property, or the granting of an option to purchase real property,
the notice of proposed action shall state the material terms of the
27
There also was strong evidence that Williams transferred
the Hobart property to the trust in bad faith to deprive the other
heirs of their share of the property. Williams argued at trial, as
she does on appeal, that she intended to make the transfer to
benefit the estate by securing a loan to renovate the property,
then return the improved property to the estate. But as the
probate court observed, Williams and Woodson also argued the
opposite—that there was consideration for the transfer of the
property to Williams and Woodson (payment of Kevin’s debt to
Advance Inheritance).
As to Williams and Woodson’s argument that Williams
intended to secure a loan to repair the Hobart property, then
return it to the estate, as discussed, Williams never obtained a
loan or made any improvements to the property. Further,
Williams and Woodson recorded the deed transferring the
transaction, including, if applicable, the sale price and the
amount of, or method of calculating, any commission or
compensation paid or to be paid to an agent or broker in
connection with the transaction. [¶] (4) The date on or after
which the proposed action is to be taken. [¶] (b) The notice of
proposed action may be given using the most current Notice of
Proposed Action form prescribed by the Judicial Council. [¶] (c)
If the most current form prescribed by the Judicial Council is not
used to give notice of proposed action, the notice of proposed
action shall satisfy all of the following requirements: [¶] (1) The
notice of proposed action shall be in substantially the same form
as the form prescribed by the Judicial Council. [¶] (2) The
notice of proposed action shall contain the statements described
in subdivision (a). [¶] (3) The notice of proposed action shall
contain a form for objecting to the proposed action in
substantially the form set out in the Judicial Council form.”
28
property to the Certified Holding Trust after Leestma filed the
850 petition to remove Williams as the trustee. And after
Williams was ordered to provide an accounting, on April 20, 2020
she filed her first account, which listed the Hobart property as
property of the estate with no mention that the property had
been transferred out of the estate, concealing that fact from the
heirs. Williams and Woodson argue the transfer of the Hobart
property to Certified Holding Trust was temporary, and therefore
it did not constitute bad faith. The probate court reasonably
rejected this argument, explaining, “Had it been temporary for
the obtaining of a loan (a loan that never materialized),
once . . . Williams was removed, the property should have been
returned to the estate. Instead, . . . Williams argued,
alternatively it appears, that she and Woodson should remain
owners of the property outright.”
Further, Williams testified she had yet to return the
Hobart property to the estate because she wanted to keep the
property. And Woodson testified that if Williams asked her to
transfer the Hobart property to the estate, she would not comply
“[b]ecause I feel I’m a bona fide purchaser of the property.”
Woodson’s assertion on appeal that “she held the property in a
resulting trust with the intention to transfer it back to the estate
if the heirs did not accept the $200,000 agreed to,” is belied by
her own trial testimony.
With respect to consideration, Williams admitted at trial
that the estate did not receive any consideration for the
conveyance of the Hobart property to the trust. During cross-
examination Williams was asked, “[I]n fact the estate didn’t
receive any consideration, money or otherwise, for the transfer?”
She responded, “Not to my knowledge.” Woodson claimed in her
29
testimony that the $15,000 she paid Advance Inheritance in
partial satisfaction of Kevin’s $18,000 debt (for assignment of his
interest in the estate to Advance Inheritance) constituted
consideration and made her a “bona fide purchaser of the
property.” But Kevin’s assignment was not a debt or liability of
the estate, and the estate did not directly benefit from Woodson’s
partial satisfaction of Kevin’s assignment. Further, Woodson did
not treat the $15,000 payment as consideration for the Hobart
property as shown by the fact she submitted a creditor’s claim for
the $15,000 payment, which Williams approved. In addition,
Woodson made the $15,000 payment months after the April 11,
2019 transfer of the Hobart property, which makes the payment
irrelevant as to consideration because “the adequacy of
consideration must be determined as of the date of the
agreement.” (Estate of Stevens (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 255, 266;
accord, Greif v. Sanin (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 412, 444 [“‘“[i]n
determining whether consideration was fair and adequate, all
circumstances surrounding the transfer of the property as they
existed at that time, must be considered”’”].)
Williams and Woodson’s contention that Kevin and Kenji
agreed to the transfer fares no better. Williams admitted she did
not have the written consent of Kevin, Kenji, or Arthur to
transfer the Hobart property out of the estate.17 Instead,
Williams testified she spoke with Kevin and Kenji, who “both
were aware” she would obtain a loan to make improvements to
17 Section 10582 provides that “[n]otice of proposed action
need not be given to any person who consents in writing to the
proposed action. The consent may be executed at any time before
or after the proposed action is taken.”
30
the Hobart property. Woodson testified Kevin orally consented to
the transfer of the property to the Certified Holding Trust
because he did not have the money to pay the debt he owed to
Leestma. According to Woodson, Kenji also consented to the
transfer because he did not have “money to do anything.” The
probate court rejected Williams’s and Woodson’s “self-serving
testimony,” finding neither Kevin nor Kenji had agreed to the
transfer. Other than their own testimony, which was discounted
by the probate court, Williams and Woodson on appeal cannot
point to any evidence of consent by the other heirs. To the
contrary, in Kenji’s verified response to Williams’s petition to
remove Leestma, Kenji stated he was not aware of the
conveyance and never consented to it. In addition, Arthur in his
declaration in lieu of direct testimony (Code Civ. Proc., § 98)
stated he was not aware that Williams had transferred the
Hobart property out of the estate, and he did not consent to it.
And Williams and Woodson admitted they did not discuss the
transfer with Arthur, claiming “he wanted nothing to do with the
property.”18
Accordingly, the evidence that Williams transferred the
Hobart property to Certified Holding Trust without
consideration, Williams and Woodson concealed that fact from
the heirs, and Williams and Woodson refused to return the
property to the estate fully supported the probate court’s findings
of bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty. Further, Williams and
18 Williams and Woodson also contend Leestma committed
bad faith and had unclean hands, but they fail to explain what
conduct by Leestma constituted bad faith or unclean hands.
31
Woodson acted with an improper purpose to deprive the heirs of
their share of the property. (Bruno, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 823.) And the bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty findings,
in turn, supported the probate court’s order directing Williams
and Woodson to convey the property back to the estate under
section 856, imposing double damages under section 859, and
surcharging Williams for her breach of fiduciary duty under
section 9601.
D. The Probate Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs to Leestma, Arthur, and Kenji
Williams and Woodson contend the probate court abused
its discretion in awarding Leestma, Arthur, and Kenji their
attorneys’ fees and costs under section 859 because there was no
bad faith, and further, the amounts awarded were not
reasonable. Williams and Woodson’s contentions lack merit.
1. Governing law and standard of review
Section 859 provides that a person who has “in bad faith
wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property” belonging to
the estate, except in circumstances not applicable here, “may, in
the court’s discretion, be liable for reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.” “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins
with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ‘California courts have
consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and
the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a
determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’ [Citation.]
The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community
for similar work. [Citations.] The lodestar figure may then be
32
adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in
order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services
provided. [Citation.] Such an approach anchors the trial court’s
analysis to an objective determination of the value of the
attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not
arbitrary.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084,
1095.)
“The trial court has broad authority to determine the
amount of a reasonable fee.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095; accord, Bruno, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p 818.) However, “[w]hile the amount of an
attorney fee award is left to the trial court’s sound discretion, the
entitlement to fees is a matter we review under the de novo
standard.” (Conservatorship of Ribal, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 523-524; accord, Smith v. Szeyller (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 450,
457.)
2. The probate court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Leestma his attorneys’ fees and costs
In Leestma’s posttrial closing brief, he requested attorneys’
fees and costs under sections 859.19 Leestma submitted a
19 Leestma also based his attorneys’ fees request on
section 11003, subdivision (b), which provides that if an
administrator opposes the contest of his or her accounting
“without reasonable cause and in bad faith,” the probate court
may award attorneys’ fees to the contestant. (Estate of
Bonaccorsi, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 473; see § 11003, subd. (b)
[“If the court determines that the opposition to the contest was
without reasonable cause and in bad faith, the court may award
the contestant the costs of the contestant and other expenses and
33
declaration from his attorney, John F. Eyrich, in support of his
request for attorneys’ fees and costs. Eyrich averred that when
he was retained in April 2020 his standard hourly rate was $525,
but he agreed to a discounted rate of $425 per hour. Eyrich spent
a total of 143.8 hours in connection with Leestma’s section 850
petition, Williams’s account, and Williams’s petition to remove
Leestma. Eyrich’s legal work included fact investigation, legal
research, analysis of claims and defenses, written discovery and
deposition, correspondence with Leestma, Mogan, and the
attorneys for the other heirs, court appearances, trial preparation
and trial, and preparation of posttrial briefs. From April 2020
through October 15, 2021, Leestma incurred attorneys’ fees of
$56,865 (143.8 hours at $425 per hour less a $4,250 discount) and
costs of $1,104.20 In his supplemental declaration, Eyrich stated
he expected to spend an additional 20.5 hours ($8,713 in
attorneys’ fees) to review the billing records, prepare his
declaration, and prepare further briefing. Eyrich calculated his
total attorneys’ fees were $65,578, plus $1,204 in costs. Williams
and Woodson opposed Leestma’s request for attorneys’ fees,
simply arguing he sought an “inordinate amount of legal fees.”
On February 24, 2022 the probate court ordered Williams
and Woodson to pay Leestma’s attorneys’ fees of $65,578, plus
$1,204 in costs (totaling $66,782) pursuant to section 859. In its
statement of decision, the court rejected Williams and Woodson’s
argument “that Leestma’s litigation was what drove up costs
costs of litigation, including attorney’s fees, incurred to contest
the account.”].)
20 Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar amount.
34
unnecessarily.” Rather, the court found Leestma properly
performed his duties as administrator by marshalling the estate’s
assets.
Williams and Woodson contend the probate court abused
its discretion in awarding Leestma his attorneys’ fees and costs
under section 859 because they did not act in bad faith. As
discussed, substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that
Williams and Woodson acted in bad faith by transferring the
Hobart property to Certified Holding Trust without consideration
and without first providing written notice to the other heirs.21
Williams and Woodson also argue the probate court erred
because it did not use the lodestar method to calculate the
attorneys’ fees awarded to Leestma. Although the probate court
did not expressly state it was applying the lodestar method in
determining reasonable attorneys’ fees, “there is no general rule
requiring trial courts to explain their decisions on motions
seeking attorney fees. In cases where the award corresponds to
either the lodestar amount, some multiple of that amount, or
some fraction requested by one of the parties, the court’s
rationale for its award may be apparent on the face of the record,
without express acknowledgment by the court of the lodestar
21 Williams and Woodson also argue Leestma should not have
been awarded attorneys’ fees and costs for pursuing a quiet title
action because each party to a quiet title action should pay his or
her own fees and costs. But, as discussed, the probate court
awarded Leestma his attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to
section 859, which provides for such an award based on bad faith
conduct. The fact the bad faith involved a transfer of property
does not affect the legal basis for the probate court’s award of
attorneys’ fees and costs.
35
amount or method.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101; see Gunther v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 361-362.) This is such a case.
The probate court’s award of Leestma’s attorneys’ fees and
costs was supported by Eyrich’s detailed declarations and billing
statement. Williams and Woodson do not contend Eyrich’s
discounted rate of $425 is higher than the hourly rates charged
by other attorneys for similar work. Nor do they identify any
specific charges that are objectionable. Williams and Woodson
have therefore failed to show the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to Leestma
under section 859.
3. The probate court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Arthur and Kenji their attorneys’ fees and
costs
a. Arthur’s attorneys’ fees and costs
On March 26, 2019 Arthur filed a petition to determine his
entitlement to distribution of a share of Carole’s estate after
Williams refused to acknowledge his right to inherit as Paschell’s
intestate heir. On June 26, 2019 Williams filed objections to
Arthur’s petition, claiming Paschall had gifted her estate to
Williams. On July 22, 2021, at the final status conference for the
July 27 trial, Williams withdrew her objections, and the probate
court found Arthur had submitted sufficient evidence to support
his petition. The court granted the petition, finding Arthur was
entitled to inherit Paschell’s share of Carole’s estate.
On October 14, 2021 Arthur filed a brief on surcharge of
legal fees against Williams under section 9601 for her breach of
fiduciary duty. Arthur argued that had Williams not made
36
meritless objections to his petition to determine entitlement, the
probate court would have approved his petition without objection,
and he would have incurred only $3,863 in attorneys’ fees and
$557 in costs. But because Arthur had to respond to Williams’s
objections and participate in the protracted litigation that
resulted from Williams’s breach of fiduciary duty and bad faith in
converting the Hobart property, Arthur incurred an additional
$16,913 in attorneys’ fees and $329 in costs. Arthur attached two
billing statements from his attorney, Sandra B. DeMeo: a
statement for $4,420 reflecting attorneys’ fees and costs from
March 25 to June 5, 2019 for filing Arthur’s petition; and a
second statement for $17,242 showing attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred from July 19, 2019 to October 13, 2021 for services
rendered after the petition was filed. The second billing
statement reflected DeMeo’s billing rate at $450 per hour.
DeMeo spent a total of 37.58 hours, which included her review of
probate notes, trial transcript, and trial documents; preparation
of Arthur’s response, declaration, and brief on surcharge;
communications with Arthur, Leestma, and Mogan; and
appearances at court hearings.22
b. Kenji’s attorneys’ fees and costs
On October 15, 2021 Kenji filed a brief requesting the
probate court surcharge Williams for Kenji’s attorneys’ fees of
$7,140 and costs of $357 (for a total of $7,497). Kenji argued that
under section 9601, the court should surcharge Williams for her
22 Williams and Woodson opposed Arthur’s request for
attorneys’ fees, but their brief is not included in the record on
appeal.
37
bad faith conduct and breach of fiduciary duty based on her
failure to provide notice to Kenji before transferring the Hobart
property. Kenji asserted “he was forced to employ counsel in this
matter to protect his beneficial interest” in the estate. Kenji
attached a billing statement from his attorney, William J. Smyth,
showing Smyth’s billing rate was $300 per hour and he spent a
total of 23.8 hours on the case for document review, court
appearances, review of a settlement offer, drafting briefs, trial
preparation, and appearance at trial. Williams and Woodson
opposed Kenji’s request for attorneys’ fees, arguing Williams did
not act in bad faith and the fees were excessive.
c. The probate court did not abuse its discretion
On February 24, 2022 the probate court ordered Williams
and Woodson to pay Arthur’s attorneys’ fees and costs of $17,242
and Kenji’s attorneys’ fees and costs of $7,497. In its statement
of decision, the court found as to Arthur, “Filing and continuing
the objections to Arthur Gleason’s petition were done in bad faith
and constitute a breach of her fiduciary duties. It is in bad faith,
as [Williams and Woodson] provide no reasonable or justifiable
basis in law or fact to have objected to the petition or to have
continued to object up to the eve of trial. Doing so caused the
expenditure of monetary resources by Arthur Gleason to protect
his interest. Had Arthur Gleason’s petition been approved
without objection, the attorney fees and costs associated with his
petition would have been significantly less (fees of $3,862.50 and
costs of $557). Instead, due to Gleason Williams’[s] objections
and the continued posture of objections virtually up to trial,
Arthur Gleason’s attorney fees were, by necessity, increased to
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$16,912.50, and his costs were $329, totaling $17,241.50. These
costs and fees are just and reasonable.”
The probate court found as to Kenji, “Due to Gleason
Williams’[s] failure to market and sell the property as was her
duty as successor administrator, Kenji Gleason was compelled to
hire counsel to protect his beneficial interest in the estate. Kenji
Gleason incurred $7,140 in attorney fees and $356.89 in costs.
These fees and costs totaling $7,496.89 are just and reasonable.”
The court rejected Williams and Woodson’s argument that Kenji’s
“fees were excessive and unsupported.”
The court further explained, “[P]ursuant to Probate Code
sections 859 and 9601, it is equitable to surcharge [Williams and
Woodson] for the attorney fees and costs of Arthur Gleason and
Kenji Gleason, who by the necessity of [Williams’s and
Woodson’s] bad faith actions, were required to engage legal
counsel in this matter. [Williams and Woodson], by taking and
holding the property away from a portion of its rightful heirs,
Arthur and Kenji Gleason, caused a loss in the value of the estate
in that it was not distributed to the heirs timely. In addition, as
[Williams and Woodson] have kept the property by way of their
transfer of it into the Certified Holding Trust, they have profited
from it in that they have effectively and wrongly held ownership
of it since 2019. Thus, imposing attorney fees and costs is
equitable and just and in concert with Probate Code sections 859
and 9601.”23
23 Because the probate court had discretion to award Arthur
and Kenji their attorneys’ fees and costs under section 859, we do
not reach whether section 9601 authorized the court to surcharge
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Williams and Woodson contend, as they do with respect to
Leestma, that the probate court erred because it failed to use the
lodestar method to calculate the award of attorneys’ fees to
Arthur and Kenji.24 As discussed, however, courts are not
required to explain their reasoning in awarding attorneys’ fees.
(Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 361-362; Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v.
Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 264; Gorman v. Tassajara
Development Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.)
The award of attorneys’ fees and costs to Arthur is
supported by his attorney’s billing statement. The billing
statement showed DeMeo’s hourly rate was $450, and she spent a
total of 37.58 hours providing legal services to Arthur. On
appeal, Williams and Woodson assert DeMeo’s billing statement
Williams for Arthur’s and Kenji’s attorneys’ fees and costs.
Although Arthur and Kenji did not cite section 859 in their briefs
in the probate court, they argued they were entitled to their
attorneys’ fees and costs for Williams’s bad faith.
24 Williams and Woodson do not contend the probate court
lacked authority to surcharge them for Arthur’s and Kenji’s
attorneys’ fees and costs under section 859, instead arguing
Williams did not act in bad faith. In their reply brief, Williams
and Woodson contend Leestma lacks standing to respond to their
argument that the probate court abused its discretion in granting
attorneys’ fees and costs to Arthur and Kenji. However, Williams
and Woodson bear “the ‘affirmative burden to show error whether
or not the respondent’s brief has been filed,’ and we ‘examine the
record and reverse only if prejudicial error is found.’” (Smith v.
Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078; accord, Sanchez v.
County of San Bernardino (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 516, 529.)
There was no error.
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is “ambiguous,” but they do not challenge her hourly rate or point
to any specific charges lacking detail. And, as discussed, DeMeo’s
billing statement contained specific information on the tasks she
performed for Arthur, including the documents she prepared,
court appearances, telephone calls, and email communications.
Williams and Woodson complain DeMeo failed to provide more
detailed descriptions of her emails and telephone calls, but the
probate court could reasonably infer the emails and telephone
calls related to Arthur’s petition to determine entitlement and
Leestma’s section 850 petition.
Williams and Woodson further contend Williams did not
act in bad faith because, as she testified at trial, she initially
objected to Arthur’s petition because he had stated he did not
“‘want to have anything to [do] with the house.’” However,
Williams and Woodson fail to explain how this purported
comment by Arthur caused him to lose his entitlement to inherit
his share of the estate as the sole heir to Paschell. Nor do they
explain why Williams withdrew her objection at the eleventh
hour before trial.
Williams and Woodson also argue Arthur should not have
recovered for DeMeo’s attorneys’ fees rendered to Paschell for
Paschell’s role as administrator from March 2018 to March 2019
and fees incurred by Paschell to evict Kevin from the Hobart
property. But the probate court’s award of attorneys’ fees and
costs were for legal services provided to Arthur, not Paschell,
starting on March 25, 2019. Williams and Woodson’s argument
that Arthur was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs
under section 10811 because he did not serve as the
administrator of the estate is likewise not persuasive because the
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probate court awarded fees for Williams and Woodson’s bad faith
conduct pursuant to section 859, not under section 10811.25
The award of attorneys’ fees and costs to Kenji is likewise
supported by his attorney’s billing statement. The billing
statement shows Smyth’s hourly rate was $300, and he spent a
total of 23.8 hours rendering legal services to Kenji. On appeal,
Williams and Woodson do not object to Smyth’s hourly rate or the
billing statement, arguing only that Kenji’s fees were inflated
because his attorney did not participate at trial. However, they
fail to cite a specific charge they contend is excessive.
E. Williams and Woodson’s Objections to the Statement of
Decision Are Meritless
Williams and Woodson contend the probate court’s findings
in its statement of decision were ambiguous and failed to resolve
material disputed facts. For many of the purported errors, the
probate court adequately disclosed its rulings on the material
issues and was not required to address every evidentiary fact on
which it relied. As to others, substantial evidence supports the
probate court’s findings. There was no error.
“‘“The substantial evidence standard applies to both
express and implied findings of fact made by the superior court in
its statement of decision rendered after a nonjury trial.”’” (Gomez
v. Smith (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1027; accord, In re Marriage
of Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.) “A party may avoid
25 Section 10811, subdivision (a), provides for the recovery by
the personal representative of reasonable compensation for
“extraordinary services” performed by the attorney on behalf of
the estate.
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implied findings in favor of a judgment, and preserve perceived
error in a statement of decision, by making specific objections to
the statement of decision. Code of Civil Procedure sections 632
and 634 prescribe a two-step process for doing so. ‘[F]irst, a party
must request a statement of decision as to specific issues . . . ;
second, if the court issues such a statement, a party claiming
deficiencies therein must bring such defects to the trial court’s
attention to avoid implied findings on appeal favorable to the
judgment.’” (In re Marriage of Ciprari, at p. 94; accord, Cameron
v. Las Orchidias Properties, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, 501
[“‘[I]f the statement of decision does not resolve a controverted
issue or is ambiguous, and the omission or ambiguity was
brought to the attention of the trial court, “it shall not be inferred
on appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of the
prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue.’”].)
“Even where proper procedure under [Code of Civil
Procedure] sections 632 and 634 has been followed punctiliously,
‘[t]he trial court is not required to respond point by point to the
issues posed in a request for statement of decision. The court’s
statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s
determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the
case.’ [Citations.] ‘When this rule is applied, the term “ultimate
fact” generally refers to a core fact, such as an essential element
of a claim.’ [Citation.] ‘Ultimate facts are distinguished from
evidentiary facts and from legal conclusions.’ [Citation.] Thus, a
court is not expected to make findings with regard to ‘detailed
evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual
items of evidence.’” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 970, 983; accord, Eyford v. Nord (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 112, 127 [“‘[A] statement of decision need not
43
address all the legal and factual issues raised by the parties.’”].)
If a “‘statement of decision sets forth the factual and legal basis
for the decision, any conflict in the evidence or reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support
of the determination of the trial court decision.’” (Lincoln v.
Lopez (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 922, 928; accord, Gateway Bank
F.S.B. v. Metaxas (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 71, 94-95.)
On appeal, Williams and Woodson raise the same
objections to the statement of decision they made in the probate
court. To the extent Williams and Woodson challenge the court’s
findings on material issues of fact, the findings are supported by
substantial evidence. They contest the court’s finding that the
Hobart property was valued at $350,000, ignoring evidence in the
record that the valuation was made by the probate referee.
Contrary to their contention the probate court erred in finding no
consideration for the transfer of the Hobart property (relying on
Woodson’s $15,000 payment to Advance Inheritance), as
discussed, Woodson’s partial satisfaction of Kevin’s assignment
was made months after the transfer and did not benefit the
estate. Williams and Woodson’s argument that the court failed to
address why neither was a bona fide purchaser also fails.
Neither Williams nor Woodson satisfied the elements of a bona
fide purchaser, which require “payment of value, in good faith,
and without actual or constructive notice of another’s rights.”
(Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
513, 521; accord, Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251.) As discussed, substantial evidence
supports the court’s findings that the transfer of the Hobart
property was made in bad faith without consideration or written
notice to the other heirs.
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Williams and Woodson also challenge the probate court’s
finding that Woodson received proper notice of Leestma’s
section 850 petition. But as discussed, the proof of service shows
the petition was served on Woodson by mail on August 14, 2020.
Williams and Woodson’s contention the court failed to address
why they were surcharged for Arthur’s and Kenji’s attorneys’ fees
and costs or the reasonableness of the fees also lacks merit. As
the court found, Williams acted in bad faith, supporting an award
of attorneys’ fees and costs under section 859.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Leestma, as successor administrator,
shall recover his costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
MARTINEZ, J.
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