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Conservatorship of M.C. CA2/3 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 11/22/23 Conservatorship of M.C. CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    Conservatorship of the Person of                          B327027
    M.C.
    Los Angeles County
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                        Super. Ct. No. ZE042938
    OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
    GUARDIAN, as Conservator, etc.,
    Petitioner and Respondent,
    v.
    M.C.,
    Objector and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County. Ronald Owen Kaye, Judge. Affirmed.
    Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court
    of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
    Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
    Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J.
    Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________
    M.C. was charged with murder and declared incompetent
    to stand trial. The Los Angeles County Office of the Public
    Guardian (the Public Guardian) petitioned for appointment
    as a Murphy conservator. At trial on the petition, the Public
    Guardian presented evidence that M.C. suffers from delusions,
    some of which involve violence against others. The jury
    found M.C. presents a substantial danger to others by
    reason of a mental disorder, and the court imposed a Murphy
    conservatorship. On appeal, M.C. argues the jury’s verdict
    is not supported by substantial evidence, the court erroneously
    admitted his testimony from a prior trial, and the court should
    have declared a mistrial. We reject M.C.’s arguments and affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1.     The murder charges
    In December 2016, M.C. allegedly killed a man by
    repeatedly stabbing him in the chest with a pair of scissors.
    M.C. was 65 years old at the time. The People charged M.C.
    with murder, but a court found he was incompetent to stand trial.
    M.C. was admitted to Patton State Hospital (Patton), and a court
    issued an order for involuntary medication.
    2.     The Murphy conservatorship
    In August 2018, the Public Guardian filed a petition
    for appointment as a Murphy conservator. A Murphy
    conservatorship is a type of civil commitment for gravely
    disabled individuals who are incompetent to stand trial on
    charges involving death or great bodily harm. (Welf. & Inst.
    Code, § 5361, subd. (a); see Conservatorship of A.A. (2022)
    2
    
    84 Cal.App.5th 66
    , 68.)1 After a bench trial, the court found M.C.
    met the criteria for a Murphy conservatorship and appointed
    the Public Guardian as his conservator for a one-year term.
    About a month before the end of the conservatorship,
    the Public Guardian filed a petition for re-appointment. At
    M.C.’s request, the case was tried to a jury in December 2021.
    M.C. testified on his own behalf. The jury found M.C. qualified
    for a Murphy conservatorship, and the court reappointed the
    Public Guardian as his conservator.
    3.     The present trial
    The Public Guardian filed another request for
    reappointment, and the case was tried to a jury in 2022. At
    the trial, the parties stipulated that M.C. had a pending charge
    for violating Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a), a court
    found probable cause for the charge, and M.C. was found
    mentally incompetent to stand trial in that case. The only issue
    for the jury to decide was whether M.C. represents a substantial
    danger of physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease,
    defect, or disorder.
    a.    M.C.’s prior testimony
    Over M.C.’s objection, the court allowed the Public
    Guardian to introduce into evidence portions of M.C.’s testimony
    from the December 2021 jury trial. The testimony included
    M.C.’s account of the incident that led to the murder charge.
    M.C. testified he was sleeping under a bridge when the
    victim struck him in the head five times with “steel nunchuks.”
    The victim said he would be back to kill M.C. because he “ ‘hate[s]
    Mexicans.’ ” M.C. grabbed a pair of sewing scissors to protect
    1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
    and Institutions Code.
    3
    himself. The victim tried to punch M.C., but M.C. blocked the
    punch and stabbed the victim.
    According to M.C., at that point, an “eight-foot tall tornado
    came in like Star Trek in the T.V.” From the “whirlwind,” a man
    named Hector stepped out of colored vapors and accused the
    victim of stealing his money. Hector took out a knife and stabbed
    the victim 12 or 13 times, but it did not kill him. M.C. said
    the victim “was in perfect health,” not injured at all, and now
    runs a liquor store in Atwater Village.
    M.C. testified that he had been hospitalized four times
    in the past. He also claimed he had been wrongly convicted of
    assault with a deadly weapon for breaking a man’s hand with
    a tree branch. M.C. seemed to believe the People accused him
    of harming the victim using a photograph of the tree branch,
    rather than the branch itself.
    b.     M.C.’s treating psychiatrist
    The Public Guardian presented testimony from M.C.’s
    treating psychiatrist at Patton, Jasdeep Aulakh. According
    to Aulakh, M.C. had been diagnosed with schizoaffective
    disorder, bipolar type. His symptoms include disorganized
    thought processes, manic episodes, “odd, bizarre, kind of
    grandiose delusions, and persecutory thoughts.” Among other
    delusions, M.C. claimed to be a multi-star general in the military,
    a law professor, and the owner of a baseball team.
    Aulakh prescribed M.C. an atypical anti-psychotic
    medication at twice the maximum dosage that would be
    administered in an outpatient setting. Despite the medication,
    M.C. continued to suffer delusions and his mental health had
    not improved.
    Aulakh testified that M.C. initially refused to allow staff
    to draw his blood to monitor his health and confirm he was
    taking his medication. After the hospital obtained a court order
    4
    allowing staff to do so, M.C. agreed to give one vial of blood
    at a time, which was significantly less than Aulakh needed.
    Nevertheless, Aulakh did not press the issue because he did not
    want a confrontation with M.C., which he feared could place
    hospital staff in danger.
    Aulakh reported that M.C. had recently fallen after a chair
    he was sitting in collapsed. For a “brief period of time” after the
    fall, M.C. used a walker and wheelchair. Since then, he had been
    walking “really well with a stable gait.” Aulakh described M.C.
    as “quite able-bodied” and considered him a physical threat.
    Nevertheless, Patton staff designated M.C. a “fall risk” and
    placed him in the hospital’s “frail unit.”
    According to Aulakh, M.C. had not had any physical
    altercations with other patients or staff at Patton. Aulakh
    explained that, because M.C. is physically imposing, the staff
    tried to avoid confrontations with him. Also, the staff who cared
    for him were trained to minimize the risks of confrontations
    with patients.
    Aulakh opined it is “[h]ighly unlikely” that M.C. would
    comply with a medicine regiment outside the structured
    environment of Patton. He explained that M.C. claims he
    does not suffer from schizoaffective disorder and believes he
    does not need medication.
    c.    The Public Guardian’s expert
    In addition to M.C.’s treating physician, the Public
    Guardian presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Gordon
    Plotkin. Plotkin interviewed M.C. five times and performed
    a psychiatric evaluation of him. Plotkin agreed with M.C.’s
    treating physician that M.C. suffers from schizoaffective disorder,
    bipolar type.
    Plotkin testified that M.C.’s symptoms include
    hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking, and
    5
    disorganized speech. Among other delusions, M.C. claimed
    he is the highest-ranking official in the military, a prosecutor
    in Monte Carlo, and a supreme court justice. He said he has
    authority to have people executed and the governor might ask
    him to murder someone. M.C. believed he would be shielded
    legally because of his military work.
    Plotkin explained that schizoaffective disorder is a lifelong
    condition that cannot be cured, but it can be managed with
    anti-psychotic and mood stabilizing medications. The keys to
    managing M.C.’s condition are medication compliance and insight
    into mental illness. M.C. had no insight whatsoever into his
    symptoms and illness, despite having been hospitalized many
    times. M.C. told Plotkin he would stop taking his medication
    if given the choice because he would be better off without it.
    Plotkin opined that M.C. presents a substantial danger
    of physical harm to others due to his mental illness. In support,
    he pointed to the fact that M.C. experiences delusions that
    drive him to commit violent acts.
    Plotkin acknowledged that M.C. had not had any recent
    violent incidents, had been compliant with his medication, and
    was considered a “fall risk.” Plotkin explained those facts did
    not change his opinion concerning M.C.’s dangerousness because
    they were “environment dependent.” Plotkin noted that, since
    2019, M.C. had been living in a high-security facility where
    he was closely supervised by forensically trained staff. He
    also noted that M.C. was considered a fall risk during a time
    he was “over-medicated.”
    4.     Verdict and appeal
    After deliberating for less than an hour, the jury found
    M.C. represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others
    by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. It also found
    6
    M.C. qualifies for a Murphy conservatorship. M.C. timely
    appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    1.     Relevant law and standard of review
    “The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,
    § 5000 et seq. . . .) authorizes the creation of renewable one-year
    conservatorships for persons who are gravely disabled as a result
    of a mental disorder.” (People v. Quiroz (2016) 
    244 Cal.App.4th 1371
    , 1375–1376.) As relevant to this case, a person is “gravely
    disabled” if (1) the person has a pending felony case involving
    death or great bodily harm to another; (2) there has been
    a finding of probable cause at a preliminary examination;
    (3) as a result of a mental-health disorder, the person is unable
    to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
    against him and to assist counsel in his defense; and (4) the
    person represents a substantial danger of physical harm
    to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder.
    (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(i)–(iv).) A conservatorship imposed
    under this definition of “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” is commonly referred
    to as a “ ‘ “Murphy conservatorship.” ’ ” (Quiroz, at p. 1376.)
    A Murphy conservatorship automatically terminates
    after one year. (§ 5361, subd. (a).) If the conservator determines
    the conservatorship is still required beyond that period, the
    conservator may petition the superior court for reappointment
    for an additional one-year period. (Id., subd. (b).)
    A court may impose a Murphy conservatorship over a
    person only if the petitioner proves, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    the person is gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of Murphy
    (1982) 
    134 Cal.App.3d 15
    , 17–18 (Murphy).)
    2.     Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict
    M.C. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
    the jury’s verdict.
    7
    We review a jury’s verdict in a Murphy conservatorship
    case for substantial evidence. (Murphy, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d
    at p. 18.) Under this familiar standard, we review the entire
    record in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
    whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence
    that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
    reasonable trier of fact could find all the elements of a Murphy
    conservatorship beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.
    Clements (2022) 
    75 Cal.App.5th 276
    , 298.) In so doing, we
    presume in support of the verdict the existence of every fact
    the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v.
    Nieber (2022) 
    82 Cal.App.5th 458
    , 476; People v. Owens (2022)
    
    78 Cal.App.5th 1015
    , 1022.) Substantial evidence includes
    circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
    from that evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 1
    , 57;
    Nieber, at p. 476.)
    We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and questions
    of credibility in favor of the verdict. (People v. Brady (2018)
    
    22 Cal.App.5th 1008
    , 1014, quoting People v. Cardenas (2015)
    
    239 Cal.App.4th 220
    , 226–227.) We cannot reweigh the evidence
    or reassess witness credibility on our own. (People v. Young
    (2005) 
    34 Cal.4th 1149
    , 1181 [resolution of conflicts and
    inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of
    the trier of fact].)
    Here, the parties stipulated to three of the four elements
    required for a Murphy conservatorship: (1) M.C. had a pending
    murder case; (2) there had been a finding of probable cause at
    a preliminary hearing in that case; and (3) M.C. was incompetent
    to stand trial as a result of a mental-health disorder. Therefore,
    the only issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports
    the jury’s finding on the fourth element: that M.C. represented
    a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of a
    8
    mental disorder. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv).) We conclude
    it does.
    The record contains ample evidence that M.C. has a severe
    mental disorder. M.C.’s treating psychiatrist testified that he
    suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which causes
    him to experience frequent delusions, some of which are violent
    in nature. For example, M.C. claimed he is the highest-ranking
    officer in the military with the authority to have people executed.
    He also claimed the governor might ask him to commit homicide,
    for which he would have legal immunity because of his position
    in the military.
    The record also contains evidence that M.C.’s mental
    disorder has led him to commit actual violence. The jury heard
    M.C.’s testimony from the 2021 trial, in which he admitted
    stabbing a man with a pair of scissors. Although portions of
    M.C.’s testimony seemed plausible, he also recounted facts that
    were plainly delusions. For example, he claimed the victim was
    armed with “steel nunchuks,” an “eight-foot tall tornado came
    in like Star Trek,” and a man named Hector appeared in the
    “whirlwind.” M.C. also was adamant that, despite being stabbed
    more than a dozen times, the victim suffered no visible injuries
    and was in “perfect health.” Given these incredible claims,
    the jury reasonably could have found M.C.’s decision to stab
    the victim was connected to his mental disorder.
    The jury also reasonably could have concluded there is
    a substantial danger M.C. will commit similar acts of violence
    in the future. The Public Guardian’s expert testified that
    schizoaffective disorder is a lifelong condition that cannot be
    cured. Consistent with that characterization, M.C.’s psychiatrist
    reported his condition had not improved and he continued to
    experience delusions, despite being heavily medicated and
    receiving intensive treatment. Moreover, according to the expert,
    9
    the keys to managing M.C.’s disorder are medication compliance
    and insight into the disorder. The record indicates M.C. lacked
    both, as he repeatedly denied being mentally ill and claimed
    he would stop taking his medication if given the option. On
    this record, the jury reasonably could have found M.C. poses
    a substantial danger of physical harm to others on account of
    a mental disorder.
    M.C. contends the jury’s finding was unreasonable in
    light of evidence that he is elderly and physically infirm. He
    points out he was 71 years old at the time of trial, the hospital
    staff considered him to be a “fall risk,” he resided in the hospital’s
    “frail unit,” and he had been reliant on a walker and wheelchair.
    Contrary to M.C.’s contentions, none of this evidence
    precludes a finding that he was dangerous at the time of trial.
    Although M.C. was 71 years old, he also was relatively elderly—
    65 years old—when he reportedly stabbed a man with scissors.
    The record also indicates M.C.’s physical infirmities were
    transitory. The Public Guardian’s expert suggested M.C.
    was considered a fall risk due to the side effects from being
    over-medicated. Given M.C. claimed he wanted to stop taking
    his medication, the jury reasonably could have found those
    side effects would not limit him in the future.
    Similarly, M.C.’s reliance on a wheelchair and walker
    seems to have been intermittent, and it does not appear he
    used either during trial. In fact, M.C.’s treating physician
    described him as “quite able-bodied,” such that the physician
    felt threatened by him. The jurors were able to observe
    M.C. throughout the trial, so they could have evaluated the
    reasonableness of the physician’s fear. The jurors were in a
    better position than we are to evaluate M.C.’s physical condition
    at the time of trial, and we decline to second guess them on
    appeal.
    10
    3.      The court did not err by admitting M.C.’s prior
    testimony
    Before trial, M.C. moved to preclude the prosecutor
    from entering into evidence his testimony from the 2021 trial.
    M.C. argued admission of the testimony violated his right to
    due process because it could be used against him in a future
    criminal proceeding. He also argued the testimony was
    inadmissible hearsay, he was incompetent at the time he gave
    it, the testimony lacked reliability, and he did not understand
    the nature of the oath he was under. Alternatively, he sought
    to exclude the testimony under Evidence Code section 352,
    arguing its prejudicial nature far outweighed its probative value.
    The court overruled M.C.’s objections and admitted the
    testimony as party admissions. The court found the testimony
    was “profoundly probative” on key issues in the case: whether
    M.C. suffers from a mental disorder and whether he is
    dangerous. The court noted that whether M.C. understood
    the nature of the oath went to the weight of the evidence,
    not its admissibility.
    M.C. argues the trial court erred, raising many of the same
    issues on appeal. First, he contends his prior testimony was
    inadmissible because there is no indication he was competent
    to testify or understood the nature of the oath he was given.
    We are not persuaded.
    At the outset, M.C.’s arguments concern the admissibility
    of the testimony at the 2021 trial, and the proper time to raise
    them was at that trial. Instead, M.C. effectively waived the
    issues by voluntarily testifying on his own behalf. At the 2022
    trial, the Public Guardian sought to admit the prior testimony
    as party admissions, which do not require the declarant be
    competent nor under oath. (See Evid. Code, § 1220.) Therefore,
    whether M.C. was competent to testify or understood the nature
    11
    of the oath in 2021 is irrelevant to the admissibility of the
    statements in 2022.
    Even if M.C.’s competency in 2021 were relevant in 2022,
    he has not shown his prior testimony was inadmissible on
    that basis. M.C. seems to believe the fact he was incompetent
    to stand trial means he was incompetent to testify. However,
    the competency requirements to stand trial and the requirements
    to testify are distinct. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial
    if, “as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental
    disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature
    of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of
    a defense in a rational manner.” (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)
    In contrast, a witness is incompetent to testify if he or she is
    “(1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning
    the matter so as to be understood . . . ; or (2) Incapable of
    understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” (Evid.
    Code, § 701, subd. (a).)
    Here, despite being incompetent to stand trial, M.C. plainly
    was capable of expressing himself at the 2021 trial. Moreover,
    although his testimony was bizarre and improbable, it appears
    he believed he was testifying truthfully. M.C. points to nothing
    in the record indicating his delusional thinking rendered him
    incapable of understanding his obligation to tell the truth.
    Accordingly, he has not met his burden to show he was
    incompetent to testify. (See People v. Avila (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 491
    ,
    589 [the party challenging a witness has the burden to prove
    incompetence].)
    M.C. briefly argues his prior testimony should be treated
    like statements made to experts during an examination to
    determine competency, which are not admissible in a subsequent
    trial on guilt or sanity. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.130(d)(3).)
    We disagree. Our Supreme Court has explained the immunity
    12
    rule for statements made during competency examinations is
    necessary because it protects the accused’s privilege against self-
    incrimination and promotes accuracy in psychiatric evaluations,
    which furthers the public policy of not criminally trying persons
    who are mentally incompetent. (People v. Weaver (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 876
    , 960.) Those concerns are not present here: M.C.
    voluntarily testified on his own behalf at the 2021 trial, he
    did not give the testimony as part of a psychiatric evaluation,
    and the 2022 trial was a civil proceeding, not a criminal one.
    We decline to extend the immunity rule to these circumstances.
    Next, M.C. argues his prior testimony was “fundamentally
    unreliable” because it expressed delusional thinking. Relatedly,
    he argues the Public Guardian improperly used the testimony
    both to prove the truth of the matters asserted—that he stabbed
    a man—and also that he suffers from delusions. We agree with
    the trial court that these issues go to the weight of the testimony,
    not its admissibility. Moreover, there is nothing improper about
    the Public Guardian using the testimony for multiple purposes.
    (See, e.g., People v. Clark (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 522
    , 593 [rejecting
    a defendant’s argument that a trial court erred by admitting
    evidence for both hearsay and nonhearsay purposes].) The jury
    was capable of analyzing M.C.’s statements to determine which
    were true and which reflected delusional thinking.
    M.C. alternatively argues the court should have excluded
    the testimony under Evidence Code section 352 because its
    probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability
    of undue prejudice. We review a trial court’s decision to admit
    evidence over an Evidence Code section 352 objection for abuse
    of discretion. (People v. Rocha (2013) 
    221 Cal.App.4th 1385
    ,
    1397.)
    Contrary to M.C.’s suggestions, his prior testimony had
    substantial probative value. The Public Guardian’s expert
    13
    testified that M.C. suffers from schizoaffective disorder, which
    is a condition that causes delusional thinking. The expert
    explained that, although rare, some people experience delusions
    that lead them to commit acts of violence. M.C.’s prior testimony
    —in which he recounted stabbing a man with scissors under
    bizarre and improbable circumstances—indicates he suffers from
    such delusions. Accordingly, it is highly relevant to key issues
    before the jury: whether M.C. suffers from a mental disorder
    that makes him dangerous to others.
    M.C. contends the incident was too remote in time to be
    relevant on the issue of his current dangerousness. We disagree.
    The Public Guardian’s expert testified that schizoaffective
    disorder is a lifelong condition that can be managed, but not
    cured. There is ample evidence that, in the years following
    the stabbing incident, M.C. had not been able to manage the
    disorder effectively. Indeed, despite receiving extensive care and
    medication, he continued to experience delusions, some of which
    involved violence towards others. Under these circumstances,
    evidence that M.C.’s delusional thinking was connected to
    extreme violence in the relatively recent past is highly probative
    of whether he is likely to commit similar acts of violence in
    the present and future.
    We also reject M.C.’s suggestion that the evidence was
    unduly prejudicial. Even without M.C.’s testimony, the jury
    would have learned he had been charged with murder and
    suffers from delusional thinking. Although bizarre, M.C.’s
    account of the incident was not particularly graphic. Nor did he
    reveal any information that might have turned the jury against
    him. Weighed against the evidence’s significant probative value
    on key issues, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining
    to exclude the testimony under Evidence Code section 352.
    14
    4.     The court did not err by denying M.C.’s requests
    for a mistrial
    M.C. argues the trial court erred by refusing to declare
    a mistrial in response to improper testimony and argument. He
    identifies three instances in which the trial was “infected” by
    references to extraneous and prejudicial matters. We consider
    each in turn.
    a.    Standard of review
    “ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of
    prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.
    [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial
    is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is
    vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.
    [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial should be granted
    when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair trial have been
    irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2010) 
    49 Cal.4th 175
    , 198–199.)
    Generally, we review the denial of a mistrial motion for
    an abuse of discretion. (People v. Garcia (2022) 
    83 Cal.App.5th 240
    , 248.) However, we apply a de novo standard where the
    appellant’s constitutional rights are implicated. (Ibid.)
    b.    Aulakh’s testimony
    At trial, M.C. requested the court instruct the jury not
    to consider the possibility that he could be released into the
    community. In support, M.C. cited People v. Mendez (2018)
    
    21 Cal.App.5th 654
     (Mendez). The court declined to give M.C.’s
    proposed instruction, but it agreed the jury could not consider
    his possible placement.
    During direct examination, the Public Guardian asked
    Aulakh—M.C.’s treating psychiatrist—what must happen before
    M.C. can transition to a lower level of care. Aulakh responded
    that M.C. would need to show insight into his disorder, seek
    15
    treatment on his own, and work collaboratively with his
    treatment team. The doctor continued: “[M.C.’s] on a very
    structured specialized unit and he’s on a decent dose of
    medication, and I can just imagine if he was in the community
    or . . . .” M.C. objected. The court sustained the objection
    and struck the testimony.
    During a break in the trial, M.C. moved for a mistrial,
    citing Mendez, supra, 
    21 Cal.App.5th 654
    . M.C. argued that,
    although the court struck Aulakh’s statement, the jury still heard
    the improper testimony. The court denied M.C.’s motion. On
    appeal, M.C. argues the court erred because it was impossible
    to cure the prejudice from Aulakh’s testimony.
    M.C.’s reliance on Mendez, supra, 
    21 Cal.App.5th 654
    ,
    is misplaced. In that case, the People sought to commit the
    appellant as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Id. at
    p. 656.) Like a Murphy conservatorship, an MDO commitment
    requires a finding that the person represents a substantial
    danger to others. At the People’s request, the trial court in that
    case instructed the jury it must determine whether the appellant
    represented a substantial danger “ ‘if released into the community
    unsupervised.’ ” (Id. at p. 659.) The Court of Appeal held the
    trial court erred and reversed the commitment order. The court
    explained the qualification in the instruction—if released into
    the community unsupervised—was not consistent with the
    statute, improperly asked the jury to consider the consequences
    of its verdict, and was misleading because there were
    alternatives to unsupervised release. (Id. at pp. 660–661, 663.)
    We will assume, for the sake of argument, the Mendez
    court’s reasoning also applies to Murphy conservatorships.
    Nevertheless, the case is inapposite. Here, unlike in Mendez,
    the trial court did not give a flawed instruction. Nor did it
    suggest to the jury it should consider M.C.’s future placement
    16
    or the consequences of its verdict. To the contrary, when M.C.’s
    psychiatrist started to discuss the possibility that M.C. could be
    released into the community, the court immediately sustained
    M.C.’s objection and struck the testimony. In fact, the court
    sustained the objection before the doctor had finished his
    thought, which plainly communicated to the jury it should
    not consider the issue. The court’s swift and definitive action
    cured any potential prejudice. Accordingly, under any standard
    of review, the court did not err in denying M.C.’s motion for
    a mistrial.
    c.    Plotkin’s testimony
    On direct examination, the Public Guardian’s expert,
    Gordon Plotkin, testified that M.C. poses a substantial physical
    danger to others due to his mental disorder. The Public
    Guardian asked Plotkin to elaborate on his opinion. Plotkin
    noted there were “two officers next to him in [the] court. So
    the chance of him—.” M.C. objected, and the trial court struck
    the testimony.
    The court and the parties discussed the incident during a
    break in the trial. The prosecutor suggested Plotkin was simply
    explaining why he believed M.C. is dangerous, despite the lack
    of recent violent incidents. M.C. moved for a mistrial, arguing
    Plotkin’s comment shifted the burden to show dangerousness.
    The court noted the testimony was improper, but it found
    Plotkin’s comment did not warrant a mistrial. The court offered
    to give a curative admonition, which M.C. accepted. The court
    then admonished the jury as follows: “[B]efore we took our break,
    you heard some testimony regarding the fact that there are two
    guards that are here with [M.C.], and then I granted a motion
    to strike, and that was stricken. [¶] But I just wanted to advise
    you that it is standard practice that individuals transported from
    Patton State Hospital to this court are escorted by two guards,
    17
    and you should not consider for the purpose of determining
    whether [M.C.] is a danger to others that he is escorted by
    two guards to this courtroom.”
    Contrary to M.C.’s contentions, the trial court handled
    the situation appropriately and cured any potential prejudice.
    Regardless of Plotkin’s comment, the jury likely would have
    noticed that M.C. had been escorted by guards throughout the
    trial. Although Plotkin’s comment drew additional attention
    to the situation, the court explained to the jury it was common
    practice and had no bearing on M.C.’s potential dangerousness.
    The court’s admonition sufficiently cured any prejudice. In fact,
    it is likely M.C. benefited from the incident, as the jury was
    no longer left to speculate as to the reason for the heightened
    security. Accordingly, under any standard of review, the court
    did not err in denying M.C.’s motion for a mistrial.
    d.    Closing argument
    During closing argument, the Public Guardian argued
    M.C. was compliant with his medication only because there was
    a threat of an involuntary medication order. M.C. requested
    a sidebar with the court, which was not reported. During
    a subsequent break, M.C. moved for a mistrial, arguing the
    prosecutor’s argument was improper because there was no
    evidence that M.C. was aware of an involuntary medication
    order. The Public Guardian asserted Aulakh had testified
    that he told M.C. about the order. M.C. responded that Aulakh
    was referring to an order for blood draws, not medication.
    The court denied the motion, explaining the prosecutor’s
    argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence. The
    court noted that, in its experience, involuntary medication orders
    do not identify specific procedures; instead, they defer to the
    doctor to determine what is necessary.
    18
    On appeal, M.C. contends the Public Guardian’s argument
    was pure speculation as there is no evidence he was aware of
    an involuntary medication order. We disagree. Aulakh testified
    that he informed M.C. he had obtained a court order to draw his
    blood. Even assuming that order was limited to blood draws, it is
    reasonable to conclude it motivated M.C. to take his medication.
    According to Aulakh, one of the reasons to draw M.C.’s blood was
    to ensure he was compliant with his medication. It is reasonable
    to infer M.C. was aware of this fact and knew that, if his doctors
    discovered he was not taking his medication, they also could
    obtain a court order forcing him to do so. Accordingly, the Public
    Guardian’s argument was a fair comment on the evidence, and
    it did not provide grounds for a mistrial under any standard
    of review.
    DISPOSITION
    We affirm the order.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    EGERTON, J.
    We concur:
    LAVIN, Acting P. J.                      ADAMS, J.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B327027

Filed Date: 11/22/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/26/2023