In re Al.G. CA2/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 5/30/24 In re Al.G. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re Al.G. et al., Persons B319877
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. Nos.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 20CCJP03767A–C
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Kristen Byrdsong, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Pamela Rae Tripp for Defendant and Appellant.
Freeman Mathis & Gary, Christian E. Foy Nagy, and Chris
Fleissner, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
M.G. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s orders finding
jurisdiction over his three children, Al.G., An.G., and O.G., under
Welfare and Institutions Code,1 section 300, subdivisions (b), (c),
(d), and (j), and terminating the case with a juvenile custody
award. The court’s orders followed a heavily litigated, year-long
trial. Father contends that the court improperly found the
children’s testimony credible in light of evidence he presented of
mother’s ongoing alienation of the children. He also contends that
the court inappropriately limited the evidence he could present at
trial and demonstrated bias in its rulings. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and S.G. (mother) married in 2004. Al.G. was born
in December 2007 and the twins An.G. and O.G. were born in
April 2009. The parents divorced in 2009. Custody proceedings
have been ongoing since that time and could fairly be described
as contentious.
1. Prior Child Welfare History
Between 2011 and 2017, the Los Angeles Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) received 11
referrals in which it was alleged that the children were the
victims of physical abuse, emotional abuse, or general neglect.
Eight of the referrals alleged abuse by father and three alleged
abuse by mother. Father’s alleged conduct included throwing
O.G. into a cold pool as punishment, allowing the children to ride
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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in the front seat of the car without a car seat, hair pulling, and
pushing. The Department determined that five of the referrals
alleging abuse by father were unfounded, one was inconclusive,
and two were evaluated out. It concluded that one of the prior
referrals alleging abuse by mother was unfounded, one was
inconclusive, and the remaining allegation was evaluated out.
2. Original Petition
On July 15, 2020, the Department filed a petition asserting
allegations against mother and father under section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (d), and (j). Count a-1 alleged that, on
June 4, 2020, father “physically abused the child [Al.G.] by
forcefully putting his hands on the child’s body by tackling the
child against the gate, causing the child to fall to the ground and
lose consciousness.” Count a-2 alleged that father abused An.G.
and O.G. by hitting and punching them, pulling their hair and
ears, and throwing them against the wall. Counts a-1 and a-2
alleged that mother was aware of the physical abuse by father
and failed to protect the children.
Counts b-1 and b-2 described the same conduct by father as
counts a-1 and a-2. Count b-3 alleged that father was an abuser
of alcohol and marijuana and was under the influence of these
substances while the children were under his care and
supervision. Count b-4 alleged that father created a detrimental
and endangering home environment by forcing the children to
drink alcohol and smoke, withholding food and charging the
children for water, and because he allowed a female companion
who was an abuser of alcohol and marijuana to reside in the
home with the children. Count b-5 alleged that father drove a car
while under the influence while the children were passengers.
Counts b-6 through b-8 alleged that father sexually abused the
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children by fondling their nipples and crotch area and kissing
and blowing on their stomachs. With respect to each count, the
Department also alleged that mother failed to protect the
children.
Counts c-1 through c-3 alleged that father emotionally
abused the children by physically and sexually abusing them,
withholding food, and making audio and video recordings of
them. The Department alleged that the children had expressed
thoughts of self-harm due to father’s conduct. It also alleged with
respect to each count that mother had failed to protect the
children.
Counts d-1 through d-3 alleged that father sexually abused
the children by fondling their nipples and crotch area and kissing
and blowing on their stomachs and that mother failed to protect
the children.
Counts j-1 through j-5 repeated the prior allegations of
father’s physical and sexual abuse of the children and of mother’s
failure to protect.
3. Detention Report
On June 15, 2020, the Department received an emergency
response referral after mother and Al.G. went to the Santa
Monica Police Department. Al.G. reported an incident in which
father pinned him against a wall and tackled him to the ground.
During the incident, father called Al.G. “ ‘wussy’ and ‘pussy.’ ”
Two days later, a social worker, Edda Figueroa, received a
phone call from father informing her that an officer had closed
the police investigation as “ ‘unfounded’ ” after father had
provided photos and videos. Father told her that she should also
close the Department’s investigation. Later that day, Figueroa
spoke with Officer Benjamin Jenkins, who stated that the
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incident was “ ‘unfounded’ ” because there was a video showing
that father grabbed Al.G. by the shoulder and Al.G. slipped.
Father only stumbled but remained standing the whole time.
Officer Jenkins stated that father denied falling on top of the
child, tackling him, yelling at him, hitting him, or any other form
of abuse and neglect and reported that the children were not in
danger and that the police had no concerns of abuse and neglect.
Officer Jenkins stated that “it appears as if the parents have had
a bad divorce and the children are in the middle of it.”
On June 24, 2020, Figueroa made initial contact with the
children at mother’s house. Figueroa did not observe any physical
signs of abuse or neglect. Al.G., who was then 12 years old, told
Figueroa that father is a bad person. Father made the children go
on far walks and, if they refused, they would not receive dinner.
Al.G. stated that father had made him go on a long walk on June
4. Father reportedly stated, “you either use your walk free pass
or ‘I smack your butt free pass.’ ” Al.G. replied that he wanted to
skip the walk. Father told him he would not receive dinner if he
did so. Al.G. agreed to go. Father then “ ‘tackled him against the
gate and they both fell to the ground and he went unconscious for
5-10 seconds.’ ” Al.G. then got up and tried to move away from
father because he was scared. Father started recording Al.G. “to
make himself look good as if [he] hadn’t hurt [Al.G.].” Al.G.
reported that father cursed at him and called him “a ‘fucking
wussy and fucking pussy.’ ”
Since the incident, Al.G. had not returned to father’s house.
He did not feel safe with father. Al.G. reported that there was “no
food” at father’s house because father is “ ‘obsessed with their
weight’ ” and that he would go to bed hungry at father’s house.
Father would make fun of their weight and would deny them food
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if they weighed a certain amount. He reported that they went on
a boat ride and father ordered insufficient food for the children
and kept calling Al.G. “ ‘fat pregnant bitch.’ ” Al.G. stated that
father disciplines the children by yelling, hitting, punching,
taking away electronics, and taking away food. He felt sad and
depressed every time he was at father’s house and did not want
to go back “because he has a plan to hurt himself . . . by ‘grabbing
a knife and cutting his neck.’ ” Al.G. had never hurt himself
before but wanted to while at father’s house. He reported “he
would jump from the second-floor stairs towards the floor.” He
stated that he did not feel like hurting himself while at mother’s
house.
Al.G. also reported that father made the children do “ ‘belly
time,’ ” during which they would “ ‘lay flat in the bed with their
hands behind their back and lift their shirt while the father put
his mouth to their stomach and kisses it and blows air.’ ”2 Al.G.
stated that father sometimes went lower than his stomach but
denied that father “ ‘kiss[ed] his penis.’ ” He stated that belly
time made him uncomfortable. Father would also do something
called “ ‘cherry-picking,’ ” which involved father “ ‘putting his
hands around [Al.G.’s] groin and . . . lift[ing] him from there.’ ”
During this, Al.G. could feel father “touching, rubbing, and
pressuring his private parts.” Al.G. was afraid to go back to
father’s after reporting everything that happened because “at the
other times when he or his sibling tried to explain how bad their
situation was at their father’s, he gets ‘extremely pissed off.’ ”
2 Although it was referred to by various names in the Department’s
reports, the family consistently referred to this conduct as “belly meat”
in their testimony. We refer to it by this name henceforth.
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Figueroa also interviewed An.G., who was then 11 years
old. She did not observe any visible signs of abuse or neglect.
With respect to the incident on June 4, An.G. stated that father
told the children they must either go on a walk or they would not
receive dinner. When they were walking out of the house, father
tackled Al.G. against the gate and they both fell to the ground.
Father fell on top of Al.G. and said, “ ‘you rude bitch, you fucking
weezy [sic] and pussy.’ ” An.G. was so scared that he froze and
watched. Al.G. started to cry.
An.G. was afraid of father and did not feel safe going back
to his house because he was afraid father would hurt him. An.G.
reported that father disciplines him by making him run at least
two miles. One time, father said “ ‘either I punch you for real or
you won’t go to your friend’s party.’ ” Another time, An.G. did not
greet father quickly enough and father threw him against the
wall. He reported that sometimes there was no food for them at
father’s house. If father learned that they had spoken to mother,
he would make them “ ‘skip a meal.’ ”
An.G. informed the social worker that father had put his
hand on An.G.’s butt after taking off his shorts and underwear.
He did not remember how long ago it happened. He also
described “ ‘belly him time’, ” during which father “puts his face
on [An.G.’s] belly and kisses it and blows air and then he turns
him around and touches his butt.” He also reported that father
“ ‘touched his penis’ ” when doing “ ‘cherry-picking,’ ” which he
described as “when the father grabs him in between his legs and
hip and lifts him.” When father did that, An.G. felt “that his
father is touching his private parts and when the father releases
his hands he always ‘goes over his penis area.’ ” An.G. denied
that father made him do anything else of a sexual nature.
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An.G. felt sad and depressed when he saw father hurt Al.G.
He stated that he wanted to hurt himself when at father’s house
and wanted “ ‘to grab a knife and cut his neck with it.’ ” He had
gotten close to doing so before. He denied any plan to hurt
himself at mother’s house, where he felt safe.
Figueroa also spoke with O.G., also 11 years old. O.G.
reported that, on June 4, father wanted them to take a walk
towards the beach and that he did not wish to go because they
were walking towards protests and he didn’t feel safe. Al.G. had
won a “ ‘free walk pass’ ” and asked if he could use it but father
did not let him. Everyone started walking and then O.G. saw
father “ ‘tackle [Al.G.] against the fence and falling to the floor.’ ”
He reported that father said: “ ‘excuse me you don’t get to talk to
me like that you weeze [sic], fucking bitch.’ ”
O.G. stated that he did not like to be around father because
he never knew what would happen. He did not feel safe with
father and did not want to go back to his house. O.G. reported
that father once made him run two miles at night because O.G.
did not put on his pajamas fast enough. He also hit O.G. and his
brothers, threw them against the wall, and held their faces
against the wall. O.G. stated that he “usually cries at dinner time
and he is always super scared of father.” He had suicidal
thoughts about going to father’s house, although he never had a
plan of how to hurt himself. O.G. had nightmares that “father
will come to get him from his mother’s home; kidnap him and
then put him and his siblings in bags; put in a car and throw
them somewhere else far away.”
Following the June 4 incident, mother took Al.G. to the
police “per [his] request” and stopped the visitations with father.
She denied seeing any marks or bruises on the children but
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stated that the children reported father’s “extreme[]” discipline of
them and were scared of father and did not want to return to his
house. The children told her they would hurt themselves if they
went back. She denied knowing how the children’s rejection of
father started.
The following day, Figueroa had contact with father, who
stated “to complete a visit with him at his home, that he needed
to know . . . what his children reported.” Figueroa told him the
discussions were confidential. Father reported that he was going
to email her “various files and that he ‘expected’ [her] to have
read them.” He urged her to close the referral by “ ‘sometime next
week’ ” because he had a pending court hearing regarding
custody. He also “expected [her] to use law enforcement’s
information to complete her investigation.” Father later sent her
an email attaching the police report and declarations from
himself and his wife, Am.G. (stepmother), about the June 4
incident.
Zophia Barrera, a social worker who had interacted with
the family in 2017, stated that the parents were going through a
custody battle and that An.G. and O.G. were afraid of father.
Father was difficult to work with and was upset that she had to
complete a home assessment. Father recorded her and “was
‘trying to control her through the investigation’ and . . . wanted to
go above the law.” Barrera also stated that “mother plays ‘the
victim’ and might influence the children emotionally.”
Figueroa also contacted Alexis Garcia, who provided
therapy to Al.G. first in a group counseling setting through his
middle school and then on an individual basis. Garcia stated that
father was “difficult to work with” and “didn’t want to approve
the therapy session.” Al.G. told her that “ ‘there are things that
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happen to him and his siblings but no one believes us.’ ” He had
spoken up sometime in 2017 with the Department and “got the
‘worse consequences.’ ” He told her he was “hopeful and the next
time he and his siblings speak up that someone believes him and
takes him seriously, even though ‘he knows that his father
always gets in his way.’ ”
Al.G. also told her that father always made fun of his
weight and was “always controlling his privacy.” Garcia disclosed
that father has cameras everywhere in his house. Father was
“ ‘very interesting to interact with’ ”; “always tries to manipulate
her”; and “was ‘verbally aggressive and controlling towards her.’ ”
Al.G. had a therapy session at father’s house and “disclosed that
he couldn’t talk to her ‘normally’ . . . because his father was
recording him.” Garcia was concerned that father was abusing
and neglecting Al.G. but lacked evidence.
Figueroa also completed a call with father, father’s
attorney, and county counsel. Father read from a declaration. He
stated that, on June 4, he asked the children to take a walk to
thank the National Guard and police. When he asked the
children to get ready to go, Al.G. grew “very belligerent,” said no,
and said “he wanted to ‘smack [father’s] ass’ in exchange for
coming.” Father said no. Al.G. walked out and father followed
him. He tried to put his hand lovingly on Al.G.’s shoulders when
Al.G. slipped and they both almost fell. Father told Al.G. “you
can’t say you are going to hit me.” He told Al.G. to get up. “No one
was hurt. No one hit anyone.”
Father stated that he disciplines with “positive parenting.”
He would sometimes make the children run a quarter mile on the
treadmill. He denied physically disciplining the children. The last
time he weighed them was two or three months prior. He
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expressed concerns about the children’s mental health because he
believed they were “suffering from a lot of pressure from the
mother saying, ‘bad things about him.’ ” He stated that belly
meat happened when the children were younger and consisted of
“ ‘blowing air on their stomach.’ ” He had not done it for over a
year. Cherry-picking was a wrestling move. He denied doing it to
the children and said they did it amongst themselves. Father
denied any drug or alcohol consumption. He stated that he is an
upstanding citizen and that “mother has created all the
allegations and there [sic] are not true.”
Father’s housekeeper stated that the children were treated
“ ‘well’ ” by father. She had worked for mother for approximately
three months and stated that mother was “aggressive” and she
was scared of her. The housekeeper said father’s house had rules
and schedules and that mother let the children do whatever they
wanted.
Stepmother, who was present on June 4, stated that
“[Al.G.] was at no moment ‘physically injured.’ ” Al.G. was being
disrespectful to father, father put a hand on his shoulder, and
Al.G. fell back. Stepmother stated that father would discipline
the children by talking to them or sending them to their rooms.
She denied any yelling, physical punishment, or restriction of
food or water.
On July 10, 2020, Figueroa had a follow-up meeting with
the children, who asked to speak to her together. The children
reported that they were scared to go back to father’s house and
did not feel safe with him. Al.G. was scared of father doing
“ ‘preparation’ ” to him, which was when “father ‘rubs his nipples
and stomach in a circular motion while father sat on his legs.’ ”
He described preparation as a “preparation to ‘belly me[at].’ ”
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Al.G. stated that he had to agree to preparation, belly meat, and
cherry-picking so father would “give him ‘extra food or allow him
to skip weighing.’ ” An.G. and O.G. each stated that belly meat
and preparation happened on a daily basis at father’s house,
while cherry-picking took place less frequently. An.G. also
reported that, the last time the children spoke with a social
worker in 2017, father put them in separate rooms, asked them
many questions, and threatened to deny them food if they did not
answer.
The Department recommended that the children be
removed from their father’s care and placed with mother.
4. Detention Hearing
On July 20, 2020, the court held the detention hearing and
concluded that a prima facie case existed that the children were
persons described by section 300. It concluded that reasonable
efforts had been provided to prevent removal and that there were
no services available to prevent the children’s detention from
father. The court released the children to mother’s home. It
ordered monitored visitation for father in a therapeutic setting.
5. Last Minute Information
In a last minute information filed in September 2020, the
Department reported that it had attempted to facilitate
therapeutic visits between the children and father. Dr. Lynn
Steinberg had agreed to facilitate visits at her office, but the
children refused to attend, even when social worker Steve Garza
came to transport them. Without meeting the children,
Dr. Steinberg stated that she believed that mother was
intentionally alienating the children. Department investigator
Jamie Hein spoke with Dr. Steinberg and concluded that it was
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“apparent that [Dr. Steinberg] has had significant
communication with father and has taken a side.”
Dr. Steinberg told Hein, “I think it’s false accusations
against the father without a doubt,” and that “[mother] had the
police at [father’s] house today,” although it was unclear how
Dr. Steinberg knew this. Dr Steinberg stated that mother was
“ ‘one of the most vicious women I’ve met’ ” based on a statement
mother purportedly made to paternal grandfather. When Hein
disclosed that the children were consistent in their statements,
Dr. Steinberg “[w]ithout hesitation . . . sounded as though she did
not believe the children’s statements.” It therefore appeared to
the Department that she was not a neutral therapist per the
court’s order.
6. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report
On October 1, 2020, the Department filed its jurisdiction
and disposition report. The report contained new witness
statements from the family obtained by Hein and Garza.
On August 4, 2020, Garza had met with the children for an
initial visit. Garza engaged the children on the subject of the
June 2020 incident. Al.G. told Garza that father tackled him
because Al.G. “ ‘didn’t want to go walking during the civil
unrest’ ” and that he would commit suicide before seeing father
again. O.G. confirmed Al.G.’s statement and reported that father
“ ‘always gets very angry if [they] don’t do what he wants.’ ”
An.G. stated that father had sexually abused him by
“ ‘put[ting] his finger in [An.G.’s] butt.’ ” Garza questioned him
about the abuse and An.G. stated it had occurred after they had
gone boating and An.G. was tired and went to his room. He was
lying on his stomach when father entered, pulled down his shorts,
“pulled [his] cheeks and put his finger in me.” An.G. confirmed
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that he meant that his father had placed his finger in An.G.’s
rectum. An.G. stated that it had occurred twice before but he
could not recall details, other than it happened at least once in
father’s bedroom with stepmother in the room. Al.G. and O.G.
told Garza that nothing similar had happened to them.
The children stated that father “[w]eighs each one of them
when they come to his home for a visit” and makes them run a
minimum of two miles if they have gained any weight; “verbally
abuses them by calling them names such as ‘pregnant bitch’ and
‘fat pussy’ ”; withholds food if he is unhappy with them; and
forces them to sit for photographs and tells them to look happy so
he can use them as proof.
Garza spoke with father and stepmother at their home on
August 5, 2020. Father showed Garza a video of the June 4
incident that was captured by cameras outside his house. The
report states that “[t]he video shows father. [sic] stopping [Al.G.]
by placing his hands on [Al.G.’s] shoulders and pulling him back
into the yard” and noted that it was “unclear whether [Al.G.] lost
his footing due [to] the pressure of being pushed/pulled by father
or simply miss-stepping.” Father also showed a video taken on a
cell phone with sound in which Al.G. was “very upset as
evidenced by crying and yelling.” In the video, Al.G. stated “ ‘Get
off me’ several times in a clearly upset/dysregulated manner” and
stated “ ‘Stop recording me’ in the same upset fashion.”
Father stated that he believed mother to be “bi-polar or
borderline” and that “[s]he’s been trying to turn the boys against
[him] for years.” Father denied failing to properly feed the
children and showed Garza receipts from food purchases. He
showed Garza pictures of him and the children in which the
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children were smiling. At the time the report was filed, Hein had
been unable to interview father.
On September 26, 2020, Hein interviewed mother. Hein
questioned mother about the fact that reports to the Department
began soon after mother and father split up, and that it appeared
that the children had been in the middle of father and mother’s
custody disputes for over a decade. Mother admitted that she had
never seen father abuse the children in the manner described in
the prior allegations but that the children had disclosed
additional abuse that she could not report due to a family law
judgment. Hein asked mother why she did not call father before
taking Al.G. to the police station following the June 4 incident.
Mother stated that when she reaches out to father, “ ‘it gets
turned around on me.’ ”
Hein interviewed Barrera for the report as well. Barrera
remembered the case because it was a “ ‘custody case.’ ” She
recalled that father “ ‘was difficult” and told her that he was
“ ‘going to record this whether you like it or not.’ ” Barrera
described him as having a temper and “ ‘anger issues.’ ” She
recalled that mother “ ‘did a lot of coaching’ . . . [such as] ‘ “Tell
the truth. Tell them how you don’t like to be with him (their
father) so you don’t have to see him anymore. You have to tell
them everything or you are going to have to still go see him.” ’ ”
Barrera concluded that there was no abuse or neglect. She
believed “ ‘[i]t was mom coaching them’ ” and observed that Al.G.
seemed the most coached and aligned with mother.
Officer Jenkins explained the inconsistencies between
Al.G.’s story and the video of the incident and stated that the
“ ‘physical abuse was unfounded as far as criminally.’ ” However,
he did not believe that mother was coaching the children. Officer
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Jenkins thought the children were each “ ‘very afraid of their dad
and they all have different issues with their dad.’ ”
Garcia told Hein that father was “ ‘hesitant’ ” to allow Al.G.
to participate in individual counseling with her “ ‘because of past
reports (to DCFS).’ ” Garcia completed an assessment at father’s
house. He requested a copy of the assessment and sent back
edits. Garcia added the edits with a note that they came from
father. He sent back additional edits which were not incorporated
into her assessment. Garcia described father as “ ‘controlling.’ ”
He attempted to obtain a statement from her that mother was
manipulating the children. Father’s attorney also repeatedly
contacted her, “ ‘basically threatening [her] and wanting [her]
notes from [her] assessments.’ ” Al.G. did not disclose any current
abuse to Garcia. Garcia did not get the sense that mother was
coaching or coercing the children.
The report included the summary of Hein’s interview with
Dr. Steinberg that was described in the last minute information.
It also noted that Dr. Steinberg had asked Garza about his
licensing status and had told him, “ ‘I could throw a lot of work
your way. There’s good money in these Parental Alienation
cases.’ ”
The Department’s report acknowledged that, “[d]espite
repeated statement[s] from the children to numerous
professionals, the Department had no physical evidence, such as
bruises, video, collateral witness statements or police
corroboration to support that the children are current victims of
physical abuse. The allegations of ear pulling, hair pulling,
hitting and throwing the children against the walls were all
previously investigated and either unfounded or inconclusive.”
However, the Department still had “concerns about ongoing
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physical intimidation and inappropriate discipline in father’s
home” and stated that its assessment was “that there is a
recurring theme of inappropriate, insensitive, and unwarranted
discipline by father, inappropriate boundaries by father, and
inappropriate parenting techniques by father.” Examples of this
included “pulling a child’s hair and ears . . . , withholding food,
body shaming and using excessive exercise . . . , video-taping the
boys at inappropriate times and against their wishes . . . and
pulling the children’s shirts up and blowing air on their
stomachs . . . .” The Department further assessed that “the
children overstated the allegations of abuse and neglect as
children and adolescents will do given their age and level of
immaturity,” but that this “likely occurred in an effort for the
children to ensure that their concerns are heard and believed or
as a way to bolster their wish not to visit their father.”
The Department believed that “the parent’s [sic] on-going
custodial conflict is at the root of the issues in this family,” as
both parents are “litigious,” “which results in the children being
placed in the middle of their conflict once again.” The
Department recommended that the children be detained from
father and released to mother and that the court order family
reunification services for father and family maintenance services
for mother.
The report attached the summary of a forensic evaluation
of the children performed in August 2020 at the Harbor UCLA
Hub. Mother waived her right to be present during the
interviews. The evaluator noted that “[a]ll three children
reported extensive sexual, physical and emotional abuse by their
father.” It further noted that “[t]he children’s mental distress
resulting from the abuse was excessive, as evidenced by the
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children’s constant fears of punishment, violence, and retaliation
by [father], their anxiety about visiting [father] or being in his
care/custody, their insomnia/altered sleep habits, they [sic] high
levels of attachment to [mother], and [Al.G.]’s suicidal
ideations/plans if he is to return to [father’s] home/custody.”
7. First Amended Petition
The first amended petition, also filed October 1, 2020,
amended the counts alleged under section 300, subdivision (c).
Count c-1, as amended, alleged that the children were victims of
emotional abuse because of an ongoing custody dispute between
mother and father, “which includes the parents making
continued accusations of abuse and neglect against each other”
since 2011, which placed the children at risk of suffering serious
emotional damage. Amended count c-2 alleged that father
emotionally abused the children by rationing and withholding
food, punishing the children with exercise, weighing them
repeatedly and frequently, body-shaming them, making audio
recordings against their will and without their consent to
humiliate and manipulate them, calling them derogatory names
like “fat, pussy, wussy, and pregnant bitch,” and punishing the
children if they acknowledged their mother in public during his
custodial time.
8. Trial
Trial proceedings took place over approximately a year.
Father, mother, stepmother, and the children each testified. The
court also heard testimony from employees of the Department,
including Figueroa, Garza, and Hein; police officers; a friend and
current and former employees of father; mother’s friend and
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fiancé; and Linda Gottlieb, father’s expert on parental
alienation.3
8.1. Al.G.’s Testimony
Al.G. was 12 years old at the time of trial. He testified that
father often punished him by taking away meals. For example,
father would not give Al.G. dinner after he greeted his mother at
a sports game when father had instructed him not to, or if father
did not like the way he said something or something he did.
Father hit Al.G. multiple times, kicked him, pushed him, yelled
at him, and pulled his hair and ears in a way that hurt, including
multiple times within the last year that Al.G. had in-person visits
with father. Father usually appeared angry when he did so.
Father punished Al.G. by making him run on the treadmill. Al.G.
felt that he had to run the most “because [father] didn’t like
[him].”
Father weighed the children every day they were in his
house and recorded their weight in a chart. The children would
lose a point for gaining weight and gain a point for losing weight.
This made Al.G. feel very negative about his body. Father made
derogatory comments about Al.G.’s weight, including “ ‘pregnant
bitch,’ ‘fat,’ ‘you need to lose this,’ (indicating) ‘you need to lose
that’ (indicating),” while grabbing Al.G.’s stomach. These
comments made Al.G. feel “very sad” and did not make him want
to lose weight or change his habits.
3 Given the considerable size of the trial record, and in light of the
deferential standard of review, which we discuss below, we primarily
summarize testimony the court found to be credible. We also
summarize the testimony of father’s expert to provide context for
arguments raised on appeal.
19
Al.G. testified that father is “one way in front of people and
then he’s a different way in front of us.” Father spoke negatively
about mother more times than Al.G. could count and said things
like “ ‘Your mom’s fat[,]’ ” “ ‘Your mom’s poor[,]’ ” and “ ‘Your mom
should work at Panda Express.’ ” Al.G. stated that father and
stepmother would sit the children down for two- or three-hour
conversations in which they accused mother of brainwashing the
children. Father also showed him documents related to court
proceedings, including Our Family Wizard messages and emails.
Mother did not brainwash Al.G. and told him to tell the
truth. She did not say anything negative about father and did not
allow discussions about the family law case in her home. If Al.G.
stated that he hated his father, mother would say things like
“ ‘That’s not very good[,]’ ” “ ‘He’s your dad[,]’ ” and “ ‘You should
still see him.’ ” Mother tried to make him go to visits with his
father when he and his brothers refused to go, and continued to
encourage him even when he said he did not want to go. Al.G. did
not wish to attend visits with father, even with another adult
present, because he was afraid father would “say something or do
something that would trigger something inside of me.”
With respect to the incident on June 4, 2020, Al.G. testified
that on a prior walk with his father, he had received a pass that
allowed him to either skip a walk or “smack [father’s] butt.” On
the day in question, there were riots in Santa Monica and it was
the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. When father told the
children that they would all go on a walk, Al.G. asked to use his
pass to skip the walk because he felt that it would be dangerous
to go. Father told him he would lose dinner if he did not go. Al.G.
then asked to smack father’s butt, though he did not mean it
seriously. As Al.G. approached the gate, father threw Al.G. to the
20
ground. Al.G. testified that he was sobbing on the ground when
father began cursing at him, calling him “pussy, wussy, jackass,
bitch, motherfucker.” He put his arms up to shield himself and
father grabbed his stomach or hands. Father then took out his
phone and started recording Al.G. Al.G. felt scared and tried to
get away from father. Al.G. testified that father frequently
recorded him and did not stop when Al.G. asked him to. On the
rare occasion father explained why he was recording Al.G., father
stated that it was for court.
Al.G. felt that father did preparation and belly meat to him
more frequently than to his brothers. He described preparation as
father pinning them down and belly meat as father rubbing his
hands over their abdomens and “a combination of blows and tugs
but like aggressively.” This would take place “basically every
single time” they were at father’s house. Al.G. stated that father
knew they did not like it. When performing belly meat, father
pulled Al.G.’s pants down, exposing his penis, over 100 times.
Al.G. also testified that father touched his penis during belly
meat and that father put his mouth on his penis, and that this
also happened around 100 times.
Father also performed cherry picking on the children after
they told him “no.” Al.G. demonstrated it to the court, which
described it for the record: “The witness has his left hand
underneath his groin and his other hand is touching that hand
from the other side of his body, going against underneath his
groin to touch the first hand described.” Father had done this 10
to 40 times in the prior two years. Al.G. found cherry picking
“very uncomfortable” and painful.
Al.G. testified that he witnessed father put a finger in
An.G.’s anus on one occasion. He did not recall when it happened
21
or how old An.G. was. Al.G. testified that it took place in father’s
room but did not remember whether stepmother was present.
The three children went into father’s room, with An.G. entering
first. Al.G. testified that father told An.G. “Come here.” Al.G. did
not recall how An.G. ended up on the bed. He was “pretty sure”
he could see An.G.’s bare bottom and “pretty sure” that father
had pulled his pants down. He did not remember whether he saw
father put a finger or hand in An.G.’s anus. After a minute or
less, Al.G. left the room. He did not remember speaking to An.G.
about it afterwards.
The events to which he testified made Al.G. suicidal and
caused him depression and anxiety. He stated that he would
want to kill himself if he had to go back to father’s house. Al.G.
stated that he was in therapy and on medication for his anxiety
and nightmares. He had dreams of father trying to kill him and
mother. Al.G. feared that father would seek revenge because
Al.G. had spoken up and that he would make Al.G.’s life an “even
worse living hell.”
Al.G. was emotional when giving testimony. Before his
third day of testimony, the court stated for the record that court
Department staff were so concerned about Al.G. when he testified
that “they called out to the field to inform their supervisors and
to make sure that supervisors checked on his mental and
emotional well-being.” On another occasion, the court explained
for the record that, when asked to describe belly meat using his
own body, Al.G. began to cry hysterically and ran out of the
building. On a later date, Al.G. was in distress and suffering from
chest pain while testifying. It was believed that he suffered an
anxiety attack and he was taken to the hospital in an ambulance.
22
8.2. An.G.’s Testimony
An.G. was 12 years old at the time of trial. He testified that
father was strict and controlling and would become upset and
angry when he did not get his way. Father kept a chart in his
house that started out as a way for the children to earn points to
play a sport, but then became a weight chart. The children would
earn or lose points based on their weight and would have to
weigh themselves between two and five times every visit. If the
children refused to weigh themselves, father would deny them
their next meal. An.G. testified that he was denied meals
between 35 and 50 times at father’s house. Father also
disciplined the children by pulling their hair and ears and
punching them. Father slammed O.G. into the wall on one
occasion when O.G. failed to greet father quickly enough. Father
also kicked An.G. as punishment for breaking a rod in his closet.
An.G. did not feel free to be himself at father’s house. He
felt that he had no privacy and that father used the cameras in
the house to spy on him and his brothers. Father “would have
proof of everything [the children] said or [did].” An.G. testified
that there were situations where the children would all be on
camera and father would ask them “set-up questions,” including
whether anyone had ever hurt them, touched them in private
places, or denied them a meal. Father did not tell them what to
say but would be angry if they did not respond in a certain
manner and would accuse mother of brainwashing them. When
An.G. was around 10 years old, father and stepmother sat the
boys down for a two- to three-hour conversation about their
mother brainwashing them. They had the same conversation
about brainwashing several times. An.G. did not feel it was the
truth, as mother did not speak to them about father and
23
encouraged them to visit father. However, father spoke about
mother and told the children she was “poor, ugly, fat and that she
should work in a fast food restaurant.” An.G. also testified that
father had a large binder in his office labeled “[mother’s] lies.”
With respect to the June 4 incident, An.G. testified that the
family was going on a walk to see the National Guard because
father wanted the children to thank the National Guard. An.G.
did not want to go because of the Covid-19 pandemic, but father
told the children that they would not get dinner if they did not.
Al.G. was upset because father would not let him use his pass to
skip the walk. An.G. testified that father threw Al.G. to the
ground and began cursing at him. An.G. did not know why his
father responded in that way but was afraid of talking back to
father because father would become upset.
An.G. testified that father would do preparation to him at
least once a visit, and usually two to four times during the typical
four-day visit. Father would usually do belly meat two to four
times during the typical visit as well. An.G. told his father that
he did not enjoy preparation or belly meat, but father would hold
him down. He described preparation as father rubbing his nipple
and abdominal area and belly meat as father blowing and
sucking on the same area. Father did not put his hands or mouth
on An.G.’s penis during preparation or belly meat. Father also
performed “cherry picking” on An.G., during which father held
An.G. by the groin and picked him up. Father knew that he did
not like it, but that father would do it an average of two times
during the typical visit.
An.G. also testified that father had put his finger in his
anus on multiple occasions. The first incident occurred around
the time An.G. was eight years old and took place in father’s
24
bedroom. It happened during a period when the children had to
go to father’s room to greet him good morning or they would not
receive breakfast. Father told him to come to the bed and
instructed him to lay face down on the mattress. He removed
An.G.’s shorts and then stuck his finger in An.G.’s anus. His
brothers were also in the room and stepmother was getting out of
bed. An.G. asked father to stop around five times but he did not.
The incident lasted seven to 15 seconds. An.G. later told his
brothers and mother. The second incident occurred at least a year
later, when An.G. was 10 years old. It was the afternoon and
An.G. was reading in his room when father entered, sat on top of
An.G.’s legs, pulled down his shorts, and put his fingers in
An.G.’s anus. He told his mother and brothers between a few
days and a month later. The third incident took place several
months later, at night, when An.G. and O.G. were in their room,
lying in bed. An.G. believed O.G. was still awake. Father entered
the room and came over to An.G.’s bed and removed his own
boxers. He sat on top of An.G., held his head down, and again put
his finger in his anus. An.G. told him to stop but he did not. O.G.
also did not respond. Father then told An.G. “if [he] told anyone,
[he wouldn’t] want to know what would happen.” When An.G.
told mother, he asked her not to tell anyone but thought that she
might have called someone about it.
An.G. testified that he did not feel comfortable around
father because he did not want father to get mad at him and his
brothers and punish or hurt them. An.G. did not want to see
father again. He did not believe father would ever be truly sorry
for anything that had happened.
25
8.3. O.G.’s Testimony
O.G. was also 12 years old at the time he testified. O.G. did
not enjoy himself at father’s house and did not ever have a good
relationship with father. He was afraid of father and felt that
father’s actions were hard to predict. O.G. recounted a time that
he did not greet father fast enough and father held him up
against the wall and pulled his hair. Father had held him against
the wall in a similar manner on approximately five occasions.
When O.G. was younger, father used to pull his ear frequently
and it was painful. O.G. did not feel comfortable speaking openly
around father or telling father if he did not like something father
did because when Al.G. did so, he would always get punished.
O.G. was scared and afraid when father threw Al.G. to the
ground during the incident in June 2020. On the evening after
the incident, O.G. used a Google Doc to explain to his mother
what had happened. He stated that he wanted to die because of
father. The document described the incident and how father had
called Al.G. a “ ‘fucking wussy, pussy.’ ” Al.G. also wrote in the
document: “ ‘Tomorrow if things were as bad as today, I might
runaway [sic].’ ” O.G. testified that the June 4 incident was not
the first time that father lost his temper and became physical
with one of the children.
O.G. testified that the weight chart was used when he was
nine or 10 years old. During that time, father weighed the
children every morning. They would be awarded a point for losing
weight and lose a point for gaining weight. This process upset
O.G. Father also used exercise as a punishment during the two
years preceding the case. When the children did something father
did not like, such as talking back, he would tell them to run a
mile or two on the treadmill. Father would not let them eat until
26
they ran. O.G. believed he had lost at least 30 to 35 meals in the
prior two years as punishment and believed his brothers had lost
as many meals as he had.
Father said negative things about mother to the children,
such as that she brainwashed the children and that she was fat.
O.G. felt that father was the one who tried to brainwash him
because father always talked badly about mother, whereas
mother did not speak about father and told the children that they
had to visit father.
O.G. described preparation as father rubbing all over the
children’s stomachs and sometimes their nipples. O.G. did not
recall a time when father’s hands ever went lower than his
stomach and never observed father’s hands go any lower when he
was doing preparation to the other children. O.G. described belly
meat as father “lick[ing] and slobber[ing] and, like blow[ing] on
[their] stomachs.” Father performed belly meat mostly on O.G.’s
stomach and his mouth did not go anywhere lower. O.G. did not
enjoy preparation or belly meat and would scream for father to
stop. He described cherry picking as when father “would grab
[their] hands and penises and like hold [them] from behind.” O.G.
testified that it did not feel good and he did not like it but was not
sure whether father knew that.
O.G. testified that he was present for two of the incidents
during which father put his finger in An.G.’s anus. He testified
that the first took place when he and An.G. were eight or nine
years old. Father told An.G. to come to his side of the bed. Father
pulled An.G. under the blankets so O.G. could not see all that
happened. O.G. stated at first that An.G. was facing the wall but
then testified that An.G. was on his stomach and that he could
not see An.G.’s face. O.G. stayed for a few seconds before leaving
27
the room. He did not know what happened until An.G. told him
later that day. The second incident took place in his and An.G.’s
room at night. O.G. had his eyes closed when father entered. He
heard An.G. yell “ ‘Stop’ ” but did not hear any other noise. An.G.
later told him that “it happened again.”
O.G. testified that he had nightmares because of father’s
treatment of him. He feared that father would hurt him and his
brothers both mentally and physically. He did not think there
was any relationship with father to repair. O.G. believed that, if
they had a monitored visit with father, he would “just be faking
it.” O.G. did not believe father loved him or his brothers, even
though father told them that he did.
8.4. Department Testimony
Social worker Figueroa testified that she interviewed each
child privately and found them to be credible. She had no
concerns about the children being coached. Nothing in her
interview with mother gave Figueroa reason to believe mother
was coaching the children. Figueroa also did not get the
impression that mother was using the children as a weapon
against father. She described father as “very demanding” and felt
that he had tried to pressure her. She found mother to be open
and honest and did not feel that mother was demanding. On
cross-examination, Figueroa acknowledged that she received no
training from the Department on parental alienation and that
she was not an expert in investigating parental alienation. She
further stated that it was her job to believe children.
28
Sandra Hernandez, the social worker currently assigned to
the family’s case, also testified.4 At the time she testified,
Hernandez had worked with the Department for 21 years and
had been assigned to the family’s case for seven or eight months.
She had no concerns that the children were saying what mother
wanted them to, although she “always” considered that
possibility. Hernandez spoke with father’s expert, Linda Gottlieb,
who had reached the conclusion that they were being alienated,
but told Hernandez she had not met the children. Hernandez
testified that, as a social worker, she would not be able to make
an assessment without contacting all parties involved. Based on
Hernandez’s interactions with mother, and even after speaking
with father and Gottlieb, Hernandez did not have any basis to
believe that mother was attempting to interfere with father’s
parenting. She believed that the children had genuine reasons
why they did not want to interact with father.
Hein also testified. She had been a social worker since 1993
and had been a dependency investigator for 22 of the 24 years she
worked at the Department. Hein stated that “it was a concern”
that mother might be coaching the children, both because it was
a “sort of a custody situation” and because there were mentions
in the Department records of such concerns. However, Hein did
not feel that mother was coaching the children based on their
interactions and found mother credible. Hein testified that father
appeared open and forthcoming in his interview, although she
4 Hernandez was assigned based on the supervising social worker’s
“understanding that Mr. Garza and [father] could no longer
communicate effectively, and it was causing . . . the situation to be
more stressful on everyone.”
29
felt pressure “by him and his attorney, at times.” Hein also felt
that father was not credible “on certain things,” in part because
“the children would say one thing, and he’d have an explanation
or deflect from that in some way[,] shape or form.”
Hein felt that “the emotional abuse is the main aspect of
this case.” With respect to the physical abuse allegations, Hein
concluded that “there was more concern of inappropriate
discipline as opposed to physical abuse.” Although there was no
physical evidence of sexual abuse, Hein stated that this was often
the case.
Hein believed the custody battle between the parents had a
negative effect on the children and that both parents played a
part in it, though she could not say whether they played an equal
part. Hein testified that, “when watching [the children] and
reading what they said, it’s almost like they’ve told the story so
many times they’re repeating it in their head, and they’re
hypersensitive trying to get their voice heard.” She did not
attribute this to any undue influence from an adult and did not
think the children were lying about what they disclosed. She
thought “they are genuinely emotionally upset and in despair.”
Garza testified that he had taken steps to try and
determine whether mother was actively alienating the children,
including by “ask[ing] the children repeatedly, generally every
visit when interviewing them alone and together . . . has their
mother made any denigrating remarks about their father” or
“told them to . . . make untrue statements.” The children always
responded in the negative and Garza found them to be credible.
Nothing in their demeanor caused him to be concerned that
mother was alienating them from father. Garza testified that
father’s actions in the case seemed “very, very much over-the-
30
top.” This included father’s submission of “a huge amount of
documents,” including materials on parental alienation, which
Garza did not believe to be “ ‘real evidence’ ” but “designed to
sway the person who is reading them.”
8.5. Therapist Testimony
Garcia testified that she provided individual therapy to
Al.G. She spoke with both parents to go over intake and
assessment forms, which concerned the child’s relationship with
the parents and school and medical history. Father asked Garcia
to tell him what mother had said on her forms, which Garcia
declined to do. Garcia testified that she initially felt
uncomfortable during a meeting with father at his home because
he had set up a camera to record them. Garcia further testified
that a telephone call between her and father that was played at
trial was recorded without her knowledge or consent.
Garcia testified that father tried to instruct her on what
she and Al.G. could talk about and told her not to discuss the
court case with him. Al.G. then participated in a session from
father’s house, during which he and Garcia discussed the case.
Father later asked Garcia again about what mother had said and,
when Garcia refused to tell him, his tone became “aggressive”
and he told Garcia, “I specifically asked you not to talk to [Al.G.]
about the court cases, and you did during the last session.” This
demonstrated to Garcia that father was watching the sessions
that took place at his house. She believed that father was
controlling. Garcia did not find mother controlling. Mother did
not ask what father said on his intake forms or tell Garcia what
she could discuss with Al.G.
When at father’s house, Al.G. “seemed very uncomfortable,”
“very unresponsive,” and gave “small answers.” At school, Al.G.
31
had been “very hyper, very friendly, very willing to talk.” When
at mother’s house, he also “act[ed] as though he was the same
child when [they] were in person at school . . . very willing to
speak to [Garcia] about anything . . . .” In her sessions with Al.G.,
Garcia did not see anything trained or rehearsed from him.
8.6. Expert Testimony
Gottlieb, father’s expert on parental alienation, testified
that she concluded that mother had engaged in a “determined”
and “malicious” effort to sever the relationship between father
and the boys based on her consideration of the “total clinical
picture.” Gottlieb testified that she reviewed the video of the June
4, 2020 incident, Our Family Wizard messages provided by
father, custody evaluations performed by Dr. Suzanne Dupee in
2014 and another doctor in 2011, deposition testimony from
mother, “motions and rulings,” Department reports, testimony
from officers, pediatrician records, and school records;
interviewed two pediatricians and father; and listened to audio
recordings of the children. Gottlieb opined that the allegations
against father lacked “credible, neutral, collateral corroboration,”
such as “medical records, police reports, school records,
information from the nannies who were always in the house
when the kids were there with [father], the records from the
school,” and other “evidence from parties . . . that has [sic] no
interest in the outcome of the case.” She believed that mother
was the abusive parent and was projecting abuse onto father and
“programming the boys against their father to falsely believe that
he has sexually abused them.” She stated that father was not a
markedly deficient parent such that the children’s rejection of
him would be justified, but acknowledged that “he can be a bit
controlling and a bit want his point of view given a lot of
32
consideration.” She opined, based on research, that it was “anti
instinctual” for children to reject even an abusive parent, and
that she had “never experienced a child rejecting a parent unless
the child was alienated.”
Based on her review of records, Gottlieb believed the
children were “engaged in delusion thinking” and had broken
with reality based on their belief in the allegations of sexual and
physical abuse. Without court intervention, the children were at
increased risk of developing personality disorders. She believed
that they were already exhibiting antisocial behaviors, such as
“lying, making up stories, deceiving” and maltreating a parent.
Gottlieb testified that an example of Al.G.’s antisocial behavior
was present in the declaration of one of the children’s nannies.
When informed that the nanny testified that she did not write
that declaration but had merely signed it, Gottlieb stated that
this only changed the weight given to that declaration, not her
overall opinion.
Gottlieb testified that she was able to make a finding “with
99 percent clinical certainty” that the children’s allegations of
abuse were meritless because a research study had concluded
that, in high conflict custody cases, the prevalence of actual sex
abuse was only two percent. Gottlieb testified that the only
evidence she would trust to establish sexual abuse in a high
conflict custody case was a video of the sex abuse taking place.
Gottlieb also concluded with “99 percent clinical certainty” that
mother was intentionally alienating the boys from father.
On cross-examination, Gottlieb agreed that the court would
have to conclude that no abuse and no pattern of markedly
deficient parenting took place in order to conclude that parental
alienation had taken place. She testified that speaking with the
33
children was “not required by the standard of clinical practice or
the standard to give an expert opinion” and “[a]bsolutely [would]
not” be informative. She “certainly wouldn’t accept the word of an
alienated child that something actually happened.” Similarly,
Gottlieb stated that interviewing mother “definitely [would] not”
be informative. Gottlieb denied that any updated psychological
assessments would be necessary to her opinion and testified that
they were “[v]ery often misleading and misused” and that they
are widely used only “[b]ecause most forensic evaluators have not
been trained in the family dynamics, and they don’t know what to
look for.” She testified that 90 percent of her profession gets the
issue of alienation wrong.
Gottlieb opined both that “when children are abused, ‘it’s
like pulling teeth to get them to give up their parents’ ” and that
the fact that the children had not disclosed the abuse at an
earlier point in time was evidence of alienation. Gottlieb agreed
that she was not present at any of the children’s prior interviews
and did not know whether they were resistant to speaking about
the abuse. Even if they had been, it would not change her overall
opinion. Gottlieb further testified that she would need more
information to determine whether father putting his mouth on
the children’s stomachs despite their protestations or forcing the
children to eat hot peppers as a punishment were indicative of
estrangement caused by father’s actions, rather than parental
alienation alone. She agreed that her conclusion to 99 percent
certainty that the children were alienated was based on the
information made available to her and that “[t]here are a lot of
things that could have changed my opinion if I heard the whole
clinical picturing.”
34
Gottlieb testified that she was paid $50,000 for her
evaluation and $2,000 per day for her testimony.
8.7. The Court’s Ruling
The court began its ruling by observing that “[t]he multiple
family law bench officers who have handled the G[.] family law
case have a great disadvantage of not hearing from these three
very articulate, intelligent, credible, and sincere boys. . . . [¶] The
comfort level all three of the boys had in testifying in this case
was visibly evident and allowed them to be forthcoming, honest
and candid about many painful truths.” It found that the children
did not appear coached and did not offer canned responses. The
children “stated they were more comfortable telling the truth of
what happened in court after speaking with Dr. Poulter [their
therapist].” The court believed that, “[u]nlike in previous
interviews, the boys were under oath in court, and they took that
oath seriously, they felt comfortable . . . . They testified to feeling
free to tell the truth in court and they felt listened to in court.”
The court found that Hein “generated a very balanced
report” and that her testimony was “very credible and balanced.”
The court similarly found that Garcia “was a very neutral and
credible witness,” as were Garza and Figueroa. The court found
that Gottlieb’s testimony was “biased, one-sided and completely
uninformed regarding the facts of this case” and that she had
relied on “very limited, stilted and outdated information to reach
her conclusion that parental alienation exists in this case.”
The court amended the petition by interlineation and
sustained the petition as amended. It struck the counts under
section 300, subdivision (a). It amended counts b-1 and b-2 to
allege inappropriate physical discipline based on the June 4,
2020, incident and father hitting and punching the children,
35
pulling their hair and ear, and throwing them against the wall. It
struck counts b-1 through b-6 and count b-8 and amended count
b-7 to allege that father had, “[o]n prior occasions . . . sexually
abused the child [An.G.] by inserting his finger into the child
[An.G.’s] anus.” The court struck count c-1 and amended count c-
2 to allege that father “emotionally abused the children by
rationing their food portions and withholding food from the
children, punishing the children with excessive exercise,
repeatedly and frequently weighing the children, body-shaming
the children and documenting their weight on a chart,” making
“audio and video recordings of the children against their will and
without their consent as a way to humiliate, intimidate and
manipulate the children,” belittling and humiliating them “by
calling them derogatory names such as fat, pussy, wussy, and
pregnant bitch,” “us[ing] verbal and physical intimidation and
threats to control and manipulate the children,” “engag[ing] in
unwanted and inappropriate physical contact with the children in
the form of ‘belly meat,’ ‘preparation’ and ‘cherry picking’ which
was done against the children’s wishes,” and “punish[ing] the
children if they show their mother attention in public during
father’s custodial time.” The court struck counts d-1 and d-3 and
amended count d-2 to allege that father had, “[o]n prior
occasions . . . sexually abused the child [An.G.] by inserting his
finger into the child [An.G.’s] anus.” The court struck counts j-3
and j-5 and amended counts j-1, j-2, and j-4 to reflect the
amendments made to the allegations under subdivisions (b) and
(d).
8.8. Writ Proceedings
During the pendency of the trial, father filed five petitions
for writ of mandate with this court. The first writ petition
36
concerned the court’s denial of the pro hac vice application of one
of father’s attorneys. After a panel of this court issued a notice
that it intended to grant the peremptory writ on the ground that
the court had abused its discretion in denying the application, the
juvenile court granted the application and the petition was
dismissed as moot. The second writ petition addressed the court’s
exclusion of father’s family law exhibits and many of his
witnesses. A panel of this court denied the petition but noted that
nothing in its order should be construed as a reflection of the
court’s opinion concerning the admissibility of impeachment
evidence. The third writ petition challenged an order of the
juvenile court discontinuing visits between father and the
children during the children’s testimony without holding a
noticed hearing. The petition was denied “without prejudice to
the filing of a new petition if the respondent juvenile court does
not conduct a properly noticed hearing, within three weeks of the
date of this order, to consider the propriety of suspending
[father’s] visitation with the children and the children’s
participation in conjoint therapy.” A fourth writ petition
concerned the court’s refusal to continue the hearing on visitation
after father suffered complications from a surgery because it
understood this court’s order to require that the hearing be
completed within three weeks. A panel of this court denied the
petition but clarified that nothing in its prior order required the
juvenile court to conclude the proceedings within a set period of
time. The final writ petition followed the juvenile court’s order
striking father’s statement of disqualification, which sought the
court’s disqualification on the ground that it lacked impartiality.
This petition was summarily denied.
37
9. Disposition Report and Hearing
In a disposition report filed in March 2022, the Department
stated that Hernandez continued to meet with the children on a
monthly basis. At a meeting that took place in February 2022,
O.G. and An.G. informed Hernandez that they continued not to
want visits or contact with father. O.G. felt they would be
“meaningless” and that his life was “much better now that his
father is not in his life.” An.G. stated he did not want to receive
any cards or letters from father because “father was not going to
be honest.” He was doing better in school because he was able to
sleep better at night not seeing father.
Al.G. also told Hernandez that he did not want any contact
with father. He believed that father was in a car following him
the day before, and it was not the first time he felt a car following
or a person taking pictures of him. Al.G. expressed fears of being
kidnapped for ransom, or “that father would kidnap him to keep
him quiet since he had already said too much against father.” He
did not feel safe having contact with father. He asked Hernandez
to give the court a statement from him: “ ‘If I ever see that man I
don’t care how old I am or he is or if he even tried to come in
contact with me I will attack him and kill him so I strongly
suggest you stay away from me because you know what you
did.’ ” Al.G. was angry with the Department for allowing father to
abuse him and for failing to do anything in its prior
investigations.
The Department recommended that the court sustain the
petition and terminate jurisdiction with a family law order
granting mother sole physical and legal custody of the children. It
also recommended that the family law order provide for
monitored visitation for father, provided that he participates in
38
individual counseling and complete a parenting class, an anger
management program, and a “Parents Beyond Conflict” or
similar program.
Hein and Hernandez testified at the disposition hearing
held in March 2022. Both stated that they did not believe it
would be appropriate for the children to begin reunification
therapy with father, or begin to see father, until a therapist
recommended it.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that
remaining in father’s home would pose a substantial danger to
the children’s physical health, safety, and emotional well-being
and that no reasonable means existed to prevent removal. It
further found that father refused to take any responsibility for
the physical and emotional abuse he inflicted on the children.
The court terminated jurisdiction and awarded mother sole legal
and physical custody. It further ordered that, in order to begin
visitation with the children for one hour a month in a therapeutic
setting, father would need to complete individual counseling,
receive counseling on parenting for high conflict individuals,
complete an age-appropriate parenting course, complete anger
management, and complete a sex abuse awareness for
perpetrators course.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings must be reversed for lack of substantial credible
evidence. He asserts that the court abused its discretion in
limiting the witnesses he could call at trial, particularly those he
describes as “impartial, independent professionals with an
intimate and percipient knowledge of the entire family dynamic.”
(Italics omitted.) He argues that the escalating allegations of
39
abuse over time, the contradictions in the children’s testimony,
and the testimony of his expert fully demonstrate that the
children were alienated by mother and that their testimony was
entitled to no weight. Father further contends that the juvenile
court demonstrated bias through various adverse rulings and the
manner in which it questioned witnesses and addressed his
counsel. Finally, father contends that this proceeding was a
“family law war . . . waged by other means” and that the
dependency court was not an appropriate venue to resolve the
issues raised in the petition.
1. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
witnesses and documentary evidence.
1.1. Applicable Law
“We review the evidentiary rulings of the juvenile court for
abuse of discretion, and will not disturb those rulings in the
absence of a showing of a manifest abuse of that discretion.” (In
re Roberto C. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249; accord In re
Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1176 [“[We] will not disturb
a trial court’s broad discretion in determining admissibility of
evidence unless its ruling is shown to be ‘ “ ‘ “arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd. . . .” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]”].)
“In dependency proceedings, as in other civil proceedings,
parties have a due process right to cross-examine and confront
witnesses. [Citations.]” (In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440,
444.) “But due process also is a flexible concept, whose
application depends on the circumstances and the balancing of
various factors.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 751, 757.) “The state’s strong interest in prompt and
efficient trials permits the nonarbitrary exclusion of evidence
40
[citation], such as when the presentation of the evidence will
‘necessitate undue consumption of time.’ [Citation.] The due
process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of
significant probative value to the issue before the court.”
(Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1146–
1147.) “ ‘[D]ue process does not require the admissibility of all
evidence which may tend to exonerate the defendant.’ [Citation.]”
(In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 133.)
1.2. Analysis
Father contends that the court “abusively limited” father
from presenting both his case in chief and rebuttal case. We
disagree.
Father’s witness list contained over 60 witnesses, whose
testimony was estimated at over 115 hours: nine expert witnesses
(whose testimony was estimated at 22 hours), two party
witnesses (himself and mother, whose testimony was estimated
at 24 hours), and 50 collateral witnesses (whose testimony was
estimated at nearly 70 hours). These estimates did not include
rebuttal witnesses. Many of the collaterals were current or
former employees of father, “family friend[s],” current and former
coworkers of father’s, and relatives of father’s. Some, such as
former neighbors of mother, appeared to be offered for the sole
purpose of discrediting mother. The court concluded that father’s
list was “excessive, duplicative, redundant, and largely
irrelevant.”
Father asserts that the court “allowed the Department,
minors’ counsel, and Mother’s counsel to litigate for weeks and
weeks of court time,” while unfairly limiting his witnesses.
However, the exhibit lists of the Department, children, and
mother largely overlapped with one another and with father’s
41
list. Moreover, we cannot fault the court for concluding that the
testimony of the children—who were absent from father’s witness
list—was of substantially greater relevance to the allegations of
the petition than the testimony of father’s coworkers, the
children’s teachers, former neighbors of mother’s, and other
people who likely had limited or no familiarity with father’s
interactions with the children in the home.5
Sixteen people on father’s witness list testified at trial.6
This included an expert witness on the issue of parental
alienation, as well as two former nannies employed by him, a
boat captain he hired, and a friend, who each generally testified
that father was a loving father and behaved appropriately with
the children and that the children loved him in return, and thus
impeached the children and mother’s testimony. One of the
nannies also testified that she heard mother speak badly of
father in the children’s presence. Father’s request to put
approximately 40 additional witnesses on the stand whose
testimony would likely have taken 18 additional trial days, if not
more, was inconsistent with “[t]he state’s strong interest in
prompt and efficient trials” and would “ ‘necessitate undue
consumption of time.’ [Citation.]” (Maricela C. v. Superior Court,
5 Although the children testified for weeks, the trial generally took
place for only three hours each trial day, and trial often did not take
place every day. Furthermore, the length of the children’s testimony
owed in part to father’s comprehensive cross-examinations. For
example, of the 16 days Al.G. was on the stand, seven days consisted of
cross-examination by father.
6 We do not include the children’s therapist, Dr. Poulter, in this total,
as he was called for the limited purpose of testifying about the
detriment to the children of visiting father during their testimony.
42
supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146–1147.) We have reviewed the
offer of proof and are unconvinced that father demonstrated that
each of the dozens of witnesses would have provided non-
cumulative and “relevant evidence of significant probative value
to the issue before the court.” (Id. at p. 1147.) For example, in the
offer of proof, father represented that the two nannies the court
allowed to testify would speak to mother’s false statements and
abusive behavior, the children’s positive relationship with father,
and father’s appropriate behavior with the children. Over twenty
of the other collateral witnesses would have testified to the same
or very similar issues.
Father further contends that the court abused its discretion
in denying his request to allow Dr. Dupee and Judge Aviva
Bobb—whom he describes as “two of the most significant,
independent witnesses”—to testify as rebuttal witnesses. In his
offers of proof, Father asserted that Dr. Dupee would testify
concerning her 2014 evaluation of the family, which he contends
supports his theory of parental alienation, and that her testimony
would impeach testimony from the children, mother and social
workers about whether the children were abused. Although the
court did not allow father to call Dr. Dupee, it accepted her report
into evidence.7 Father was able to cross-examine mother at
length about statements Dr. Dupee made regarding mother’s
behavior in the evaluation. Moreover, Gottlieb relied on Dr.
Dupee’s conclusions extensively in her report and cited Dr.
7 Father’s contention that Dr. Dupee’s report was excluded is not
supported by his record citations. In fact, on October 26, 2021, his
counsel expressly noted that Dr. Dupee’s report—marked as exhibit
385—had been admitted into evidence.
43
Dupee’s evaluation in her trial testimony multiple times as
support for her conclusions. The court did not abuse its discretion
or violate father’s due process rights by concluding that
testimony from a doctor whose last interaction with the family
took place when the children were between five and seven years
old was not of significant relevance to the allegations of the
petition, or to rebutting testimony concerning abuse that
allegedly took place after 2014, and would not justify the
additional consumption of court time.
Judge Bobb was a private judicial officer who presided over
dissolution proceedings between father and mother. Father did
not represent in his offers of proof that Judge Bobb had ever
interacted with the children, nor did he describe when Judge
Bobb’s involvement with the family ended. Mother’s testimony
indicates that Judge Bobb stepped down after mother filed a
motion to disqualify in or around 2016, years before much of the
conduct described in the petition and in the children’s testimony
took place.8 The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
Judge Bobb’s testimony was of limited relevance to the
allegations of the petition. The court could have also reasonably
8 The court instructed mother’s counsel that mother’s testimony
concerning Judge Bobb should pertain to the allegations in the petition
that mother failed to protect the children and should not address other
family law issues. Mother testified that when she raised concerns
about father’s conduct to Judge Bobb, she received reduced custody.
Even if Judge Bobb would have refuted mother’s claim that she was
prevented from reporting abuse, such testimony would not go to the
substance of the children’s allegations against father, but the issue of
mother’s credibility, which father already called into question through
the testimony of his witnesses and through his cross-examination of
mother.
44
concluded that testimony from a family law officer might turn the
dependency trial into another forum to relitigate family court
disputes, which would be an inappropriate use of court resources.
(See In re Nicholas E. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 458, 466 [“ ‘The
juvenile courts must not become a battleground by which family
law war is waged by other means.’ ”].)
In other portions of the argument section of his brief, father
contends that claims by the children of abuse “would have been
fully impeached if the trial court had allowed the impeachment
evidence proffered by Father in the way of: . . . Dr. Lynn
Steinberg, and Terri Barach, LMFT, and numerous percipient
nannies.” For purposes of argument, we will assume these
contentions are not forfeited because they were not raised under
the heading concerning the exclusion of evidence. We again
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
these rebuttal witnesses. Although the court did not allow father
to call all former nannies to the children as witnesses, he was
permitted to call two. Due process did not entitle father to put
every nanny who ever interacted with the children on the stand
to rebut the children’s testimony. (See In re Jordan R., supra, 205
Cal.App.4th at p. 133.)
Dr. Steinberg never met the children. The Department
expressed concerns that Dr. Steinberg had aligned with father
based on information he provided to her. Counsel for the children
stated that a brief conversation with Dr. Steinberg left her under
the impression that Dr. Steinberg was “predisposed to
determining that [the children] are liars, that they have been
pushed by the mother, and that this is a clear case of parental
alienation.” Before trial started, the court concluded that the bias
Dr. Steinberg had displayed was “quite shocking and
45
unconscionable and inappropriate.” It was not an abuse of
discretion to conclude that rebuttal testimony from Dr. Steinberg
would be of limited relevance, might be neither impartial nor
credible, and would necessitate undue consumption of court
time.9
Father has also failed to demonstrate that the court abused
its discretion in concluding that Barach’s testimony would be
cumulative or that its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission would
necessitate undue consumption of time. Barach was a therapist
agreed upon by the parties to facilitate visits between the
children and father. Al.G. testified that he felt that Barach was
not responsive to his concerns and dismissed his feelings about
father. According to his testimony, the children had met with
Barach “four or five times.” Father wished to call Barach to rebut
this testimony and to testify to a request she made to the court
that the children be evaluated by an expert on parental
alienation. However, every one of father’s witnesses called the
children’s credibility into question. Further, father did not
represent that Barach was an expert on parental alienation or
that she would opine that the children were indeed alienated,
merely that she believed an assessment of the children by such
an expert would be appropriate. Father was permitted to call an
expert witness on parental alienation, who testified that an
assessment of the children was not only unnecessary but possibly
unhelpful to determining whether they were alienated.
9 We also note that Gottlieb spoke with Dr. Steinberg and that
Dr. Steinberg’s impression of the family informed Gottlieb’s opinion
and testimony.
46
Finally, father broadly asserts that the court erred in
excluding documentary evidence. The only specific argument
advanced in his opening brief is that the court improperly
excluded the results of a polygraph test, even though it was not
prohibited by law from considering it under In re Jordan R.,
supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at page 121. An appellant forfeits a point
by failing to support it with reasoned argument. (Benach v.
County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) Father’s
assertion, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that the
court abused its discretion in excluding the results of his
polygraph testing. The absence of any argument with respect to
the remaining documentary evidence in the opening brief
likewise forfeits any contention of error with respect to its
exclusion.
2. Substantial evidence supports the court’s
jurisdictional findings.
2.1. Applicable Law
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for
substantial evidence. (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426,
1433; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.) Under
this standard of review, we determine only whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that
supports the juvenile court’s order, resolving all conflicts in
support of the determination and indulging all legitimate
inferences to uphold the lower court’s ruling. (In re John V.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212; In re Katrina C. (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) If there is substantial evidence to support
the juvenile court’s order, we must uphold the order even if other
47
evidence would support a contrary conclusion. (In re Megan S.
(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251.)
“ ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for
its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged
statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the
evidence.’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; accord, In re
M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 896 [“ ‘[a]s long as there is one
unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another
might be inappropriate’ ”].) A reviewing court may nonetheless
exercise its discretion to reach the merits of a parent’s further
arguments when “(1) the jurisdictional finding serves as the basis
for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal; (2) the
findings could be prejudicial to the appellant or could impact the
current or any future dependency proceedings; and (3) the finding
could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction.”
(In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1150.)
Here, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that counts brought under section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), (d)
and (j) were true as amended.
Section 300, former subdivision (b)(1), authorizes the
juvenile court to assume jurisdiction when “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child . . . .”
48
“A jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
requires the Department to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s
or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect
the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness
or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re
Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.) “Although section 300
requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at
the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not
wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.” (Id. at
pp. 601–602; accord, In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238
[“ ‘Although there must be a present risk of harm to the minor,
the juvenile court may consider past events to determine whether
the child is presently in need of juvenile court protection.’ ”].)
Counts b-1 and b-2 alleged inappropriate physical
discipline. “Whether a parent’s use of discipline on a particular
occasion falls within (or instead exceeds) the scope of this
parental right to discipline turns on three considerations: (1)
whether the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2)
whether the punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the
discipline was ‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3)
‘whether the amount of punishment was reasonable or excessive.’
[Citations.]” (In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 641.)
“Section 300, subdivision (c) states that a child who comes
within the following description is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court and may be adjudged a dependent thereof: ‘The
minor is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial
risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive
behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the
49
parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of
providing appropriate care. . . .’ ” (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 322, 329, superseded by statute on other grounds.)
“ ‘The statute thus sanctions intervention by the dependency
system in two situations: (1) when parental action or inaction
causes the emotional harm, i.e., when parental fault can be
shown; and (2) when the child is suffering serious emotional
damage due to no parental fault or neglect, but the parent or
parents are unable themselves to provide adequate mental health
treatment. [¶] In a situation involving parental “fault,” the
petitioner must prove three things: (1) the offending parental
conduct; (2) causation; and (3) serious emotional harm or the risk
thereof, as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal
or untoward aggressive behavior.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“Under Section 300, subdivision (d), a child comes within
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction if ‘[t]he child has been sexually
abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be
sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code,
by his or her parent . . . or a member of his or her household, or
the parent . . . has failed to adequately protect the child from
sexual abuse when the parent . . . knew or reasonably should
have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse.’
[Citations.] . . . Penal Code 11165.1 sets forth numerous
enumerated offenses that constitute child sexual abuse, sexual
assault, and sexual exploitation, with references to the Penal
Code.” (In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.) “Penal Code
section 11165.1, subdivision (a), provides that ‘ “sexual abuse”
means sexual assault or sexual exploitation’ and lists a number of
offenses that qualify as ‘sexual assault or sexual exploitation.’
Most of the offenses listed involve physical touching, child
50
trafficking/prostitution, or pornography. Penal Code section
11165.1, subdivision (b)(4), describes ‘intentional touching’ as
‘[t]he intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts . . . of
a child, . . . for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification . . . .”
The absence of physical evidence of sexual abuse does not
preclude a finding of sexual abuse. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “We note
that ‘[a]llegations of child molestation are serious; they merit
more than a rubber stamp. With the exception of death penalty
cases, it is hard to imagine an area of the law where there is a
greater need for reliable findings by the trier of fact. The
consequences of being wrong—on either side—are too great.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 243.)
“Subdivision (j) applies if (1) the child’s sibling has been
abused or neglected as defined in specified other subdivisions and
(2) there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or
neglected as defined in those subdivisions. [Citation.]” (In re I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
Whether there was substantial risk of harm to the children
may be established based on evidence of prior acts. (In re J.K.,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Evidence that an adult has a
“proven record of abusiveness” can suffice to support a finding of
substantial danger to a different minor. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 814, 824, superseded by statute on other grounds.)
“The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to
protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)
“ ‘[T]he more severe the type of . . . abuse, the lower the required
probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the
child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section
300.’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family
51
Services v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 149, 164.)
“While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current
conditions, the question under section 300 is whether
circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the
defined risk of harm.” (In re Rocco M., at p. 824.)
2.2. Analysis
Hein testified that, in her opinion, “emotional abuse is the
main aspect of this case.” We agree that the court’s jurisdictional
findings under section 300, subdivision (c), were supported by
substantial evidence. The children each testified to conduct by
father—including his constant surveillance of the children, his
use of belittling language, and his refusal to respect their bodily
autonomy—that resulted in “severe anxiety, depression, [and]
withdrawal.” (§ 300, subd. (c).) Each of the children testified to
thoughts of self-harm when at father’s home and anxiety about
returning. Al.G.’s extreme emotional response to testifying is also
indicative of severe emotional distress.
Although we need not consider the remaining counts to
affirm the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the children (In re
M.R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 896), we will address the
allegations of inappropriate physical discipline and sexual abuse
in light of the serious nature of these allegations and their
possible prejudice to father in future proceedings.
Father does not contend in his opening brief that there is
no substantial evidence to sustain the counts under section 300,
subdivisions (b), (d), and (j). With respect to count b-1, we have
reviewed the video recording of the June 4 incident that father
lodged with this court. Although it does not support aspects of
Al.G.’s initial description of the incident (i.e., father does not
shove Al.G. against the gate, nor does it appear that Al.G. lost
52
consciousness), the court could reasonably conclude that it does
not support father’s claim that he put his hand on Al.G.’s
shoulder and they both slipped and, instead, reflects an incident
in which father acted out of anger and without a genuine
disciplinary motive.10 The children’s testimony that father pulled
their hair and ears, punched and pushed them constitutes
substantial evidence of inappropriate physical discipline under
count b-2. We note that father does not assert that, even if the
children’s testimony was found credible, his physical discipline of
the children was genuine, warranted by the circumstances, or
reasonable. Likewise, An.G.’s testimony concerning the three
incidents in which father put his finger or fingers in his anus,
when accepted as true, is substantial evidence of serious physical
harm and sexual abuse as alleged in counts b-7 and d-2.
Together, this evidence also supports the court’s findings with
respect to counts j-1, j-2, and j-4.11
10 It appears to this court that father hurried to catch up with Al.G.,
who was about to exit the gate, and forcefully pulled him back. Al.G.
then either fell to the ground or was pulled there by father, who was
still holding onto Al.G.’s arms. Father leaned over Al.G. and appeared
to speak animatedly to him (the video has no audio). As Al.G. was lying
on the ground, father continued to hold him with one hand and
appeared to shake him. Meanwhile, Al.G. shielded his face with one
arm and, when father released him, with both arms. Father then
leaned over Al.G. and appeared to speak to him again. He then took
out his phone. Al.G. stood and walked back towards the house, and
father followed, holding his phone up and ostensibly recording Al.G.
11 Nothing in the juvenile court’s ruling suggests that it placed undue
weight on father’s strained relationship with the Department
employees in making its finding. Father cites In re Jasmine G. (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 282, 290, in which the court of appeal expressed
concern that the juvenile court’s order removing a teenaged child from
53
Father instead contends that there is insufficient credible
evidence. We reiterate that, where the substantial evidence
standard applies, “[t]he fact finder’s determination of the veracity
of a witness is final. [Citation.] Credibility determinations thus
are subject to extremely deferential review. [Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶]
Fact finders see and hear witnesses. The finder of the facts has a
view appellate courts lack. That view is better.” (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582 (Schmidt), italics
added.) Thus, “[t]he rule is settled that the credibility of a
witness and the weight to be accorded his testimony are
questions directed to the trier of fact who may accept all or part
of the testimony of any witness it believes to be true or may reject
all or any part which it believes to be untrue. [Citation.] Hence
testimony which would support a conclusion contrary to that
reached by the trier of fact must be disregarded by this court.”
(Estate of Durham (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 154, 155; accord,
Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631 [under
substantial evidence standard, the test is not the presence or
absence of a substantial conflict in the evidence” and “we will
her mother’s home suggested that “objectively measurable things like
disavowing corporal punishment under oath can still be trumped by a
parent’s having incorrect ideas about social workers, government
intervention in family life, and the whole juvenile justice ‘system’ that
do not sit well with social workers.” The parents in Jasmine G. had
expressed remorse for their physical discipline of the child and
participated in parenting classes and therapy, and the child expressed
no fear or anger towards them. (Id. at pp. 285–286.) Father has not
acknowledged or expressed remorse for the conduct alleged by the
children. Although his controlling behavior towards the Department
may have impacted the court’s opinion of him, other substantial
evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings.
54
look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting
the successful party, and disregard the contrary showing”].)
Father’s position on appeal presumes that we can consider the
testimony of witnesses supporting his position and supplant the
juvenile court’s credibility determinations with our own, neither
of which we are at liberty to do. Accordingly, and contrary to
father’s contention in his reply brief, the Department did not act
improperly in focusing on the evidence that supported the court’s
jurisdictional findings in its respondent’s brief.
Although we may ultimately only consider the evidence
that supports the court’s ruling, we reviewed the extensive record
and are aware of inconsistencies between the children’s
testimony and their statements to social workers and forensic
investigators, as well as inconsistencies between one child’s
testimony regarding certain events and another’s. It is evident
from the record that the allegations of sexual abuse expanded
over time.12 However, the children were subject to extensive
cross-examination and offered explanations for some of these
inconsistencies. The court credited testimony from the children
that their participation in therapy allowed them to speak more
12 For example, when Al.G. spoke with Figueroa, he denied that
father’s mouth touched his penis during belly time. However, at trial,
he testified that father put his mouth on his penis during belly time
and that this occurred around 100 times. Likewise, An.G. informed
Figueroa that father had put his hand on An.G.’s butt once. He later
told Garza that father had sexually abused him by “ ‘put[ting] his
finger in [An.G.’s] butt’ ” an afternoon after they had gone boating, and
that it had happened twice before but he could not recall the details. At
trial, he was able to testify to all three incidents in some detail and
there was no mention of the boating trip in relation to these
allegations.
55
openly about the abuse than they felt able to in prior interviews,
and Hein’s testimony that inconsistencies in the children’s stories
could owe to the lapse in time in reporting and the children’s
developmental stage and did not mean their allegations were not
credible. Father’s assertion that any inconsistencies in the
testimony demonstrate “an alignment with [the] alienating
Mother” is one interpretation of the evidence. It is not the only
interpretation supported by substantial evidence.
The court’s rejection of father’s alienation theory was not
patently absurd. Father contends that Gottlieb should have been
entitled to greater weight in determining credibility, as she was
an “impartial, independent professional[] with an intimate and
percipient knowledge of the entire family dynamic.” (Italics
omitted.) In Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th
621, the court rejected the assertion that a trier of fact must
accept uncontradicted expert testimony as “ ‘conclusive.’ ” (Id. at
p. 632.) The court explained that, “ ‘as a general rule, “provided
the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily, he may reject in toto the
testimony of a witness, even though the witness is
uncontradicted. [Citations.]” [Citation.] This rule is applied
equally to expert witnesses.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The exceptional
principle requiring a fact finder to accept uncontradicted expert
testimony as conclusive applies only in professional negligence
cases where the standard of care must be established by expert
testimony.” (Ibid.) This is not such a case.
Thus, although Gottlieb was the sole expert presented on
issues of parental alienation, the court did not act arbitrarily in
concluding that Gottlieb’s testimony lacked credibility. Gottlieb
never spoke with the children or mother and relied on materials
provided to her by father, which she ultimately acknowledged
56
might not reflect the whole clinical picture. She was paid a
substantial sum of money by father for her reports and trial
testimony. A trier of fact could reasonably question both her
impartiality and her intimacy with the facts of the case.13
We therefore conclude the court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over the children was appropriate under the deferential
substantial evidence standard of review.
3. Bias
3.1. Applicable Law
“California’s substantial state statutory system for dealing
with alleged judicial bias . . . requires those concerned about
judicial bias to file in the trial court and, if dissatisfied, to
petition for writ of mandate, which is the exclusive means of
review.” (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 588; accord, People
v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000 [“ ‘Under our statutory
13 Even if we could reweigh the evidence and conclude that the
accusations of physical and sexual abuse were exaggerated or
fabricated, it is not clear that the correct course would have been to
dismiss the petition, as father contends. In In re Christopher C. (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 73, the court concluded that a child’s willingness to
make false allegations was demonstrative of serious emotional damage
within the meaning of subdivision (c). The petitioner in Christopher C.
presented evidence that the parents’ conduct during an ongoing
custody dispute had caused the children to make false “allegations of
sexual and physical abuse,” and rendered them “unable to distinguish
reality from fiction.” (Id. at p. 84) There is substantial evidence here
that father contributed to the children’s awareness of discord between
himself and mother, including by recording the children for the stated
purpose of protecting himself in court (including when Al.G. was
visibly upset and repeatedly asked him to stop) and speaking poorly of
mother and discussing her purported brainwashing with the children.
57
scheme, a petition for writ of mandate is the exclusive method for
obtaining review of a denial of a judicial qualification motion.’
[Citation.]”].) Father moved to disqualify the juvenile court under
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 and filed a writ petition
challenging the court’s order striking his disqualification
statement, which a panel of this court summarily denied.
“Because writ relief is the only authorized mode of appellate
review for peremptory challenges, [the Court of Appeal’s]
decision, in contrast to routine summary denials, is binding on
the parties, and cannot be revisited on a subsequent appeal.”
(Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 415; accord,
D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake School (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 836,
849–850 [appellate court could not “revisit whether the judge
should have disqualified himself” after it had summarily denied
writ petition].)
Thus, we may not consider any statutory claim of bias.
Rather, the “only avenue for [father’s] bias argument is the due
process clause, which sets an exceptionally stringent standard.”
(Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.) “It is ‘extraordinary’
for an appellate court to find judicial bias amounting to a due
process violation. [Citation.] The appellate court’s role is not to
examine whether the trial judge’s behavior left something to be
desired, or whether some comments would have been better left
unsaid, but to determine whether the judge’s behavior was so
prejudicial it denied the party a fair, as opposed to a perfect,
trial.” (Ibid.)
The assertion that bias is demonstrated where the court
uniformly believes one party’s evidence and rejects the other
party’s evidence “is contrary to the great weight of authority. For
example, in McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1916) 172 Cal. 6,
58
11, it was held that numerous and continuous rulings against a
litigant, even when erroneous, form no ground for a charge of bias
or prejudice. This rule is tenable in both a judicial and an
administrative context. . . . As the Supreme Court declared, ‘total
rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn the integrity
or competence of a trier of fact.’ [Citations.]” (Andrews v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795–796.)
Thus, “adverse or erroneous rulings, especially those that are
subject to review, do not establish a charge of judicial bias.”
(People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112, disapproved in
part on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76,
151.)
“ ‘[W]hen the state of mind of the trial judge appears to be
adverse to one of the parties but is based upon actual observance
of the witnesses and the evidence given during the trial of an
action, it does not amount to that prejudice against a litigant
which disqualifies him in the trial of the action. It is his duty to
consider and pass upon the evidence produced before him, and
when the evidence is in conflict, to resolve that conflict in favor of
the party whose evidence outweighs that of the opposing party.
The opinion thus formed, being the result of a judicial hearing,
does not amount to [improper] bias and prejudice . . . .’
[Citation.]” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219–1220.)
3.2. Analysis
Father cites rulings that were reversed following writ
petitions as evidence of the court’s bias against him. He also
argues that the fact that the court limited his witnesses and
documentary evidence after the adverse rulings on his writ
petition further demonstrate the court’s bias, as does the fact
59
that the court overruled father’s objections a greater percentage
of the time than it overruled the objections of the other parties.
Father does not attempt to demonstrate that all or most of his
overruled objections were meritorious, or that the objections of
other parties were sustained despite being unfounded. Statistics
alone are insufficient to persuade us that the court acted in a
clearly biased manner.14 Even if the juvenile court’s rulings were
erroneous or an abuse of discretion in part, “numerous and
continuous rulings against a litigant, even when erroneous, form
no ground for a charge of bias or prejudice.” (Andrews v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 795–
796.)
Father further contends that the court’s suspension of his
visitation with the children demonstrates bias. However, the
court’s order was not “sua sponte,” as he claims. The Department
requested that visitation be temporarily suspended while the
children testified and the court issued the order, explaining that
“[Al.G.] was uncontrollably sobbing for over 30 minutes
yesterday, was again crying today, describes having nightmares
of father, anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, is on medication
or has been for the last three to four weeks. “The court clearly
believed the order was necessary to protect the children’s
emotional wellbeing. To the extent its order also suggested an
adverse frame of mind against father, it was “ ‘based upon actual
14 At the time of trial, the children were all under the age of 14. The
court had an obligation to “take special care to protect [them] from
undue harassment or embarrassment, and to restrict the unnecessary
repetition of questions.” (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (b).)
60
observance of the witnesses.’ ” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v.
Colombo, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.)
Following a writ petition by father, this court ordered that
the juvenile court must hold a properly noticed hearing within
three weeks of the date of its order on the issue of father’s
visitation with the children. Father asserts that the court’s bias
is further demonstrated by the fact that it would not move the
hearing on visitation to accommodate an emergency surgery.
When father’s attorney informed the court that father would be
having surgery on the date that the hearing was set to take place,
the court advised her that it intended to comply with the court of
appeal’s order, which it understood to require that a hearing be
completed within three weeks, and that father should seek a
continuance from this court. The juvenile court set the hearing
two days after father’s surgery to accommodate his request to
attend the hearing remotely, while still complying with its
understanding of this court’s order. When father’s counsel later
informed the court that there had been complications and father
would be unable to participate, the court stated: “[I]f it was up to
me, I’d find good cause to grant a continuance; but it’s not up to
me. I’m following the mandate of the Court of Appeal.” The court
reiterated that it had advised counsel to seek an extension from
the court of appeal. This court’s clarification that there was no
deadline by which to conclude the hearing on visitation came
after the children’s therapist, Dr. Stephen Poulter, had testified
for several hours. We do not find the court’s handling of this issue
to be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.
We are also not persuaded that the juvenile court’s denial
of father’s request to have Dr. Steinberg and Barach testify at the
visitation hearing was indicative of bias. The court’s conclusion
61
that the children’s therapist was in the best position to opine on
whether visiting father during their testimony would be
detrimental to the children’s mental health was reasonable. As
discussed above, Dr. Steinberg and Barach were neutral
therapists whose intended role was to facilitate the children’s
visitation with father. Dr. Steinberg never met the children,
however. And although Barach met with the children on at least
four or five occasions, father identifies no evidence that she was
as familiar with their emotional wellbeing as Dr. Poulter, who
had been providing one-on-one therapy to the children on a
weekly basis for months. Thus, we are not persuaded that father
had met the exceptionally stringent standard for demonstrating
bias.15
The court’s accommodation of requests from other parties
and counsel for time off trial also fails to support father’s claim of
bias, as father presents no evidence that the other requests could
have potentially put the juvenile court at risk of violating an
order of this court. Indeed, father’s and his counsel’s requests for
days off were granted in other contexts.
Finally, father contends that the court’s questioning of
certain witnesses was inappropriate. As a general matter, a court
may appropriately question witnesses, particularly in a bench
trial. (See People v. Randal (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 105, 109–110
[court in bench trial “had both the right and the duty to satisfy
[itself] as fully as possible on the credibility of the respective
witnesses”].) Father cites the supplemental clerk’s transcript
15 Similarly, we reject father’s contention that the court’s exclusion of
other witnesses and how it handled one of mother’s witnesses showed
bias.
62
rather than the trial transcript in support of these claims.
Without full context, we are unable to judge the reasonableness
of the court’s questioning or interjections. We have reviewed the
trial transcript in its entirety and did not perceive any
inappropriate interference in the proceedings by the court.16
4. The juvenile court was the proper venue to resolve the
allegations of the petition.
Finally, we agree with the Department that father’s
contention that this matter was more suited to family court is
unsupported. “ ‘The juvenile courts must not become a
battleground by which family law war is waged by other
means . . . .’ But where the Department is able to prove that
dependency jurisdiction is warranted, these concerns must give
way to the primacy of the dependency court jurisdiction and its
special role.” (In re Nicholas E., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 466;
see also In re Roger S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30–31 [“Although
both the family court and the juvenile court focus on the best
16 In the portion of father’s opening brief concerning the court’s
purported bias in admonishing his counsel, a number of citations to the
record are incorrect or impossible to follow. For example, he cites “4RT
5” and “6RT 5,” even though the fourth volume of the reporter’s
transcript contains pages 901 to 1,200 and the sixth volume contains
pages 1,501 to 1,800. “If a party fails to support an argument with the
necessary citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be
stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived.” (Duarte v.
Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)
Accordingly, contentions supported by incorrect record citations are
forfeited. Even if father had provided appropriate citations, one of his
arguments is that the court incorrectly admonished his trial counsel
for his tone with a witness “when, in fact there were no tone issues at
all.” We are not in a position to decide such issues on a cold record.
63
interests of the child, the juvenile court has a special
responsibility to the child as parens patriae and must look at the
totality of the child’s circumstances.”].) The court’s jurisdictional
findings were supported by substantial evidence. “The long and
ongoing family law proceeding between [f]ather and [m]other
does not change the analysis under section 300 here.” (In re D.B.
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622.)17
17 The heading in father’s opening brief contends that “alternatively,
the court should have kept the case open for services,” yet advances no
arguments in furtherance of this claim. He therefore forfeits this point.
Even if it were not forfeited, we perceive no error. The children
remained with their custodial parent; father was not entitled to
reunification services and termination of jurisdiction was appropriate.
(In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 212.)
64
DISPOSITION
The court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition orders
terminating jurisdiction are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
65