People v. Wiley ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 11/29/23
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,            A165613
    v.                         (Humboldt County Super. Ct.
    ERIC DAVID WILEY,                          Nos. CR1902147B, CR2101049)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Defendant Eric David Wiley appeals after the trial court imposed a
    prison sentence that includes a three-year upper term for a conviction of
    criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422.1
    Wiley argues the court erred under federal and state law because in
    selecting the upper term, it relied in part on aggravating factors—the
    increasing seriousness of Wiley’s convictions and his poor performance on
    probation—that were not admitted by Wiley or found true by a jury beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    We conclude the court properly considered the aggravating factors
    challenged by Wiley. They were proved by a certified record of Wiley’s
    convictions, and they fall within the prior conviction exception to the
    1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    1
    heightened proof requirements that apply to other types of aggravating
    factors. We therefore affirm.2
    I. BACKGROUND3
    A criminal complaint filed in May 2019 charged Wiley in case
    No. CR1902147B with kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 1) and making a
    criminal threat (§ 422; count 2). In January 2020, Wiley entered a guilty plea
    to the criminal threat charge. The trial court dismissed the kidnapping
    charge as part of a plea deal. In July 2020, the trial court imposed the upper
    term of three years, but suspended the execution of the sentence and placed
    Wiley on probation for three years. A condition of probation was that Wiley
    obey all laws.
    An information filed in December 2021 charged Wiley in case
    No. CR2101049 with possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
    count 1), possession of a billy club (§ 22210; count 2), and possession of a stun
    gun by a felon (§ 22610, subd. (a); count 3). The information alleged Wiley
    had sustained a prior serious felony conviction, a strike, i.e., his criminal
    threat conviction in case No. CR1902147B. In March 2022, Wiley entered a
    guilty plea to the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. The court
    2 Because we conclude the court did not err by considering the
    aggravating factors challenged by Wiley, we need not address the parties’
    arguments about (1) whether Wiley forfeited his claim of error by failing to
    raise it in the trial court, and (2) whether the alleged error was prejudicial,
    including the question of which standard of prejudice should apply (see
    People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted
    Aug. 10, 2022, S274942).
    3 We recount only those background facts necessary to resolution of the
    sentencing issue raised on appeal (i.e., whether the trial court properly relied
    on Wiley’s record of prior convictions in selecting the upper term). In
    particular, the events underlying Wiley’s present convictions are not material
    to our analysis of that question.
    2
    dismissed the other counts and the prior conviction allegation as part of the
    plea deal. The court found that, by committing the offense of possessing a
    firearm while a felon, Wiley had violated the terms of his probation in the
    criminal threat case.
    As we discuss further below, the court later sentenced Wiley for his
    convictions in both matters, imposing an aggregate prison term of three
    years, eight months. The court imposed the three-year upper term for the
    criminal threat conviction and a consecutive term of eight months (one-third
    the midterm) for the firearm possession conviction. (§§ 422, subd. (a), 29800,
    subd. (a)(1), 18.)
    Wiley appealed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Wiley contends that, by imposing the upper term for his criminal threat
    conviction, the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution as well as the revised standards that govern determinate triad
    sentencing under section 1170, subdivision (b) following its amendment by
    Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), legislation that
    took effect on January 1, 2022. Specifically, Wiley argues the court engaged
    in impermissible factfinding when it considered as aggravating circumstances
    the increasing seriousness of his convictions and his prior poor performance
    on probation, two circumstances that Wiley did not admit and that were not
    found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude the court did
    not err in considering these circumstances.
    A. Additional Background
    At a sentencing hearing on June 24, 2022, the court noted that, in the
    earlier case involving the criminal threat charge under section 422 (case
    No. CR1902147B), Wiley had entered an open plea and had not stipulated to
    a three-year term. The court stated the probation report in the threat case
    3
    listed several prior convictions, but the report “is not a certified rap sheet. If
    you want me to consider those things, I would need a certified rap sheet.”
    The court continued the sentencing hearing to July 1, 2022.
    At the reconvened hearing on July 1, 2022, the court considered a
    “certified rap sheet” recording Wiley’s several prior convictions, and the
    parties presented arguments (largely based on the rap sheet) about whether
    the court should impose the two-year midterm or the three-year upper term
    as the principal term (which would result in an aggregate sentence of either
    two years, eight months, or three years, eight months).4 In the course of his
    argument, defense counsel stated, “I do understand the Court, itself, without
    a jury can find [the] aggravated term based on the defendant’s rap sheet.”
    After hearing argument from both counsel, the court, as noted, imposed
    the three-year upper term for the criminal threats charge, with an eight-
    month consecutive term for the firearm possession charge. The court stated
    that, in making this decision, it was considering Wiley’s performance on
    probation in the threat case, his prior felony convictions, a prior prison term,
    the fact that two previous grants of probation had terminated unsuccessfully
    in custodial sentences, and the increasing seriousness of his convictions. (See
    Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)–(5).)5
    4 Although the court had previously imposed and suspended the three-
    year upper term for the threat conviction in July 2020, the court clarified
    with defense counsel at the July 1, 2022 sentencing hearing that “because it
    is not a final sentence, you are asking the Court [to] resentence on that?”
    Counsel confirmed that was his request, and the court stated, “I think that is
    an appropriate argument to make so go ahead.”
    5 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.Rule 4.421(b)
    sets forth aggravating factors “relating to the defendant” (such as the
    numerosity and seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions, and the
    defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole), while rule 4.421(a)
    4
    As to the last point, the court stated: “I do think that the [current
    offenses under sections] 29800 [firearm possession] and 422 [criminal
    threats] [are] increasing in seriousness from the drug type cases he has had
    previously as well as the DUI though it is about the same seriousness, the
    29800 as the 30305 [a prior conviction for possession of ammunition].” As to
    the threat charge under section 422 specifically, the court noted that offense
    was “more serious [than Wiley’s prior offenses], and it is designated as such
    in the statute,” i.e., making a criminal threat in violation of section 422 is
    statutorily classified as a “ ‘serious felony.’ ” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(38).)6
    The court stated that, based on the above factors reflected in Wiley’s
    criminal history, it would not be appropriate to sentence him to the midterm,
    and the court would instead “follow the negotiated disposition,” i.e., the three-
    year upper term resulting from Wiley’s earlier plea to the threats charge.
    The court summarized its ruling: “I am—having considered whether or not
    midterm or high term is appropriate based on his prior convictions, poor
    performance on probation, and the fact that the charges are becoming more
    serious, the Court is going to choose the high term or three years on the 422
    [criminal threats] case, CR1902147B.”
    lists factors “relating to the crime” (such as whether the crime involved “great
    violence” or “a high degree of cruelty,” and whether the victim was
    “particularly vulnerable”).
    6 Earlier in the hearing, defense counsel made a similar point,
    emphasizing Wiley’s prior offenses were nonviolent, but noting a criminal
    threat conviction under section 422 “is a violent offense” or one that “involves
    some sort of alleged violent conduct.”
    5
    B. The Trial Court’s Consideration of Wiley’s Criminal History as
    Reflected in his Record of Convictions Did Not Violate the Sixth
    Amendment or Section 1170, Subdivision (b)
    1. The Sixth Amendment
    Under the Sixth Amendment, “ ‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior
    conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
    prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Catarino (2023) 
    14 Cal.5th 748
    , 754,
    quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490.) The California
    Supreme Court has explained that the prior conviction exception to the jury
    trial right in this context encompasses certain aggravating circumstances
    based on a defendant’s criminal history. (People v. Towne (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 63
    , 80–82 (Towne); People v. Black (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 799
    , 818–820 (Black).)
    Specifically, “[u]nder Cunningham [v. California (2007) 
    549 U.S. 270
    ],
    aggravating circumstances based on a defendant’s criminal history that
    render the defendant eligible for the upper term include a trial court’s finding
    that the defendant suffered a prior conviction (Black, 
    supra,
     41 Cal.4th at
    pp. 818–820); that the defendant suffered prior convictions that are
    numerous or increasingly serious (ibid.); that the defendant was on probation
    or parole at the time the offense was committed [(Towne, 
    supra,
     44 Cal.4th at
    pp. 80–81)]; and that the defendant performed unsatisfactorily while on
    probation or parole to the extent such unsatisfactory performance is
    established by the defendant’s record of prior convictions (id. at p. 82).”
    (People v. Scott (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 363
    , 405.)
    Under these precedents, the Sixth Amendment did not require that a
    jury make the determinations at issue here—the questions whether Wiley’s
    convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether his previous
    performance on probation was poor (to the extent that performance was
    6
    established by his record of convictions). In his reply brief, Wiley responds to
    the Attorney General’s citation of Black and Towne by suggesting those cases
    may have been undercut by subsequent decisions, including People v.
    Gallardo (2017) 
    4 Cal.5th 120
     (Gallardo), which overruled People v. McGee
    (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 682
    , a case relied on by Black and Towne. But we find no
    basis to ignore Black or Towne (or Scott, which followed them), decisions from
    our state’s high court that address the precise issue presented here, have not
    been overruled, and (as Wiley acknowledges) are binding on this court. (Auto
    Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 
    57 Cal.2d 450
    , 455.)7
    2. Section 1170, Subdivision (b), as Amended by Senate Bill 567
    “Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to specify that,
    when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen
    term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the
    aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the defendant’s stipulation
    to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived) beyond a
    reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified
    7 We note Gallardo concluded the McGee decision was “no longer
    tenable insofar as it authorizes trial courts to make findings about the
    conduct that ‘realistically’ gave rise to a defendant’s prior conviction.”
    (Gallardo, 
    supra,
     4 Cal.5th at p. 134, italics added.) The inquiries at issue
    here involve the determination of recidivism-related factors based solely on a
    certified record of the prior convictions, without any factfinding as to the
    conduct underlying those convictions. (See Towne, 
    supra,
     44 Cal.4th at
    pp. 90–92 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.) [contrasting the approach authorized in
    McGee with the inquiries approved in Towne].)
    The other legal development identified by Wiley—the high court’s
    decision in Alleyne v. United States (2013) 
    570 U.S. 99
    , 116, 103 [holding jury
    trial right attaches to facts that increase the minimum sentence for a crime;
    overruling Harris v. United States (2002) 
    536 U.S. 545
     on that point]—also
    provides no basis to disregard the decisions in Black and Towne as to the
    scope of the prior conviction exception to the jury trial right.
    7
    record of conviction. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding § 1170,
    subd. (b)(1)–(3), by amendment.)” (People v. Jones (2022) 
    79 Cal.App.5th 37
    ,
    44.)8
    Notably, the amended statute “preserves [the] distinction” in Sixth
    Amendment jurisprudence establishing “ ‘the right to a jury trial does not
    apply to the fact of a prior conviction.’ ” (People v. Pantaleon (2023)
    
    89 Cal.App.5th 932
    , 938 (Pantaleon).) While section 1170, subdivision (b)(1)
    and (2) generally require that aggravating factors supporting an upper term
    be submitted to a jury,9 section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) states:
    “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) [of section 1170, subdivision (b)],
    the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
    sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
    prior convictions to a jury. This paragraph does not apply to enhancements
    imposed on prior convictions.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
    Wiley argues that, even if the prior conviction exception to the Sixth
    Amendment jury trial right includes related matters provable from a record
    8 Senate Bill 567 took effect on January 1, 2022, prior to Wiley’s
    sentencing hearings in June and July of that year, and the record reflects the
    court applied the new statutory framework, including requiring that any
    arguments based on Wiley’s criminal record be supported by a certified record
    of his convictions. This case does not involve retroactive application of Senate
    Bill 567.
    9 Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) states “the court shall, in its sound
    discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term,
    except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” The referenced paragraph
    provides in part: “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle
    term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
    justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
    and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
    defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
    jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
    8
    of convictions (rather than just the bare fact of a prior conviction), the prior
    conviction exception in section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) should be construed
    more narrowly. He contends section 1170, subdivision(b)(3) does not
    authorize a court, even when relying on a certified record of convictions, to
    determine whether the convictions are of increasing seriousness or whether
    the defendant has previously performed unsatisfactorily on probation.
    The Courts of Appeal that have weighed in to date are divided on this
    question. Some courts have treated the prior conviction exception under
    section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) as having the same scope as the exception
    under the Sixth Amendment. (Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 938
    [under Sixth Amendment and § 1170, subd. (b)(3), “the fact of a prior
    conviction includes ‘other related issues that may be determined by
    examining the records of the prior convictions’ ”]; accord, People v. Ross
    (2022) 
    86 Cal.App.5th 1346
    , 1353, review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S278266
    [under § 1170, subd. (b)(3), trial court could rely on certified conviction
    records to consider recidivism-based aggravating factors under rule 4.421(b),
    including the defendant’s multiple offenses, prior prison term, and poor
    performance on parole and probation; trial court committed Senate Bill 567
    error, however, by relying on “crime-based aggravating factors” set forth in
    rule 4.421(a)]; People v. Flowers (2022) 
    81 Cal.App.5th 680
    , 685–686, review
    granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276237.)
    Other courts have suggested that, under section 1170,
    subdivision (b)(3), such factors as the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s
    convictions must (at least in some circumstances) be submitted to a jury
    rather than determined by the court from a certified record of convictions.
    (See People v. Butler (2023) 
    89 Cal.App.5th 953
    , 959, 961, 955, review
    granted May 31, 2023, S279633 [in analyzing prejudice from Senate Bill 567
    9
    error, appellate court stated (1) prior prison terms “could have been proven
    by certified records of conviction,” but (2) it was “not clear whether a jury
    would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Butler’s four admitted
    prior convictions were of ‘increasing seriousness’ ”]; People v. Falcon (2023)
    
    92 Cal.App.5th 911
    , 952, fn. 12, 953–955, review granted Sept. 13, 2023,
    S281242 (Falcon) [noting “amended section 1170(b) now effectively
    incorporates Sixth Amendment principles,” but questioning whether § 1170,
    subd. (b)(3) has the same scope as the constitutional exception for prior
    convictions, and ultimately declining to resolve that question];10 see also
    People v. Dunn (2022) 
    81 Cal.App.5th 394
    , 404–405 & fn. 8, review granted
    Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 [some aggravating factors were proved by certified
    record of conviction or by defendant’s admission; that defendant was on
    probation at time of charged offense was not proved by those methods, so
    upper term sentence was erroneous due to retroactive application of Senate
    Bill 567].)
    In our view, the prior conviction exception in section 1170,
    subdivision (b)(3) includes both the fact of a prior conviction and “other
    related issues” (Black, 
    supra,
     41 Cal.4th at p. 819) that may be determined
    from a certified record of conviction. (See Gallardo, 
    supra,
     4 Cal.5th at p. 138
    [“Our precedent instructs that determinations about the nature of prior
    convictions are to be made by the court, rather than a jury, based on the
    record of conviction.”].) As relevant here, these related issues include the two
    10 The Falcon court also suggested in a footnote (as Wiley argues here,
    see part II.B.1, ante) that the scope of the constitutional exception for prior
    convictions “may be debatable.” (Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 954,
    fn. 13, rev. granted.) As discussed above, we will follow the California
    Supreme Court’s holdings in Black, Towne, and Scott as to the scope of the
    constitutional exception.
    10
    factors Wiley contends the trial court should not have considered—the
    increasing seriousness of Wiley’s convictions (rule 4.421(b)(2)) and his poor
    prior performance on probation (rule 4.421(b)(5)).11
    As noted, section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) provides: “Notwithstanding
    paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior
    convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of
    conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. This paragraph
    does not apply to enhancements imposed on prior convictions.” The statute
    does not specify the court is limited to finding that a prior conviction
    occurred; instead, it states the court may “consider the defendant’s prior
    convictions in determining sentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) And, as our
    Supreme Court has recognized in the context of the prior conviction exception
    to the constitutional jury trial right, consideration of prior convictions may
    establish recidivism-based aggravating factors such as increasing seriousness
    of the convictions (Black, 
    supra,
     41 Cal.4th at pp. 818–820) or prior
    unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole (Towne, 
    supra,
     44 Cal.4th
    at p. 82). The statutory language does not suggest the Legislature sought to
    depart from our Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence on this point
    by establishing a significantly narrower statutory prior conviction exception.
    (See Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 938 [the amended statute
    “preserves [the] distinction” in Sixth Amendment case law establishing “ ‘the
    right to a jury trial does not apply to the fact of a prior conviction’ ”].)
    In one respect, the statutory prior conviction exception in section 1170,
    subdivision (b)(3) does differ from the constitutional exception—the statute
    11 Wiley acknowledges that, under section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), the
    trial court could consider the prior convictions themselves as shown in the
    certified rap sheet as a circumstance in aggravation.
    11
    requires that a trial court’s “consider[ation]” of prior convictions be “based on
    a certified record of conviction.” This proviso limits the class of materials on
    which a trial court may rely in finding aggravating factors based on prior
    convictions. For example, courts have held a probation report is not a
    certified record of conviction for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (b)(3)
    (e.g., People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403, rev. granted; Falcon,
    supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 942, rev. granted), while the constitutional prior
    conviction exception is not so limited (Towne, 
    supra,
     44 Cal.4th at pp. 76, 82
    [probation report established defendant’s prior convictions and that several of
    them occurred while he was on probation]; Black, 
    supra,
     41 Cal.4th at p. 818
    [probation report showed defendant’s convictions were numerous and of
    increasing seriousness]).
    In contrast to this legislative decision to specify a method of proof of
    prior convictions that differs from that required by case law addressing the
    constitutional prior conviction exception, the statutory text does not narrow
    the types of recidivism-based aggravating factors that may be established by
    a defendant’s prior convictions. We think the most reasonable construction of
    section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) is that, once a defendant’s prior convictions
    are properly established by a certified record, a trial court may “consider”
    those convictions in determining whether related aggravating factors apply,
    as is the case under the constitutional prior conviction exception. Depending
    on the record in a particular case, the aggravating factors that may be proven
    in this manner include the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s convictions
    and the defendant’s poor prior performance on probation or parole. (People v.
    Scott, 
    supra,
     61 Cal.4th at p. 405; Black, 
    supra,
     41 Cal.4th at pp. 818–820;
    Towne, 
    supra,
     44 Cal.4th at p. 82.)
    12
    3. The Trial Court Correctly Relied on Certified Records To
    Find the Aggravating Factors Challenged by Wiley
    As noted, the trial court, applying section 1170, subdivision (b)(3),
    required that the prosecution provide a certified record of Wiley’s convictions
    and then selected the upper term based on those convictions as reflected in a
    certified rap sheet. The court considered several recidivism-related factors,
    including Wiley’s prior felony convictions, a prior prison term, his poor
    performance on probation, and the increasing seriousness of his convictions.
    The court did not err by considering the two factors challenged by
    Wiley. First, as to increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), the court could
    properly conclude, based on the record of convictions, that Wiley’s recent
    conviction for making a criminal threat (§ 422), a statutorily designated
    serious felony (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(38)), was more serious than his prior
    convictions, which were for drug offenses, driving under the influence (DUI),
    and possession of ammunition. Contrary to Wiley’s suggestion, this
    determination did not require the court to engage in factfinding about the
    specifics of the offenses or to make subjective value judgments as to the
    relative seriousness of similar crimes. (See Black, 
    supra,
     41 Cal.4th at
    pp. 819–820 [trial court may determine whether a defendant’s convictions are
    “ ‘numerous or of increasing seriousness’ ” under rule 4.421(b)(2) by
    considering “the number, dates, and offenses of the prior convictions alleged”
    and “the range of punishment provided by statute for each offense”].)
    As to the range of punishment, Wiley points out the statute governing
    one of his prior drug offenses (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a))
    specifies a sentencing triad of two, three, or four years, while his current
    convictions for criminal threats (§ 422) and unlawful firearm possession
    (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) are punishable by terms of 16 months, two years, or
    three years (§ 18). By that metric, he suggests, his current offenses are not
    13
    more serious than all of his prior offenses. But in our view, despite the
    slightly different triads applicable to the various offenses, Wiley’s progression
    from drug and other offenses that are not designated as serious felonies to a
    criminal threat conviction that is a “ ‘serious felony’ ” (§ 1192.7,
    subd. (c)(38))—carrying significant potential future consequences (§§ 667,
    subds. (a)(1), (b)–(i), 1170.12)—reflects “increasing seriousness” under
    rule 4.421(b)(2) since he is on a path toward violence.
    Second, as to Wiley’s prior performance on probation (rule 4.421(b)(5)),
    the record of convictions reflects that, in at least one previous case, he
    violated probation by sustaining convictions of new offenses. (Towne, supra,
    44 Cal.4th at p. 82 [“When a defendant’s prior unsatisfactory performance on
    probation or parole is established by his or her record of prior convictions, it
    seems beyond debate that the aggravating circumstance is included within
    the [prior conviction] exception and that the right to a jury trial does not
    apply.”].) Wiley argues the record is mixed, showing he successfully
    completed probation or post-release community supervision (PRCS) on some
    occasions but not others. But the record of convictions supports the court’s
    determination that Wiley’s prior performance on probation—which included
    the commission of crimes while on probation—was “poor,” or, in the language
    of the rule, “unsatisfactory.” (Rule 4.421(b)(5).)
    14
    III. DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    STREETER, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    GOLDMAN, J.
    HIRAMOTO, J.*
    * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa,
    assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    15
    Trial Court:         Superior Court of California, County of
    Humboldt
    Trial Judge:         Hon. Kaleb V. Cockrum
    Counsel:             Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
    Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M.
    Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D.
    Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and
    Brady Baldwin, Deputy Attorney General, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    People v. Wiley – A165613
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A165613

Filed Date: 11/29/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/30/2023