Gutierrez v. Tostado ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 12/1/23
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ,                              H049983
    (Santa Clara County
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                 Super. Ct. No. 20CV361400)
    v.
    URIEL TOSTADO et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    Francisco Gutierrez appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted
    summary judgment in favor of respondents Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, on
    the basis that Gutierrez’s personal injury claims were time-barred under the Medical
    Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). Gutierrez contends that the trial court erred
    when it found MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence
    applicable. We conclude that because Tostado was a medical provider rendering
    professional services at the time the alleged negligence occurred, MICRA’s statute of
    limitations bars Gutierrez’s claims. We thus affirm the judgment.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Gutierrez was driving on Interstate 280 when he was forced to stop. Shortly after
    Gutierrez stopped, Tostado, who was driving an ambulance, rear-ended him. At the time
    of the accident, Tostado was an emergency medical technician (EMT) employed by
    ProTransport-1, LLC and was transporting a patient from one medical facility to another.
    While Tostado drove, his partner attended to the patient in the rear of the ambulance.
    Gutierrez was injured in the collision and visited a chiropractor for treatment within ten
    days of the incident.
    Almost two years later, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and
    ProTransport-1, alleging various personal injury claims. The respondents filed a motion
    for summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s claims were time barred under
    MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed that MICRA applied and
    granted the motion. The trial court concluded that because Tostado was transporting a
    patient at the time of the accident, he was rendering professional services. The trial court
    held that Gutierrez’s claims against the defendants were time-barred under the statute.
    Gutierrez timely appealed from the judgment.1
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    “We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, and in doing so, we review
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. [Citation.]” (Lopez v.
    American Medical Response West (2023) 
    89 Cal.App.5th 336
    , 342 (Lopez).) In this case,
    the trial court granted summary judgment based on its statutory construction of MICRA.
    We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (Aldana v. Stillwagon (2016) 
    2 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 6 (Aldana).)
    B. MICRA’s Statute of Limitations Bars Gutierrez’s Claims
    The trial court granted summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s
    action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in MICRA. Gutierrez contends
    that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims because MICRA does not apply to his
    1
    Gutierrez filed his notice of appeal on April 19, 2022, after the trial court had
    granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants but prior to judgment being
    entered. We issued an order to show cause as to why Gutierrez’s appeal should not be
    dismissed as premature. After the trial court filed the judgment and Gutierrez submitted
    a notice of submission of judgment, we discharged the order to show cause and deemed
    Gutierrez’s notice of appeal filed on July 11, 2022, the date judgment was entered.
    2
    personal injury claims. A personal injury action for negligence must generally be filed
    within two years of the date on which the injury occurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)2
    However, suits against health care providers for professional negligence must be filed
    within one year. (§ 340.5.) Gutierrez argues that the one-year statute of limitations does
    not apply to his action because his claims are for general negligence not professional
    negligence, and the duty that Tostado violated by crashing into his car was a duty of care
    generally owed to the public, not a professional duty owed by a medical provider to a
    patient.
    MICRA defines professional negligence as “a negligent act or omission to act by a
    health care provider in the rendering of professional services.” (§ 340.5, subd. (2).) The
    parties do not dispute that an EMT transporting a patient in an ambulance is providing
    medical care to the patient for purposes of the statute. (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 347; Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 
    160 Cal.App.4th 388
    , 407
    (Canister).) However, only actions “alleging injury suffered as a result of . . . the
    provision of medical care to patients” are covered. (Flores v. Presbyterian
    Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 75
    , 88, italics added (Flores).)
    In this appeal we must decide whether a driver in a separate vehicle, injured in a
    collision with an ambulance transporting a patient, was injured as a result of the provision
    of medical care, such that MICRA’s one year statute applies. Gutierrez urges us to find
    that any injury here was caused by ordinary negligence. He argues that where a medical
    provider owes no professional duty to the plaintiff and allegedly breaches only a duty
    owed to the general public, a claim for personal injuries should be governed by the two-
    year statute of limitations applicable to ordinary negligence. Conversely, respondent
    suggests that the critical question is not whether defendant owed plaintiff a professional
    duty, but simply whether plaintiff was injured as a result of the provision of medical
    2
    All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise
    stated.
    3
    services by defendant; in other words, was plaintiff’s injury a foreseeable consequence of
    defendant’s act of providing medical care?
    1. Legal Framework for MICRA
    The Supreme Court in Flores examined what it means for a health care provider to
    render professional services under MICRA. There, a hospital patient sued the hospital
    for negligence after the latch on her bedrail broke, causing her to fall and injure herself.
    (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 89.) The court considered the difference between regular
    negligence arising out of the duty owed to the general public, the negligence in the
    maintenance of equipment and premises that are merely convenient for, or incidental to,
    the provision of medical care to a patient, and the negligence that arises from the duty
    owed to patients in the rendering of professional services. (Id. at pp. 88-89.) The court
    found that “Even those parts of a hospital dedicated primarily to patient care typically
    contain numerous items of furniture and equipment—tables, televisions, toilets, and so
    on—that are provided primarily for the comfort and convenience of patients and visitors,
    but generally play no part in the patient’s medical diagnosis or treatment. Although a
    defect in such equipment may injure patients as well as visitors or staff, a hospital’s
    general duty to keep such items in good repair generally overlaps with the ‘obligations
    that all persons subject to California’s laws have[.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
    Relying on its prior decision in Lee v. Hanley (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 1225
    , 1237 (Lee)3,
    for this concept of overlapping duty, the court held that where there are overlapping
    3
    In Lee, the Court considered “section 340.5’s neighboring provision imposing a
    one-year statute of limitations for ‘[a]n action against an attorney for a wrongful act or
    omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services.’
    [Citation.]” (Flores, 
    supra,
     63 Cal.4th at p. 87.) The court decided “that section 340.6(a)
    is properly read to apply to claims that ‘depend on proof that an attorney violated a
    professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.’ [Citation.]”
    (Ibid.) Explaining that the statute excludes services unrelated to the law or matters that
    entail violations of professional obligations that may overlap with obligations that all
    persons have, the court emphasized that the statute applies when an attorney violates a
    4
    obligations—those owed to patients, and those owed to the general public—an injury
    resulting from a breach of a generally applicable obligation does not fall within MICRA.
    “Rather, the special statute of limitations for professional negligence actions against
    health care providers applies only to actions alleging injury suffered as a result of
    negligence in rendering the professional services that hospitals and others provide by
    virtue of being health care professionals: that is, the provision of medical care to
    patients.” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 88.) The court concluded that the hospital’s
    alleged negligence in the maintenance of plaintiff’s bedrail did not overlap with its
    general duty owed to the public because it was “integrally related to [plaintiff’s] medical
    diagnosis and treatment,” and was therefore professional negligence encompassed by
    MICRA. (Id. at p. 89.)
    Flores and Lee both considered whether the injury to the patient or client was
    caused by negligence in the provision of professional services or whether the injury was
    the result of the breach of some broader overlapping duty owed to the public. Gutierrez
    asks us to conclude that the contrast drawn in those cases, between a professional duty
    and the general duty owed to the public, means that MICRA only applies where the
    defendant owes a professional duty to the plaintiff. However, neither Flores nor Lee
    considered whether MICRA applies where the plaintiff is injured during the provision of
    professional services, as a result of those services, but was not the recipient of the
    services. In both of those cases, the plaintiff was either the client or the patient. Multiple
    courts have considered injuries to third parties who were not patients and have concluded
    that MICRA applied to their claims.
    In Canister, a police officer accompanying an arrestee in the back of an ambulance
    was injured when the ambulance hit a curb. At the time of the accident, the ambulance
    was being driven by one EMT while another attended to the arrestee in the rear of the
    professional obligation as opposed to some generally applicable nonprofessional
    obligation. (Id. at pp. 87-88.)
    5
    ambulance. The officer sued for negligence. (Canister, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 392.) After finding that an EMT was a health care provider and that transporting a
    patient constituted professional services within the meaning of MICRA, the Canister
    court held that MICRA extends to “ ‘any foreseeable injured party, including patients,
    business invitees, staff members or visitors, provided the injuries alleged arose out of
    professional negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 407-408.) The court concluded that it
    was foreseeable as a matter of law that a police officer accompanying an arrestee in an
    ambulance might be injured in the operation of the ambulance. (Id. at p. 408.)
    Gutierrez argues that Canister is no longer viable authority after Flores, because
    Flores set forth “a completely new framework for analyzing the scope of MICRA,
    making those prior cases irrelevant.” Flores neither mentions nor overrules Canister.
    (See Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345-346 [expressing doubt that Flores overruled
    Canister].) Nor did it need to. Because the plaintiff in Flores was a patient injured at the
    hospital due to faulty equipment, the analysis necessarily focused on whether the duty
    owed to plaintiff was that of a medical provider or a duty owed to the general public.
    The Flores court concluded that by providing the bedrail the hospital was providing
    medical care, not just a convenience incidental to care. The question before the Flores
    court was what duty was owed to its patient, not to whom their professional duty of care
    extended.
    2. Tostado was a medical provider providing medical care at the time of the
    accident.
    Tostado was transporting a patient who was receiving medical care at the time of
    the accident. He drove while his partner attended to the patient. There is no question that
    transporting a patient in an ambulance qualifies as the provision of medical care, and that
    the act of driving the ambulance is an integral part of that care. (Lopez, supra, 89
    Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) For certain patients, safe and quick ambulance transport may
    mean the difference between life and death. Even though the transport at issue here does
    6
    not appear to have been emergent, we cannot say that an interfacility transport is so trivial
    that it can be characterized as being “merely convenient for, or incidental to, the
    provision of medical care to a patient.” (Flores, 
    supra,
     63 Cal.4th at p. 88.) Consistent
    with Flores, driving the ambulance qualifies, under the circumstances here, as “rendering
    of professional services.” (See § 340.5, subd. (2); contrast Aldana, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th
    at pp. 5, 7-8 [MICRA does not apply where paramedic supervisor not transporting
    patient, but driving to the scene of an emergency in a truck].)
    3. Gutierrez was injured as a result of the provision of medical care.
    Because Gutierrez was not the recipient of the medical care, the question here is
    different from the one raised in Flores. It is not whether the injuries alleged were the
    result of general or professional negligence. Instead, the question here is whether an
    injury to a third party, who is not a patient, is subject to MICRA’s statute of limitations
    because the injury occurred during, and as a result of, the provision of medical care by a
    medical provider.
    The court in Lopez, a case decided after Flores, considered this issue and decided
    that nonpatients injured while an EMT was rendering professional services were subject
    to MICRA. In Lopez, plaintiffs were the patient who was being transported by an
    ambulance and his son who was also in the ambulance. Both were injured when the
    ambulance was in an accident. The Lopez court held, “MICRA’s statute of limitations
    applies to plaintiffs’ claims because their alleged injuries occurred while the EMT’s were
    rendering professional services by transporting plaintiffs in an ambulance. Plaintiffs’
    injuries resulted from [] negligence in the ‘use or maintenance of equipment [the
    ambulance] integrally related to [plaintiff’s] medical diagnosis and treatment’ and
    therefore was professional negligence for the purposes of section 340.5. [Citation.]”
    (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) The court acknowledged that the son was not a
    patient. However, the court held that this fact “does not change our analysis because the
    injury to both plaintiffs occurred while defendant was using the ambulance to transport
    7
    [the patient]. Section 340.5 applies to negligent acts or omissions ‘in the rendering of
    professional services’ but does not require the services to have been performed for the
    plaintiff. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 347, fn. 6; see Aldana, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 8
    [“MICRA is not limited to suits by patients”]; Canister, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 407
    [applying MICRA to claim by third party injured while defendant rendered professional
    services to another].)
    In both Canister and in Lopez, the nonpatient was also a passenger in the
    ambulance. Here, plaintiff was not a passenger in the ambulance, but was injured by
    Tostado while Tostado was providing medical services. Canister focused on the
    foreseeability of the injury to a passenger (Canister, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 407-
    408), while Lopez adopted the Flores framework and found that the passenger was
    injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services and did not need to be
    the recipient of the services (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347). Because neither
    Flores nor Lee considered MICRA’s applicability to nonpatients, we must agree with
    Canister and Lopez and conclude that MICRA is not limited to suits by patients or to
    recipients of medical services as long as the plaintiff is injured due to negligence in the
    rendering of professional services and his injuries were foreseeable.
    The provision of ambulance services involves driving on the road, sometimes at a
    very high speed. Getting a patient to the hospital quickly is often as integral to the
    provision of this medical service as performing CPR or administering medication
    intravenously. It is, therefore, entirely foreseeable that collisions may occur where third
    parties are injured. The fact that Tostado was not driving quickly here or that Gutierrez
    was in a separate vehicle rather than in the ambulance does not change the analysis or our
    conclusion that third parties injured in a collision with an ambulance when it is rendering
    medical care are subject to MICRA.
    To hold otherwise would lead to unintended consequences. At oral argument we
    posed the following hypothetical to counsel for Gutierrez: If a hospital attendant were
    8
    wheeling a patient on a gurney down the hallway of the hospital at a high speed and ran
    into a hospital visitor, injuring both the patient on the gurney and the nonpatient visitor,
    would the visitor be subject to MICRA, or the two-year statute of limitations for general
    negligence? Counsel for Gutierrez acknowledged that under their proposed approach of
    applying MICRA only to those owed a professional duty by the medical provider, the
    third party would be subject to a general negligence statute of limitations. Counsel’s
    concession demonstrates the untenability of such a result. Under Gutierrez’s proposed
    approach, two people involved in the same accident at the same time would be subject to
    two different statutes of limitations, possibly resulting in two separate lawsuits with
    inconsistent judgments and greatly increased costs for all involved. Such an outcome is
    inconsistent with the fundamental intent of MICRA to “reduce the cost of medical
    malpractice insurance ‘by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases of
    professional negligence.’ [Citations.]” (Flores, 
    supra,
     63 Cal.4th at p. 81.)
    For these reasons, Guttierez’s reliance on Johnson v. Open Door Community
    Health Centers (2017) 
    15 Cal.App.5th 153
     and on Aldana to argue that driving safely is
    an overlapping duty Tostado owed to the general public, not a specific duty he owed by
    virtue of his role as a healthcare provider, is misplaced. Simply because there is also a
    general duty owed to the public to drive safely does not negate the fact that the conduct at
    issue in this case was integral to the provision of medical care. As explained in Flores,
    even when there is a general duty to the public to maintain safe premises, MICRA applies
    where equipment is “integrally related to [a patient’s] medical diagnosis and treatment.”
    (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89; Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347 [relying
    on Flores to conclude that ambulance transport is “integrally related” to a patient’s
    medical diagnosis and treatment].) Similarly here, even though Tostado may owe a duty
    to the public to drive the ambulance safely when not in use for medical care, the injury to
    Gutierrez occurred while Tostado, a medical provider, was performing the integral
    9
    function of transporting a patient by ambulance. The trial court correctly concluded that
    MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations applied to Gutierrez’s negligence claims.
    III.   DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    10
    _______________________________
    Greenwood, P. J.
    I CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    Grover, J.
    H049983
    Gutierrez v. Tostado, et al.
    Bromberg, J., dissenting.
    I respectfully dissent. The majority interprets the statute of limitations in the
    Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5) to apply
    whenever a claim involves conduct constituting professional negligence under MICRA.
    This interpretation extends MICRA’s statute of limitations unpredictably and unfairly. It
    also departs from the Supreme Court’s approach to a similarly worded statute of
    limitations in Lee v. Hanley (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 1225
     (Lee) in favor of the Lee dissent’s
    approach. In my view, we should follow the Lee majority.
    This case arises out of a run-of-the-mill traffic accident involving an ambulance
    that happened to be transporting a patient on a non-emergency matter, presumably with
    its siren off. As a consequence, plaintiff Francisco Gutierrez had no way of knowing that
    the ambulance that rear ended him was transporting a patient and therefore no way of
    knowing that, under interpretation adopted by the majority, MICRA’s statute of
    limitations applies. (It also would have been difficult for Gutierrez or his lawyer to
    determine that MICRA’s statute of limitations applies to claims against paramedics
    because paramedics are no longer included in the statutory provisions referenced by
    MICRA. (See Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 
    160 Cal.App.4th 388
    , 395-399 [noting that the paramedic provisions were moved in 1982].) As a
    consequence, Gutierrez and his counsel were quite likely surprised to learn that his traffic
    accident claim is subject to MICRA’s one-year limitations period rather than the two-year
    period now generally applicable to personal injury claims. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
    § 335.1.)
    MICRA’s statute of limitations need not be interpreted to apply in such an
    unpredictable and surprising manner. That statute of limitations applies to claims “for
    injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged
    professional negligence” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5, italics added), and the Supreme Court
    has interpreted a similarly worded, neighboring statute of limitations to apply only to
    claims that are based on professional negligence in the sense that they require proof that a
    special obligation imposed on professionals has been violated. As a consequence,
    MICRA’s statute of limitations need not be interpreted to apply here because the
    ambulance that rear-ended plaintiff happened to be carrying a passenger. Instead,
    MICRA’s statute of limitations can—and, in my view, should—be interpreted to apply
    only if the plaintiff advances a claim requiring proof that an obligation owed by health
    providers was violated.
    This is how the Supreme Court interpreted the statute of limitations in section
    340.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Lee. Section 340.6 applies to claims “against an
    attorney for a wrongful act or omission . . . arising in the performance of professional
    services.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.6, subd. (a).) Lee held that “the way a plaintiff styled
    his or her complaint” does not determine whether a claim arises in the performance of
    professional services by attorneys under section 340.6. (Lee, 
    supra,
     61 Cal.4th at
    p. 1236.) It also held that a claim does not arise in the performance of professional
    services merely because it touches upon professional services (id. at p. 1238), rejecting
    the dissent’s position that section 340.6 applies whenever such services are involved.
    (See id. at p. 1242 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.) [“I would hold that section 340.6 governs
    any claim against an attorney, except for actual fraud, that is based on the attorney’s
    wrongful conduct in performing professional services.”].) Instead, the Supreme Court
    held that application of section 340.6 depends on the proof needed to establish the claim
    asserted by the plaintiff: Specifically, under Lee a claim arises out of the performance of
    professional services, and triggers application of section 340.6, if it requires “proof that
    an attorney violated a professional obligation as opposed to some generally applicable
    nonprofessional obligation.” (Id. at p. 1238.)
    MICRA’s statute of limitations should be interpreted using this approach. In
    Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 75
     (Flores), the
    Supreme Court relied on Lee in interpreting MICRA’s statute of limitations. Section
    2
    340.6, Flores noted, is a “neighboring provision” that is “similarly worded.” (Id. at
    pp. 87-88.) Flores also observed that Lee’s analysis of section 340.6 is “instructive” (id.
    at p. 88) and, in particular, that Lee’s distinction between professional obligations and
    generally applicable nonprofessional obligations applies to MICRA’s statute of
    limitations. “Just as an attorney’s obligations ‘often overlap with obligations that all
    persons subject to California’s laws have’ [citation], so do the obligations of hospitals.”
    (Ibid.) “And,” Flores continued, “just as an attorney’s breach of a generally applicable
    obligation to avoid stealing from or physically harming his or her clients does not fall
    within section 340.6(a), so too, we conclude, an injury resulting from a hospital’s breach
    of a generally applicable obligation to maintain its equipment and premises in a safe
    condition does not fall within section 340.5.” (Ibid.)
    It is true that Flores did not rule that the MICRA’s statute of limitations applies
    only to claims requiring proof that a professional obligation has been violated. That issue
    was not raised in Flores: The question before the Supreme Court in Flores was instead
    whether the violation that the plaintiff sought to prove involved “professional
    negligence.” (Flores, 
    supra,
     63 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89 [concluding that maintaining a
    hospital bed’s rail involved professional negligence because it was “integrally related to
    the medical treatment and diagnosis of the patient”].) Nonetheless, Flores signaled that it
    would follow Lee’s approach in interpreting MICRA’s statute of limitations by observing
    that section 340.6 is “similarly worded” to MICRA’s statute of limitations (id. at
    pp. 87-88), describing Lee’s analysis of section 340.6 as “instructive” (id. at p. 88), and
    noting that Lee’s distinction between professional obligations and generally applicable
    nonprofessional obligations applies to MICRA. (Ibid.) Moreover, nothing in Flores
    suggests that the Supreme Court intended to reject Lee’s approach and to interpret
    MICRA’s statute of limitations to apply in a fundamentally different way from section
    340.5. much less that it intended to interpret MICRA’s statute of limitations using the
    approach of the Lee dissent.
    3
    In addition, adopting the Lee majority’s approach avoids the unpredictability and
    unfairness that the approach of the Lee dissent creates here. Under the dissent’s
    approach, MICRA’s statute of limitations and its one-year limitation period applies
    whether or not a plaintiff such as Gutierrez had reason to suspect that a patient was being
    treated in the ambulance that rear-ended him. By contrast, under the Lee majority’s
    approach, MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations applies only if a plaintiff asserts a
    claim requiring proof that a health care provider’s professional obligation has been
    violated, which means that under that approach the plaintiff will always know if his or
    her claim is based upon professional negligence and there will no surprise or unfairness.
    The majority objects that it is impracticable to interpret MICRA’s statute of
    limitations to depend on whether a claim requires proof that a professional obligation has
    been violated because claims by two people involved in the same accident at the same
    time might be subject to two different statutes of limitations. While it is true that claims
    by different people may be subject to different statute of limitations, that is no reason to
    reject the Lee majority’s approach. Lee itself recognized that under this approach claims
    brought by the same person concerning the same conduct may be subject to different
    statutes of limitations: (Lee, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1230 [“[A]n claim based on his
    violation of [the defendant’s professional] obligations is time-barred” but “a claim for
    conversion whose ultimate proof at trial may not depend on the assertion that [defendant]
    violated a professional obligation . . . is not time-barred.”].) As a consequence, it is
    neither impermissible nor impractical to interpret MICRA’s statute of limitations so that
    claims involving the same conduct may be subject to different statutes of limitations if
    they are based on different theories.
    The majority also argues that a restrictive interpretation of MICRA’s statute of
    limitations would undermine MICRA’s overarching goal of reducing the cost of medical
    malpractice insurance. However, the majority does not offer any reason to believe that
    traffic accident claims involving ambulance drivers are covered by medical malpractice
    4
    insurance. Nor does it offer any reason to believe that, if such claims are covered, they
    are so numerous and costly that they will have a material impact on medical malpractice
    rates. In any event, MICRA’s statute of limitations was not intended to shorten the
    limitations period for tort claims against health care providers. When MICRA was
    enacted, personal injury claims were subject to the same one-year limitations period as
    under MICRA (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 82), and therefore extending MICRA’s
    limitations period to personal injury claims would not have limited claims or reduced
    medical malpractice costs (id. at p. 86). Indeed, because MICRA adopts a discovery rule
    that delays the running of the statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5), “at the
    time MICRA was enacted,” extension of the Act’s statute of limitations “could well have
    been counterproductive” from a financial perspective. (Flores, 
    supra,
     63 Cal.4th at p. 87,
    fn. 4.)
    In sum, I see no good reason to reject the approach of the Lee majority in
    interpreting MICRA’s statute of limitations, much less to do so in favor of the Lee
    dissent’s approach. In my view, MICRA’s statute of limitation should be interpreted in
    accordance with Lee majority’s approach to apply only to claims requiring proof that a
    professional obligation owed by health care providers has been violated. Because
    Gutierrez’s claims are based on the generally applicable, nonprofessional duty of care
    owed by all drivers, I also would conclude that his claims are not subject to MICRA’s
    statute of limitations and reverse the judgment.
    5
    ______________________________________
    BROMBERG, J.
    Gutierrez v. Tostado et al.
    H049983
    Trial Court:                             Santa Clara County Superior Court
    Superior Court No.: 20CV361400
    Trial Judge:                             The Honorable Christopher G. Rudy
    Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant,
    Francisco Gutierrez:                     Southwest Legal Group
    Anthony Robert Lopez, Jr.
    The Ehrlich Law Firm
    Jeffrey I. Ehrlich
    Clinton E. Ehrlich-Quinn
    Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents,
    Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1 LLC:     Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester
    LLP
    David Vincent Roth
    Mark R. Wilson
    H049983
    Gutierrez v. Tostado et al.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H049983

Filed Date: 12/1/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/2/2023