People v. Martin CA3 ( 2024 )

Filed 2/9/24 P. v. Martin CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098123
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
STKCRFE20220010036)
v.
D ANDRE ANTHONY MARTIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant D Andre Anthony Martin appeals from denial of a motion to suppress a
search that found a firearm and ammunition. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant filed a motion under Penal Code section 1538.51 to suppress evidence
obtained in a search, to wit, bullets and handgun parts found in a roller bag in the trunk of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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a red Honda Civic. In his moving papers, defendant argued that to justify a warrantless
search “may require the People to comply with Harvey, Remers-Madden case law.”2 The
People filed an opposition.
On November 15, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to
suppress in conjunction with the preliminary hearing. The following recitation of the
facts is based on testimony at the hearing by Stockton Police Detective Jeremy Coppock
and Stockton Police Officers Nicholas Fogal and Robert Louis Johnson.
At approximately 2:09 a.m. on October 10, 2022, Detective Coppock responded to
a report of a person with a gun. When he got to the area, nothing stood out, so he parked
in a McDonald’s parking lot. Shortly after, defendant and a Hispanic male walked up to
a red Honda Civic. The Honda was separated from Detective Coppock’s car by another
unmarked police car. Detective Coppock noticed the Honda because these two
individuals entered the car near him late at night in a high-crime area. Defendant was
wearing a red hooded sweatshirt with white writing on the front. Defendant entered the
driver’s side door. After a few minutes, the two men left the Honda, came back, and
entered the car again. When they approached the car the second time, defendant was
holding his waistband as if there was something in it.
Detective Coppock was about to leave the parking lot because the two men were
moving close by when he decided to search the license plate number of the car on his
police e-mail. He reviewed an e-mail from another detective stating that the car was
associated with an attempted murder that occurred sometime before August 20, 2022. A
tall male with a dark complexion and average build wearing a red hooded sweatshirt with
white writing on the front was a person of interest. Detective Coppock was not involved
in that investigation and did not know how this information was obtained.
2 People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516 (Harvey); Remers v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 659 (Remers); People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017 (Madden).
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Detective Coppock radioed officers on the community response team. Officer
Fogal and another officer responded. When they arrived, defendant was in the front
passenger seat of the Honda, fumbling around underneath the front seat. The two men
began walking away. Detective Coppock informed Officer Fogal that one of them
matched the description of a suspect in a recent shooting in the area. Officer Fogal got
out of his patrol car, stopped defendant, and placed him in handcuffs. Officer Fogal
recovered a car key from defendant’s hand, and, after a pat search, found a baggy
containing a white substance in defendant’s front pants pocket. Other officers conducted
a records check on defendant and advised Officer Fogal that defendant was on probation
with an unlimited search and seizure condition. The detectives directed Officer Fogal to
the vehicle in the McDonald’s parking lot and he assisted in searching the vehicle.
When Officer Johnson arrived at the scene, he stayed by the Honda to make sure
no one else went near it. Officer Fogal and another officer approached and stated that
defendant was on searchable probation. One of them had the keys to the vehicle. Officer
Johnson searched the trunk of the car. He found a disassembled handgun in a zipper
pocket in a roller bag in the trunk. The frame of the gun was aqua-colored plastic. The
slide was black metal. There were two pins that would go in a slide release and two loose
bullets, one was a handgun round and the other a rifle round.
Defense counsel objected to Detective Coppock’s testimony at the outset of the
suppression hearing as requiring compliance with Harvey-Madden. After hearing
argument, the trial court ruled that Harvey-Madden was not applicable at that stage of the
case and overruled the objection. At the close of testimony, defense counsel argued that
defendant was detained based on an e-mail sent a month and a half before about an
incident involving the vehicle and a suspect in a red sweatshirt. The e-mail did not
indicate where the information came from, including whether or not it was from an
anonymous tip. Defense counsel argued this was insufficient to stop defendant more than
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six weeks later simply for wearing the same type of sweatshirt. The prosecution
submitted without further argument.
The magistrate ruled: “The descriptions were very specific as to the sweatshirt. It
was a red Hoody with white writing with the word ‘cookies’ on it. The fact that it may
have been anonymous or whoever the search was was really of no moment in the
situation. It would have been a prolonged detention if they attempted to try to see who
put that information out initially. The detention was legal and therefore the motion to
suppress is denied.”
An information filed thereafter charged defendant with being a felon in unlawful
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)—count 1) and of ammunition (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1)—count 2). The information also alleged that defendant had suffered two
strikes (§§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subd. (d)), and, as circumstances in aggravation, that
defendant’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness and defendant
had served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(b)(2) and (b)(3)).
Defendant renewed the motion to suppress in conjunction with a motion to dismiss
(§ 995), both of which the People opposed, and the trial court denied.
Defendant pled no contest to count 1 of the information and admitted one strike.
The trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of 16 months doubled by the strike
to 32 months. The court awarded defendant 152 days of actual custody credit and 152
days of conduct credit for a total of 304 days. The trial court imposed restitution and
parole revocation fines of $300 each, plus a court security fee of $40 and conviction
assessment of $30.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the suppression motion should have been granted because the
prosecution relied on unreliable hearsay that was inadmissible under the Harvey-Madden
rule. We disagree. The specific information in the e-mail Detective Coppock reviewed
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matching both the car and defendant’s sweatshirt to a shooting incident was sufficient to
comply with Harvey-Madden.
Preliminarily, we note that “[b]ecause the initial motion to suppress was made
during the preliminary hearing, and the renewed motion before the trial court was
submitted on the transcript of that hearing pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (i), we
disregard the findings of the trial court and review the determination of the magistrate
who ruled on the initial motion. ‘We review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the magistrate’s ruling and will uphold the magistrate’s express or implied findings if
supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The question of whether a
search was unreasonable, however, is a question of law. On that issue, we exercise
“independent judgment.” ’ ” (Blakes v. Superior Court (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 904, 910;
see People v. Nonnette (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 659, 664.)
It is well-settled in California officers can make arrests based on information and
probable cause furnished by other officers. (Remers, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 666.) “[W]hen
police officers work together to build ‘collective knowledge’ of probable cause, the
important question is not what each officer knew about probable cause, but how valid and
reasonable the probable cause was that developed in the officers’ collective knowledge.”
(People v. Ramirez (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1555.)
The Harvey-Madden rule requires “proof that the source of the information on
which the arrest was based was ‘ “something other than the imagination of an officer” ’
who did not testify.” (People v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 228, 246.) The
Harvey-Madden rule requires that when one officer “furnishes to another officer
information which leads to an arrest, the People must show the basis for the former
officer’s information.” (Remers, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 667.) This rule applies to searches
and detentions, as well as arrests. (People v. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 812
[searches]; In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1643 [detentions].)
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The purpose of the Harvey-Madden rule is to prevent officers from manufacturing
probable cause or reasonable suspicion “ ‘by one officer transmitting information
purportedly known by him to another officer who did not know such information, without
establishing under oath how the information had in fact been obtained by the former
officer.’ ” (Madden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 1021.) However, the first officer need not
“testify as to how he or she received the information transmitted.” (People v. Johnson
(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1320.) “To the contrary, the Harvey[-]Madden rule merely
precludes the prosecution from relying on hearsay information communicated to the
arresting officer that is not sufficiently specific and fact based to be considered reliable.”
(People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 541.) Moreover, “[w]hen the judiciary
can reasonably determine that no evidence has been manufactured, there is no reason for
strict compliance with the letter of the ‘Harvey-Madden’ rule.” (In re Richard G. (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1260; see also People v. Orozco (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 435,
444.)
Here, no information was manufactured. (In re Richard G., supra,173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259.) Rather, the information Detective Coppock received was
sufficiently specific and fact-based to be considered reliable. (People v. Gomez, supra,117 Cal.App.4th at p. 541.) The e-mail turned up in a search of police e-mails for the
license plate number that contained a detailed description of a car, including the make,
model, and color, associated with a shooting in the area that matched the vehicle
Detective Coppock observed defendant entering. The e-mail also provided a detailed
description of an item of clothing the shooting suspect wore, including the color of the
writing on the red sweatshirt that matched what defendant was wearing. Absent
“clairvoyance,” the first detective could not have simply made up such specific
information to manufacture probable cause, which then happened to fortuitously match
what Detective Coppock observed. (Ibid.)
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Accordingly, we conclude the Harvey-Madden rule does not require us to reverse
denial of defendant’s suppression motion.3
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/S/
MESIWALA, J.
3 Because we reject defendant’s claim that his motion to suppress should have been
granted by application of the Harvey-Madden rule, we need not reach the People’s claim
that suppression was unwarranted under Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135.
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