Marriage of Salkhi and Behroyan CA1/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 12/5/23 Marriage of Salkhi and Behroyan CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re the Marriage of ARASH
SALKHI and NOOSHIN
BEHROYAN.
ARASH SALKHI,
Appellant, A165484
v.
(Marin County
NOOSHIN BEHROYAN,
Super. Ct. No. FL1500976)
Respondent.
Appellant Arash Salkhi and his former wife, respondent Nooshin
Behroyan, executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was
incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. The MSA contains a provision
requiring the parties, who are Iranian nationals, to cooperate with each other
in obtaining an “Iranian divorce decree consistent with the terms of this
agreement.”
Salkhi appeals from a postjudgment order enforcing the MSA. The
order requires him to cooperate with Behroyan in obtaining an Iranian
1
divorce through a process that allows Iranian nationals residing in the
United States to register their foreign divorce decree in Iran (the “consular
divorce process”). The order also requires him to dismiss with prejudice a
divorce action he claimed to have filed in Iran shortly after Behroyan
requested his participation in the consular divorce process.
On appeal, he argues that the family court erred in ordering him to
dismiss his Iranian divorce action and comply with the consular divorce
process because the plain meaning of the term “Iranian divorce decree” as
used in the MSA refers to a divorce decree issued in an Iranian marital
proceeding. He also argues that he had no prior notice that the order might
include a restraint on his prosecution of the Iranian divorce action. He
further contends that the order requiring him to dismiss his Iranian divorce
action was an improper antisuit injunction. Finally, he argues that the court
erred in awarding Behroyan over $22,000 in sanctions pursuant to Family
Code section 271 because the underlying injunctions were improper, and
because she provided insufficient evidence of her claimed costs and fees. We
reject these contentions and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Salkhi and Behroyan were married in 2003 in Iran and later moved to
California. They had two children during their marriage. In 2015, Salkhi
filed a petition for dissolution in the Superior Court for Marin County.
The parties divorced in 2016. Salkhi’s counsel prepared the judgment
of dissolution incorporating the parties’ MSA, which settled all issues
concerning marital rights, including child custody and support, spousal
support, and division of property. Both parties were represented by legal
counsel in the preparation of the MSA and attested to the opportunity to
adequately consult with legal counsel concerning their respective rights.
2
Both parties acknowledged receipt of preliminary declarations of
disclosure and elected to waive final declarations of disclosure. With limited
exceptions set forth in the MSA, the parties released each other “from any
and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands and obligations of any kind or
nature, whether known or unknown, . . . that either of them ever had, now
has or may have against the other upon or by reason of any matter, cause or
thing up to the date of the execution of the Agreement.”
In section 11 of the MSA, the parties warranted that they had disclosed
in the MSA all property in their possession and that they did not gift or
transfer any community property. The MSA states, “If it shall hereafter be
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that either party now
possesses any community property not set forth in this Agreement, . . . each
party covenants and agrees to pay to the other,” one-half of the fair market
value of the property as of the date the parties executed the MSA.
Section 27 of the MSA requires the parties to “cooperate with the other
in obtaining an Iranian divorce decree consistent with the terms of this
agreement.” Section 21.12 of the agreement states that the MSA “resolves
any and all claims or rights that either party may assert in any Iranian
dissolution proceeding to establish an Iranian decree of divorce.” The parties
waived “the right to assert in any Iranian marital proceeding any request for
money, property, support or asserting any other claim against the other in
any such proceeding other than a claim to terminate marital status in Iran
without any claims for money, support, property or fees.” Section 25 of the
MSA authorized the trial court to retain jurisdiction to supervise execution of
documents required or reasonably necessary to carry out the terms of the
MSA.
3
In 2019, the parties submitted a stipulated modification to the
judgment which was also drafted by Salkhi’s counsel. Paragraph 1 reiterated
the parties’ agreement that “Nooshin and Arash will both cooperate in the
obtaining of an Iranian dissolution.” Other terms of the amendment required
Behroyan to cooperate with an audit of Salkhi’s business and the execution of
necessary documents related to assignment of Salkhi’s business. The
stipulation reiterated that it resolved all outstanding issues between the
parties and that “any claims either party has against the other not addressed
in this stipulation are waived and cannot be raised in any future proceeding.”
In March 2022, Behroyan filed a request for order enforcing the
provision in the MSA requiring the parties to cooperate with each other in
obtaining an Iranian divorce decree (the RFO). She argued that Salkhi had
“frustrated” her efforts to obtain an Iranian divorce through the consular
divorce process. She said she could not visit her family in Iran until the
Iranian divorce was finalized because she feared for her safety and freedom.
Under Iranian law, Salkhi could prevent her from leaving Iran. Accordingly,
she requested an order requiring Salkhi to participate in the consular divorce
process and to pay her for the attorney fees and costs she incurred as a result
of his failure to comply with the MSA pursuant to Family Code section 271.
Behroyan’s declaration explained that the consular divorce process
requires submitting the state divorce decree and a “finalization of divorce”
form from the Iranian Embassy website to an authorized Iranian Islamic
Center where a certified cleric would finalize the divorce. She said Salkhi
initially cooperated with the process by signing the required documents but
later failed to appear at the hearing with the cleric, telling her that he
wanted to file a divorce action in Iran.
4
Attached to Behroyan’s declaration was an e-mail she sent to the
Islamic Educational Center of Orange County in early April 2021, requesting
an appointment for her and Salkhi. Included with the e-mail was an “Islamic
Divorce Contract” that was signed by both parties. The contract noted,
“THIS DIVORCE CONTRACT IS AN ISLAMIC (RELIGIOUS) DIVORCE
ONLY; IT IS NOT A CIVIL DIVORCE THAT IS RECOGNIZED IN THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA.” Nearly a week later, she informed her attorney
via e-mail that Salkhi “signed the form but refuses to attend the zoom
meeting with the Imam (aka priest) . . . .” An e-mail Salkhi’s counsel sent to
Behroyan’s counsel in December 2021 stated that Salkhi did not agree to
proceed with divorce using the consular divorce process, as he was “not aware
that he would be waiving all rights he has under Iranian law by utilizing that
process, specifically the right to seek information regarding financial
transactions in Iran.”
The declaration of Amin Alemohammad, an Iranian attorney,
confirmed that the consular divorce process was “sufficient to obtain an
Iranian divorce decree.” He clarified that once the parties obtained an
“Islamic Divorce Certificate” from the cleric, the Iranian Consulate validates
the divorce, and the state divorce decree is referred to the Iranian courts for
“review and registration.” His declaration listed the documents the parties
must submit to the Iranian Consulate and the specific steps they must take
to register the divorce in Iran. He further stated that “[i]n the event a new
divorce case is filed, the court will disregard the judgment in Marin County
and make rulings accordingly [sic] to Iranian law, where divorce laws favor
men; Iranian Civil Code Article 1133 states that the rights to divorce are
solely and strictly the rights of men.”
5
In his responsive declaration, Salkhi stated that after Behroyan had
informed him of her intent to obtain a “religious divorce” with the help of an
Iranian attorney, he told her that he “had conducted [his] own research and
would obtain an attorney in Iran and grant power to that attorney for the
divorce.” He emphasized that he was not seeking an award of money,
property or support against Behroyan in the Iranian proceeding; he “merely
wish[ed] to investigate whether any undivided property exists.” He stated
that a petition had been filed in Iran for divorce and his attorney was
“making investigations on my behalf.” He claimed that he had “good reason
not to trust” Behroyan because she “emptied” the marital home of valuables
and “secreted” property in a storage locker. He said that she had been
withholding his passport and birth certificate and that his “right to
investigate should not be taken away from [him] when it was [Behroyan] who
delayed obtaining an Iranian divorce by withholding [his] Iranian documents
for five years.” He requested that the court sanction Behroyan under Family
Code section 271.
Salkhi attached to his declaration “Judicial Correspondence” showing
he applied for “the issuance of Certificate of Impossibility of Reconciliation -
(Divorce)” in April 2022. The correspondence appears to be from “Public Civil
Courts, Chamber 1” in the “City of Neka [¶] General Justice Department of
Mazandaran District.” Salkhi did not include evidence of his Iranian divorce
petition, or how long the Iranian divorce process would take, or how
Behroyan and he could “both” cooperate in securing a status-only Iranian
divorce decree. Salkhi presented no evidence to show whether a divorce could
be pursued simultaneously in an Iranian court and through the consular
process, or whether Iranian courts even recognize a status-only divorce
proceeding.
6
After a hearing, the court ordered the parties to comply with the
procedures set forth in the Alemohammad declaration for the consular
divorce process. The court further ordered Salkhi to dismiss the divorce
action he filed in Iran with prejudice, finding that the action was his attempt
to “do-over” the California dissolution in violation of the judgment
incorporating the MSA. The court denied his request for sanctions and
ordered him to pay Behroyan sanctions in the amount of $22,519 pursuant to
Family Code section 271.
II. DISCUSSION
Salkhi argues that the trial court’s order enforcing the MSA was
erroneous because the consular divorce process does not result in an “Iranian
divorce decree,” and therefore Behroyan’s request that he comply with that
process does not implicate his duty under the MSA to cooperate with her “in
obtaining an Iranian divorce decree.” Additionally, he claims that the order
compelling him to dismiss his Iranian divorce action violated his due process
rights by expanding the scope of the injunctive relief requested by Behroyan
without adequate notice, and that the order constitutes an improper antisuit
injunction. These contentions lack merit.
A. Behroyan’s Expert’s Declaration
Before addressing the issue whether the MSA contemplates the
consular divorce process, we first address Salkhi’s argument that the trial
court lacked evidence about the process because the declaration of
Alemohammad, Behroyan’s legal expert, did not comply with the attestation
requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. That section
provides that a declaration must state that it is “true under penalty of
perjury.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.) The declaration must also state the
“place of execution” in California or that the declaration under penalty of
7
perjury occurs “under the laws of the State of California.” (Id., § 2015.5,
subds. (a), (b).)
The declaration of Alemohammad filed with Behroyan’s RFO does not
meet either requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. The
court noted at the hearing that the declaration was not “under penalty of
perjury.” A couple of days later, Behroyan filed and served a notice of errata
with an amended declaration from Alemohammad. Although the amended
declaration states that it is under penalty of perjury, it still does not comply
with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 because it does not specify
whether it was made under California law. (See Kulshrestha v. First Union
Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 612 [declaration defective “absent
an express facial link to California or its perjury laws”].)
However, as Behroyan has pointed out, Salkhi waived this argument by
failing to object in the trial court. (See Robinson v. Grossman (1997) 57
Cal.App.4th 634, 648 [failure to object in the trial court on ground that
declaration was not signed under penalty of perjury waives the issue]; Vinson
v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1166, 1178, fn. 7, citing Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.111(c) [“absent timely objection that a declaration does not meet
content requirements, ‘any objection will be considered waived, and the
declaration may be considered as evidence’ ”].)
We do not agree with Salkhi’s belated argument in his reply that
objecting would have been futile based on the trial court’s brief comment at
the RFO hearing that the declaration was not “under penalty of perjury.”
The authority he relies on as support for his argument is distinguishable. In
City of Long Beach v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 780, defense counsel twice orally requested that the trial court
rule on written evidentiary objections but the trial court neglected to do so.
8
(Id. at p. 784.) The appellate court concluded that the written evidentiary
objections had been preserved for appellate review because “[i]t would have
been a fruitless or idle act to have interposed a third oral request for rulings.”
(Id. at p. 785; see also Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1580
[party did not waive his evidentiary objections where he orally requested a
ruling on them].)
Here, in contrast, the record does not reveal that Salkhi objected to
either Alemohammad declaration on the ground that the declarations did not
comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. “ ‘To obtain reversal
based on the erroneous admission of evidence, the record must show a timely
objection making clear that specific ground.’ ” (Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 1036, 1066, disagreed with on another ground by In re Marriage
of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1080.) “ ‘Lack of such objection
deprives the proponent of the evidence an opportunity to establish a better
record or some alternative basis for admission.’ ” (Oiye v. Fox, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.) Salkhi cites no authority stating that the court’s
recognition of a defect is enough to absolve him of the duty to make a specific
and timely objection, particularly where Behroyan promptly attempted to
cure the defect and no objection to the amended Alemohammad declaration
was raised.
Although “[t]rial courts possess some inherent power to exclude
objectionable evidence on their own motion, [] ‘[i]t has been suggested that
this power should be exercised only where the evidence is irrelevant,
unreliable, misleading, or prejudicial, and that relevant and useful evidence
that is merely incompetent under technical exclusionary rules ought to be
received in the absence of objection by counsel.’ ” (Gonzalez v. Santa Clara
County Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 173.) We therefore
9
conclude that Salkhi’s reliance on the trial court’s recognition of a technical
defect in the first Alemohammad declaration was insufficient to preserve his
evidentiary challenges to the declaration for appeal.
B. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the MSA.
As previously mentioned, section 27 of the MSA requires in relevant
part that “[e]ach party shall cooperate with the other in obtaining an Iranian
divorce decree consistent with the terms of this agreement.” Salkhi does not
dispute that he failed to cooperate with Behroyan when she attempted to
obtain an Iranian divorce through the consular divorce process. He insists,
however, that the court’s order requiring him to comply with that process was
contrary to the plain language of the MSA, because “Iran’s recognition of a
foreign religious divorce is not the same thing as an Iranian divorce decree.”
According to Salkhi, an “Iranian divorce decree” refers to a divorce decree
issued by an Iranian court in a marital proceeding.1 Based on our de novo
review of the MSA as a whole, we reach the same conclusion as the trial court
that Behroyan’s efforts to obtain an Iranian divorce through the consular
divorce process triggered Salkhi’s duty to cooperate under section 27 of the
MSA. (In re Marriage of Rosenfeld & Gross (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 478, 488
1 At oral argument, Salkhi’s counsel further argued that if both the
consular process and an Iranian marital proceeding were contemplated by
the MSA, the trial court cannot order Salkhi to comply with one permissible
process over the other. Even if we were to consider this argument raised for
the first time at oral argument, we explain in the following section why the
trial court had a sufficient basis to conclude that Salkhi violated the MSA by
filing his Iranian divorce action.
10
[“because no extrinsic evidence was considered, we are not bound by the trial
court’s construction and interpret the terms of the MSA de novo”].)
Where, as here, the MSA was incorporated in the marital dissolution
judgment, we apply the general rules of contract interpretation to construe
the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the MSA. (In re
Marriage of Thorne & Raccina (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 492, 501.) We
determine the parties’ intent from the plain language of the contract, the
words being understood in their ordinary and popular sense (id. at p. 502),
and the contract “may be explained by reference to the circumstances under
which it was made, and the matter to which it relates” (Civ. Code, § 1647).
And if an ambiguity exists after employing rules of construction, the
ambiguity is construed against the drafter. (Breathe Southern California v.
American Lung Assn. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1182; Civ. Code, § 1654.)
In ascertaining whether the consular divorce process is contemplated
by the MSA, we first observe that contrary to Salkhi’s characterization, the
process does not merely result in “Iran’s recognition” of a “foreign religious
divorce.” The evidence shows that the consular divorce process allows
Iranian nationals residing in the United States to obtain an “Iranian
divorce.” It requires the parties to acquire an “Islamic Divorce Certificate”
from a certified cleric and submit the certificate and their state divorce decree
to the Iranian Consulate, which then refers the matter to the Iranian courts
“for review and registration.” According to the Alemohammad declaration,
this is “sufficient” to obtain an “Iranian divorce decree.” Indeed, Salkhi
admitted in the trial court that if the parties utilized the consular divorce
process, he would be waiving “all rights he has under Iranian law . . . .” The
trial court could reasonably infer from this evidence that the Iranian court’s
decision to recognize the foreign divorce decree is in effect an order of that
11
court that terminates the parties’ marital status in Iran. The question then
is whether that decision constitutes an “Iranian divorce decree” as that term
is used in the MSA. We conclude it does.
Dictionary definitions of “decree” show that it can be broadly defined as
“a judicial decision in a court of equity, admiralty, divorce, or probate” or
“[a]ny court order” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 516) or as “an order
usu. having the force of law” (Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1989) p.
331, col. 2). A decision from the Iranian courts that has the effect of legally
terminating the parties’ marital status in Iran falls squarely within this
broad definition of “decree.”
Moreover, in the context of the MSA as a whole, it is clear that the
provision requiring each party to cooperate with the other in obtaining an
Iranian divorce decree was not intended to be as limited as Salkhi suggests.
(See In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 688 [we must
construe the language of a provision in context, “in view of the intended
function of the provision and of the contract as a whole”].) The stated
purpose of the MSA was “to make a final and complete settlement of all
rights and obligations between the parties, including all property rights and
all rights and obligations concerning child custody, child support, spousal
support, and attorneys’ fees.” Notably, the MSA aims “to resolve and settle
any rights or obligations that might arise in accordance with procuring an
Iranian divorce.” (Italics added.) The parties further agreed that the MSA
“resolves any and all claims or rights that either party may assert in any
Iranian dissolution proceeding to establish an Iranian decree of divorce. Both
parties specifically waive the right to assert in any Iranian marital
proceeding any request for money, property, support or asserting any other
claim against the other in any such proceeding other than a claim to
12
terminate marital status in Iran . . . .” (Italics added.) Taken together, these
provisions plainly show the parties’ intent to resolve all claims regarding
their marital rights in the California divorce action but allow either party to
seek termination of their marital status in Iran.
Viewed in this context, the term “Iranian divorce decree” is not
reasonably susceptible to Salkhi’s restrictive interpretation. Such a
construction would result in an extraordinarily unusual provision requiring
the parties to initiate an entirely new divorce action in Iran if they wished to
terminate their marital status despite the existence of a far simpler process
to do so. (See Sayble v. Feinman (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 509, 513 [“[W]here one
construction would make a contract unusual and extraordinary and another
construction, equally consistent with the language employed, would make it
reasonable, fair, and just, the latter construction must prevail”]; Beverly Hills
Oil Co. v. Beverly Hills Unified School Dist. (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 603, 609,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Chavez v. Zapata Ocean
Resources, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 115, 120 & fn. 3 [“A contract must
receive such interpretation as will make it reasonable”].)
To be sure, the MSA contemplates that a party might pursue a
dissolution proceeding in the Iranian courts, and, in accordance with the
MSA’s purpose to resolve all claims related to the parties’ marital rights, it
requires reimbursement for attorney fees and costs the other party incurred
in defending against claims in that action. But in reading the MSA as a
whole, the intended purpose of the provision requiring cooperation among the
parties to obtain an Iranian divorce decree was to ensure that either party
can terminate their marital status in Iran if they so desire. Even if there is
any remaining uncertainty regarding the construction of the phrase “Iranian
divorce decree” in the MSA, we would resolve the ambiguity against Salkhi,
13
as it was his counsel who drafted the MSA and the subsequent addendum.
(See Breathe Southern California v. American Lung Assn., supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 1182.)
Salkhi argues that even if we disagree that the term “Iranian divorce
decree” refers to an order issued in an Iranian marital proceeding, the
“ambiguity” in the MSA regarding the process the parties must use to obtain
an Iranian divorce renders the agreement too indefinite for the remedy of
specific performance. We disagree. “ ‘ “ ‘The law does not favor but leans
against the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty; and it will, if
feasible, so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable
intentions of the parties if they can be ascertained.’ ” ’ ” (Patel v.
Liebermensch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 344, 349.) As we have explained, the MSA
reveals an intent to ensure either party can achieve legal termination of their
marital status in Iran and an agreement for both to cooperate to achieve that
result. It is the end result, not the specific process used to obtain that result,
that is material to the substance of the agreement. (See Elite Show Services,
Inc. v. Staffpro, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 263, 269 [“neither law nor equity
requires that every term and condition of an agreement be set forth in the
contract”].) Therefore, on its face, the MSA is sufficiently certain to enforce.
In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding that Behroyan’s efforts
to obtain an Iranian divorce through the consular divorce process triggered
Salkhi’s duty to cooperate under section 27 of the MSA, and the relevant
provision in section 27 was sufficiently definite to enforce.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Findings.
As previously mentioned, the trial court not only ordered Salkhi to
comply with the consular divorce process, but it also ordered him to dismiss
the separate divorce action he filed in Iran after finding that his “attempt at
14
a do-over of the California dissolution in Iran [was] in direct defiance of this
court’s order . . . .” Salkhi does not expressly argue that the order is
unsupported by the record, but he insists that his Iranian divorce action is
not a “do-over” of the California dissolution.2 To the extent Salkhi is
challenging the trial court’s factual basis for the order requiring him to forego
his Iranian divorce action in favor of the consular divorce process, we
conclude the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. (In
re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780 [standard of review of
court’s factual findings].)
The record demonstrates that in March 2021, Behroyan explained the
consular divorce process to Salkhi, but he did not comply with all required
2 Salkhi also spends much of his brief explaining why his Iranian
divorce action does not violate the provision in the MSA prohibiting the
parties from asserting any claim in an Iranian dissolution other than a claim
for termination of marital status, even though he seeks to investigate
whether Behroyan is hiding community assets in Iran. We need not decide
the issue because, for the reasons explained below, we conclude the trial
court’s findings regarding his Iranian divorce action are supported by the
record. In any event, we disagree with Salkhi that because the parties
retained the right to request that the family court divide any community
assets omitted from the MSA, he has the right to use the Iranian divorce
action to investigate undisclosed assets. The right to discovery in an action is
ordinarily tied to the claims being raised. (See John B. v. Superior Court
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1186 [“ ‘ “Under the discovery statutes, information is
discoverable if it is unprivileged and is either relevant to the subject matter
of the action or reasonably calculated to reveal admissible evidence” ’ ”];
Darbee v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 680,
688 [“The ‘subject matter of the action’ is the circumstances and facts out of
which the cause of action arises”].) The parties expressly agreed in the MSA
to waive their right to assert “any” claim in an Iranian divorce proceeding
other than a claim for termination of marital status, including any claim for
money or property. We therefore do not interpret the MSA as permitting the
parties to seek discovery regarding community assets in an Iranian
dissolution proceeding.
15
steps, and he claimed nearly a week later that he would be filing a divorce
action in Iran. His purported reason for doing so was to investigate whether
Behroyan was hiding community assets in Iran. However, the parties
warranted in the MSA that they had disclosed all assets, and Salkhi’s only
basis for suspecting that undisclosed assets existed in Iran were certain
actions Behroyan took during the divorce, nearly six years earlier.3 He
claimed in his declaration that the delay in filing the Iranian divorce action
was due to Behroyan withholding his passport and birth certificate. The trial
court apparently did not find Salkhi’s explanation credible, as it concluded
that his “position [was] untenable” because he could have filed an RFO
regarding his documents and the undisclosed assets instead of waiting nearly
six years “before making this allegation for the first time in defense of Wife’s
RFO.” Moreover, Salkhi did not provide any evidence of the effect of the
Iranian divorce filing and whether he can seek discovery in a status-only
proceeding. Alemohammad, on the other hand, stated in his declaration that
if a new divorce action was filed in Iran, the Iranian court would disregard
the judgment and “make rulings accordingly [sic] to Iranian Law” under
which “the rights to divorce are solely and strictly the rights of men.” The
trial court could have reasonably inferred from this evidence, the timing of
Salkhi’s divorce action, and the lack of a credible explanation for the delay in
filing the action that Salkhi’s intent was to thwart Behroyan’s efforts to
obtain an Iranian divorce so that he could relitigate his marital claims.
3 Salkhi’s counsel also claimed for the first time at the hearing that in
the prior year, Salkhi ran into Behroyan’s former employer, who told him
that Behroyan had “bragged” about “pull[ing] a fast one in the divorce.” The
court implicitly did not credit this hearsay evidence. We will not second
guess the court’s credibility determinations. (See Estate of Berger (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 1293, 1309.)
16
The court thus had a sufficient basis to conclude that Salkhi’s Iranian
divorce action violated the MSA because it was a pretext for Salkhi to avoid
cooperating with Behroyan and to relitigate his marital claims. Accordingly,
we affirm the court’s findings to that effect.
D. Order Compelling Salkhi to Dismiss His Iranian Divorce Action
Salkhi makes two additional arguments regarding the propriety of the
court’s order requiring him to dismiss his Iranian divorce action. We consider
and reject each in turn.
1. Due Process: Notice of Scope of Injunctive Relief
Salkhi first asserts that Behroyan’s RFO asked the court to compel him
to comply with the consular divorce process, but the court “went further” by
ordering him to dismiss his Iranian action. He argues that this expansion of
the injunctive relief requested by Behroyan without notice violated the due
process principle that a party must receive “ ‘ “proper notice and an
opportunity to defend.” ’ ” (Midway Venture LLC v. County of San Diego
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 58, 77.)
The record, however, demonstrates that Salkhi had ample notice of
Behroyan’s desire to enjoin him from proceeding with his divorce action in
Iran. To begin with, Behroyan’s RFO sought compliance with the provision
in the MSA requiring cooperation in obtaining an Iranian divorce decree.
Her RFO identified Salkhi’s intent to file a divorce action in Iran as an issue,
arguing that the action was barred by the MSA and “[was] likely a pretext
and another stall.” And her supporting evidence described the consequences
of Salkhi filing a divorce case in Iran, namely that he would have the sole
right to finalize the divorce. Salkhi’s responsive declaration addressed those
arguments and confirmed that he had, in fact, initiated a divorce action in
Iran. In reply, Behroyan further explained why the court “must not enable
17
[Salkhi’s] attempt to use Iranian courts to create nuisance.” Then, prior to
the hearing on the RFO, the court issued a tentative ruling that included an
order compelling Salkhi to dismiss his Iranian divorce action.
We further observe that at the hearing, neither Salkhi nor his counsel
objected to the tentative ruling on grounds of inadequate notice or requested
a continuance. Instead, they presented substantive arguments as to why the
court should allow Salkhi to proceed with the divorce action in Iran. Salkhi
has therefore arguably waived his claim of inadequate notice. (See Carlton v.
Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
880–881 [party who resided in Czechoslovakia and had not been given proper
notice of dependency proceeding waived any defect in notice by subsequently
appearing through counsel and making substantive arguments without
objecting to jurisdiction].)
Thus, the record leaves no doubt Salkhi had sufficient notice that
Behroyan’s request to compel his compliance with the MSA included a
restraint on his pursuit of a separate divorce action designed to delay or
frustrate Behroyan’s efforts to terminate their marital status in Iran. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 580 [courts are authorized to grant “any relief consistent
with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue”]; In re
Marriage of O’Connell (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 565, 576 [finding that husband’s
“motion to reduce support put his life insurance in issue”].) The cases on
which Salkhi relies are therefore inapposite because they hold only that an
injunction granted without prior notice is void. (See, e.g., Midway Venture
LLC v. County of San Diego, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 79; Pacific Decision
Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110.)
18
2. Propriety of Antisuit Injunction
Salkhi next argues that the order requiring him to dismiss his Iranian
action is an improper antisuit injunction.
An “antisuit” injunction restrains a party from pursuing an action in a
court of a foreign jurisdiction. (TSMC North America v. Semiconductor
Manufacturing Internat. Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 581, 589–591
(TSMC).) Although California courts have a recognized power to issue an
antisuit injunction to restrain a party from litigating an action in another
state’s courts, this power must be exercised “ ‘sparingly.’ ” (Id. at p. 589.)
The leading case on the propriety of issuing an antisuit injunction is
Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 697 (Advanced
Bionics).)
In Advanced Bionics, an employee for a Minnesota-based company
signed, as a condition of employment, an agreement that contained a
covenant not to compete and required that all claims regarding the
agreement be decided under Minnesota law. (Advanced Bionics, supra, 29
Cal.4th at pp. 700–701.) After the employee resigned and accepted
employment with a California company, the California employer filed a
complaint for declaratory relief in a California court, alleging the
noncompetition clause was void because it violated California law and public
policy. (Id. at p. 701.) The Minnesota company then filed suit in Minnesota
state court against the former employee and his new California employer for
breach of contract and tortious interference. (Id. at pp. 701–702.) A
California trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the
California lawsuit, compelling the Minnesota company not to undertake any
litigation whatsoever, other than in the California action, to enforce its
19
covenant not to compete. (Id. at p. 702.) The Supreme Court ruled that the
trial court had improperly issued the TRO. (Id. at p. 708.)
The Supreme Court explained that an antisuit injunction may be
issued to prevent conflicts between California courts, but the situation
becomes more difficult, and requires additional “judicial restraint,” when a
second case is filed in another state and each state’s “sovereignty concerns”
are implicated. (Advanced Bionics, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 705–707.) “When
the cases involve different states, as in the matter before us, judicial restraint
takes on a more fundamental importance.” (Id. at p. 706.) The court cited
with approval cases from other states holding a difference in substantive law
is insufficient to justify an injunction prohibiting a party from litigating a
proceeding in another state, as is the potential for inconsistent judgments.
(Id. at pp. 705–706.)
The court also noted the importance of principles of comity when
determining whether an antisuit injunction should be issued. (Advanced
Bionics, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 707.) As the court explained, “[c]omity is
based on the belief ‘ “ ‘that the laws of a state have no force, proprio vigore,
beyond its territorial limits, but the laws of one state are frequently
permitted by the courtesy of another to operate in the latter for the promotion
of justice, where neither that state nor its citizens will suffer any
inconvenience from the application of the foreign law.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Therefore,
comity “requires that we exercise our power to enjoin parties in a foreign
court sparingly, in line with the policy of judicial restraint . . . .” (Ibid.)
The court held that “enjoining proceedings in another state requires an
exceptional circumstance that outweighs the threat to judicial restraint and
comity principles.” (Advanced Bionics, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 708.) In the
case before it, the court concluded that the circumstances did not provide
20
sufficient justification to warrant a TRO prohibiting the parties from pursing
the Minnesota litigation. (Ibid.)
In TSMC, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 581, relied on by Salkhi, the trial
court declined to issue an injunction enjoining a party to a trade secrets
lawsuit in a California court from litigating a parallel proceeding in the
People’s Republic of China. (Id. at p. 585.) In affirming, Division 3 of this
court rejected an argument that an antisuit injunction was needed to
preserve a California company's constitutional rights of free speech and
petition because there was no evidence that the Chinese court had taken, or
had been asked to take, any action that was forbidden by the California
Constitution or by the United States Constitution. (Id. at pp. 592–593.) The
court also rejected an argument that an antisuit injunction was necessary to
protect the California court’s power and rulings, as there was no evidence of
an attempt by the Chinese court to “carve out exclusive jurisdiction over the
parties’ disputes.” (Id. at p. 596.) Finally, the court rejected arguments that
an antisuit injunction was appropriate to protect California public policies
and enforce contractual choice of law provisions. (Id. at pp. 597–602.)
Assuming a divorce action has actually been filed in Iran based only on
Salkhi’s statement, Behroyan does not dispute that the order compelling
Salkhi to dismiss his Iranian divorce action constitutes an antisuit
injunction, but she contends that TSMC and Advanced Bionics are
distinguishable because those actions involved similar claims proceeding
simultaneously in different forums, whereas in this case, the California case
reached judgment several years before Salkhi filed his divorce action in Iran.
We agree that Advanced Bionics and TSMC are not exactly on point. In
concluding that no exceptional circumstances existed in the case before it, the
Advanced Bionics court considered the sovereignty concerns present when
21
parallel actions proceed to judgment in two different states with concurrent
jurisdiction. (Advanced Bionics, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 706, citing Auerbach
v. Frank (D.C. Cir. 1996) 685 A.2d 404, 407.) “The fundamental rule is that,
when concurrent jurisdiction exists, ‘each forum is ordinarily free to proceed
to a judgment.’ ” (Auerbach v. Frank, at p. 407, italics added.) We therefore
determine whether and under what circumstances an antisuit injunction is
proper where one of the two proceedings has reached judgment. As we will
explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
implicitly finding that Salkhi’s use of the Iranian divorce action to impede
Behroyan’s efforts to enforce the MSA as incorporated into the California
judgment constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying an antisuit
injunction preventing him from litigating his Iranian action.
a. Law Governing Antisuit Injunctions in Post-Judgment
Proceedings
The parties do not cite any, and we have not found any, California
cases identifying the circumstances that would justify an antisuit injunction
prohibiting a party from prosecuting an action in a foreign jurisdiction.
Justice Moreno’s concurring opinion in Advanced Bionics acknowledged the
dearth of California authority on this point and attempted to describe the
appropriate criteria for issuing antisuit injunctions. (Advanced Bionics,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 710–711 (conc. opn. of Moreno, J.).) The concurrence
relied on federal circuit court decisions in describing two approaches to
antisuit injunctions. (Id. at pp. 712–714.) Under the “restrictive approach,”
which Justice Moreno favored, “courts should only issue antisuit injunctions
in two situations: if ‘necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the enjoining
court, or to prevent the litigant’s evasion of the important public policies of
22
the forum.’ ” (Id. at p. 714.) The concurrence emphasized that “circuits that
follow the restrictive approach ‘have interpreted these exceptions narrowly.’ ”
(Ibid.)
The concurrence cited Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines (D.C. Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 909 (Laker Airways) as an example where
an antisuit injunction was proper under the restrictive approach. (Advanced
Bionics, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 714–715 (conc. opn. of Moreno, J.).) There, a
British airline filed an antitrust action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia against several domestic and foreign defendants. (Laker Airways,
at p. 915.) A few months later, one of the defendants filed suit in the United
Kingdom seeking a declaratory judgment that no laws were violated and an
injunction forbidding the airline from pursuing its antitrust action in the
District of Columbia. (Ibid.) The United Kingdom court granted the
injunction. (Ibid.) The airline thereafter sought an injunction in the District
of Columbia court to prevent the remaining defendants from filing any action
in a foreign court that would interfere with the District of Columbia court’s
jurisdiction, which the court granted. (Ibid.) The defendants appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. (Ibid.)
Applying the restrictive approach, the court of appeals affirmed the
grant of the injunction on the ground that the English cause of action
threatened its jurisdiction. (Laker Airways, supra, 731 F.2d at pp. 927–928.)
The court acknowledged that neither duplication of parties and issues nor the
possibility of an “ ‘embarrassing race to judgment’ or potentially inconsistent
adjudications” are alone sufficient to justify issuance of an antisuit
injunction. (Id. at pp. 928–929.) However, it reasoned that “where the
foreign proceeding is not following a parallel track but attempts to carve out
exclusive jurisdiction over concurrent actions, an injunction may be necessary
23
to avoid the possibility of losing validly invoked jurisdiction.”4 (Id. at p. 930.)
In the case before it, the court concluded that “the British and American
actions [were] not parallel proceedings” because “the sole purpose of the
English proceeding [was] to terminate the American action.” (Ibid.)
Laker Airways did not involve a judgment, but the court indicated that
a post-judgment threat to the integrity of a domestic court’s judgment is
comparable to a pre-judgment threat to the domestic court’s ongoing
4 The TSMC court concluded that the Advanced Bionics majority
“arguably” adopted a stricter standard than the federal courts’ “ ‘restrictive
approach.’ ” (TSMC, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 596.) “[A]lthough the trial
court had found there was a substantial chance the defendant ‘would “go to
the Minnesota court [and] attempt to undercut the California court’s
jurisdiction” ’ [citation omitted], the Supreme Court concluded no exceptional
circumstance justified the order enjoining the Minnesota proceedings.”
(Ibid.) Thus, TSMC concluded, “the Advanced Bionics majority did not
endorse the issuance of an antisuit injunction for a California court to protect
its jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) We note, however, that although the defendant in
Advanced Bionics sought an order from the Minnesota court restraining the
parties from litigating the California action, the preliminary injunction the
Minnesota court ultimately issued did not prohibit the parties from
prosecuting the California action and only enjoined the parties from seeking
any relief that would restrain the Minnesota action. (Advanced Bionics,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 702–703.) Therefore, by the time the plaintiff sought
an antisuit injunction in the California action (ibid.), it was not a situation
where “the foreign proceeding is not following a parallel track but attempts to
carve out exclusive jurisdiction over concurrent actions . . . .” (Laker Airways,
supra, 731 F.2d at p. 930; see also Gau Shan Co. Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co.
(6th Cir. 1992) 956 F.2d 1349, 1356 [“we find nothing to indicate that the
federal court’s jurisdiction is threatened” because “Gau Shan offers no reason
why this court should conclude that the Hong Kong courts would enter an
antisuit injunction in this case”]; Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit
Industries, Inc. (M.D. Ala. 1992) 805 F.Supp. 919, 925 [finding that only a
limited injunction preventing the party from seeking an antisuit injunction
was justified where the foreign litigation was “being used in part to terminate
the action before this court”].)
24
jurisdiction. (Laker Airways, supra, 731 F.2d at pp. 927–928.) “When the
injunction is requested after a previous judgment on the merits, there is little
interference with the rule favoring parallel proceedings in matters subject to
concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, a court may freely protect the integrity of its
judgment by preventing their evasion through vexatious or oppressive
relitigation.” (Id. at p. 928.) The court further reasoned, “There is less
justification for permitting a second action after a prior court has reached a
judgment on the same issues.” (Id. at p. 928, fn. 53.) “Since res judicata and
collateral estoppel may be pled in subsequent actions, a showing of
harassment, bad faith, or other strong equitable circumstances should
ordinarily be required.” (Id. at p. 928, fn. 54.)
Citing Laker Airways, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a permanent injunction
prohibiting an insurer from litigating the issue of whether it had a duty to
defend its insured in the Isle of Man after the district court had entered
judgment on the same issue. (Mutual Services Ins. Co. v. Frit Industries, Inc.
(11th Cir. 2004) 358 F.3d 1312, 1324–1325.) “The district court was in the
best position to know the history of the case and assess the strategic conduct
of [the insurer] in seeking to relitigate the duty to defend issue in the Isle of
Man litigation. In this case, the ‘only conceivable benefit that [the foreign
defendants] would reap if the district court’s injunction were overturned
would be the right to attack the pending United States action in a foreign
court.’ ” (Id. at p. 1325.)
Similarly, in Silva Run Worldwide Ltd. v. Gaming Lottery Corp. (2d
Cir. 2002) 53 Fed. Appx. 597, the Second Circuit held that “ ‘a more lenient
standard’ [for issuing an antisuit injunction] prevails once judgment has been
entered . . . .” (Id. at p. 598.) The court affirmed the district court’s ruling
25
enjoining a party from prosecuting a legal malpractice action against his
former counsel in Canada after the district court had decided a dispute
between them and awarded the latter its unpaid attorneys’ fees. (Ibid.) “The
district court evidently found that the litigation commenced in Canada is an
effort to inflict expense on a prevailing party in order to discount, delay,
avenge or otherwise frustrate the judgment entered in this case. Having
reviewed the record, we cannot disagree with this finding.” (Ibid.)
b. Analysis
In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist that outweigh
the threat to judicial restraint and principles of comity (Advanced Bionics,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 708) where one of two parallel proceedings has
reached judgment, we find the Laker Airways line of cases instructive. Those
cases concluded that comity considerations are less strong where the
domestic court has rendered judgment on the merits because the foreign
court “is usually obliged to respect” the judgment, and thus a more relaxed
standard applies for the issuance of an antisuit injunction where judgment
has been reached. (Laker Airways, supra, 731 F.2d at pp. 928–929 & fn. 53.)
We agree, and we further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing an antisuit injunction under the circumstances in this
case.
California courts have long recognized that comity permits the
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to determine what can and
cannot be litigated once the first suit is complete. (Thomson v. Continental
Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 746, fn. 4; Levin v. Ligon (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 1456, 1475 [employing comity to give effect to a foreign
judgment]; see also Laker Airways, supra, 731 F.2d at p. 939 [“Comity
ordinarily requires that courts of a separate sovereign not interfere with
26
concurrent proceedings based on the same transitory claim, at least until a
judgment is reached in one action, allowing res judicata to be pled in
defense”].) Relying on federal authority, our high court held, “The doctrine of
comity prescribes that a court of this nation recognize the judgment of a court
of a foreign nation when the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and
enforcement does not prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate
domestic public policy.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 314.)
Although the issue in those cases was whether the domestic court
should recognize a foreign judgment, comity is founded upon the principle of
governmental reciprocity. (See Biosense Webster, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 827, 837, citing Mahan v. Gunther (1996) 278
Ill.App.3d 1108, 1116–1117 [“While a court of equity has the power to
restrain persons within its jurisdiction from instituting or proceeding with
foreign actions, the exercise of such power is a matter of great delicacy and is
to be invoked with great restraint in order to avoid distressing conflicts and
reciprocal interference with jurisdiction”]; Advanced Bionics, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 707 [“ ‘ “ ‘This courtesy, or comity, is established, not only from
motives of respect for the laws and institutions of the foreign countries, but
from considerations of mutual utility and advantage’ ” ’ ”]; see also Laker
Airways, supra, 731 F.2d at p. 937 [“the central precept of comity teaches
that . . . recognition [of foreign decisions] fosters international cooperation
and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability
through satisfaction of mutual expectations”].) This principle would be
undermined in most cases if a foreign court refused to recognize a domestic
judgment that resolved issues raised in the foreign action between the same
parties. Thus, it makes sense that comity is generally less of a concern and
“there is little interference with the rule favoring parallel proceedings” when
27
there is a domestic judgment because of the expectation that a foreign court
will respect the prior adjudication of the matter. (Laker Airways, supra, 731
F.2d at p. 928.)
Laker Airways suggests, however, that a judgment on the merits alone
is insufficient to justify an antisuit injunction barring a party from litigating
a foreign action. (Laker Airways, supra, 731 F.2d at p. 928, fn. 54.) This is
because a “plea of res judicata was for [the] second forum, not [the] first
forum, to determine.” (Ibid.; see Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly
Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 32 F.Supp.2d 118, 131 [“[A]lthough it is true that the
foreign court should ideally determine whether a judgment in a domestic
court precludes the foreign litigation, the standard for enjoining foreign
litigation after the domestic court reaches judgment is lower”].)
Accordingly, to justify the issuance of an antisuit injunction in cases
where the domestic action has reached judgment, federal courts have
required a “convincing demonstration” that the purpose of the foreign action
is to evade the judgment. (Auerbach v. Frank, supra, 685 A.2d at p. 409; see
Laker Airways, supra, 731 F.2d at p. 928 [“a court may freely protect the
integrity of its judgment by preventing their evasion through vexatious or
oppressive relitigation”]; Silva Run Worldwide Ltd. v. Gaming Lottery Corp.,
supra, 53 Fed.Appx. at p. 598; Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly
Corp., supra, 32 F.Supp.2d at p. 131.) Such “strong equitable circumstances”
outweigh comity concerns (Laker Airways, at p. 928 & fn. 54) because
“[c]omity is not advanced when a foreign country condones an action brought
solely to interfere with a final [] judgment” (SAS Institute, Inc. v. World
Programming Limited (4th Cir. 2020) 952 F.3d 513, 525). And where the
reason for issuing an antisuit injunction is that a party is acting in bad faith
in pursuing foreign litigation, there is little risk of “convey[ing] the message,
28
intended or not, that the issuing court has so little confidence in the foreign
court’s ability to adjudicate a given dispute fairly and efficiently that it is
unwilling even to allow the possibility.” (Gau Shan Co., Ltd. V. Bankers
Trust Co., supra, 956 F.2d at p. 1355.)
Considering the foregoing, we agree that comity considerations are less
strong where there is a domestic judgment, and that comity is not advanced
when a foreign court allows a party to litigate an action brought solely to
interfere with the judgment in a jurisdiction that will not apply res judicata.
We therefore take into consideration the limited nature of the comity
concerns present in this case as a result of the judgment in determining
whether there is an “exceptional circumstance” that “outweighs” the threat to
judicial restraint and principles of comity. (Advanced Bionics, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 708.) Under the Advanced Bionics standard, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an antisuit injunction
given the circumstances concerning Salkhi’s divorce action in Iran.
Salkhi chose to litigate his marital claims in a California court. It was
only after Behroyan sought to obtain an Iranian divorce decree through the
consular procedure, nearly six years after judgment had been reached in the
California action, that Salkhi initiated a divorce action in Iran. The trial
court apparently found that Salkhi’s intent in pursuing a new divorce action
in Iran was to frustrate the California judgment. As previously discussed, we
do not disagree with the trial court’s findings based on the record before us.
Moreover, allowing Salkhi to proceed with his separate divorce action cannot
be reconciled with the MSA and the order compelling him to comply with the
consular divorce process to obtain an Iranian divorce. The MSA prohibits the
parties from bringing any claims in an Iranian proceeding other than a claim
to terminate marital status. And the purpose of the relevant provisions in
29
the MSA is to allow either party to terminate their marital status in Iran, but
the evidence suggests that as long as Salkhi pursues his Iranian divorce
action, he alone has the right to finalize the divorce. In other words, the
record indicates not only that Salkhi seeks to evade the California judgment
through his Iranian divorce action, but also that an antisuit injunction is
necessary to effectuate the MSA incorporated into the judgment. The
exceptional circumstances of this case therefore outweigh the respect and
deference ordinarily owed to independent foreign proceedings.5
While we are cognizant that an antisuit injunction is a matter of
“ ‘great delicacy’ ” considering the principles of comity (Biosense Webster, Inc.
v. Superior Court, supra,135 Cal.App.4th at p. 837), those “considerations of
comity have diminished force” at the post-judgment stage (Paramedics
Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v. GE Medical Systems Info. Tech., Inc. (2d
Cir. 2004) 369 F.3d 645, 654). Under the narrow circumstances of this case,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an antisuit injunction.
E. Family Code Section 271 Sanctions
Finally, Salkhi makes two arguments for why the trial court’s Family
Code section 271 sanctions order is erroneous. Again, his contentions fail.
5 The declaration of Alemohammad clarifies that Iranian courts will not
recognize a California judgment through res judicata. During oral argument,
Appellant’s counsel acknowledged there was no evidence in the record that
Iranian courts would apply principles of res judicata, nor how long the
Iranian divorce process could take to complete, but suggested that because
the Iranian divorce decree would not be enforceable in California, there was
somehow no injury to Respondent as she could seek attorneys’ fees to punish
Salkhi for his misconduct. Appellant’s argument wholly ignores the equities,
especially the inability of Behroyan to freely travel to and from Iran without
Salkhi’s ability to interfere.
30
1. Basis for Awarding Sanctions
Salkhi argues that we should vacate the Family Code section 271
sanctions award against him and direct the court to impose sanctions against
Behroyan instead. He has not met his burden to establish error, however.
Family Code section 271 permits the court to “base an award of
attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or
attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of
litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging
cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” Under this statute, and its
identical predecessor, “[t]he trial court may . . . impose fees as sanctions
against an intransigent party for the party’s own conduct, or for the conduct
of an unprofessional counsel.” (In re Marriage of Daniels (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 1102, 1107.) The court’s decision to award attorney’s fees and
costs “will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of
discretion.” (In re Marriage of Czapar (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1308, 1318–
1319.)
Salkhi’s argument here is predicated on this court finding the trial
court erred in granting injunctive relief. Because the MSA requires the
parties to cooperate with each other in obtaining an Iranian divorce decree,
and because we have concluded the trial court did not err in granting
Behroyan’s request for an order enforcing that provision of the MSA based on
Salkhi’s uncooperative conduct, his argument lacks merit. (See Menezes v.
McDaniel (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 340, 349 [Family Code section 271 sanctions
proper where wife failed to comply with court order directing her to aid in
transfer of title to real property to husband’s name].)
31
2. Amount of Award
Salkhi also argues that Behroyan did not provide sufficient details from
which the court could determine whether the attorney fees awarded were
“reasonably necessary” and whether the $2,600 in alleged costs were
compensable as Family Code section 271 sanctions. In response, Behroyan
contends that because Salkhi never objected to the amount of her fee request
or her supporting documentation in the trial court, he did not preserve his
objections for appeal. We agree with Behroyan.
“[W]here the trial court is informed of the extent and nature of the
services rendered, it may rely on its own experience and knowledge in
determining their reasonable value.” (In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86
Cal.App.3d 290, 300.) “Absent a request for a statement of decision as to how
attorney fees were computed the complaining party has waived any failure to
provide such a computation.” (In re Marriage of McQuoid (1991) 9
Cal.App.4th 1353, 1361 [concluding that counsel’s statements to the court
that wife’s total fee expense was $4,500 was “sufficient to establish the value
of his services”]; see also In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
1470, 1495–1496 [husband waived challenge to the amount of Family Code
section 271 sanctions awarded to wife where he raised no objection in the
trial court regarding the amount of attorney fees sought or the supporting
documentation].)
Here, in support of Behroyan’s request for Family Code section 271
sanctions, her counsel’s declaration stated that his office spent 36.6 hours “on
meeting and conferring with [Salkhi] to resolve the Iranian divorce issue and
passport applications[] and bringing this motion” and that Behroyan incurred
fees in the amount of $19,919 and costs in the amount of $2,600. This was
sufficient to establish the value of the attorney services Behroyan received as
32
a result of Salkhi’s uncooperative conduct.6 (See In re Marriage of McQuoid,
supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361; see also Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v.
Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269 [“ ‘An attorney’s testimony as to the
number of hours worked is sufficient to support an award of attorney fees,
even in the absence of detailed time records’ ”].)
While Salkhi requested a statement of decision, there is no evidence
that he objected to the amount of the fee award. He also does not cite any
portion of the record showing that he objected to the award of $2,600 in costs
or to the evidence supporting Behroyan’s claimed costs. “ ‘An appellate court
will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings . . . where
an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by
some appropriate method. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [party waived claim that trial court improperly
calculated the amount of child support by failing to raise the argument in the
trial court].) The justification for this rule is that it is unfair to the trial court
and the adverse party to permit a party to raise an alleged error that could
easily have been corrected at trial. (In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661,
671.) Accordingly, we deem him to have waived any error regarding the
amount of the Family Code section 271 sanctions award.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent Nooshin Behroyan shall recover her
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
6 The cases Salkhi relies on are distinguishable because in those cases,
no evidence whatsoever was presented to support the fee request (In re
Marriage of Duris & Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510, 515), or the other
party objected to the amount requested (In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 860, 869).
33
GETTY, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
BANKE, J.
A165484N

Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
34