Falb v. Scherer CA4/3 ( 2023 )

Filed 12/5/23 Falb v. Scherer CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MICHELE FALB,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G062731
v. (Super. Ct. No. TRUPS1900250)
LYNNE SCHERER, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
Rafael A. Arreola, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct., assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6.) Affirmed.
Law Offices of Robert F. Schauer, Robert F. Schauer and Noah K. McCall
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Keehn Law Professional Corporation and Carla B. Keehn for Defendant
and Respondent.
During their marriage, Felice DiBlasi Verona (Felice) and James Verona
1
(James) created a revocable trust. When the first of them died, the survivor was to
divide that trust into two trusts — one of which would become irrevocable — unless the
total value of the original trust’s assets was less than the federal tax-free amount. When
James died before Felice, the total trust assets were less than the federal tax-free amount,
so the trust was not divided. Felice later changed the beneficiaries of the original
revocable trust, and then created a new trust into which she placed the assets of the
original trust. When Felice died, all the assets passed to her children, with nothing
passing to James’s children.
While James was alive, he withdrew half the money from bank accounts
held jointly with Felice and transferred that money to bank accounts held jointly with his
daughter, appellant Michele Falb. After James’s death, Falb held onto the remaining
money.
We hold (1) Felice had the authority and the capacity to amend the original
trust after James’s death, to establish a new trust, and to transfer the assets to the new
trust; (2) the original trust authorized Felice not to divide the trust assets into two trusts
after James’s death, given the value of the trust’s assets at that time; and (3) Falb
committed financial elder abuse against Felice by taking and assisting James in taking
and holding half of the money from the bank accounts belonging jointly to Felice and
James, hiding from Felice the only executed copy of the trust document, taking personal
property belonging to Felice as the surviving trustee, and tying up the trust’s real property
in litigation and preventing Felice from selling it. We therefore affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
1
We refer to Felice and James by their first names to avoid confusion. We intend no
disrespect.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.
THE PARTIES AND THE FAMILY TRUST
Felice and James married in 1978. Felice and James had no children of
their marriage, but each had children from their previous marriages. Appellant Falb was
James’s daughter from a previous marriage, and respondent Lynne Scherer (Scherer) was
Felice’s daughter from a previous marriage. James died February 28, 2018. Felice died
June 10, 2020, during the pendency of this matter.
In October 2008, Felice and James created the Verona Family Revocable
Trust (the Family Trust). Felice and James were the initial trustees of the Family Trust.
Falb and Scherer were named as co-successor trustees.
The Family Trust provides that upon the death of the first-to-die spouse, the
surviving trustee must divide the Family Trust property into two trusts (Trust A or the
Survivor’s Trust, and Trust B or the Unified Credit Trust), subject to one important
caveat in section 5.02: “Should, however, at the death of the first Trustor the newly
appraised value of the assets be less than the maximum Federal tax-free amount, the
Trustee shall not divide the assets into two trusts.” (Italics added.)
After James’s death, Felice executed a first amendment to the Family Trust
by which she named Scherer as the co-trustee and removed Falb and Falb’s brother, Scott
Verona, from consideration as successor trustees. Felice also exercised a power of
appointment by which the beneficiaries of the Family Trust were changed to Scherer and
Felice’s son, Ronald DiBlasi, and their descendants by right of representation; Falb, her
siblings, and their descendants were removed as beneficiaries.
II.
REAL PROPERTY
At the time Felice and James married, Felice owned a piece of real property
located on Deodar Street in Ontario, California, as an unmarried woman (the Property).
3
In May 2008, Felice transferred the Property by grant deed to herself and James as joint
tenants. After creating the Family Trust, Felice and James transferred the Property by
trust transfer deed to themselves as trustees of the Family Trust.
After James’s death, Felice created the Felice Verona Revocable Trust (the
Individual Trust) in July 2019. Felice executed three deeds in July 2019 transferring the
Property, conveying the Property first to herself as trustee of the Family Trust, then to
herself as her sole and separate property, and then to herself as trustee of the Individual
Trust.
III.
BANK ACCOUNTS
At the relevant times, Felice and James had four bank accounts:
(1) US Bank checking account ending 6578, held in joint tenancy; (2) US Bank money
market account ending 2001, held in joint tenancy; (3) Chase Bank checking account
ending 5875, held as trustees of the Family Trust; and (4) Chase Bank savings account
ending 5575, held as trustees of the Family Trust. In October 2017, James withdrew half
of the balance from each of these bank accounts. The total withdrawn from the bank
accounts was $291,569.26. Falb drove James to both banks to make those withdrawals.
On the same day, Falb and James opened a joint account at Chase Bank into which they
deposited all of the funds withdrawn from Felice and James’s four bank accounts.
In April 2018, after James’s death, Falb had two cashier’s checks issued to
herself from the joint account at Chase Bank in the total amount of $285,474.30. She
deposited this money into a new account at Union Bank in her own name.
IV.
OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY
In May 2019, after James’s death, knowing that Felice was in Colorado,
Falb hired a locksmith to enter the Property and rekey it. She later rented a small truck to
4
remove what she claimed was her personal property from the Property. She took a
2
mechanical bed, three flat screen televisions, a typewriter, and a sewing machine.
V.
SIGNED COPY OF THE FAMILY TRUST
After James’s death, Felice was unable to locate a signed copy of the
Family Trust and was therefore unable to administer the Family Trust. In March 2018,
Scherer asked Falb if she was in possession of the Family Trust document; Falb claimed
she was not. Falb claimed she found the Family Trust document in May 2019 in her
garage in a box of books given to her by James in late 2017.
VI.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Falb filed a petition in November 2019 to remove Felice as trustee. Felice
died in June 2020. Falb filed a first amended petition in August 2020, asking the court to
(1) determine who should serve as successor trustee, (2) order the Family Trust assets,
including the Property, not to be sold, (3) void the exercise of power of appointment and
the first amendment to the Family Trust signed by Felice in July 2019 due to Felice’s
alleged lack of capacity, and (4) void all deeds regarding the Property signed by Felice in
July 2019 due to Felice’s alleged lack of capacity. Scherer filed a cross-petition in
February 2021 seeking damages from Falb for financial elder abuse, undue influence,
recovery of Family Trust assets, a surcharge for attorney fees and double damages, and
imposition of a constructive trust.
A bench trial was conducted in October 2021. The court issued a two-page,
handwritten decision after trial on October 29, 2021. In that decision, the court made the
2
The trial court also found Falb took two pianos, an additional television, and “more
items that were presented at trial.” The specific nature of the personal property removed
from the Property is not material to the resolution of the issues in this appeal.
5
3
following findings: (1) Falb’s testimony was not credible; (2) after James’s death, Felice
became the sole trustor and trustee of the Family Trust; (3) Felice had the legal capacity
to create a new trust and transfer the Property to that new trust; (4) Falb had no right to
enter the Property or take any personal property from it; and (5) although James had the
right while living to take money from the Family Trust for his living expenses, he was
required to do so in a reasonable manner, and he did not have the right to take about half
of the money from the bank accounts and give most of that money to Falb. The court
ordered Falb to return the money from the bank accounts to the Family Trust or to the
Individual Trust and to not use that money for any purpose (including but not limited to
litigation expenses); imposed a constructive trust on the bank account money; and denied
without prejudice Scherer’s requests for punitive damages, attorney fees, and double
damages. The court also ordered Scherer’s counsel to prepare findings and orders for the
court’s signature.
Falb timely requested a statement of decision. The court issued a tentative
statement of decision on November 19, 2021, which merely restated the decision after
trial in typewritten form. Falb filed objections to the tentative statement of decision.
Scherer then submitted a proposed supplement to the statement of decision
to which Falb objected. After a hearing on Falb’s objections, Scherer filed a revised
proposed supplement to the statement of decision, to which Falb again objected.
The trial court signed the revised proposed supplement to the statement of
decision, with minor interlineated changes (the supplement). In the supplement the trial
court found: (1) Falb took, appropriated, and assisted James in taking $291,569.26 from
joint accounts held by James and Felice, and later transferred that money into her own
3
On appeal, we may not disturb the trial court’s finding Falb was not credible.
(Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v . Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 771, 804–805 [witness credibility is the exclusive province of the trier of
fact].)
6
account; (2) Falb took and hid the only executed copy of the Family Trust; (3) Falb took,
appropriated, hid, and obtained numerous items of personal property from the Property,
including two pianos and four flatscreen televisions; (4) Falb prevented Felice from
selling the Property; (5) after James died, Falb took and appropriated to herself the
money taken from James and Felice’s joint accounts; (6) given the language of the
Family Trust and the size of the Family Trust at James’s death, the Family Trust was not
divided into A and B trusts; (7) Felice had testamentary capacity to create the Individual
Trust and to transfer the Property to the Individual Trust in July 2019; (8) Falb failed to
rebut the presumption of Felice’s testamentary capacity; (9) the testimony of the attorney
who drafted the Individual Trust as to Felice’s capacity to make financial decisions was
entitled to substantial weight; and (10) by means of the Individual Trust, Felice left the
Property to her surviving children, Scherer and Ronald DiBlasi. The supplement noted:
“These supplemental findings do not change the court’s tentative statement of decision
and the initial findings, rulings and orders shall become the final decisions and orders of
this court.” (The decision after trial, tentative statement of decision and the supplement
will hereafter be referred to collectively as the Statement of Decision.)
On the same day, the court entered an order taxing a portion of Scherer’s
costs, and entered judgment in favor of Scherer and against Falb in the amount of
$300,087. Falb filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on March 1, 2022. On March
24, 2022, Falb filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“When the court announces its tentative decision, a party may, under [Code
of Civil Procedure] section 632, request the court to issue a statement of decision
explaining the basis of its determination, and shall specify the issues on which the party is
7
requesting the statement; following such a request, the party may make proposals relating
to the contents of the statement. Thereafter, under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 634,
the party must state any objection to the statement in order to avoid an implied finding on
appeal in favor of the prevailing party.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1130, 1133, fns. omitted.) In order to avoid the doctrine of implied findings, litigants
must bring ambiguities and omissions in the statement of decision’s factual findings to
the trial court’s attention. If omissions or ambiguities in the statement of decision’s
factual findings are timely brought to the court’s attention, “it shall not be inferred on
appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to those facts or
on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 634.) “Failure to determine a material issue in a
statement of decision can, in some circumstances, be reversible error if there is evidence
that would support a finding in the opposing party’s favor.” (Triple A Management Co.
v. Frisone (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 520, 536.) “‘[I]f the judgment is otherwise supported,
the omission to make such findings is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding in the complaining party’s favor which would have the effect of
countervailing or destroying other findings.’” (Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 736, 745.)
The interpretation of a trust instrument is a question of law which we
review de novo, as there is no conflict or question of the credibility of extrinsic evidence
in this case. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 604; McGee v. State Dept. of
Health Care Services (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1169.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THE MONEY JAMES TOOK FROM HIS
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS WITH FELICE MUST BE RETURNED TO THE FAMILY TRUST
A. Family Trust Section 5.02
Section 5.02 of the Family Trust provides that upon the death of the first-to-
die spouse, the trustee must immediately divide the Family Trust property into two trusts,
8
subject to one important caveat: “Should, however, at the death of the first Trustor the
newly appraised value of the assets be less than the maximum Federal tax-free amount,
the Trustee shall not divide the assets into two trusts.” (Italics added.)
At trial, Falb agreed the total value of the Family Trust when James died
was less than $6 million. The trial court took judicial notice the federal tax exemption for
tax year 2018 was $5.6 million per individual. Therefore, as the surviving trustor and
trustee, Felice was not required to split the Family Trust into a Survivor’s Trust and a
Unified Credit Trust at James’s death or otherwise divide the Family Trust’s assets.
Because the Family Trust remained intact, no part of the Family Trust became
irrevocable; section 2.03(D) of the Family Trust provides the Unified Credit Trust would
become irrevocable after creation following the death of the first-to-die spouse, but under
section 5.02 of the Family Trust no Unified Credit Trust was ever created. Therefore,
Felice was entitled to amend the entirety of the Family Trust to change the beneficiaries
and to transfer the Family Trust’s assets — including the Property — to herself as an
individual and/or to the Individual Trust.
Falb does not mention, much less address, section 5.02 of the Family Trust
in her appellate briefs. Instead, Falb focuses on sections 5.01 and 7.04 of the Family
Trust. Section 5.01 provides: “Upon the death of either Trustor, the Trustee shall
distribute immediately the decedent’s separate property according to the terms of Article
7.04, infra.” Section 7.04 provides, “Upon the death of the Surviving Trustor, Trustee
shall divide the entire trust estate, including additions thereto by way of pour-over from
the Wills of James R. Verona and Felice Verona, or from any other source” one-half to
James’s children and one-half to Felice’s children. (Some capitalization omitted.)
Neither of those sections is applicable in this case. Section 5.01 applies only to separate
property. Although section 1.01 of the Family Trust provides separate property
transferred by each trustor will retain its character as such, neither trustor identified any
separate property in the schedules to the Family Trust and no evidence identifying any
9
separate property was presented at trial. This leaves us with the necessary conclusion
there was no separate property to be distributed under section 5.01. As for section 7.04,
by the time Felice — the surviving trustor — died, the Family Trust had been amended to
remove James’s children as beneficiaries.
Falb incorrectly argues on appeal the trial court ruled Felice and James held
the Property as joint tenants and it therefore became Felice’s sole property via the right of
survivorship. Before James’s death, the Property was held by Felice and James as
trustees of the Family Trust. After James’s death, Felice became the sole trustee and
owned the Property in that capacity. As the sole trustee, given the applicability of section
5.02 of the Family Trust that it “shall not” be divided into two separate trusts, Felice had
the sole authority to amend the Family Trust and to exercise a general power of
appointment changing the beneficiaries. Nothing in the Statement of Decision presumes
otherwise.
B. Felice’s Mental Capacity
The trial court found Felice had the legal capacity to exercise the power of
appointment, amend the Family Trust, execute the Individual Trust, and transfer the
Property to the Individual Trust, under either Probate Code section 6100.5 and Andersen
v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722, or under Probate Code sections 810 through 812.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
In Andersen v. Hunt, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at page 731, the court held
that when a trust document is more like a will than a legal contract in its complexity, it is
appropriate to apply the standard for capacity to execute a will, as set forth in Probate
Code section 6100.5, rather than the general, higher standard for legal capacity, as set
forth in Probate Code sections 810 through 812. Under Probate Code section 6100.5, a
person may be found to lack the mental capacity to make a will only if they (1) lack the
mental capacity to understand the nature of the testamentary act, the nature and situation
of their property, or their relation to those whose interests are affected by the
10
testamentary document, or (2) suffer delusions or hallucinations that cause them to devise
their property in an unnatural way.
Section 810 of the Probate Code creates a rebuttable presumption that
everyone has the capacity to make their own decisions, including testamentary decisions,
even if they have been diagnosed with a mental or physical disorder. A court’s
determination an individual lacks testamentary capacity requires evidence of a deficit in
mental function as well as evidence of a correlation between that deficit and the
testamentary act if the deficit “significantly impairs the person’s ability to understand and
appreciate the consequences of his or her actions with regard to the type of act or decision
in question.” (Prob. Code, § 811.) Under Probate Code section 812, a person lacks
capacity to make a decision unless they have the ability to communicate the decision and
to understand the rights and duties created by the decision, the consequences for the
decisionmaker, and the risks, benefits, and alternatives involved in the decision.
Dr. Amanda Goldstein testified as an expert witness for Falb. She reviewed
Felice’s medical records and opined, based on those records and an interview of Falb,
Felice did not meet the criteria of testamentary capacity on July 17, 2019, and July 23,
2019, notwithstanding Goldstein’s opinion Felice then knew she did not want her
stepchildren to inherit anything. However, Goldstein never met or treated Felice, and the
trial court was not required to give credence to her opinion. “An expert’s opinion is only
as good as the facts on which it is built.” (Shiffer v. CBS Corp. (2015) 240
4
Cal.App.4th 246, 253–254.)
4
Falb also offered evidence from several friends and family members who testified to
Felice’s forgetfulness, anxiety, compulsive desire to leave Colorado, and changes in
behavior and mood. None of this testimony was sufficient, alone or together, to rebut the
presumption of legal capacity. As the trial court noted, “The presumption of
testamentary capacity cannot be rebutted by showing a few isolated acts of mental
irregularities, isolated acts, departures from the normal, unless they bear directly
on . . . and influence the testamentary act. Estate of Woehr (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 4,
17.” (See Estate of Lingenfelter (1952) 38 Cal.2d 571, 581.)
11
Barbara Cashman, an attorney in Colorado, testified Felice retained her in
July 2019 for estate planning guidance and assistance. Cashman testified Felice was
aware of the Property as real property she owned in California, and she desired to leave
all her property her property to her children. Cashman drafted a first amendment to the
Family Trust naming Scherer as Felice’s co-trustee, and removing Falb and her brother
Scott Verona from consideration as successor trustees. Cashman also drafted an exercise
of general power of appointment, by which Felice changed the beneficiaries of the
Family Trust so that only Scherer and her brother Ronald DiBlasi (or their descendants
by representation) would be the beneficiaries of the Family Trust after Felice’s death.
Cashman also drafted a new revocable trust — the Individual Trust — consistent with
Felice’s stated desires.
Cashman met with Felice four or five times. Felice provided Cashman with
information about her property and who she wanted to be the beneficiaries of the
Individual Trust. Scherer did not provide Cashman with a medical diagnosis for Felice;
Cashman testified she would have made her own assessment or evaluation of Felice’s
capacity even if Scherer had done so. Cashman testified: “Now, Ms. Verona, as I said,
was a feisty little old lady. She knew what she wanted. She might not have been as clear
and had all the cognitive capacity that she once had, but that’s, in fact, very common.
And it’s also very common for adult children to tell me, ‘Well, you know, Dad isn’t what
he used to be.’ Well, you know what? Dad can still hire me, or mom can still hire me as
their counsel and direct me about what changes they want to make.” The trial court gave
“substantial weight” to Cashman’s testimony.
In summary, Cashman testified Felice had the capacity to make financial
decisions, to execute the various documents related to the Family Trust, to execute the
Individual Trust, and to execute the various deeds for the Property. None of Falb’s
witnesses provided evidence of the three criteria under Probate Code section 6100.5, or
12
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of capacity under Probate Code sections 810
through 812.
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS
REGARDING FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE
Scherer’s cross-petition alleged Falb committed financial elder abuse
against Felice by assisting James in removing money from James and Felice’s bank
accounts, hiding the original executed copy of the Family Trust, taking personal property
from the Property, and preventing Felice from selling the Property by tying it up in
litigation. The cross-petition also alleged Falb exercised undue influence against James
to obtain money from the couple’s bank accounts.
Financial abuse of an elder occurs when a person deprives the elder of a
property right or assists in depriving the elder of a property right, either (1) for a
wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both, or (2) by undue influence. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15610.30, subds. (a), (c); see id., § 15610.70.) If the person knows depriving the
elder of the property right “is likely to be harmful to the elder,” they may be deemed to
have taken the property for a wrongful use. (Id., § 15610.30, subd. (b).)
Falb argues the judgment must be reversed because the Statement of
5
Decision fails to state facts to support the judgment against her for financial elder abuse.
While the Statement of Decision does not make a finding Falb committed financial elder
abuse, it contains findings on which such a finding could be based. Only if the evidence
is sufficient to support a contrary finding in Falb’s favor “‘which would have the effect of
5
Scherer argues Falb forfeited this argument on appeal because she failed to object to
the Statement of Decision based on a failure to address financial elder abuse. While we
disagree the failure to raise an issue in objections to a statement of decision forfeits the
issue on appeal, we agree it brings into play the doctrine of implied findings. Falb’s
objection to the proposed supplemental statement of decision filed January 24, 2022 does
raise the issue of whether Falb did anything improper in assisting James withdraw money
from James and Felice’s bank accounts.
13
countervailing or destroying other findings’” (Sperber v. Robinson, supra, 26
Cal.App.4th at p. 745) is reversal required.
Scherer suggests in her respondent’s brief the trial court never ruled on the
petition for financial elder abuse. Neither the Statement of Decision nor the judgment
specifically mentions financial elder abuse. If financial elder abuse is proven, Probate
Code section 859 imposes liability for twice the value of the recovered property.
Additionally, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a) makes an
award of attorney fees and costs against a defendant mandatory when financial elder
abuse is proved.
The decision after trial and the Statement of Decision deny attorney fees.
Yet the trial court awarded Scherer judgment against Falb in the amount of the money
taken from the bank accounts (plus costs in the matter) and imposed a constructive trust
over those funds. The trial court’s award is indicative of a finding of financial abuse and
it was then appropriate for the trial court to impose a constructive trust on the money.
The trial court could also order Falb to return the money to the Family Trust or the
Individual Trust. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did rule on the cross-petition for
financial elder abuse, although it did not state so explicitly.
Additionally, the trial court found James, assisted by Falb, took and
appropriated money from his joint accounts with Felice. The court also found Family
Code section 721 applied in this case: “[I]n transactions between themselves, spouses are
subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of
persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship
imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall
take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary
14
relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners.” (Fam.
6
Code, § 721, subd. (b).)
Falb testified the money removed from the bank accounts was intended to
pay for James’s care. Even if we assume the truth of that testimony despite the trial
court’s finding Falb was not credible, the sum of the checks and cash withdrawals Falb
testified were made for James’s care totaled less than $12,000. The money withdrawn
from the joint bank accounts in excess of this amount was not used for James’s care and
was not returned to James and Felice.
In any event, substantial evidence supports judgment in Scherer’s favor on
the financial elder abuse claim. The trial court made findings that Falb took and
“appropriated” the money in question by assisting James in withdrawing the money. To
appropriate means “to take without permission.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict.
7
(1986) p. 106.) The court also found Falb had taken and hidden the only executed copy
of the Family Trust; taken, appropriated, and hidden items of personal property; and
prevented Felice from selling the Property by pursuing the probate petition. These
findings were sufficient to support a conclusion that Falb’s conduct was undertaken for a
wrongful purpose within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30,
subdivision (b).
6
There was no cause of action asserted against James for breach of fiduciary duty. The
duties imposed by Family Code section 721, however, apply even in the absence of a
cause of action for such a breach.
7
In her appellate briefs, Falb cites her testimony that she did not influence James’s
decisions to withdraw the money or open the joint bank accounts with her; rather, the
decision was James’s alone and his purpose was to pay for his care with his half of the
Family Trust’s assets. As discussed ante, we review the judgment for substantial
evidence. Falb fails to cite and explain why the evidence supporting the judgment is
insufficient. (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) Additionally, the trial
court found Falb not to be credible.
15
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
16