People v. Cisneros CA4/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 2/9/24 P. v. Cisneros CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E081819
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV900532)
EDWARD RAMON CISNEROS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Sachs,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Lynne
McGuiness and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Edward Ramon Cisneros filed a form petition for
resentencing under then-applicable Penal Code section 1170.95.1 The trial court denied
the petition without appointing counsel, which the Attorney General as respondent
concedes was error. We accept the concession and find that the error in failing to appoint
counsel was not harmless. We therefore reverse and remand the matter for further
proceedings, beginning with the appointment of counsel.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In September 2012, in a joint trial with his codefendant, Joel Jaquez, a jury
convicted defendant of attempted murder of a police officer (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a);
count 4) and assault with a firearm on the same officer and three other peace officers
(§ 245, subd. (d)(1); counts 3, 5, 7 & 9). The jury also convicted defendant of robbery
(§ 211; counts 11 & 12); commercial burglary (§ 459; count 13); and making a criminal
threat (§ 422; count 14). On the robbery counts, the jury found defendant personally used
a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); the jury also found true a firearm use allegation
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) on the burglary and criminal threat counts.
The jury convicted Jaquez of the same counts with the same true findings, while
also finding Jaquez guilty of attempted murder of another police officer (count 2). The
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Just after defendant filed
his petition, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended and renumbered
section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; eff. June 30, 2022.) We
generally cite the current section number, but leave intact case quotations referencing
section 1170.95 where there is no relevant change in the corresponding subdivisions.
2
jury further found Jaquez committed the attempted murder in count 4 with premeditation
and deliberation and personally discharged a firearm in committing the offense.2
The jury deadlocked on the murder count alleged against both defendants
(count 1). Nothing in the charging instrument or the record indicates that the murder
victim was a peace officer. In pertinent part as to defendant, the jury also deadlocked on
three counts of attempted murder of a peace officer (counts 2, 6 & 8), as well as on the
allegation that the attempted murder in count 4 was premeditated and deliberate. The
court declared a mistrial on the deadlocked counts and subsequently dismissed them on
the prosecutor’s motion.
The initial sentences that the trial court imposed on defendant and Jaquez required
resentencing after their direct appeal. This court’s unpublished opinion resolving that
appeal struck one of the robbery convictions (count 12) and ordered a stay under
section 654 of their sentences for counts 13 and 14, but affirmed the judgment in all other
respects. (People v. Cisneros et al. (Sept. 10, 2014, E058626 [nonpub. opn.]
(Cisneros I).) At defendant’s resentencing, the trial court imposed a determinate term of
38 years four months, plus 14 years to life.
With a caveat that we explain in the margin, Cisneros I provides convenient
factual context for the foregoing procedural history that backgrounds defendant’s present
2 We summarize the jury’s findings as to Jaquez only briefly because they are
tangential to defendant’s resentencing petition at this stage in the proceedings.
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appeal.3 Cisneros I summarized: “Defendants . . . entered a Papa John’s Pizza (PJP) on
Central Avenue in Chino at closing time. Silvio Guiral was the only employee in the
store. Defendants demanded Guiral’s money from his wallet, his personal keys and keys
to the PJP’s safe. They threatened Guiral with a gun. Unbeknownst to defendants, a
woman outside the store had seen them enter the restaurant and immediately called the
police. Numerous Chino police officers arrived and eventually Jaquez engaged them in a
shootout. Jaquez and Cisneros were shot, along with an officer [whose forearm was
shattered, requiring surgery]. Additionally, during the clash, an innocent bystander was
shot and killed by an officer.” (Cisneros I, supra, E058626.)
In April 2022, defendant filed the resentencing petition that is the subject of this
appeal. In checking the three boxes on the preprinted form, he attested that he met the
prerequisites for resentencing under section 1172.6. He also checked the box stating that,
“[h]aving presented a facially sufficient petition,” he requested the appointment of
counsel.
3 If this matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s resentencing
petition (see § 1172.6, subd, (d)), at which the trial court acts as an independent fact
finder (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123), the trial court should not
rely on our prior opinion’s implicit or explicit resolution of any factual discrepancies in
the trial record; instead, the trial court acts as the trier of fact. (Ibid.; see People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292 [holding based on the “specificity” of
§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3), that “the Legislature has decided trial judges should not rely on
the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions when a section 1170.95
petition reaches the stage of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing”].) At the early stage now
at issue on appeal—even before the prima facie hearing for which the trial court should
have appointed defendant counsel, as we explain post—these cautionary evidentiary
considerations are not at issue.
4
The prosecutor opposed the petition, filing a written brief as we discuss more fully
post. The trial court did not appoint counsel for defendant; nothing indicates defendant
received notice of the opposition, to which defendant did not reply. At the hearing on the
petition, at which the prosecution appeared but defendant did not and no attorney
appeared on defendant’s behalf, the trial court denied the petition.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate
Bill 1437) changed the law of murder “‘“to more equitably sentence offenders in
accordance with their involvement in homicides.”’” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 986.) “Now, ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’” (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 433.) To this
end, the new legislation eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for aider and abettor murder liability and it limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis), citing §§ 188, subd. (a)(3);
189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; Senate
Bill 775) then expanded the class of defendants authorized to petition for resentencing to
those convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223,
fn. 3 [identifying changes in Sen. Bill 775].)
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Senate Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95, which—now renumbered as
section 1172.6 and as amended by Senate Bill 775—created “a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief.” (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 & fn. 2 (Strong).)
That mechanism or process for potential resentencing includes, as relevant here:
first, the defendant must file a petition meeting certain prerequisites (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(1)); second, the trial court conducts an initial review in which it determines if
the petition includes the required information (id., subd. (b)(2)); and third, for defendants
who have filed a complying petition, the court then appoints counsel if the defendant has
so requested (id., subd. (b)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963).
Next, in a fourth step, the parties then submit briefing and the court conducts a
hearing to determine if the defendant has made a prima facie case for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Only then, if the defendant has made the requisite prima facie
showing, does the trial court proceed to a final multipart step, including an order to show
cause and an evidentiary hearing, which may result in resentencing. (Id., subd. (d)(1));
see, e.g., Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-967.)
Here, the trial court jumped ahead to the prima facie hearing in the fourth step
without appointing counsel, indeed without briefing by defendant or by an attorney on his
behalf. This was error. The resentencing statute “does not envision a structure by which
courts can make a[ prima facie] determination without briefing and without the
appointment of counsel.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) “[O]nly after the
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appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing may the superior court consider
the record of conviction to determine whether ‘the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that he or she is entitled to relief.’” (Id. at p. 957.)
The Supreme Court in Lewis decided the dispositive issue here, namely: “[W]hen
does the right to appointed counsel arise?” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) Lewis
explained that “whether a petitioner ‘requests the appointment of counsel’ is part of the
information that must be included in a petition for it to satisfy the court’s
section 1170.95, subdivision (b)(2) review. [Citations.] Subdivision (c)’s language
regarding the appointment of counsel is mandatory: ‘If the petitioner has requested
counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner.’ [Citation.] The
combined meaning is clear: petitioners who file a complying petition requesting counsel
are to receive counsel upon the filing of a compliant petition.” (Lewis, at pp. 962-963.)
Respondent concedes, and we agree, that defendant filed a compliant petition here.
There is no dispute, for example, that he averred he met all the requirements for
resentencing, including that he “could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder
because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189.” As respondent acknowledges,
defendant’s petition included all the necessary information and attestations. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) The trial court therefore was required to appoint counsel.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963.)
We review the erroneous failure to appoint counsel under section 1172.6 for
prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
7
at pp. 957-958; People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 892.) The defendant must
show a reasonable probability of a more favorable result if the trial court had appointed
counsel. (Lewis, at p. 974.)
Defendant met that standard here. As respondent concedes, the trial court relied
on an erroneous rationale in the prosecution’s brief opposing defendant’s petition to
conclude he could not make a prima facie showing for resentencing relief. The
prosecution argued defendant was excluded from resentencing relief as a matter of law
based on subdivision (f) of section 189 (hereafter subd. (f) or § 189(f)). That subdivision
provides that Senate Bill 1437’s new restrictions in section 189, subdivision (e), on the
felony-murder rule “do[] not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who
was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties . . . .” (§ 189(f), italics added.)
This was inapt as to defendant in several respects. The changes that Senate
Bill 1437 made to section 189 placed limitations on the felony-murder rule. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708.) But defendant was not convicted of murder on any
theory—neither of a civilian nor a police officer, nor was he so sentenced.
Instead, he was convicted of attempted murder, for which resentencing is available
if the conviction was based on the now-proscribed natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (§§ 1172.6, subd. (a); 188, subd. (a)(3); see People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842-843 [latter section “amend[ed] the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”], abrogated by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023)
14 Cal.5th 839, 869.) Nothing in these statutory provisions regarding the natural and
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probable consequences doctrine expresses a similar bar to resentencing relief that
section 189(f) erects when the offense is committed against a peace officer. And as
respondent acknowledges, there is no crime of attempted felony murder. (People v. Billa
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1071, fn. 4; People v. Brito (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 316, 321.)
Thus, nothing brought defendant’s attempted murder conviction in count 4 within
subdivision (f)’s resentencing exclusion when the offense involves felony murder.
Our review of whether the trial court properly denied a defendant’s petition at the
prima facie stage is de novo. (E.g., People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987.) If
the record of conviction conclusively showed defendant was ineligible for resentencing
notwithstanding the trial court’s error in failing to appoint counsel, the error would be
harmless. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [examining record “allow[s] the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless”]; see
also People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935 [record of conviction includes
“the charging document, verdict forms, closing arguments, and jury instructions”].)
Here, the jury instructions and closing arguments from defendant’s trial are not in
the record on appeal. Nor did the prosecution rely on or reference them in its opposition
to defendant’s petition. Thus, at this juncture, nothing refutes defendant’s attestations in
his petition that the prosecutor obtained his attempted murder conviction “under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” and that he “could not presently” be
convicted of attempted murder in count 4 because the doctrine is no longer valid. As the
record stands, the jury may have been instructed on and convicted defendant based on
9
that discredited theory, in which case he would be eligible for the trial court to hold a
hearing to determine whether to vacate his conviction and provide resentencing relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d).)
The trial court’s erroneous ruling short-circuited the proceedings early in the
petitioning process. We reverse and remand for the trial court to appoint counsel and
resume the proceedings as appropriate.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order summarily denying defendant’s resentencing petition is
reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings, beginning with the
appointment of counsel for defendant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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