In re L.A. CA2/4 ( 2024 )

Filed 6/6/24 In re L.A. CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re L.A. et al., B329121
(Los Angeles County
Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP02658B-D)
Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.A. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Nancy A. Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Robert McLaughlin and Robert McLaughlin, by
appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.O.
Law Office of William Hook and William Hook, by appointment of the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.A.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
______________________________________________
A.O. (mother), joined by A.A. (father), appeals from the juvenile court’s
findings and orders terminating parental rights over L.A., Sofia A., and M.A.
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 et seq.1 We conclude
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the parental-
benefit exception to termination of parental rights does not apply.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) filed a petition on May 14, 2020, alleging mother and father
had a history of engaging in violent altercations in the presence of L.A., Sofia
A., M.A., and S.A.2 S.A. is mother’s daughter from another relationship. The
petition alleged that father violently abused mother, who failed to protect the
children by allowing father to reside in the children’s home and have
unlimited access to them. Mother had a history of substance abuse that
rendered her incapable of providing regular care for the children. The
petition alleged father sexually abused S.A. Mother failed to protect S.A.
when she knew or reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse.
At the detention hearing on May 19, 2020, the juvenile court ordered
the children to be detained, with S.A. to be released to her biological father,
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 S.A. and her biological father, D.A., are not parties to this appeal.
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D.A. The court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
September 2020, at which it sustained the allegations that the children were
at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to the parents’ domestic
violence (§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(A), (B); count b-1), mother’s substance abuse
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D); count b-2), and mother’s failure to protect S.A. from
father’s sexual abuse (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (d), (j); counts b-3, d-1, j-1).
During the six-month review period, the children lived with caregivers
R.M. and J.M. In the Department’s February 16, 2021, status report, mother
stated she did not believe father sexually abused S.A. The juvenile court held
a six-month review hearing in March 2021. The court found continued
jurisdiction was necessary because both parents were only in partial
compliance with the case plan. The court noted it was problematic that
father and mother still denied the sexual abuse allegations against father,
especially when the court sustained the charges of sexual abuse. The court
concluded that returning the children to parents would be detrimental to
them. In October 2021, the court held a 12-month review hearing, finding
that continued jurisdiction was necessary. The court indicated mother
complied with her case plan “in name but not [in] deed” as she continued to
deny father sexually abused S.A.
In November 2021, S.A. disclosed to a Department social worker that
mother attempted to persuade her to recant her sexual abuse allegations
against father. In February 2022, the juvenile court held an 18-month review
hearing. The court found continued jurisdiction was necessary because,
despite mother and father attending their court-ordered programs, they still
denied the domestic violence and sexual abuse allegations. The court
terminated reunification services and set a hearing for a permanent plan
under section 366.26. The court subsequently noted that the Department’s
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recommendation was for maternal aunt, V.T., to adopt the children. The
court ordered the Department to interview the children, the current
caregivers R.M. and J.M., and V.T. to learn what permanency plan would be
in the children’s best interest.
The children remained placed with caregivers R.M. and J.M. for the
next few months. However, the caregivers reported they could not provide
the children with permanency due to the children’s increased needs. In June
2022, the Department placed the children with V.T. and her husband, J.T.,
who lived in Fresno County. V.T. expressed interest in providing the children
with permanency and stability. In the Department’s July 22, 2022, status
report, the children stated that they preferred to live with their parents. The
children continued to live with caregivers V.T. and J.T. from August 2022 to
April 2023. The social worker reported during this period that the children
appeared to have developed a trusting and loving relationship with the
caregivers. In December 2022, the children reported they no longer wanted
in-person visits with their parents, as the parents “minimally engage[d]” with
and “often ignore[d]” them. The children informed the Department in early
2023 that they preferred to be adopted by their caregivers.
The juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing on April 27, 2023.
The parents requested the court apply the parental-benefit exception under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) and not to terminate parental rights.
The court found the parents met the first element of the parental-benefit
exception, as they regularly visited the children. However, the court
concluded the parents did not meet the second element of the exception—they
did not show the children would benefit from continuing the relationship.
The court found the children’s relationship with their parents had “broken
down.” The court acknowledged that, in contrast to recent reports, there
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were earlier reports that showed the children were bonded with their
parents. The court explained this discrepancy by indicating the children’s
time with their current caregivers allowed them to open up and comfortably
share their feelings.
The juvenile court then determined the third element of the exception
was not met because termination of parental rights would not be so
detrimental as to outweigh the benefits gained through adoption. The court
found the children adoptable and that no exception applied. The court
terminated the parents’ parental rights.
Mother timely appealed. Father joined mother’s appeal shortly
thereafter.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Findings on the
Parental-Benefit Exception
1. Standard of Review
“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that
issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.]’”
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
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2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Denial of the Parental-Benefit
Exception
Mother and father contend the juvenile court erred in denying the
parental-benefit exception. We disagree.
The parental-benefit exception is codified in section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i). The section provides that the court shall terminate parental
rights when it has denied reunification services, “unless . . . [¶] [t]he parents
have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.” “[T]hree elements the
parent must prove to establish the [parental-benefit] exception [are]: (1)
regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
631.)
“In each case [in which a court considers the parental-benefit
exception], . . . the court acts in the child’s best interest in a specific way: it
decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security
and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If
severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a
substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the
benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the
court should not terminate parental rights.” (In re Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.)
The first element of the exception concerning visitation and contact is
not in dispute here. Instead, the parents argue the juvenile court erred when
it found they did not satisfy the second element. “[For] the second element,
courts assess whether ‘the child would benefit from continuing the
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relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 632.) “[T]he relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as
‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[C]ourts often
consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their
parents.” (Ibid.) A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
second element, which is “essentially a factual determination whether the
relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing it.” (Id. at p.
640.)
The record contains substantial evidence demonstrating L.A., Sofia A.,
and M.A. would not benefit from continuing their relationship with parents.
By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the children were estranged from
their parents. Each child expressed she no longer wanted to visit the parents
and was ready to be adopted by her caregivers. M.A. reported the parents
minimally engaged with the children and often ignored them. M.A. also
disclosed that mother hit and kicked her. M.A. stated that mother would hit
her if she told anyone of mother’s violent acts against her.
Sofia A. reported the parents did not care for the children, stating “my
dad hurt [S.A.]” and “my mom hurt me.” Sofia A. disclosed that mother
grabbed her by the throat and hit her. Sofia A. stated that mother also
kicked and slapped her. Sofia A. was also resentful that mother gave L.A.
preferential treatment.
L.A. reported she was aware of and saddened by father’s alleged sexual
abuse of S.A. L.A. stated that the sexual abuse allegations made her feel
uncomfortable when father forced her to hug and kiss him and to respond
when he told her he loved her. L.A. also expressed discomfort that mother
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displayed preferential treatment towards her in front of her siblings. L.A.
reported that the parents have failed her.
By early 2023, the children refused to attend in-person visits with the
parents, despite the Department and their caregivers encouraging them to do
so. Given the complete breakdown of their relationship, substantial evidence
demonstrates the children had little or no bond with the parents when the
section 366.26 hearing was held. Thus, substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding that mother did not satisfy the second element of the parental-
benefit exception.
3. The Parents’ Remaining Arguments as to the Second Element of
the Parental-Benefit Exception are Unpersuasive
The parents contend the children spent the vast majority of their lives
in mother’s custody. The parents argue the children previously expressed a
desire to return to mother's custody and that the Department failed to
sufficiently investigate why the children turned against their parents.
However, the children had not lived with their parents since May 2020,
nearly three years before the section 366.26 hearing in April 2023. During
this time, the children developed a trusting and loving relationship with their
caregivers and disclosed their misgivings about the parents. The children
later refused to attend visits with their parents, despite the Department and
the caregivers encouraging them to do so. Thus, the children no longer
exhibited any positive emotional attachment to the parents.
The parents’ argument as to the sufficiency of the Department’s
investigation also lacks merit because the parents have the burden of proof
that the parental-benefit exception applies. (See In re J.D. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 833, 861 [“To be clear, it was not the agency’s burden to disprove
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the existence of the beneficial relationship exception—the burden of proof on
this issue was squarely on mother”].) The parents never objected to the
sufficiency of the Department’s reports at the section 366.26 hearing. The
evidence shows the caregivers engaged with the children and provided them
a safe space to express their feelings. Accordingly, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude the children’s time with their caregivers allowed them to
later willingly share their misgivings about the parents.
In addition, the parents maintain the juvenile court improperly
compared mother’s caregiving attributes with those of the children’s
maternal aunt, V.T. While it is improper to “compar[e] the parent’s
attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive
parent(s)” (see In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634), the court
specifically considered each child’s relationship to the parents at the section
366.26 hearing. The court discussed each child’s statements about the
parents and the negative effects of their interaction. The court indicated the
children no longer wanted to visit their parents despite the caregivers
encouraging them to do so. Hence, the court did not inappropriately rely on
comparisons between the parents’ attributes as custodial caregivers relative
to the potential adoptive parents.
The parents also assert the juvenile court placed excessive emphasis on
V.T.’s visitation logs and did not sufficiently weigh evidence of mother’s
longstanding relationship with her daughters. However, “issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 773, internal quotation marks omitted.) This court “do[es] not reweigh the
evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine[s] if there
are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” (Ibid.) The
record is reviewed “in the light most favorable to the [court’s
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determinations].” (Ibid.) Thus, the court did not err in its consideration of
the exception when it weighed more heavily certain evidence, such as V.T.’s
visitation logs, against the parents.
In reviewing the whole record, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s findings that L.A., Sofia A., and M.A. lacked the
substantial, positive emotional attachment to mother and father necessary to
apply the parental-benefit exception. Because we find substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding that the parents did not satisfy the second
element of the parental-benefit exception, we need not consider their
arguments concerning the third element of the exception.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights is
affirmed.
ZUKIN, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
COLLINS, J.
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