Santa Clara County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Wright CA6 ( 2024 )

Filed 6/10/24 Santa Clara County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Wright CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SANTA CLARA COUNTY H051180
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT (Santa Clara County
SERVICES, Super. Ct. No. 2011-1-CS-134144)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH WRIGHT,
Defendant and Respondent;
MARIA SARABIA,
Appellant.
Respondent Santa Clara County Department of Child Support Services (the
Department) initiated a child support action against defendant Joseph Wright. Maria
Sarabia, Wright’s former spouse, appeals the trial court’s order denying her request to
join that action. In 2011, the Department obtained and recorded a child support judgment
against Wright (related to his child with another woman), resulting in a lien on his real
property in Los Angeles. At that time, Sarabia had no interest in the Los Angeles
property. A few years later, Wright transferred an interest in that property to Sarabia as
“joint tenants in common” during their marriage.1 In 2015, Sarabia obtained a default
dissolution judgment against Wright, and the Los Angeles property was awarded entirely
to Sarabia as her separate property. Almost a decade later, Sarabia sought joinder in the
child support action to request removal of the lien against the Los Angeles property,
alleging that she was unaware of the lien until 2022, did not receive notice of the lien,
and was a bona fide purchaser of the property. The trial court denied her request for
joinder. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2011, the Department initiated the underlying title IV-D action2 to
establish child support for Wright’s minor child (with a woman other than Sarabia).
Wright and Sarabia married in April 2011. At the time of their marriage, Wright owned,
as his separate property, real property located in Los Angeles County (Los Angeles
Property), titled in his name alone as a single man.
In August 2011, the Department obtained a default judgment against Wright,
requiring him to pay child support at $370 per month. It recorded a notice of support
1
“Joint tenants in common” is the verbatim description contained in the grant
deed signed by Wright. We note that persons may hold property as joint tenants, or as
tenants in common, but cannot hold title as “joint tenants in common.” (See Civ. Code, §
682 [“The ownership of property by several persons is either: [¶] (a) Of joint interest. [¶]
(b) Of partnership interests. [¶] (c) Of interests in common. [¶] (d) Of community
interest of spouses.”) However, because the nature of Sarabia’s interest in the property
during their marriage is not dispositive of her claims here, we do not resolve the legal
incongruity in the grant deed’s language.
2
A title IV-D action is filed by, or otherwise involves, the local child support
agency. The purpose of the action is to establish, modify or enforce child support
obligations. (See Fam. Code, §§ 17303, 17304; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.300(c); see
also County of Yuba v. Savedra (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1317-1318.) The label is
derived from the federal legislation, title IV-D of the Social Security Act, enacted in 1974
“ ‘ “[f]or the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their
children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such children are living.”
[Citations.]’ ” (County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Dept. v. Watson (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 638, 641.)
2
judgment in Los Angeles County on August 30, 2011. A prior support judgment had
already been recorded against Wright in Los Angeles County by another local child
support agency for his support obligations related to a different child. In 2012, the
combined child support liens totaled $49,065.
In May 2013, Wright executed a grant deed, transferring his interest in the Los
Angeles Property to himself and Sarabia as “joint tenants in common.” They separated
six months later, and in November 2014, Sarabia filed for dissolution. In her petition for
dissolution, Sarabia claimed no community assets or debts and identified no separate
property debts. She requested the court to award her the Los Angeles Property as her
separate property. In 2015, the court entered a default judgment against Wright and
awarded the Los Angeles Property to Sarabia as her separate property in the dissolution
case.
In May 2022, Sarabia requested to be joined as a party in the title IV-D action now
before this court to seek removal of the lien against the Los Angeles Property. Sarabia
alleged she became aware of the child support lien in 2022 when she tried to sell the Los
Angeles Property and the title company informed her of it. Asserting that she never
received notice of the lien, Sarabia claimed it was void and, as a bona fide purchaser of
the Los Angeles Property, she requested the court in the title IV-D action to remove the
lien.
The Department opposed Sarabia’s joinder motion. It argued that the court in title
IV-D actions lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make orders concerning the Los
Angeles Property and that Sarabia should seek relief in her dissolution action against
Wright. Further, it claimed Sarabia received constructive notice of the lien based on the
recorded notice of support judgment, and Sarabia was not a bona fide purchaser of the
Los Angeles Property because there was no evidence that she paid any consideration.
3
The court heard and denied Sarabia’s motion on December 12, 2022, stating in the
minute order, “[t]he Court does not find that requesting party can be joined as a
party . . . .” The court entered a conforming written order on December 20, 2022.
Sarabia filed a motion for reconsideration of the order based on the same
arguments regarding lack of notice, but she failed to appear at the hearing. The court
took her reconsideration motion off calendar. Sarabia then filed a request to restore her
motion for reconsideration but, again, failed to appear. On May 16, 2023, the court
entered its order, taking off calendar Sarabia’s request to restore her motion.
On June 5, 2023, Sarabia filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 20,
2022 order denying her requests for joinder and removal of the lien and the May 16, 2023
order taking her request to restore her reconsideration motion off calendar.3
II. DISCUSSION4
Sarabia challenges the trial court’s order denying joinder on multiple grounds.
Mainly, she contends the trial court should have joined her in the title IV-D action
3
Sarabia claims she was not served with either order, the record does not show she
was served, and the Department does not contend otherwise. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a)(3).) (Subsequent undesignated references to rules of court are to the
California Rules of Court.) Additionally, Sarabia’s notice of appeal identified the order
denying her joinder request as dated December 12, 2022, the date of the joinder hearing,
instead of December 20, 2022, the date the trial court entered the order. On this court’s
own motion, we deem the appeal to be taken from the December 20, 2022 written order.
(See K.J. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 884-885.)
4
Citing R & A Vending Services, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 172
Cal.App.3d 1188, the Department argues that Sarabia’s appeal of the May 16, 2023 order
taking her request off calendar should be dismissed because it is a nonappealable order.
In that municipal action, after the trial court determined plaintiff had no cause of action
against the city, it placed off calendar the hearing on a demurrer related to plaintiff’s
request for remedies. (Id. at pp. 1190, 1193-1194.) Plaintiff appealed but the appellate
court affirmed, concluding that the order placing the demurrer hearing off calendar was
not appealable. (Id. at pp. 1193-1194 [off calendar “ ‘is not synonymous with
“dismissal’ ” ” and “ ‘merely means a postponement’ ”].) We need not decide whether
the May 16, 2023 order is separately appealable because, as we understand Sarabia’s
4
because, as the current owner of the Los Angeles Property subject to the child support
lien, she was an indispensable party to the Department’s attempts to enforce the child
support judgment. Sarabia further contends that she was entitled to removal of the lien as
a bona fide purchaser of the Los Angeles Property.5 The Department argues that the trial
court was without authority to join third parties in title IV-D actions, and, even if it had
such authority, Sarabia did not have standing to seek joinder. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm the order because Sarabia has not met her burden on appeal to
demonstrate error.
A. Standard of Review
We are required to presume that the trial court’s order is correct. (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) The appellant bears the burden of affirmatively
showing error. (Ibid.)
A trial court’s ruling on joinder is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Bianka M. v.
Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004, 1018 (Bianka M.); Schnabel v. Superior Court
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 758, 763 (Schnabel).) “Under that standard, there is no abuse of
discretion requiring reversal if there exists a reasonable or fairly debatable justification
under the law for the trial court’s decision or, alternatively stated, if that decision falls
within the permissible range of options set by the applicable legal criteria.” (Cahill v.
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957.) “Judicial discretion
‘implies absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking.
It imports the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) “[A] reviewing court should not disturb the trial court’s exercise of
discretion unless it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (City and County of San
position, she is only appealing the December 20, 2022 order denying her requests for
joinder and removal of the lien and that she designated both the December 2022 and May
2023 orders in her notice of appeal in an abundance of caution. She advances no
argument or record citation supporting the appeal of the May 2023 order.
5
Wright filed a notice of nonopposition to Sarabia’s appeal.
5
Francisco v. State of California (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1036; see also Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 13.)
B. No Abuse of Discretion or Reversible Error
Sarabia contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to join
the title IV-D action. While the reasons for the trial court’s denial of Sarabia’s motion
for joinder are unclear,6 we find neither an abuse of discretion nor a miscarriage of justice
warranting reversal.
Code of Civil Procedure section 389 provides, in part, “[a] person who is subject
to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if . . . he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.” (Id., subd. (a).) “All provisions of law relating to joinder of parties in civil
actions generally apply to the joinder of a person as a party to a family law case. . . .”
(Rule 5.24(a)(1).) A family law case includes title IV-D actions. (Rule 5.2(b)(3).)
Joinder is mandatory in a family law case if a person has physical custody or claims
custody rights to a minor child subject to the action. (Rule 5.24(e)(1).) In all other
respects, joinder is discretionary. (Rule 5.24(e)(2).)
6
In the minute order, the court denied joinder because it did not find that Sarabia
“can be joined as a party.” Sarabia did not designate an oral record of the proceedings
under rules 8.120(b) and 8.121(b)(1)(C), which require her to provide a reporter’s
transcript (here, however, the hearing was not reported), an agreed statement under rule
8.134, or a settled statement under rule 8.137. We thus are unable to discern whether the
trial court believed it did not have authority to join Sarabia or whether it found Sarabia
not an indispensable party. Without a complete record from the hearing, well-established
principles of appellate review require us to assume the trial court properly applied the
law. (See In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526; Gorman v.
Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 67.)
6
Sarabia agrees mandatory joinder does not apply. Under the rules for
discretionary joinder, the court first decides whether “it would be appropriate to
determine the particular issue in the proceeding[,]” and then decides whether the claimant
is either “indispensable” to that issue or is “necessary to the enforcement of any judgment
rendered.” (Rule 5.24(e)(2); Schnabel, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 762, fn. 4.)
Here, Sarabia has not shown how the issue regarding the lien would be appropriate
for determination in this title IV-D action. She contends that her request to remove the
lien fell within the trial court’s enforcement authority. But while the court in title IV-D
actions has the authority to enforce child support judgments (see Fam. Code, § 4251), the
relief requested by Sarabia does not concern the enforcement of Wright’s support
judgment. Nothing in the record shows that the Department had taken action to enforce
the lien on the Los Angeles Property, apart from recording the support judgment in 2011,
before Sarabia held any interest in the property. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 17522 [lien
enforcement by levy]; Code Civ. Proc., § 689.020 [same].)
In essence, what Sarabia requested from the trial court through her joinder motion
was declaratory relief to clear the title on her Los Angeles Property. However, issues in
title IV-D actions are limited to parentage, support, custody, and visitation (if appropriate
under the circumstances); title IV-D actions do not adjudicate property disputes. (Fam.
Code, § 17404, subds. (a) & (e).) Therefore, the request underlying Sarabia’s joinder
motion was not an issue “appropriate” for determination in the title IV-D action. (Rule
5.24(e)(2); Schnabel, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 762, fn. 4.)
Because Sarabia has not met the first requirement for discretionary joinder, we
need not resolve whether she met the second requirement that she be an indispensable or
necessary party to the title IV-D action. We conclude that, under these circumstances, it
was within the trial court’s discretion to deny joinder.
Additionally, we are precluded from reversing the trial court’s decision unless the
appellant demonstrates a miscarriage of justice. (Paterno v. State of California (1999)
7
74 Cal.App.4th 68, 105.) Sarabia has not shown that had she been joined in the action,
she would have been entitled to removal of the lien. First, Sarabia contends the lien
should be removed because the Department never notified her. The record shows that the
trial court entered the child support judgment in 2011. As required by law, the
Department immediately recorded a “notice of support judgment” against Wright in Los
Angeles County. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 116130.) By recording said notice, the
lien attached to the Los Angeles Property in 2011 (Code Civ. Proc., § 697.320, subd. (a)),
before Sarabia received any interest in that property. Since Sarabia was neither on title to
nor had any interest in the Los Angeles Property when the support judgment was
recorded, the Department was not required to provide her with notice.
Furthermore, “[e]very duly. . . recorded judgment affecting title to or possession of
real property, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees from the time of recordation.” (In re Marriage of Cloney (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 429, 437.) “If an interest in real property that is subject to a judgment lien is
transferred or encumbered without satisfying or extinguishing the judgment lien: . . . [¶]
[t]he interest transferred or encumbered remains subject to a judgment lien . . . in the
amount of the lien at the time of transfer or encumbrance plus interest thereafter accruing
on such amount.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 697.390, subd. (b).) Under these rules, if a
judgment lien against the debtor spouse was attached to the real property of both spouses
before the property was awarded to the non-debtor spouse as her sole and separate
property, the non-debtor spouse receives the property subject to the lien. (Lezine v.
Security Pacific Fin. Services, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 56, 65-66.) The property remains
liable for satisfaction of the lien, even though the underlying debt was the obligation of
the debtor spouse. (Ibid.) Thus, because the child support lien was attached to the Los
Angeles Property before Sarabia received any interest in the property, the law infers that
she had constructive notice of the lien, and she received the property subject to the lien.
Accordingly, Sarabia’s argument that she did not receive notice of the lien is unavailing.
8
Sarabia next asserts that the lien should not apply to her as a bona fide purchaser
of the Los Angeles Property. “ ‘[A] bona fide purchaser for value who acquires his or her
interest in real property without knowledge or notice of another’s prior rights or interest
in the property takes the property free of such unknown interests.’ [Citations.]”
(Vasquez v. LBS Financial Credit Union (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 97, 107.) But Sarabia
did not purchase the Los Angeles Property from Wright for any value. (See Ehret v.
Ichioka (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 637, 643 [love and affection between spouses is not a
valuable consideration such that wife becomes a bona fide purchaser for value of
property transferred to her by husband].)
Sarabia contends, without citation to the record, that the Los Angeles Property was
the “bargained for exchange” in a property settlement between herself and Wright. The
record contains no such settlement agreement. Instead, the record shows the Los Angeles
Property was awarded to Sarabia through a default judgment in her dissolution
proceedings. “It is the rule in California that a judgment creditor is not entitled to the
protection as a bona fide purchaser for value, but, rather, stands in the shoes of the
judgment debtor and obtains by his judgment lien only that interest in the property which
the judgment debtor actually possesses.” (City of Torrance v. Castner (1975) 46
Cal.App.3d 76, 80.) Sarabia became the sole owner of the Los Angeles Property through
the dissolution judgment, making her a judgment creditor and not a purchaser for value of
the property. Accordingly, as a judgment creditor to the Los Angeles Property, Sarabia is
not entitled to the protections of a bona fide purchaser.
For the reasons explained above, we conclude that Sarabia has not demonstrated
that the trial court’s denial of the joinder motion resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the joinder request.
C. Arguments Forfeited for Lack of Compliance with Appellate Rules
Sarabia asserts she was denied an opportunity to speak at the hearing. Without a
court reporter’s transcript or an authorized substitute memorializing the hearing (see rules
9
8.134-8.137), we do not have a record of what occurred at the hearing on her joinder
request. We do not presume error on a silent record. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.) Moreover,
Sarabia has not shown how she was prejudiced by the trial court’s alleged refusal to let
her speak at the hearing. As explained above, Sarabia’s pleadings related to the joinder
motion did not establish grounds warranting joinder or removal of the lien. Apart from
her pleadings, Sarabia has not specified what arguments or evidence she could have
presented at the hearing that might have made a difference in the outcome. As such,
Sarabia has not met her burden to demonstrate reversible error.
Sarabia also makes broad assertions of violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments but provides no discussion of the law or the facts in support of this
argument. “[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also
explain how it applies in his case.” (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) “When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable
legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is
unnecessary.” (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-
700.) We are mindful of the challenges posed by Sarabia’s status as a self-represented
litigant. But we are required to treat a party who acts as her own attorney like any other
party and hold her to the rules of procedure. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1247.) Thus, we deem such arguments abandoned.
In summary, we determine that the trial court did not err by denying Sarabia’s
motion to join the child support proceeding as a means to remove the lien from the Los
Angeles Property. However, nothing in this opinion affects Sarabia’s ability to pursue
other remedies available in the Family Code or Code of Civil Procedure. Our
conclusions here are limited to the propriety of denying joinder based on the record
presented.
10
III. DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Sarabia’s joinder motion entered on December
20, 2022, is affirmed.
11
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J.
______________________________________
Grover, J.
H051180
Santa Clara County Department of Child Support Services v. Sarabia
12