People v. Tyler CA2/7 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 12/12/23 P. v. Tyler CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    THE PEOPLE,                                                     B326769
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. TA138610)
    v.
    DIAMOND DAMARE TYLER,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Allen J. Webster, Judge. Affirmed.
    Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
    Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
    Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    Diamond Damare Tyler appeals from the superior court’s
    order denying his petition for, among other things, resentencing
    under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)1
    without issuing an order to show cause. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.     Tyler Pleads No Contest to Voluntary Manslaughter
    In February 2016, in connection with the shooting death of
    Darnell Blow, the People charged Tyler with murder (§ 187,
    subd. (a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
    subd. (a)(1)). With the murder charge the People alleged firearm-
    related enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b),
    (c), and (d). The People also alleged Tyler served five prior prison
    terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
    At the preliminary hearing, the People presented evidence
    Blow died from a single gunshot to the back. Detective Samuel
    Marullo, a homicide detective with the Los Angeles Police
    Department, testified that during his investigation of the case he
    and a partner interviewed Tyler’s cousin, Alicia Baetz, who told
    them that on the night of Blow’s death she saw Tyler and Blow
    have an altercation, then saw Tyler shoot at Blow as Blow ran
    away. Baetz testified she told the detectives that, after she saw
    Tyler “shoot the boy [i.e., Blow],” she saw Blow fall, get up, walk
    “a little bit more,” and fall again.
    1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    Detective Marullo also testified he and his partner
    interviewed Lillie Davis, the mother of three children by Tyler.
    Davis told the detectives that, two days after Blow was killed,
    Tyler contacted her and “said that he didn’t mean to shoot [Blow],
    that he was scared for his life, he was concerned, and he didn’t
    mean to hit him, he attempted to scare him.” Davis testified at
    the preliminary hearing she was still in a relationship with Tyler,
    cared for him, and could not remember telling the detectives he
    told her he shot Blow. She did remember telling the detectives
    Tyler called her after the shooting and said he was scared for his
    life.
    At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, counsel for
    Tyler argued there was evidence of “some provocation” of Tyler by
    Blow and “some sort of altercation that caused one shot to be
    fired.” Counsel for Tyler also argued that, although Tyler “shot
    at” Blow, Tyler had no “intent to actually kill” Blow and that
    Blow was “accidentally . . . struck.” Counsel for Tyler therefore
    asked the trial court to “consider reducing this to a
    manslaughter.” The court held Tyler to answer on the murder
    charge.
    In July 2016, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
    Tyler pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
    subd. (a)) and admitted that, in the commission of the offense, he
    personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5,
    subdivision (a). He also admitted he served two prior prison
    terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
    Counsel for Tyler stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based
    on, among other things, police reports and the preliminary
    hearing transcript. Under the plea agreement, the trial court
    3
    sentenced Tyler to an aggregate prison term of 18 years and
    dismissed all other charges and allegations.
    B.       The Superior Court Denies Tyler’s Petition for
    Resentencing
    In March 2021 Tyler, representing himself, filed a
    document in superior court titled “Petition for Resentencing
    Pursuant to Special Directives 20-08 et seq. and 20-14 et seq.”
    Tyler asked the superior court to “recall his current sentence of
    18 years and resentence him in accordance with the newly
    implemented sentencing policies set forth in the above-noted
    [Special Directive] Provisions.”2 Under the heading “Procedural
    Background,” Tyler alleged he was convicted of manslaughter “by
    way of no contest plea,” for which, along with admitted
    allegations under sections 12022.5 and 667.5, subdivision (b), he
    received an aggregate prison term of 18 years. In the rest of the
    petition, Tyler argued his sentence was inconsistent with the
    policies set forth in special directives issued by the district
    2      Special Directive 20-08, issued in December 2020 by
    Los Angeles County District Attorney George Gascón, announced
    a policy that “sentence enhancements or other sentencing
    allegations . . . shall not be filed in any cases and shall be
    withdrawn in pending matters.” (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022)
    
    79 Cal.App.5th 478
    , 486.) Special Directive 20-14, also issued by
    Gascón in December 2020, “required the deputy district attorney
    in charge of an open and pending case to ‘join in the Defendant’s
    motion to strike all alleged sentence enhancement(s)’ or to ‘move
    to dismiss all alleged sentence enhancement(s) named in the
    information for all counts.’” (Association of Deputy District
    Attorneys for Los Angeles County v. Gascón (2022) 
    79 Cal.App.5th 503
    , 516, review granted Aug. 31, 2022, S275478.)
    4
    attorney of Los Angeles County and, with one exception, made no
    mention of section 1172.6.
    That exception was a paragraph headed “Penal Code
    1170.95/SB 1437 Resentencing Policy,” which read: “Many people
    accepted plea offers to manslaughter, made by this office in order
    to avoid a conviction for murder. It is this office’s policy that
    where a person took a plea to manslaughter or another charge in
    lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of
    felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine, attempted murder under the natural and
    probable consequences doctrine, or another theory covered by
    Senate Bill 1437, that person is eligible for relief under
    section 1170.95. Such a position avoids disparate results
    whereby a person who this office has already determined to be
    less culpable—as evidenced by allowing a plea for
    manslaughter—serves a longer sentence than a similarly
    situated person who is now eligible for relief under section
    1170.95” (underlining and nonstandard capitalization omitted).3
    The first response to Tyler’s petition by the superior court
    that appears in the record is a May 2021 minute order, which
    reflects that the case was called for a petition for resentencing
    under section 1172.6 and that Tyler was represented by counsel.
    3     Tyler appears to have taken this paragraph verbatim from
    Special Directive 20-14, which is accessible at
    https://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/SPECIAL-
    DIRECTIVE-20-14.pdf [as of December 12, 2023], archived at
    https://perma.cc/M9QV-6X9Z.
    5
    On that occasion, as well as several subsequent times, the court
    continued the hearing on the petition.
    In August 2022 the People filed a response to the petition,
    arguing Tyler was not eligible for relief under section 1172.6
    because he “was not convicted of first or second degree murder” or
    “convicted under the felony-murder rule or under the natural and
    probable consequences doctrine because he was the only actor,
    and the direct consequences of his actions resulted in the death of
    the victim.” Relying “on the preliminary hearing transcript as an
    appropriate summary of the facts,” the People argued Tyler “was
    the one and only shooter of the one and only victim” in the case.
    Counsel for Tyler did not file a written reply to the People’s
    response.
    In November 2022 the superior court held a hearing to
    determine whether Tyler had made a prima facie showing he was
    entitled to relief under section 1172.6. At the outset of the
    hearing, counsel for Tyler stated he was “going to submit.” The
    court asked whether counsel for Tyler wanted to indicate his
    reasons for doing so. Counsel for Tyler replied: “Well, Your
    Honor, I can’t. All I can tell you is that I’m going to submit.
    I can’t say on the record. It might harm my client.” Shortly
    afterward, counsel for Tyler added: “Your Honor, the People
    alleged he was the only person involved. He was the shooter.”4
    The People summarized their argument Tyler was not eligible for
    relief because, among other reasons, “he was the only actor and
    he was the shooter, so it was his direct actions that caused the
    4      The two sentences in this quotation appear exactly as they
    do in the reporter’s transcript and as the People quote them in
    their brief. Tyler does not dispute the transcription’s accuracy or
    suggest his counsel’s statements were in any way ambiguous.
    6
    death of the victim.” Asked whether he wished to respond,
    counsel for Tyler stated: “You honor, I would agree that I’ve read
    the discovery, all of it, and that’s why I’m submitting.” The court
    denied the petition “for the reasons . . . articulated by the People.”
    Tyler timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    A.     Section 1172.6
    Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
    law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
    natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
    a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Curiel (Nov. 27, 2023,
    S272238) ___ Cal.5th ___, ____ [
    2023 WL 8178140
    , p. 7]; People v.
    Reyes (2023) 
    14 Cal.5th 981
    , 984; People v. Gentile (2020)
    
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 842-843) and significantly narrowing the felony-
    murder exception to the malice requirement for murder (§§ 188,
    subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Strong (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 698
    , 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , 957 (Lewis)).
    Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
    based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
    requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
    under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
    subdivision (e). The latter provision requires the People to prove
    that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); that
    the defendant, though not the actual killer, with the intent to kill
    assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
    that the defendant was a major participant in a felony listed in
    section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference
    to human life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,”
    7
    the felony-murder special-circumstance provision. (§ 189,
    subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. ___ [p. 7]; Strong, at p. 708; Gentile,
    at pp. 842-843.)
    Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
    murder or murder, attempted murder, or voluntary
    manslaughter based on the natural and probable consequences
    doctrine, “or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
    person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,” to
    petition the superior court to vacate the conviction and be
    resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not now
    be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of the
    changes the Legislature made to sections 188 and 189. (See
    People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; Lewis, supra,
    11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
    p. 843.) If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
    information—which includes, among other things, a declaration
    by the petitioner that he is entitled to relief because he could not
    presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder as a result
    of the changes to sections 188 and 189—the court must appoint
    counsel to represent the petitioner if requested. (Lewis, at
    pp. 962-963; see § 1172.6, subds. (a)(3), (b)(1)(A), (b)(3).) The
    prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the
    petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
    determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
    showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see
    People v. Curiel, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___, ___ [pp. 7-8].)
    In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
    showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
    petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
    assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
    8
    relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
    must issue an order to show cause.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
    p. 971; see People v. Curiel, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___, ___ [p. 14].)
    The court may consider the record of conviction, which will
    “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
    section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
    potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at
    p. 971; see People v. Williams (2022) 
    86 Cal.App.5th 1244
    , 1251.)
    “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
    preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
    ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
    discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Eynon (2021)
    
    68 Cal.App.5th 967
    , 975.)
    “Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
    at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
    matter of law. ‘“[I]f the record, including the court’s own
    documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
    petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
    determination adverse to the petitioner,’”’ thereby deeming the
    petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 
    81 Cal.App.5th 45
    , 52; see People v. Curiel, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___, ___ [p. 14];
    Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) We review de novo an order
    denying a petition under section 1172.6 without issuing an order
    to show cause. (Harden, at p. 52; People v. Coley (2022)
    
    77 Cal.App.5th 539
    , 545.)
    9
    B.       The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Tyler’s
    Petition Without Isssuing an Order To Show Cause,
    and Any Error in Relying on the Preliminary Hearing
    Transcript Was Harmless
    Tyler contends the superior court erred in denying his
    petition without issuing an order to show cause because “nothing
    in the record . . . contradicts or rebuts, as a matter of law, the
    prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing in [his]
    petition.” But there was no prima facie showing of eligibility for
    resentencing under section 1172.6 in Tyler’s petition. As stated,
    Tyler barely mentioned section 1172.6 in his petition, and even
    then he did not even hint he was eligible for relief under the
    statute based on the requirements in section 1172.6,
    subdivision (a). (See § 1172.6, subd. (b) [“The petition shall
    include all the following: [¶] (A) A declaration by the petitioner
    that the petitioner is eligible for relief under this section, based
    on all of the requirements of subdivision (a). . . .”].) In particular,
    he gave no indication he “could not presently be convicted of
    murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
    or 189 . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
    Nor did counsel for Tyler make any such representation at
    the prima facie hearing. In fact, he did the opposite: Based on
    his review of the discovery in the case, he conceded Tyler was the
    actual shooter in the incident that resulted in Blow’s death. “As
    a matter of law, resentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not
    available to an ‘actual killer.’” (People v. Garcia (2022)
    
    82 Cal.App.5th 956
    , 973; accord, People v. Bodely (2023)
    
    95 Cal.App.5th 1193
    , 1201; see People v. Delgadillo (2022)
    
    14 Cal.5th 216
    , 233 [petitioner was not eligible for relief under
    section 1172.6 because he “was the actual killer and the only
    10
    participant in the killing”].) Therefore, Tyler has not
    demonstrated the superior court committed any error in denying
    his petition at the prima facie stage.
    It is unclear whether and, if so, to what extent the superior
    court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript in denying
    Tyler’s petition. And Tyler does not specifically argue the court
    did so. But he disputes the persuasive value of a case that
    figures prominently in the People’s brief, People v. Pickett (2023)
    
    93 Cal.App.5th 982
    , review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643, on
    the ground the court in that case relied on People v. Patton (2023)
    
    89 Cal.App.5th 649
    , review granted June 28, 2023, S279670, in
    which the Supreme Court granted review to decide whether a
    superior court engages in impermissible judicial factfinding by
    relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to deny a
    section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
    But to the extent the superior court relied on the
    preliminary hearing transcript in denying Tyler’s petition, and
    even assuming any such reliance was error, any error was
    harmless.5 (See People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958,
    973-974 [errors in denying a petition under section 1172.6 are
    evaluated under the harmless error standard of People v. Watson
    (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836]; People v. Flores (2022) 
    76 Cal.App.5th 974
    , 986 [“To demonstrate prejudice from the denial of a
    section 1170.95 petition before the issuance of an order to show
    cause, the petitioner must show it is reasonably probable that,
    absent error, his or her petition would not have been summarily
    denied without an evidentiary hearing.”].) Tyler has not once
    alleged or asserted—including in the three briefs filed in this
    5      At our request the parties submitted supplemental letter
    briefs on this issue.
    11
    appeal (opening, reply, and supplemental)—that he could not
    presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
    the changes to sections 188 and 189. Counsel for Tyler also
    conceded at the prima facie hearing Tyler was the actual shooter,
    and Tyler does not argue his counsel was ineffective,
    constitutionally or otherwise, for making that concession. Thus,
    Tyler has failed to show it is reasonably probable that, had the
    superior court not relied on the preliminary hearing transcript
    (assuming it did so), the court would have issued an order to
    show cause on his petition.
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying Tyler’s petition under section 1172.6 is
    affirmed.
    SEGAL, Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    MARTINEZ, J.                  EVENSON, J.*
    *     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
    the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B326769

Filed Date: 12/12/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/12/2023