People v. Limas CA4/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Limas CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062280
v. (Super. Ct. No. 12CF1325)
SHAZER FERNANDO LIMAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary S. Paer, Judge. Affirmed.
Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Shazer Fernando Limas was convicted of three counts
of first degree murder in the deaths of his girlfriend, Arlet Contreras, and
their children, sixteen-month-old Fernando Limas and three-month-old
Emmanuel Limas. (We will sometimes refer to Fernando Limas and
Emmanuel Limas together as the children.) The jury made true findings as
to the sentencing enhancement allegations of multiple murder.
On appeal, Limas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of
premeditation and deliberation and through that challenge, he argues his
convictions for first degree murder must be reduced to second degree and the
multiple murder findings must be vacated. We conclude there was
substantial evidence supporting the jury’s findings of premeditation and
deliberation.
Limas also challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence of
(1) uncharged acts of domestic violence against an ex-wife and former
girlfriends and (2) a party Limas threw shortly after the murders. We
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF LIMAS’S GUILT
BEFORE ARLET’S BODY WAS FOUND
On April 25, 2012, the decomposing body of Arlet Contreras was
found on a street in the La Puente area of Los Angeles County. Arlet’s
autopsy showed a total of 48 knife wounds; she had defensive wounds on her
2
hands and fatal wounds to the neck and chest. The medical examiner opined
Arlet had been dead for eight to ten days when her body was found. DNA
samples from the children were entered into a missing persons system from
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Their bodies were
never found.
Surveillance video from about 2:30 a.m. on April 25 showed a
U-Haul truck making a u-turn near where Arlet’s body was found. The
U-Haul truck and a refrigerator dolly had been rented by Francisco V. the
morning of April 24 and were to be returned 24 hours later. When he rented
the truck, Francisco estimated he would drive 100 miles. Francisco had
rented the truck and the dolly to pick up furniture he was purchasing from
Limas.
When Francisco arrived at Limas’s apartment in Orange,
California on April 24, Limas was acting strangely. He had cuts on his
hands, which he said he sustained in a car accident. When Francisco tried to
enter a spare bedroom in Limas’s apartment, Limas said “Don’t go back
there.” Limas went with Francisco to unload the furniture, and then offered
to drop off the U-Haul for Francisco.
The truck was returned late the next day, April 25. The actual
mileage on the truck was 331.2 miles, significantly higher than the 100 miles
Francisco had estimated. The cargo area of the truck had been cleaned, but
both the refrigerator dolly and the cargo area had a bad smell that was
“undescribable.” Later, pursuant to a search warrant, a cadaver dog alerted
to the possible presence of human remains in the cargo area of the U-Haul
truck.
Limas hired Jose Q. to clean the carpets of his apartment in
April 2012. Jose noticed a reddish stain on the carpet. Limas told him he
3
had spilled a bottle of wine. About two days later, Limas asked Jose to help
him move some furniture. Limas picked Jose up in a U-Haul truck at about
8:30 p.m. Jose noticed a bad smell in the truck, which Limas said was due to
cattle. Limas drove the truck into the mountains. He stopped the truck
twice and got out. They never unloaded any furniture.
Limas’s mother, Patricia, regularly spoke with Arlet by phone
and frequently exchanged text messages with her. She last saw Arlet and
the children on an unspecified date in the clubhouse at Limas’s apartment
complex while Arlet and Limas were arguing. Patricia left because Limas
told her not to get involved in his things. Patricia tried to call Arlet several
times over the next three weeks and left messages, but never heard back
from her. Patricia talked to Limas after the day she saw him and Arlet
arguing, and she asked about Arlet and the children. Limas told Patricia
that Arlet and the boys were okay; when Limas and Patricia had breakfast
together on April 29, he was not depressed, upset, or acting suspiciously.
Arlet’s mother, Mayra H., testified Arlet and the children lived
with her when Arlet and Limas were not getting along. On April 12, 2012,
Arlet called Mayra and asked if she could come live with her because Limas
would not let her into the apartment. Mayra last spoke with Arlet the
morning of April 13, 2012. Mayra continued to receive text messages from
Arlet’s phone. She felt something was wrong and repeatedly tried to call
Arlet, but without success. Mayra sent a text message to Arlet’s phone
asking what was going on and received a response. Mayra testified the
response said “[t]hat they were on vacation, that everything was fine; that
[she was] not to be bothering her, that everything was fine.”
A friend and co-worker of Limas testified Arlet called Limas
frequently at work, causing “a lot of drama.” About six months before Arlet
4
was murdered, Limas complained to this friend that Arlet had ruined his life,
he could not afford the children, he wished Arlet was gone, and he wished he
had never met her. Limas told his friend, “I hate her, I wish she did not have
those kids.”
Limas dated Marbeth M. from mid-2011 through spring 2012.
On April 14, 2012, Limas showed up at Marbeth’s apartment with several
very deep cuts on his hands. He told her he had been in a fight at a
restaurant. She convinced him to go to the hospital emergency room the next
day, where he told the personnel he had cut himself practicing martial arts
with a samurai sword. At the hospital, Limas gave a false name.1
Marbeth and Limas went to his apartment after dinner on
April 17. Marbeth noticed the furniture in the bedroom had been moved
around. Marbeth’s rug was on the bedroom floor and her comforter and fitted
sheet were on the bed, although she had not given Limas permission to take
those things. When she visited the apartment on April 18, the furnishings in
the apartment had been returned to their original positions and the
apartment had been cleaned.
Marbeth attended a gathering at Limas’s pool and in his
apartment on April 21. That evening, Limas rented a limousine to drive the
group to a club in Los Angeles. On April 23, after work, Marbeth went to
Limas’s apartment to help him pack his belongings in preparation for moving
to her apartment. She noticed blood stains on the floor. Limas said the blood
1
The individual whose name Limas used received a bill from the hospital in
late April 2012, and he filed an identity theft report. This individual had
worked with Limas and they were friends from 2007 through 2010. When
Limas was arrested and booked into jail on May 3, 2012, he was carrying a
driver’s license issued in this individual’s name.
5
came from the cuts on his hands. When she left Limas’s apartment on
April 24, Marbeth saw a U-Haul truck parked outside. Limas cancelled their
plans for dinner later that day. The next day, April 25, Limas told Marbeth
he had spent the previous night at a motel.
Video surveillance footage from the apartment complex showed
Arlet and the children taking the elevator to the fourth floor (where Limas’s
apartment was located) at 8:13 p.m. on April 12. No video footage was found
of Arlet or the children after that time.
Video surveillance footage also showed the following: On April 13
at 12:15 p.m. Limas took a dog down in the elevator, drove out of the garage,
and returned about two hours later without the dog. On April 16 at
9:12 p.m., Limas’s left hand was bandaged. Between 11:57 a.m. and
7:00 p.m. on April 17, Limas made multiple trips down the elevator with a
number of items, including a stroller, a crib mattress, a highchair, a rolled-up
rug, and a large plastic bag. On April 18, he carried plastic bags and a table
down through the elevator. On April 23 and 24, Limas made many trips
down the elevator with boxes, furniture, and an outdoor storage container he
had purchased at Home Depot.2
Dayse C. had cleaned Limas’s apartment on several occasions.
In April 2012, Limas texted Dayse, saying he had hurt his hand doing
martial arts and was at the hospital. Limas asked Dayse to clean his
2
A police officer testified at trial he had reviewed surveillance video
provided by the loss prevention department at the Home Depot in Santa Ana.
He observed Limas exiting the store pushing a cart containing a large
outdoor storage container and a tarp. He also observed Limas pushing the
cart toward a U-Haul truck parked in the Home Depot parking lot. The same
officer testified the container Limas had outside the Home Depot was the
same one he brought down in the apartment complex elevator.
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apartment. At the apartment, Dayse noticed the bedroom furniture had been
moved and the living room sofa was on the balcony. The bedroom carpet was
damp and smelled of chemicals. A spot on the sofa turned a dark cinnamon
color when water was applied to it. Dayse saw red spots on the walls and
picture frames. Limas said the red spots were from hurting his hand doing
martial arts. The cushions and bedding from the bed and kitchen knives
were missing. Limas told Dayse not to clean the balcony attached to the
second bedroom.
II.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF LIMAS’S GUILT
AFTER ARLET’S BODY WAS FOUND
On April 28, Limas informed the assistant manager of the
apartment complex he was moving out, despite having only recently renewed
his lease. A service technician sent to prepare the apartment for a new
tenant noticed bleach stains on the carpet and a foul smell and flies coming
from a storage closet on the balcony.
A carpet installer who went to Limas’s apartment on May 2 to
remove the old carpet noticed bleach spots on the carpet in both bedrooms,
and noticed red and blue stains under the carpet he thought might be blood.
The installer informed the apartment manager, who contacted the police.
The police collected the old carpet and padding. Human blood was detected
at several locations in the apartment, and on furnishings and pieces of
carpet. Samples of the blood from the carpet were consistent with Arlet’s
DNA. A cadaver dog showed interest in the left bedroom closet and alerted at
the balcony closet as to the presence of human remains; the police noticed
“the odor of decomposition” in that closet. The complex’s maintenance
7
supervisor testified the odor coming from the storage closet on the balcony
was so bad they had to replace the drywall to get rid of the smell.
On May 3, Marbeth learned the police wanted to speak to her.
When she asked Limas why the police wanted to speak with her, he
responded, “don’t call back.”
Limas was arrested on May 3, 2012, following a high speed
freeway chase that lasted for 38 minutes and 36 miles, during which Limas
traveled as fast as 95 miles per hour. Marbeth spoke with Limas during the
police chase and urged him to stop and surrender. Limas said, “I did
something really bad,” and “I think I might have killed someone.” The chase
finally ended when the California Highway Patrol used spear strips to flatten
the tires on Limas’s car and then used a pit maneuver to bump the car,
causing it to spin and stop. A cellphone associated with Arlet’s phone
number was found in the truck of the vehicle; the sim card had been removed
and most of the contents deleted.
Limas’s ex-wife visited him in jail in October 2016 and asked him
about his missing children. He told her, “they are safe,” while motioning
upward with his eyes. When she accused Limas of killing Arlet and the
children, Limas responded that Arlet tried to stab him, and he killed her in
self-defense.
III.
EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Marissa S. met Limas in 2006 at work. They dated and were
married on December 15, 2007. Marissa asked for an annulment two days
later, but Limas refused. In January 2008, they filled out paperwork at the
courthouse to end the marriage. Limas got upset when it was time to sign
the papers and walked out to the parking lot. When Marissa followed him,
8
Limas became very emotional, tried to talk her out of it, and held her arm so
tightly he left bruises. Limas continued coming to Marissa’s place of
employment and calling her at work. On one occasion, when she went to the
parking lot with him to keep him from coming inside, he opened the car door
and tried to push her into the car. The marriage was eventually dissolved in
2011.
Linda R. dated Limas from 2007 to 2010. While they were living
together, Limas was physically abusive on four or five occasions. Once, Linda
asked where he was when he failed to come home, and he threw her against
the wall and slapped her face, arms, and legs. On another occasion, Linda
asked where he was when he failed to come home to sleep, and Limas threw
her on the couch and choked her. On still another occasion, Limas threw
Linda against a mirrored closet door, causing it to crack. Limas started
dating Arlet while he was still seeing Linda. Limas told Linda he was
physically violent with Arlet. He told Linda that Arlet had been nagging
him, so he threw her across the bed when she was pregnant with their first
child. In March 2012, Limas told Linda that Arlet and the children were
“kind of, sort of, not really” living with him. On several occasions, Limas told
Linda he was going to send Arlet and the children to Mexico and that Arlet
would be leaving soon.
Diana A. and Limas began dating in 2008 and had a child
together in 2009. After a party, Limas dragged Diana into an underground
parking lot and threw her hard against the wall. Limas then came at Diana’s
neck with his hands. Limas then acted as if nothing had happened. Back at
Limas’s apartment, as Diana began gathering her things, Limas grabbed her
and threw her against the bed, and said, “you’re not leaving.” When Diana
tried to walk out the door, Limas threw her even harder, causing her to
9
bounce off the bed into the dresser and onto the floor. Diana sat on the floor
because she was pregnant and feared she would have a miscarriage. Diana
did not call the police because she did not have legal status. Later, when
Limas appeared to have fallen asleep, Diana fled to her car. Limas, however,
was not asleep and chased her down the hallway and tried to pull her back
into the apartment. Diana made it to her car, but Limas appeared in the car
window, yelling. He first apologized and then started threatening her. Diana
drove from Limas’s apartment to her family’s home in San Diego. It was
about 4:00 a.m. She could see Limas’s car approaching from behind at a high
rate of speed. Limas hit her car on the left side.
IV.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Limas was charged with three counts of murder. (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a).) As to all three counts, the information alleged a special
circumstance of multiple murder. (Id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The jury
convicted Limas on all three counts, determined the murders were in the first
degree, and found the special circumstance allegations to be true. The trial
court sentenced Limas to three consecutive life sentences without the
possibility of parole. Limas filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
Limas argues substantial evidence does not support the jury’s
findings of premeditation and deliberation, requiring that the first degree
murder convictions be reduced to second degree and that the multiple murder
findings be vacated. “Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for a
jury finding, we ‘“‘“review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
10
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that
is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”’”’ [Citation.] ‘The standard of review is the same in cases in which
the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.’” (People v. Rivera
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 323–324.)
Murder is of the first degree when it is willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a).) “‘“A verdict of deliberate and
premeditated first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to
kill. [Citation.] ‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of considerations in
forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in advance.
[Citations.]” [Citation.] “‘Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief
interval. “The test is not time, but reflection. ‘Thoughts may follow each
other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly.’”’”’” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1068–1069.)
“The type of evidence which this court has found sufficient to
sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation falls into three basic
categories: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual
killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed
toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing—what may be
characterized as ‘planning’ activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior
relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could
reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim, which inference of motive,
together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that
the killing was the result of ‘a pre-existing reflection’ and ‘careful thought
and weighing of considerations’ rather than ‘mere unconsidered or rash
impulse hastily executed’ [citation]; (3) facts about the nature of the killing
11
from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular
and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
‘preconceived design’ to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a ‘reason’
which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2). [¶] Analysis
of the cases will show that this court sustains verdicts of first degree murder
typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at
least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with
either (1) or (3).” (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27.) Using the
People v. Anderson analysis as a guide, we conclude the appellate record
contains substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
First, the record contains evidence of Limas’s planning activity.
In April or May 2011, Limas asked a former girlfriend “about a hit man.”
In December 2011, Limas told a friend Arlet had ruined his life and he could
not afford “all these kids.” Of Arlet, Limas stated: “I wish she was gone.
I wish I never met her.” In February or March 2012, Limas told his then-
girlfriend it was “too dangerous” to spend time at his apartment because of
Arlet, but said, “Don’t worry, I’m taking care of things.” Limas told another
girlfriend “if [she] were to consider taking him back that [Arlet] would [not]
be a problem anymore.” In March 2012, another ex-girlfriend asked Limas if
Arlet and the children were currently living with him; he replied, “Kind of,
sort of, not really,” and “he was going to send her and the kids to Mexico, that
she’s going to be leaving soon to Mexico.” On Friday, April 13, 2012, Limas
left his apartment with his dog, and returned about two and one-half hours
later without the dog, which the Attorney General suggests indicated Limas
was planning to murder Arlet and the children, and knew it would “become
violent and messy.”
12
Second, there was substantial evidence of Limas’s motive to
murder Arlet and the children because they restricted his ability to live his
life as he desired. Six months before the murders, a friend heard Limas say,
“Arlet has ruined his life. He talked about he can’t afford all these kids. And
she keeps getting pregnant. I wish she was gone. I wish I never met her.”
The friend also testified Limas had said things like, “‘I hate her, I wish she
did not have those kids.’”
Limas had specifically denied having kids to a girlfriend, and he
had no photographs of the children and nothing in his apartment for the
children, including clothing or toys. He told a girlfriend, “it was too
dangerous to go to his place right now, that you know, we have to wait some
time. Don’t worry, I’m taking care of things.” Another girlfriend had sent a
text about Limas reading: “I was on the phone with him while the cops were
chasing him. He has been [stalking] me for a long time. I have messages,
E-mails, and texts to prove it. He told me if I were to consider taking him
back that she would [not] be a problem anymore. I didn’t think that he would
go to that extreme. He even called me from jail.” The evidence supported a
finding that Limas believed Arlet and his children restricted his ability to live
his life as he wished, therefore creating strong motivation to permanently
remove them from his life.
Third and finally, the manner of the killing supports the finding
of premeditation and deliberation. Limas stabbed Arlet 48 times; the
majority of the wounds were to her neck, chest, and upper back, including
fatal wounds to the carotid artery, jugular vein, lungs, aorta, and heart. (See
People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 102 [evidence of multiple stab wounds
to victims’ neck or chest bears “most directly” on whether the defendant acted
with premeditation and deliberation]; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453,
13
471 [three potentially lethal knife wounds plus almost 80 other stab and
slash wounds is evidence of “preconceived design to kill”]; People v.
San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658–659 [multiple stab wounds on the
victim’s body support finding of deliberation]; People v. Pride (1992)
3 Cal.4th 195, 247 [“violent and bloody death sustained as a result of multiple
stab wounds can be consistent with a finding of premeditation”]; People v.
Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114 [stabbing victim in abdomen rather
than arm or leg supports finding the defendant acted willfully and with
deliberation and premeditation].)
Moreover, if Limas killed Arlet first, then he had ample
opportunity to reflect on his actions before killing the children; the reverse is
also true. (People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1028 [evidence of
premeditation and deliberation as to the second victim was “particularly
strong” where the defendant had to track her through the house after killing
the first victim].)
The record also contains substantial evidence of Limas’s
consciousness of guilt after the murders supporting the finding of
premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1128
[jury may consider actions by the defendant after the killings that are
inconsistent with rash, impulsive killing to establish premeditation and
deliberation].) After the murder, Limas used Arlet’s cellphone to text Arlet’s
mother “[t]hat they were on vacation, that everything was fine” and that she
should not be “bothering her,” because “everything was fine.”
Limas concealed evidence of the murders by attempting to
remove the blood stains with bleach. Limas explained the severe cuts to his
hands by claiming he had been in a fight at a restaurant and telling an
emergency room technician he had an accident while practicing with a
14
martial arts or samurai sword. At the emergency room, Limas used an
ex-coworker’s identification card rather than using his own name to hide his
identity. The appellate record lacks any evidence that Limas was upset or
grieving at any time. While the bodies of Arlet and/or the children were
decomposing in a balcony closet, Limas invited people to his home to watch a
UFC fight on television, after which they went to a club in Los Angeles in a
limousine.
Limas also demonstrated consciousness of guilt by disposing of
the bodies of Arlet and the children. Limas dumped Arlet’s body in a
commercial area late at night. The jury could have concluded Limas removed
the children’s bodies from his apartment in trash bags or boxes, either
placing them in the complex’s dumpster or transporting them to a remote
location; at the same time he removed all items needed for the children (such
as bouncer seats, strollers, and crib mattresses) from the apartment.
II.
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST OTHER WOMEN
Limas argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence
regarding incidents of domestic violence by Limas against his former
girlfriends. He contends the admission of this evidence violated his right to
due process and that the evidence had no probative value because the
incidents were dissimilar, the probative value was outweighed by the danger
of undue prejudice, and the evidence resulted in an undue consumption of
time and was cumulative.
Character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove a
defendant’s conduct on a particular occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)
However, a defendant’s acts of domestic violence are admissible to show
propensity to commit other acts of domestic violence. (Id., § 1109,
15
subd. (a)(1); see People v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1240 [evidence
of previous acts of domestic violence admissible in murder trial].) The
admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1109 is governed by
Evidence Code section 352: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” (Ibid.) Therefore, we review the trial court’s admission
of evidence regarding Limas’s previous acts of domestic violence for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 358.)
Before trial, the district attorney filed a motion to introduce
evidence of Limas’s past acts of domestic violence. (Evid. Code, §§ 1109,
1101, subd. (b), 352.) The district attorney identified four women who were
ex-wives or ex-girlfriends who would testify against Limas. Limas filed a
motion to exclude “any reference to acts or instances of violence committed by
Mr. Limas in prior relationships. This would be inadmissible character
evidence.” The court permitted the district attorney to offer the testimony of
three of the women,3 and gave the following limiting instruction immediately
after two of those witnesses testified: “At the end of the trial I will read you a
whole bunch of law. There is also an instruction called [a] limiting
instruction. In other words, some evidence came before you and I need to tell
you how you are to consider it. So that is why it’s somewhat limiting. Some
evidence comes in before a jury, there’s only certain things you can do with it.
Then there are certain things that you can’t do with it. [¶] That is why they
call it generally a limiting instruction to give the jury guidance on how you’re
3
The district attorney elected not to call the fourth woman to testify.
16
supposed to handle or evaluate this evidence. Well, the last two witnesses
they testified about a topic involving domestic violence. So you heard about
this. We call it uncharged domestic violence because those occurrences are
not per se charges in this case, but you heard about them anyway. [¶] So I
want to read you a limiting instruction on how you’re supposed to take this
evidence into consideration. I’m going to read you a portion of this, and it’s a
good time to read it because you just heard from Linda R. and Diana A. At
the end of the case I’m going to give you more detail on this issue, but I want
to highlight the main theme of this. This is from [CALCRIM No.] 852(a).
[¶] . . . [¶] If you decide that the Defendant committed the uncharged
domestic violence, you may but are not required to conclude from that
evidence that the Defendant was disposed or inclined to commit domestic
violence and based on that decision also conclude that the Defendant was
likely to commit and did commit murder as charged here. [¶] If you conclude
that the Defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that
conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It
is not sufficient by itself to prove that the Defendant is guilty of murder. The
People must still prove each charge and allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt. Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose unless I tell you
otherwise when the case ends.”
Before deliberations, the trial court gave the jury the following
limiting instruction from CALCRIM No. 852A: “You may consider this
evidence [of uncharged domestic violence] only if the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the
uncharged domestic violence. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a
different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is
proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more
17
likely than not that the fact is true. [¶] If the People have not met this
burden of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely.”
Limas first argues the admission of propensity evidence under
Evidence Code section 1109 violates due process. Following People v. Falsetta
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917, in which the Supreme Court held Evidence Code
section 1108 did not violate due process, the courts of this state consistently
have rejected this claim. (See People v. Mani, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp.
373–376; People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1194; People v.
Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1233, fn. 14; People v. Johnson (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 520, 529; People v. Reyes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 246, 251;
People v. Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695, 704; People v. Escobar (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1096; People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324,
1334; People v. Johnson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 419.)
Limas next argues the probative value of the evidence of domestic
violence against other women was outweighed by the risk the evidence would
create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time.
In People v. Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at page 1237, the
appellate court held evidence of the defendant’s acts of domestic violence
against the murder victim as well as against four women he dated before the
murder victim were admissible under Evidence Code section 1109: “[T]he
facts and circumstances of defendant’s relationship with Bridget were
indicative of defendant’s ‘“larger scheme of dominance and control”’ which he
attempted to exercise over Bridget as he became angry, watched her
activities, followed her, and tried to prevent her from having any other
relationships. [Citation.] Defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence,
committed against the four women he dated before Bridget, were also
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indicative of ‘cases where perpetrators of this violence will beat their intimate
partners, even kill them, and go on to beat or kill the next intimate partner.’
[Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [A] defendant’s propensity to commit domestic
violence against a former girlfriend who was murdered, and other prior
girlfriends who were assaulted, is relevant and probative to an element of
murder, ‘namely, [defendant’s] intentional doing of an act with malice
aforethought that resulted in the victim’s death.’ [Citation.] A defendant’s
pattern of prior acts of domestic violence logically leads to the inference of
malice aforethought and culpability for murder.” (People v. Brown, at p.
1237.)
The testimony of these witnesses established Limas’s pattern of
choking, hitting, exerting dominance over, and throwing women he was
dating or to whom he was married. This evidence tended to establish Limas’s
propensity to commit such acts against Arlet. Additionally, Limas’s pattern
of committing acts of domestic violence leads in this case to an inference of
malice and of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony from these witnesses.
III.
EVIDENCE OF HOSTING A PARTY DAYS AFTER THE MURDERS
Limas argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence he hosted a gathering at his home just days after the murders of
Arlet and the children. This, too, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. “‘“A
trial court has ‘considerable discretion’ in determining the relevance of
evidence. [Citation.] Similarly, the court has broad discretion under
Evidence Code section 352 to exclude even relevant evidence if it determines
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its possible
prejudicial effects.”’ [Citation.] Evidence is relevant when it ‘“‘tends
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“logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish material facts
such as identity, intent, or motive.’”’ [Citation.] We review the trial court’s
evidentiary decision for abuse of discretion, disturbing it only if we conclude
that the trial ‘“‘“‘court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’”’”’” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 53.)
Limas argues the evidence was highly prejudicial and lacked any
probative value. The Attorney General argues this evidence demonstrated
Limas’s suppression of evidence after committing the murders, as well as his
intent.
In response to Limas’s motion in limine to exclude references to
an “alleged gathering” at his home for a UFC fight on April 21, 2012, the
district attorney argued the evidence was relevant to show Limas did not act
in self-defense or that the murders were an accident, and to show his
planning and malice. Additionally, individuals present at the gathering
noticed furniture was out of place, which the district attorney contended
showed Limas was trying to suppress or hide evidence by covering up blood
stains or other evidence of the crimes. The trial court denied the motion in
limine.
Limas’s counsel raised the objection again during trial. The
district attorney responded: “Everything he did between the time of the date
of the murder to the time he was arrested is relevant because his guilt is still
at issue. He has not admitted to killing the three individuals charged in this
case. So the alternatives are that at least with respect to the kids, either the
kids are missing, his kids are missing, or someone else killed his kids. His
behavior is inconsistent with that . . . of someone who is remorseful, who is
sad, who is in agony. Anything inconsistent with that is relevant.
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Everything he did. It’s not just this party. He went to clubs. He had
dinners. He acted a normal life while either his kids were dead or missing.”
The trial court concluded the probative value of the evidence outweighed any
prejudice, as it tended to indicate through circumstantial evidence the
murders had been committed in the apartment, necessitating the movement
of furniture and attempts to clean the apartment.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis. Limas’s behavior was
inconsistent with someone whose girlfriend and children were missing.
Alternatively, if Limas killed his girlfriend and his own children, hosting a
party in his home, where the crimes occurred and the bodies were hidden and
decomposing, reflects malice, willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation.
Further, the movement of furniture was probative of Limas’s attempts to
hide evidence of the murders.
IV.
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Finally, Limas argues that the claimed errors addressed in parts
II and III above had the cumulative effect of creating such prejudice that
reversal is required.
Multiple trial errors may, indeed, have a cumulative effect.
(People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844–848.) In a close case, the
cumulative effect of these errors may require reversal where “it is reasonably
probable” they affected the verdict. (People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612,
621.) Where all or nearly all of the individual claims of error are rejected,
however, we will not reverse based on a theory of cumulative error. (People v.
Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1057.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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