People v. Ramires-Lopez CA2/3 ( 2023 )

Filed 12/14/23 P. v. Ramires-Lopez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B322299
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA437992)
v.
REYNALDO RAMIRES-LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded.
Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Noah Hill and Steven Mercer, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury convicted defendant Reynaldo Ramires-Lopez of
second degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon. On
appeal, Ramires-Lopez contends the trial court erred in
admitting statements he made during a custodial interrogation in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
He also argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
him on the assault conviction. The People concede that the court
misunderstood its sentencing discretion and that the sentence
should be modified. We vacate the sentence on the assault
conviction but otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2012, Ramires-Lopez, Mario Cosme-Arellanes, and
several other men lived in a house in Los Angeles. On July 3,
Ramires-Lopez and Cosme-Arellanes were drinking beer on the
front porch of the house with their friend, Noe Hernandez-Garcia,
and a few other men. Ramires-Lopez and Hernandez-Garcia
began play-boxing. Ramires-Lopez stumbled, became upset, and
left the porch. He later returned and struck Hernandez-Garcia
with a machete three times in the hands and back. Hernandez-
Garcia fled. As he ran away, he heard Cosme-Arellanes urging
Ramires-Lopez to calm down.
That night, the owner of the house awoke to the sound of
fighting. When he looked out the window, he saw Cosme-
Arellanes leaving the property quickly with Ramires-Lopez
following closely behind. A police officer found Cosme-Arellanes
early the next morning, lying face down and covered in blood. He
2
had 17 injuries caused by a heavy, sharp instrument. He later
died from his injuries.
The murder went unsolved for several years. Police officers
detained and interviewed the occupants of the house, but
Ramires-Lopez had fled. In 2015, investigators located and
interviewed Hernandez-Garcia, leading police to identify
Ramires-Lopez as a suspect.
The Custodial Interview
In December 2018, authorities arrested Ramires-Lopez on
unrelated charges in New York. Los Angeles Police Department
detectives traveled to New York to interview him. The interview
was videotaped. The detectives advised Ramires-Lopez of his
rights under Miranda at the start of the interview. Ramires-
Lopez indicated he understood his rights and did not object to
answering the detectives’ questions.
During the interview, Ramires-Lopez told officers his name
was Nelson Ramirez (with a “z”) Lopez. He provided a false
birthdate. He also told officers he had moved to New York
directly from El Salvador two years earlier (i.e., in late 2016), and
claimed he had never been to California or Colorado. These
statements were false. Ramires-Lopez lived in California in
2012, and police had pulled him over during a traffic stop in
Colorado in June 2015.
The following colloquy ensued:1
[Detective]: And [unintelligible] Spanish
[unintelligible] Colorado? That’s the name of
the state.
1 The interview was conducted in Spanish. A certified
translation of the interview transcript was used at trial.
3
[Ramires-Lopez]: No.
[Detective]: You haven’t been there? Okay.
And you say you’ve never been to ca—
California either?
[Ramires-Lopez]: Neither.
[Detective]: Okay. [Unintelligible].
[Ramires-Lopez]: That’s why I want . . . uh, I
want to know what’s going on. And, and—I
think when I get there uh—how could I um, get
introduced [sic] to a lawyer, could I talk to a
lawyer about . . .
[Detective]: Yes, um . . .
[Ramires-Lopez]: . . . about this situation.
[Detective]: If you have charges belonging to
another place [unintelligible] put in Colorado, if
they put [sic] in California, if they put in New
Mexico wherever the orders were the arrest
warrants [sic] . . .
[Ramires-Lopez]: Uh-huh . . . .
[Detective]: . . . What’s going to happen is that
um, you’re going to get a—and to talk
appointment for court [sic] to talk about it.
[Ramires-Lopez]: Yes, that’s why
[unintelligible].
The interview continued. The detective produced a
photograph depicting Ramires-Lopez, Hernandez-Garcia, and
three other individuals. Ramires-Lopez conceded he was in the
4
photograph, but claimed he only knew Hernandez-Garcia and the
others as friends of another man, “Jose.” The detective then
produced a photograph of Ramires-Lopez with Cosme-Arellanes.
Ramires-Lopez stated he also knew Cosme-Arellanes only as a
friend of Jose.
Ramires-Lopez eventually told detectives: “I think I need
my lawyer so I can talk about it.” The interview ended shortly
thereafter.
Before trial, the People moved to admit portions of the
interview as described above. Defense counsel objected, arguing
Ramires-Lopez’s question about being “introduced to a lawyer”
was an invocation of the right to counsel which the detectives
ignored, violating his Miranda rights. Counsel argued the trial
court should therefore exclude any statements Ramires-Lopez
made after that question. The trial court concluded Ramires-
Lopez’s reference to a lawyer was not an invocation of the right to
counsel, but instead reflected Ramires-Lopez “trying to
understand the procedures.” The court therefore admitted the
contested portion of the interview in which Ramires-Lopez said
he did not know the names of Hernandez-Garcia and Cosme-
Arellanes, and he knew them only as friends of Jose. At trial,
witnesses testified Ramires-Lopez was friendly with both
Hernandez-Garcia and Cosme-Arellanes.
Sentencing
A jury convicted Ramires-Lopez of the second degree
murder of Cosme-Arellanes (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a))2 and
assault with a deadly weapon for the attack on Hernandez-Garcia
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court found true the allegation that
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
5
Ramires-Lopez had suffered a prior serious felony conviction.
(§ 667, subd. (d); § 1170.12, subd. (b).)
The trial court sentenced Ramires-Lopez to state prison for
an indeterminate term of 30 years to life for second degree
murder (count 1), consisting of 15 years to life, doubled because of
the prior strike. As to the assault with a deadly weapon
conviction (count 2), the trial court imposed a determinate term
of four years, consisting of two years, doubled because of the prior
strike. (§ 667, subd. (e)(1).)
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Admission of the Interview Excerpt
Was Not Reversible Error
Ramires-Lopez argues law enforcement violated his
Miranda rights by continuing to interview him after he invoked
his right to counsel, thus the trial court erred in admitting the
portion of the interview that occurred after that invocation. We
find no prejudicial error.
A. Applicable legal principles
“The applicable law is settled: ‘ “As a prophylactic
safeguard to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court, in
Miranda, required law enforcement agencies to advise a suspect,
before any custodial law enforcement questioning, that ‘he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.’ [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59
Cal.4th 1063, 1085–1086.) The suspect may waive these rights so
long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. (Id. at p. 1086.)
6
“When a defendant has waived his Miranda rights and
agreed to speak with police, any subsequent invocation of the
right to counsel must be unequivocal and unambiguous.” (People
v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1011 (Frederickson).) “But
if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous
or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect
might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not
require the cessation of questioning.” (Davis v. United States
(1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 (Davis).)
Where, as here, the defendant’s custodial interview was
recorded and transcribed, “we engage in a de novo review of the
legal question of whether the statement at issue was ambiguous
or equivocal.” (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1105
(Bacon).)3
B. Ramires-Lopez did not unequivocally request
counsel
Ramires-Lopez waived his right to counsel following the
initial Miranda warning, and he does not challenge the validity
of that waiver on appeal. The detectives could properly continue
the interrogation unless and until Ramires-Lopez clearly
requested counsel. Any subsequent invocation of the right to
3 The People argue the court made a “factual finding” that
Ramires-Lopez’s inquiry was not a request for counsel and this
aspect of the trial court’s decision should be reviewed for
substantial evidence. Not so. Since the interview was recorded,
the facts regarding what was said could not be disputed. The
trial court’s conclusion that Ramires-Lopez’s statement did not
invoke his Miranda rights reflected the court’s application of law
to a set of undisputed facts. We independently review that legal
conclusion. (Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1105.)
7
counsel had to be “unequivocal and unambiguous.”
(Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1011.)
Ramires-Lopez argues the following statement was a
sufficiently clear request for the assistance of counsel: “And,
and—I think when I get there uh—how could I um, get
introduced [sic] to a lawyer, could I talk to a lawyer about . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . about this situation.” We disagree.
Frederickson is instructive. In Frederickson, the defendant
initially waived his right to counsel. During the interrogation
that followed, the defendant asked officers: “ ‘Hey, when am I
going to get a chance to call my lawyer? It’s getting late, and he’s
probably going to go to bed pretty soon.’ ” (Frederickson, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 1011.) Our Supreme Court reasoned this was not an
unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, because a
reasonable police officer “would have concluded that defendant’s
remark expressed concern over the length of the interview and a
desire to contact counsel when the interview was over.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, here, Ramires-Lopez framed his statement with
the conditional and ambiguous words, “when I get there,”
immediately after being asked if he had ever been to California or
Colorado. This suggested that Ramires-Lopez’s interest in
speaking to a lawyer was contingent on his arrival at some other
location (such as California or Colorado), and at a later time. As
in Frederickson, a reasonable officer would have understood this
to convey that Ramires-Lopez wished to obtain a lawyer
sometime after the interview. (Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
p. 1011.)
Ramires-Lopez argues we should ignore the reference to
California and his use of the terms “when” and “there,” and
instead focus solely on the second part of the statement: “how
8
could I um, get introduced [sic] to a lawyer, could I talk to a
lawyer about . . . [ ] about this situation.” We disagree that the
second part of the statement should be construed without
reference to what came before. “[A]s is true with most questions
of interpretation, context does matter,” and “[w]hether or not a
reasonable officer would perceive a suspect’s statement as
ambiguous may depend on context.” (People v. Flores (2020) 9
Cal.5th 371, 418, 417.) As discussed above, the context frames
the request and renders it unclear.
Further, even accepting Ramires-Lopez’s argument, we
would still conclude his statement was ambiguous. Ramires-
Lopez asked “how” he could “get introduced to a lawyer,” and if
he “could” talk to a lawyer. Courts have concluded requests
framed by such conditional terms are not unequivocal invocations
of the right to counsel. For example, in People v. Sauceda-
Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203 (Sauceda-Contreras), the
defendant stated: “ ‘If you can bring me a lawyer . . . that way I
can tell you everything that I know and everything that I need to
tell you and someone to represent me.’ ” (Id. at p. 219.) Because
this statement was “conditional in that it began with an inquiry,”
our Supreme Court concluded it was not an unequivocal request
for counsel. (Ibid.) As in Sauceda-Contreras, Ramires-Lopez’s
statement was conditional, thus “a reasonable officer under the
circumstances would not have understood defendant’s
[statement] to be a clear and unequivocal request for counsel.”
(Ibid.; People v. Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 18–19.)
Finally, Ramires-Lopez cites several cases in which courts
determined that a defendant’s statement was unambiguous and
contends his statement was similar. Yet, in each example cited,
the defendant made a far more definite and immediate request
9
for counsel. In Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 93, after
being advised of the right to counsel, the defendant stated: “ ‘Uh,
yeah. I’d like to do that.’ ” In In re Art T. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
335, 356, the defendant expressly asked, “ ‘Could I have an
attorney?’ ” In People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1023,
the defendant responded to a question by saying, “ ‘[I] want to,
speak to an attorney first.’ ” In Alvarez v. Gomez (9th Cir. 1999)
185 F.3d 995, 998, the defendant asked, “ ‘Can I get an attorney
right now, man?’ ” Similarly, in Tobias v. Arteaga (9th Cir. 2021)
996 F.3d 571, 580, the defendant asked, “ ‘Could I have an
attorney?’ ” In Mays v. Clark (9th Cir. 2015) 807 F.3d 968, 971,
the defendant said: “ ‘My—my step-dad got a lawyer for me.
[¶] . . . [¶] I’m going to—can—can you call him and have my
lawyer come down here?’ ” In Sessoms v. Grounds (9th Cir. 2015)
776 F.3d 615, 619, the defendant asked, “ ‘There wouldn’t be any
possible way that I could have a—a lawyer present while we do
this?’ ” followed by, “ ‘uh, give me a lawyer.’ ” In Smith v. Endell
(9th Cir. 1988) 860 F.2d 1528, 1529, the defendant asked, “ ‘Can I
talk to a lawyer?’ ” In Anderson v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2008) 516
F.3d 781, 786, the defendant stated, “ ‘I plead the [F]ifth.’ ”
In contrast to these clear demands, Ramires-Lopez’s
statement included several equivocal and conditional terms. He
framed his statement with “when I get there” and asked “how” he
could be “introduced to a lawyer.” This fell far short of asking “to
stop the interview immediately and consult counsel.”
(Frederickson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) At most, a reasonable
officer “would have understood only that [he] might be invoking
the right to counsel.” (Ibid.) This was insufficient to require “the
cessation of questioning.” (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459.) The
10
trial court did not err in concluding there was no Miranda
violation or in admitting the contested interview excerpt.
C. Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt
Even if Ramires-Lopez’s inquiry could be considered an
unambiguous request for counsel, the record establishes that any
trial court error in admitting the challenged interview excerpt
was not prejudicial.
In the contested interview excerpt, Ramires-Lopez denied
that he knew several individuals shown in two photographs,
including the two victims. At trial, witnesses testified that
Ramires-Lopez was friends with both victims. Ramires-Lopez
argues on appeal these “guilty denials” made it more likely jurors
would discredit defense counsel’s arguments, and less likely the
jury would return a verdict of not guilty or find he committed
only the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. We
disagree.
Ramires-Lopez’s statements that he was only minimally
acquainted with the victims were not inculpatory and they did
not directly address the crimes. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25
Cal.4th 926, 994 [any Miranda error harmless when admitted
statements not inculpatory and at most revealed general lack of
veracity].) Further, they were no more suggestive of guilt than
other statements he made earlier in the recorded interview that
were admitted without objection. For example, Ramires-Lopez
gave a false name and date of birth, told officers he moved to the
United States in late 2016, and claimed he had never been to
California. Other evidence established these statements were
clearly false. Under these circumstances, Ramires-Lopez’s
statements minimizing his knowledge of the victims did not
11
“have high value in the overall evidentiary calculus.” (People v.
Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 493.) Even if the trial court erred in
admitting the statements relating to the photographs, we would
find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
II. The Sentence on Count 2 Must Be Vacated Because
the Trial Court Misunderstood Its Sentencing
Discretion
Ramires-Lopez argues the trial court misunderstood, and
therefore abused, its discretion in sentencing him on count 2,
assault with a deadly weapon, and the People agree. We vacate
the sentence as to count 2 and remand to the trial court for
resentencing.
A. Background
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court first heard, and
denied, Ramires-Lopez’s Romero motion.4 On count 1, second
degree murder, the court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life,
doubled to 30 years to life due to the prior strike.
On the assault with a deadly weapon count, the court
initially indicated it would impose a consecutive sentence of “one-
third the mid-term of three years times two,” and that it would
exercise its discretion not to impose a five-year violent felony
prior enhancement, resulting in a sentence of two years.
However, the court subsequently expressed concern that it did
not have the authority to impose the indicated sentence, and that
it was “trying to get back to the two years that I’ve indicated was
appropriate.” The court stated it believed a consecutive sentence
was appropriate, then indicated it would impose the low term of
4 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
12
two years and exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior strike
conviction as to count 2 only.
The People expressed concern that the indicated sentence
was not authorized. After discussion with counsel, the court
stated: “I don’t know if this is an illegal sentence, but at least by
having the defendant agree to it, personally, it won’t be an issue
on appeal . . . . The intention is to give him what I indicated.”
The court asked Ramires-Lopez if he agreed the court could
dismiss his prior strike conviction for purposes of sentencing him
on count 2. Ramires-Lopez refused to stipulate on any sentencing
issues. Defense counsel asked the court to impose a concurrent
sentence on count 2. The trial court repeated that it believed
Ramires-Lopez should be sentenced consecutively for the attack
on Hernandez-Garcia. The court accordingly imposed the low
term of two years, doubled to four years due to the prior strike
conviction.
B. Discussion
The trial court and counsel expressed concern that the
court did not have the discretion to strike Ramires-Lopez’s prior
serious felony conviction as to the determinate count only.
However, our Supreme Court has recognized that “[w]hen a
proper basis exists for a court to strike prior conviction
allegations as to at least one current conviction, the law does not
require the court to treat other current convictions with perfect
symmetry if symmetrical treatment would result in an unjust
sentence.” (People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500.) The
People concede, and we agree, that the trial court had the
discretion to dismiss the prior strike as to count 2 only and to
impose a consecutive low term sentence of two years. (People v.
13
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 [abuse of discretion occurs
where trial court is not aware of its discretion to dismiss].)
When the trial court misunderstands its discretion, the
appropriate remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing, and we do so here. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) We decline the People’s request that we
modify the sentence rather than remanding. Although Ramires-
Lopez does not object to the People’s proposal, we note that while
the trial court repeatedly expressed its desire to impose a two-
year sentence on count 2, it also initially denied the Romero
motion and ultimately did not dismiss the prior strike. We
therefore find it appropriate to vacate the sentence as to count 2,
and remand to the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion
in the first instance.
14
DISPOSITION
The sentence as to count 2 is vacated and the matter is
remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
LAVIN, J.
15