People v. Thompson CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Thompson CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081996
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD296361)
JOSEPH ARTHUR THOMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.
Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric
Swenson and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Wearing “extra big” dark sunglasses on a cloudy October morning,
Joseph Arthur Thompson walked into a bank, wrote a note, and passed it to a
bank teller. The note read, “This is a robbery.” Shocked, the teller activated
the silent alarm. Within minutes, the police responded and had Thompson
under arrest. He admitted he passed the note because he needed money and
he wanted “[w]hatever he could get” from the bank. A jury convicted him of
attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664 & 211) and the trial court sentenced
him to a three-year prison term.2 He appeals, asserting there was
insufficient evidence he used fear in his attempt to take the bank’s money.
We affirm.
Attempted robbery requires a specific intent to commit robbery and a
direct but ineffectual act toward commission of the crime. (People v. Mora
and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 488−489.) Robbery is the felonious taking
of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or
immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
(Id. at p. 489.) To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear, the
prosecution must present evidence the victim was in fact afraid, and that
such fear allowed the crime to be accomplished. (People v. Morehead (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 765, 774 (Morehead).)
1 This case is appropriate for resolution by memorandum opinion
because it raises “no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1; see People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.)
2 The trial court dismissed Thompson’s prior strike conviction pursuant
to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, dismissed his
prior serious felony conviction, and found true aggravating factors to impose
the upper term of three years for the attempted robbery.
2
The element of fear for purposes of robbery is established when there is
sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his
property. (Morehead, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) Direct proof of fear
is not required because “fear may be inferred from the circumstances in
which the property is taken.” (Id. at p. 775.) “If there is evidence from which
fear may be inferred, the victim need not explicitly testify that he or she was
afraid.” (Ibid.) The requisite fear does not need to be the result of an express
threat or the use of a weapon; it does not need to be “extreme” to constitute
robbery; nor does it require resistance by the victim. (Ibid.) “All that is
necessary is that the record show conduct, words, or circumstances
reasonably calculated to produce fear.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) “Intimidation of
the victim equates with fear.” (Ibid.) Relevant here, “[a]n unlawful demand
can convey an implied threat of harm for failure to comply, thus supporting
an inference of the requisite fear.” (Ibid.)
In Morehead, the defendant⎯donning sunglasses and/or a beanie to
thwart his identification⎯entered four different banks and, each time,
passed a note to a bank teller demanding money. (Morehead, supra, 191
Cal.App.4th at pp. 768–769, 776.) At the first bank, his note read, “ ‘Robbery
100s/50s.’ ” (Id. at pp. 768–769.) The teller “ ‘panicked,’ ” and when she told
nearby employees she was being robbed, the defendant walked away. (Id. at
p. 769.) At the second bank, the defendant’s note read, “ ‘This is a robbery.’ ”
(Ibid.) The teller was scared and gave him $1,600. (Ibid.) At the third, the
defendant obtained money after showing the teller a note demanding money.
(Ibid.) At the fourth, the defendant’s note read, “ ‘Robbery, no dye packs,
second drawer.’ ” (Ibid.) The teller, scared, gave him just over $400. (Ibid.)
A jury convicted the defendant of one count of attempted robbery and three
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counts of second degree robbery, among other unrelated charges. (Id. at
p. 768.) His convictions were affirmed by this court. (Id. at p. 778.)
In affirming, we rejected the defendant’s claim that “any actual,
subjective fear on the part of the tellers was not objectively reasonable under
the circumstances because he ‘never threatened anyone, and never showed a
weapon,’ and thus he ‘did nothing other than hand the teller[s] a piece of
paper requesting money.’ ” (Morehead, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 777.)
We concluded substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that each of
the robbery victims either complied or, in the case of the attempted robbery,
would have complied had the defendant not walked away when the teller
sought assistance “as a result of actual and reasonable fear that arose from
the implicit threat of harm contained in his demands.” (Id. at p. 775.) We
found each victim’s testimony that she was “ ‘panicked’ ” (id. at p. 769) or
“scared and nervous” (ibid.) because of the defendant’s demand for money
“reflected a perception that she had no choice but to comply with his demand”
(id. at p. 778). “Any reasonable jury would conclude the tellers had no way of
knowing what Morehead might do if they failed to comply, and their prompt
compliance showed they viewed Morehead’s demands as carrying an implicit
threat he might harm them if they did not immediately hand money over to
him.” (Ibid.)
We reach the same conclusion here.
R.G., C.M. and M.N. were all behind the “bandit barrier”3 when
Thompson approached the tellers and slid his robbery note to R.G. R.G. was
“shocked” and “nervous” but he kept calm, turned to C.M. and told her to call
3 This is the bulletproof glass half-wall that separates the bank tellers
from the customers.
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911. He took Thompson “seriously” because he “needed to protect the branch,
the customers, and the employees.” So he immediately stepped back and
pressed the silent alarm to summon the police. After R.G. told her to call 911
because they were getting robbed, C.M. “panick[ed] and felt “nervous”
Thompson would “retaliate” because she thought they were taking too long to
give in to his demands. M.N., who was in the middle of handing $8,000 in
cash to a customer when Thompson passed the robbery note to R.G.,
“panicked,” was “fearful” and in “shock” when she became aware of the
robbery in process. She also called the bank’s Security Response Center.
As in Morehead, we conclude the People presented ample evidence the
victims felt “actual and reasonable fear . . . from the implicit threat of harm
contained in [Thompson’s] demands.” (Morehead, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at
p. 775.) Thompson argues Morehead is distinguishable because unlike the
defendant who walked up to the teller’s window, “here [Thompson] is an
elderly man who had to use the assistance of a cane to reach the teller’s
window.” This is an immaterial difference. Thompson’s remaining argument
that “one could interpret” C.M.’s and M.N.’s “panic and fear” was caused not
by his actions but from R.G.’s “loud” announcement he was being robbed is
similarly unpersuasive. It overlooks the governing standard of review. If the
circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, we do not reverse simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding. (See People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could
reasonably conclude Thompson’s unlawful demand conveyed to the victims an
implied threat of harm for failure to comply, supporting an inference of the
requisite fear to sustain a conviction for attempted robbery. (Ibid.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
RUBIN, J.
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