People v. Watkins CA1/5 ( 2023 )

Filed 12/20/23 P. v. Watkins CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
A165614
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR-743006-1)
JAMES THOMAS WATKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
James Thomas Watkins (appellant) appeals his conviction, following a
jury trial, for vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (c)(1)), after
he had a seizure while driving. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
2007–2017: Epilepsy Diagnosis and Periodic Seizures
In 2007, appellant was diagnosed with epilepsy. In 2011, he underwent
a lobectomy, a surgical procedure which removes brain tissue in an attempt
to help prevent future seizures. Lobectomies are generally performed only
when the patient “is having a very hard time with seizures.”
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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There are three categories of seizures, with different impacts on a
person’s ability to function. A simple partial seizure affects some aspect of
brain function, such as speech, without affecting consciousness or awareness.
Because there is no loss of consciousness or awareness, simple partial
seizures are compatible with driving. A complex partial seizure involves only
part of the brain, but by definition involves some loss of consciousness or
awareness, such that the person is not fully alert. A loss of awareness is
dangerous for driving. A generalized seizure affects the entire brain and
results in convulsions and a loss of consciousness. After experiencing a
seizure, a person will often be confused, disoriented, or demonstrate
behavioral changes while the brain is returning back to its normal state.
Sometimes a person does not remember having a seizure.
Dr. Jerry Schlegel, a general neurologist who treated patients with
epilepsy, began treating appellant in June 2013. At that time, appellant was
taking three “anticonvulsant” medications: lacosamide, topiramate, and
clonazepam.2 He reported having no seizures in the previous year.
In April 2014, appellant reported to Dr. Schlegel he was having simple
partial seizures one to two times per month. According to Dr. Schlegel’s
notes, appellant stated he was “[s]till not driving” and would “continue to
hold off on driving for now.” Dr. Schlegel adjusted his medication to attempt
to control the seizures. In September, appellant reported “nearly daily”
simple partial seizures. Because of the continued increase in seizure activity,
Dr. Schlegel referred appellant to Dr. Everett Austin, an epilepsy specialist.
2 Lacosamide is also referred to as Vimpat; topiramate is also referred
to as Topamax; and clonazepam is also referred to as Klonopin. To avoid
confusion, we will use the terms lacosamide, topiramate, and clonazepam
regardless of the term used in the testimony or documentary evidence being
described.
2
Dr. Austin increased the dosage of one of appellant’s medications. Two weeks
later, appellant reported having only one seizure since the change in
medication.
In April 2015, appellant was hospitalized following a generalized
convulsive seizure. The treating emergency room doctor directed appellant
not to drive until medically cleared to do so. The doctor also told appellant he
would be reporting the seizure to the DMV (Department of Motor Vehicles).
However, the DMV never received such a report and did not take any action
on appellant’s driving privileges. Appellant spoke with Dr. Austin shortly
after the seizure. Dr. Austin reiterated that appellant could not drive until
his seizures were under better control. Dr. Austin increased the dosage of
one of appellant’s medications to try to address future generalized seizures.
Appellant reported that this change helped, reducing his seizures from
generalized seizures to simple partial seizures.
In October 2017, appellant reported to a doctor that he had a possible
seizure three months earlier where he “ ‘spaced out for a few seconds.’ ”
Dr. Austin testified this description was consistent with a complex partial
seizure during which the person is “not fully cognizant or conscious of what’s
going on around them.”
March 2018 Traffic Collision
In March 2018, appellant was involved in a traffic collision. Jason
Sargis was in heavy traffic on U.S. Highway 101 when appellant drove up
behind him at a high rate of speed and hit him multiple times. Sargis could
see that appellant was slouched down and looked “a little . . . off.” Appellant
eventually hit a guardrail, drove off the road, went through a fence, and
stopped in a field. Sargis called 911 and went to check on appellant.
Appellant’s car was heavily damaged, and bystanders had to break a window
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to get appellant out. Appellant apologized for hitting Sargis’s car and was
smiling and “acting like he didn’t just crash his car.”
California Highway Patrol Officer Shawn Harvey responded to the
scene about ten minutes after the crash. Appellant seemed confused and
disoriented, giving nonresponsive answers to the officer’s questions. For
example, when asked what lane he was traveling in, appellant responded
that his car was a 2017 model; when asked how fast he was going, appellant
responded that his car was blue. Appellant was slurring his words, had
difficulty walking and standing, and had a delayed response to the officer’s
questions. Appellant told the officer he had a seizure disorder but was
“adamant” that he had not had a seizure before the crash. A blood sample
taken that day tested negative for any central nervous system depressants.
Dr. Austin testified that a person with a long-term seizure disorder who
was involved in this kind of accident should deduce that they may have had a
seizure.
2018–2019 Representations to Doctors and the DMV
In February 2018, the month before the traffic collision, appellant
represented on his driver’s license application form that he had no medical
conditions in the last three years affecting his ability to drive. A DMV safety
officer testified epilepsy is such a medical condition and when a person
informs the DMV of an epilepsy diagnosis, the DMV requires a medical
evaluation before issuing a driver’s license.
In April 2018, the month after the collision, appellant told his primary
care physician, Dr. Jack Nadler, that he had not had a seizure in more than
two years. At appellant’s request, Dr. Nadler provided him with a note for
work stating that he could work and drive. Appellant did not tell Dr. Nadler
about his recent traffic collision, and Dr. Nadler testified he would have
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wanted to know “if there were any car accidents that could be related to a
medical issue.” Dr. Jonathan Artz, a general neurologist, began treating
appellant around the same time, and appellant told Dr. Artz his last seizure
was more than three years ago. In December 2018, appellant reported to
Dr. Nadler he had no seizures in approximately five years and requested
Dr. Nadler complete a DMV form so stating on his behalf.
In March 2019, appellant participated in a DMV hearing regarding the
March 2018 collision.3 The hearing officer stated he had Dr. Nadler’s
December 2018 medical evaluation form stating appellant had not had a
seizure in more than five years.4 Appellant, who was under oath, stated that
information was correct. Appellant said the March 2018 collision was caused
by another car forcing him off the side of the road during heavy rush hour
traffic: “The cars just kind of brought me up slowed up slowed [sic] and just
kind of worked me over off to the side.” He stated he was taking lacosamide,
topiramate, and clonazepam for seizures; took them as prescribed; and
experienced no side effects from the medications. Based on the medical
evaluation form and appellant’s representations in the hearing, the hearing
officer determined appellant’s license would remain valid.
September 9, 2020 Fatality
On September 9, 2020, as a car that Samantha Semoril was riding in
approached a roundabout, a Prius passed them by veering up onto the
sidewalk. Moments later, Semoril heard a huge bang and saw a trash can fly
3 A recording of the proceeding was admitted into evidence at trial and
a transcript was provided.
4 Although the transcript identifies the date of the form as December
2019, this is either a misstatement by the hearing officer or a
mistranscription, as the DMV hearing was held in March 2019.
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through the air. A person was lying in the middle of the road by the
roundabout. Appellant stumbled out of the Prius and appeared to be drunk.
The person appellant hit, Mario Armando Castaneda, died from his injuries.
Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy Robert Sutherland responded to the
scene. When he approached appellant, appellant promptly claimed
responsibility for the accident. Appellant was lethargic and off balance,
staggering as he walked and speaking in a slightly slurred manner. He was
confused and behaving oddly, unable to give his date of birth, unable to find
his wallet even though it was located in his front pants pocket, and giving
unintelligible and nonsensical responses such as pointing to the sky or
saying, “whoop whoop whoop.” Appellant told Sutherland he was not
epileptic and was not taking any prescription medications.
A blood sample taken about two hours after the crash showed a
therapeutic level of topiramate, a low level of lacosamide, and no clonazepam.
No alcohol or other drugs were present. At the time of the accident, appellant
was prescribed daily doses of topiramate, lacosamide, and clonazepam. The
prescribed dose of lacosamide was somewhat high and appellant was
supposed to take clonazepam twice per day. Dr. Artz testified that if a
patient has a very low level or no detectable level of a drug in their system, it
likely means they were not taking the medication consistently, which would
increase their risk of seizures. Because clonazepam stays in the body for a
while, the absence of any in appellant’s blood test indicates he “wasn’t
probably taking it consistently or maybe not taking it at all. If it’s
nondetectable, . . . I would suggest that he probably wasn’t taking it
recently,” which could cause a seizure.
Appellant told Dr. Artz that the September 2020 crash was caused by a
seizure. He also said he had not missed any of his three medications. An
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inspection revealed that there were no mechanical problems with the car that
would have caused the collision.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found appellant guilty of vehicular manslaughter and found
true an enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury (§§ 667,
1192.7). The jury found not true an allegation that the victim was
particularly vulnerable. The court sentenced appellant to four years in state
prison.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence
Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict that he was grossly negligent. We disagree.
“ ‘When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask
“ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” [Citation.] Because the sufficiency
of the evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record
independently for “ ‘substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ ” that would support a finding beyond
a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In doing so, we ‘view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict and presume the existence of every
fact that the jury could reasonably have deduced from that evidence.’
[Citation.] ‘We must also “accept logical inferences that the jury might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” ’ [Citation.] We do not question
the credibility of a witness’s testimony, so long as it is ‘not inherently
improbable,’ nor do we reconsider the weight to be given any particular item
of evidence.” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.)
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The jury was instructed, “Gross negligence involves more than ordinary
carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross
negligence when: [¶] 1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high
risk of death or great bodily injury; [¶] AND [¶] 2. A reasonable person would
have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. [¶] In other
words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so
different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same
situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or
indifference to the consequences of that act.” (See CALCRIM No. 592.)
Appellant points to testimony from doctors that, as a general matter,
driving is permitted if a person has been seizure-free for six months or a year,
and that the DMV usually requires a 90-day seizure-free period before
granting permission to drive. He argues that, because there is no evidence he
had a seizure in the year before the incident, it was not grossly negligent for
him to drive.
The issue is not quite so simple, particularly if a person had a seizure
while on anticonvulsant medication. As Dr. Austin explained, in such cases
the mere passage of time is insufficient. Instead, he would work with the
patient to determine if there “could . . . be any explanation for [the seizure].
Is it because you didn’t get enough sleep? Is it because you missed your
medicine? And you know we usually get drug levels in the emergency room
because sometimes people say oh I didn’t miss my medicine, but the level is
zero. And we say well you did miss your medicine and that’s why you had
your seizure. So we need to get on the program and get you taking your
medicine so your levels in your blood are normal. I mean that’s an example
of how we go through this process, try to find is there some way, some reason
that a seizure was triggered by circumstances. And if there wasn’t then
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really we have to assume that the seizures are not being well controlled by
the current treatment and make some changes in the treatment to get better
control. And that usually means either more medicine, try a different
medicine or add another medicine.” Similarly, Dr. Schlegel testified he did
not have an “affixed seizure-free interval” to determine when a person is safe
to drive, instead, the determination depends on the specific circumstances:
“If I could reasonably expect that seizures are not going to recur, if their
cause was removed or if there had been definitive treatment or if the
antiepileptic drug regimen had been stable for quite sometime or if the
seizures themselves were not threatening. All those factors would be in my
mind if I were to write in support of driving.”
The jury could have found: (1) appellant knew the March 2018 car
crash was caused by a seizure but he actively concealed this from his doctors
and from the DMV in order to keep driving; (2) a reasonable person in
appellant’s position would know that a doctor needed to make the case-
specific determination of whether and/or when it was safe for him to drive;
(3) appellant was not properly taking his seizure medications yet continued to
drive; and (4) a reasonable person in appellant’s position would know that the
failure to be consistent with such medications can lead to seizures.5
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of gross negligence.
5 Appellant argues the absence of recent seizures shows “appellant’s
medications were working, and the serious seizures were under control, even
if he was not taking the prescribed dose.” But there is no evidence appellant
had been taking the wrong dose of his medications over a significant period of
time. To the contrary, appellant consistently represented he was taking his
medications as prescribed, even after the September 2020 seizure. The jury
could reasonably conclude that appellant had recently stopped taking his
medications as prescribed.
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II. Unconsciousness Instruction
Appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
on unconsciousness pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3425, which provides, in
relevant part, “The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]> if (he/she)
acted while unconscious. Someone is unconscious when he or she is not
conscious of his or her actions. [Someone may be unconscious even though
able to move.] [¶] Unconsciousness may be caused by (a blackout[,]/ [or] an
epileptic seizure[,]/ [or] involuntary intoxication[,]/ [or] <insert a similar
condition>).” We disagree.
“ ‘The trial court has an “obligation to instruct on defenses, . . . and on
the relationship of these defenses to the elements of the charged offense . . .”
where “[¶] . . . it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if
there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense . . . .” [Citations.]’
[Citation.] But, the court must ‘give a requested instruction concerning a
defense only if there is substantial evidence to support the defense.’
[Citations.] ‘[A] trial judge must only give those instructions which are
supported by substantial evidence,’ and ‘has the authority to refuse requested
instructions on a defense theory for which there is no supporting evidence.’ ”
(People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 823.)
Appellant’s argument is that he was unconscious at the time he struck
Castaneda. As the People argue, the relevant act was not losing control of his
vehicle, but rather deciding to drive knowing that his seizure disorder was
not fully controlled.6 There was no evidence that appellant was unconscious
at the time of this act.
6 In his reply brief, appellant argues this was merely the prosecution’s
theory. But this was the act at issue before the jury. The jury was instructed
the prosecution must prove: “1. The defendant drove a vehicle; [¶] 2. While
driving that vehicle, the defendant was driving with a seizure disorder; [¶]
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
3. The defendant committed the otherwise lawful act with gross negligence.”
(Italics added.) Similarly, in the instructions for the lesser included offense of
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(2)), the jury was
instructed, “The People allege that the defendant committed the following
otherwise lawful act with ordinary negligence: driving a vehicle with a seizure
disorder.” (Italics added.) The parties’ closing arguments reflected this
instruction. The prosecutor argued, “[Castaneda] was struck and killed
because of the defendant’s choices to drive when he knew he had this
condition.” Defense counsel argued, “[A] person with a seizure condition can
drive if licensed. It is not grossly negligent if you are allowed to drive. DMV
said you could drive. The doctors said you can drive. He’s reporting
everything that he knows is happening to him. That’s not being grossly
negligent. That’s not anything that a reasonable person wouldn’t be doing.”
Appellant’s unconsciousness at the time he lost control of his vehicle was not
a defense to the charged crime.
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SIMONS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
A165614
People v. Watkins
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