People v. Chacon CA2/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/21/24 P. v. Chacon CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B332577
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. FJ54515)
v.
EDGAR CHACON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert Totten, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Defendant Edgar Chacon challenges the juvenile court’s
order transferring him to the jurisdiction of the criminal court to
stand trial for a murder he is alleged to have committed in 2014,
when he was 16 years old. Such an order is permitted only if the
juvenile court “find[s] by clear and convincing evidence that the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd.
(a)(3)).1 Chacon contends that no substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s finding that he was not amenable to
rehabilitation in the limited two-year jurisdictional time frame
still potentially available in that court, and we should reverse to
keep his case in juvenile court.
Chacon alternatively argues we should remand for further
proceedings regarding transfer because after the court issued its
ruling, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 545 (2023-2024
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 545) which amended the Welfare and
Institutions Code to require juvenile courts to consider factors
such as “the existence of childhood trauma” and “the minor’s
involvement in the child welfare or foster care system” when
considering a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(ii), as amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 716, § 1.) At the time
of the ruling in Chacon’s case, courts were permitted but not
required to take those factors into account. Chacon contends that
the new law applies retroactively to his case, and that if it had
been in effect when the juvenile court made its ruling, the court
might not have transferred his case.
1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
We agree Senate Bill 545 is retroactive, but we disagree
with Chacon’s other arguments. Substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s decision to transfer Chacon’s case to criminal
court. Furthermore, the entirety of the record shows the court
did in fact consider the various mandatory factors required by
Senate Bill 545 before finding Chacon was not amenable to
rehabilitation in the juvenile system. Because the record
“ ‘ “clearly indicate[s]” that the [juvenile] court would have
reached the same conclusion’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15
Cal.5th 416, 419, 425) if the amendments to section 707 had been
in effect at the time of the hearing, remand for a new hearing is
not required.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. The Shooting
The People allege that, on the evening of August 18, 2014,
Chacon shot and killed Derrick Owens on a street in South Los
Angeles. Chacon’s cousin Daniel H. told police that he and
Chacon were members of the Ghetto Boyz street gang, a rival of
the Primera Flats gang. According to Daniel, Chacon was angry
that Owens, whom Chacon described as the “Black guy from
[Primera] Flats” had disrespected Chacon by waving at Chacon’s
girlfriend. The day before the shooting, Chacon texted Daniel
asking for a gun, and Daniel told him where he could find a .25
caliber handgun.
A friend of Owens testified at the preliminary hearing that
Owens had previously belonged to the Primera Flats gang but
had quit the gang life. On the evening of the shooting, the friend
and Owens were walking east on Adams Boulevard when a
person the friend later identified as Chacon approached them on
a bicycle. Chacon asked Owens where he was from and if he was
3
from Primera Flats, and Owens said, “Fuck Flats, I ain’t from
there anymore!” Chacon then pulled a gun from his waistband
and fired twice, hitting Owens in the chest.
Daniel told police that Chacon later told him that he used
“the toy on the tinto from Primera Flats.” A police detective
testified that “toy” is commonly used in gang culture to mean
gun, and that “tinto” is a slang term referring to a Black person.
Owens was Black.
Police recovered two empty casings from a .25 caliber pistol
at the scene. An autopsy determined that Owens was shot once
in the chest and once on his left flank. The first shot perforated
Owens’s heart and was immediately life-threatening.
Approximately two months later, police detectives found
freshly painted graffiti near the scene of the shooting reading
“GBZ Kid Skips” and “PF 187.” According to police, “Kid” is one
of Chacon’s gang monikers, “Skips” is Daniel H.’s moniker, and
“PF 187” referred to the murder of a Primera Flats member (with
PF signifying Primera Flats and 187 the Penal Code section for
murder).
B. Court Proceedings
The People initially charged Chacon as an adult. In 2016,
while the case was pending, voters enacted Proposition 57, which
“eliminated a district attorney’s ability to ‘direct file’ charges in
criminal court against minors who were 14 years of age or older
at the time of their alleged crimes. Instead, Proposition 57
requires a district attorney to obtain juvenile court approval
before prosecuting minors in criminal court.” (People v. Superior
Court (Alexander C.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 994, 997.)
In January 2017, the case was remanded to juvenile court,
where the People filed a petition under section 602 alleging that
4
Chacon came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a
result of the murder. The People also filed a motion under
section 707 for the court to transfer Chacon back to criminal
court.
At a hearing on the transfer motion, several juvenile hall
employees and volunteers testified that Chacon had behaved well
there and made strides toward rehabilitating himself. In
addition, Chacon introduced psychologist reports that described a
difficult childhood and suggested that Chacon suffered from
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, posttraumatic stress
disorder, depression, and substance abuse. The juvenile court
noted that Chacon’s “life was filled with assaults, abandonment,
[and] abuse,” such that “none of us are surprised [it led to]
[Chacon] gravitating towards gangs and violence.” In addition,
the court recognized that “[Chacon] performed in an exemplary
manner” in juvenile hall programming, and concluded that “he’s
a salvageable young man” who could be rehabilitated before the
juvenile court lost jurisdiction. Nevertheless, because Chacon’s
alleged actions in committing the murder showed sophistication,
and the offense itself was “a cold, callous, heartless act” with no
apparent mitigating factors, “the People . . . met their burden” to
prove that transfer to criminal court was appropriate.
On January 1, 2023, while Chacon’s case remained pending
in criminal court, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 2361) became effective. (Stats. 2022, ch. 330.)
The law amended section 707 to require the court to “find by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”
before transferring a minor to adult criminal court. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3).) In light of the new law, the criminal court transferred
5
Chacon back to juvenile court, where the People filed a new
petition under section 707 to transfer Chacon to criminal court
once again.
At a September 2023 hearing on the new transfer motion,
the People argued that Chacon was not making sufficient
progress toward rehabilitation. They noted that Chacon had
obtained a tattoo on the back of his head reading “GBZ,” referring
to his gang, the Ghetto Boyz. When the court ordered Chacon to
shave his head so the tattoo could be photographed, Chacon
refused to do so before relenting two months later in response to
a second court order. The People also submitted Chacon’s
disciplinary record from county jail, which indicated that he had
been cited for eight violations, including two incidents in which
he and several others ganged up on a fellow inmate, punching
and kicking him. Chacon’s attorney submitted a report from a
psychologist diagnosing Chacon with posttraumatic stress
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, pervasive
depressive disorder, and polysubstance abuse, and noting that
Chacon had been abused by his mother before being placed in the
foster care system.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court
reviewed the evidence in light of the factors set out in section
707, subdivision (a)(3), and found by clear and convincing
evidence that Chacon was not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The court
acknowledged that it had previously found Chacon amenable to
rehabilitation, but noted that the circumstances had changed in
that only two years of juvenile court jurisdiction remained. In
addition, the court cited the tattoo, and Chacon’s refusal to
comply with a court order to shave his head to reveal it, as
6
evidence that Chacon had recommitted himself to gang life. The
court thus granted the motion and ordered Chacon to be
transferred to criminal court.
DISCUSSION
A. Background on Section 707 and Standard of Review
Following the enactment of Proposition 57, section 707
provides the only method for the People to try a juvenile offender
in criminal court. To transfer a minor under this section, the
prosecution must show “by clear and convincing evidence that the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) The
statute sets out five criteria that juvenile courts must consider in
making this determination. These are “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(i));
“[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration
of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); “[t]he
minor’s previous delinquent history” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); the
“[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); and “[t]he
circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to
have been committed by the minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)).
The juvenile court does not consider these factors in
isolation. Instead, the statute “requires the juvenile court to
consider all five factors together in determining whether the
minor is amenable to rehabilitation.” (In re E.P. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 409, 417.) Nor does the statute dictate the
importance of one factor over another: “[T]he court has the
discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors
predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or
all of the other factors might point to a different result.” (Ibid.)
7
Each of the five factors in turn includes instructions for the
court to follow when evaluating that factor. For example, section
707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii) states that when considering the
minor’s criminal sophistication, “the juvenile court shall give
weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the
minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental,
and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the
minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or
peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s
family and community environment; the existence of childhood
trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster
care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human
trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s
criminal sophistication.”
Following Chacon’s transfer hearing in 2023, these
instructions changed. At the time of the hearing, they stated
that “the juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor.”
(Former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), italics added; accord, id., subds.
(a)(3)(B)(ii), (a)(3)(C)(ii), (a)(3)(D)(ii), (a)(3)(E)(ii).) Senate Bill
545, effective January 1, 2024, amended the statute to change
“may” to “shall,” thereby “mak[ing] consideration of any relevant
factor mandatory.” (Stats. 2023, ch. 716.)
We review a juvenile court’s decision whether to transfer a
minor to criminal court for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680; In re Miguel R.
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165.) Under this standard, “[t]he
court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and
its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] A decision
based on insufficient evidence or the court’s ‘ “erroneous
8
understanding of applicable law” ’ is subject to reversal.” (Kevin
P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187.)
The abuse of discretion standard applies not only to the
juvenile court’s consideration of individual factors, but also its
“ultimate finding ‘that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’
(§ 707[, subd. ](a)(3).) Because the juvenile court must make that
finding by clear and convincing evidence, we ‘determine whether
the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of
high probability demanded by’ the clear and convincing evidence
standard.” (In re Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Finding that Chacon Is Not Amenable to
Rehabilitation
Chacon argues that the juvenile court erred in its analysis
of four of the five factors under section 707, subdivision (a)(3),2
and contends that, as a result, no substantial evidence supports
its finding that he is not amenable to rehabilitation under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. We consider each factor in turn
and conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile
court’s finding.
2 The juvenile court described Chacon’s “previous
delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)) as “unremarkable,”
and thus apparently placed little emphasis on this factor in
determining that Chacon was not amenable for rehabilitation in
the juvenile system. Chacon does not take issue with this aspect
of the juvenile court’s decision.
9
1. Criminal Sophistication
The juvenile court found that both Chacon himself and the
crime he committed showed “criminal sophistication.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) The court reasoned that Chacon “sought out a
gun ahead of time, hunted the young man down, found the young
man, and then when the young man renounced Primera Flats,
. . . he shot him in cold blood and killed him.” The court found
that Chacon himself was sophisticated because he “knew how to
access the gun,” “was a member of Ghetto Boyz and was doing
work supporting Ghetto Boyz,” and apparently painted graffiti
“advertising or bragging about what occurred to [Owens].”
Chacon argues the juvenile court erred both in its
description of the facts and by failing to give weight to Chacon’s
youth, immaturity, and intellectual capacity, as well as other
factors such as the childhood trauma he suffered and his
involvement in the foster care system.
We are not persuaded. First, any errors in the juvenile
court’s factual description of the alleged murder were
insignificant. Chacon argues that “[t]here is no evidence that the
shooting of the victim was intended to benefit the gang,” but the
record indicates that Ghetto Boyz viewed Primera Flats as an
enemy, and Owens’s friend testified that Chacon challenged
Owens about his affiliation with Primera Flats just before
shooting him. In addition, regardless of whether Chacon
personally wrote the graffiti celebrating the shooting, its
existence shows that Ghetto Boyz members viewed the killing as
a victory for their gang over Primera Flats and intended that it
should be advertised to others. More importantly, substantial
evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that Chacon
showed sophistication in the way he planned the attack on
10
Owens in advance, obtaining a gun the previous day and then
finding and ambushing Owens.
Next, we disagree with Chacon’s argument that the court
misapplied the law by failing to give weight to evidence relating
to factors such as Chacon’s “age, maturity, intellectual capacity,
and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the
alleged offense,” “the existence of childhood trauma,” and his
“involvement in the child welfare or foster care system.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) Although Chacon’s hearing took place prior to
the enactment of Senate Bill 545, at a time when the statute
stated that the juvenile court “may give weight” to factors such as
those listed above, the record shows the juvenile court did not
ignore these factors in making its decision.
At the beginning of the 2023 hearing, the court stated that
it had reviewed the transcript of the 2018 hearing, and “I still
stand by [the] determinations” made at the 2018 hearing. One of
those determinations at the prior hearing was that Chacon acted
with criminal sophistication. In explaining its reasoning during
the 2018 hearing, the court mentioned Chacon’s “history of abuse,
. . . not being nurtured,” and “childhood trauma” but stated that
these factors “just do[ ] not answer the criminal sophistication,
do[ ] not emphatically respond to that.” Later in the 2023
hearing, Chacon’s attorney discussed Chacon’s history of
“extraordinary abuse,” and its importance in the analysis of
Chacon’s sophistication. Chacon’s attorney noted that a
psychological report on Chacon stated that “criminal
sophistication can be evaluated by all the pertinent things: given
the weight of a person’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity,
mental health, [and] the failure to appreciate risks and
consequences.” The court responded that the report in question
11
was largely “based on the general understanding of brain
development,” rather than on anything about Chacon personally.
In the court’s view, this made the study of limited use because
the Legislature was “aware of [studies on] brain development”
when it amended section 707, but nevertheless continued to allow
16-year-olds to be transferred to criminal court. In other words,
the Legislature must have believed that the immaturity of a 16-
year-old’s brain did not preclude a finding of criminal
sophistication.
In light of these indications that the juvenile court took
Chacon’s immaturity and history of abuse and trauma into
account, and the state of the law at the time of the hearing, we
find no reversible error in the court’s failure to mention those
factors expressly when making its ruling on criminal
sophistication. This is not a situation like that in C.S. v. Superior
Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009, where the court vacated the
juvenile court’s transfer order because the order “did not specify
whether it found [the criminal sophistication] criterion weighed
in favor of transfer, against transfer, or was neutral,” and thus
could not “meaningfully determine whether [the minor]’s
challenges to the juvenile court’s findings have merit.” (Id. at
pp. 1030-1031.) Here, the court explored the issue of criminal
sophistication along with evidence adduced both at the original
hearing in 2018 and the 2023 hearing, and we can meaningfully
assess Chacon’s challenge to that criterion.3
3 Because the juvenile court in this case, unlike in C.S. v.
Superior Court, explained its reasoning in sufficient detail to
allow for our review, we likewise reject Chacon’s argument that
we must remand the case with instructions for the juvenile court
12
We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s determination that Chacon was criminally
sophisticated. Chacon may disagree with certain aspects of the
juvenile court’s description of his alleged crime, but the court was
correct in the essential details: Evidence indicated that Chacon
committed the murder with premeditation, that he obtained the
gun in advance, sought out Owens, found him the following day,
and shot and killed him even after Owens disavowed membership
in Primera Flats. Furthermore, evidence indicated that Chacon
was a member of the Ghetto Boyz, and that he committed the
murder at least in part for the benefit of the gang as an attack on
their rival Primera Flats. We do not discount the significant
evidence of Chacon’s childhood trauma and his immaturity as a
16-year-old, but even giving weight to those factors as required
by section 707 as amended, a factfinder could reasonably find
that Chacon was criminally sophisticated, and that this factor
supported his transfer to criminal court.
2. Rehabilitation Prior to Expiration of Jurisdiction
Section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B)(i) instructs juvenile
courts to consider “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior
to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” This
language closely mirrors the ultimate question in a transfer
hearing, that is, whether “the minor is . . . amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(Id., subd. (a)(3).) The juvenile court initially skipped over
subdivision (a)(3)(B)(i) when analyzing the five factors because,
to state more thoroughly “the reasons supporting the court’s
finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
13
in the court’s view, “being rehabilitated prior to the expiration” of
jurisdiction is the same as “the overall analysis” in a transfer
hearing, and there was no reason to discuss the same issue twice.
The court proceeded to discuss the remaining factors before then
addressing the ultimate question of amenability to rehabilitation
(along with section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B)(i)’s nearly identical
language) and “find[ing] by clear and convincing evidence the
minor is not amenable to the treatment of the juvenile court.”
Chacon argues the court erred in its approach, and that the
court was required to consider “[w]hether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)), together with the four
other factors laid out in section 707, subdivision (a)(3), as part of
the broader analysis of whether “the minor is . . . amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(Id., subd. (a)(3).) He cites legislative history to this effect: An
Assembly committee report stated that “[t]his bill does not
eliminate the requirement that the court weigh the five factors.
This bill would further require that the court find that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court in order to transfer the minor to a court of
criminal jurisdiction.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, com. on
Assem. Bill 2361, supra, Apr. 5, 2022, p. 7, italics added; accord,
In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1294 [“The amended
version of section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider each
of the five statutory criteria and how those criteria affect [the]
minor’s amenability to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court”].)
But the legislative history does not explain how “[w]hether
the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
14
juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)) is
meaningfully different from whether “the minor is . . . amenable
to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court” (id., subd. (a)(3)) such that a separate analysis would be
useful, or how a failure to answer that question twice instead of
once is prejudicial. Courts have distinguished between the two
provisions by interpreting section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B)(i) as
focusing on “whether there is enough time to rehabilitate the
minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile
court jurisdiction” (In re Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 166), rather than on rehabilitation more broadly, and Chacon
urges us to accept this analysis.
We need not decide whether this interpretation of section
707, subdivision (a)(3)(B)(i) is correct because, even if so, the
juvenile court’s failure to analyze that subdivision at the time it
analyzed the four remaining factors was harmless. The
transcript shows that the court was aware that at the time of the
2023 hearing, Chacon was 25 years old, and that if the court
allowed the case to proceed within juvenile court and found that
Chacon committed the murder, he would remain under juvenile
court jurisdiction for only two more years.4 As the court noted,
4 See section 607, subdivision (c) [“The court may retain
jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a person described in
Section 602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of Section 707 until that person attains 25 years of
age, or two years from the date of commitment to a secure youth
treatment facility pursuant to Section 875, whichever occurs
later, if the person, at the time of adjudication of a crime or
crimes, would, in criminal court, have faced an aggregate
sentence of seven years or more”].
15
“Four years have [passed since the 2018 hearing] and he’s older,
and we have less ability to effect rehabilitation. And that’s just
the unfortunate circumstances of where he was and the law
changed.” The court ultimately decided that Chacon was not
amenable to rehabilitation by “look[ing] at what has occurred
since . . . the court’s ruling” in 2018 and determining, in light of
the GBZ tattoo and Chacon’s refusal to follow a court order
regarding shaving his head, that Chacon remained a Ghetto Boyz
member and was unable to rehabilitate: “If he’s unable to follow
the court’s orders . . . without resistance and reluctance, how is
he going to follow the guidance of therapists and probation?” We
fail to see how this conclusion would have changed if the court
had included a preliminary step in its analysis focusing on the
fact that Chacon would have no more than two years to
rehabilitate under juvenile court jurisdiction.
3. Prior Efforts at Rehabilitation
Under section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(D)(i) the juvenile
court must consider the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor.” When performing this
analysis, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services
previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (Id., subd.
(a)(3)(D)(ii).)
When analyzing this factor, the juvenile court noted that
Chacon “did receive therapy, though I think that the services he
did receive were not as full as they should have been or could
have been, and I think that he could have received better
therapy, which we could have had better results potentially.”
Chacon argues that this was insufficient, and the juvenile court
“should . . . have also considered the rehabilitative services
16
provided to [Chacon] in juvenile hall and his exemplary record of
progress and growth.”
The record shows the court did take Chacon’s prior
performance in juvenile hall into account. His progress in
juvenile hall was the basis for the juvenile court’s finding in 2018
that Chacon could be rehabilitated, and as we have noted, the
court stated at the outset of the 2023 hearing that it had
reviewed the transcripts of that prior hearing and “still [stood] by
those determinations.” Chacon’s attorney reminded the court of
Chacon’s progress and argued that it “carries tremendous
weight.” The juvenile court agreed, “It did carry . . . weight.”
Despite this acknowledgment, the court expressed skepticism, in
light of Chacon subsequently getting a GBZ tattoo and his refusal
to shave his head to allow it to be photographed, that he had
made as much progress as the court previously believed. The
court suspected that “when [Chacon] recognizes it is to his
advantage to conform, he is very capable and willing to conform.
[But when h]e doesn’t see an advantage, he doesn’t.” Thus, when
he was first transferred to criminal court, he stopped attempting
to behave, but “when he realized the law had changed [with the
enactment of Assembly Bill 2361] and he ha[d] an opportunity to”
return to juvenile court, he once again began behaving. The
juvenile court’s interpretation of Chacon’s record is not
unreasonable, and the court did not err in its analysis of this
factor.
4. The Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense
The final factor courts must consider under section 707 is
“[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i).) The court analyzed this
factor as follows: “With regard to the gravity of the offense, I
17
can’t think of an offense that’s much more grave than this one.
He seeks a gun. He hunts this person down. . . . This person,
[Owens], is cooperative. [Owens] is responsive to his inquiry
about the gang, Primera Flats. He answers and . . . disses
Primera Flats, and still, even though there is nothing to cause
this, he blatantly and in cold blood without any remorse kills
[Owens]. And this is appalling, and I can’t think of a situation
that was more dire and more offensive than what occurred there.”
Chacon argues that the juvenile court misstated the nature
of the alleged offense, contending there is no evidence that
Chacon “hunted down” Owens, nor that he acted “in cold blood
without any remorse.” Once again, this is largely a matter of
semantics. The evidence at the preliminary hearing indicated
that Chacon obtained the gun the day before the murder because
he was upset with Owens, and then approached Owens the next
day while he was walking down the street. Whether one
characterizes this as Chacon seeking out Owens or hunting him
down, it is the same predatory behavior. Similarly, as to
Chacon’s challenge to the court’s statement that he acted
“without remorse,” the evidence showed that the murder was
planned at least one day in advance, Owens did nothing to
provoke Chacon (waving at Chacon’s girlfriend was no
provocation), and Chacon later admitted the killing to his cousin
without any demonstration of remorse. The juvenile court’s
characterization of Chacon’s actions was apt.
Chacon also contends the juvenile court erred by failing to
account for his “mental and emotional development” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(E)(ii)) as a factor in the circumstances and gravity of the
offense. The lack of discussion on this topic, however, would
appear to be because there was little evidence in the record
18
relevant to this factor in determining the gravity of the offense.
The transcript of the 2023 hearing shows that, although Chacon’s
attorney argued that Chacon’s mental and emotional
development were relevant to his criminal sophistication, the
attorney did not argue that these factors lessened the gravity of
the offense. In his appellate briefs, Chacon cites two reports from
psychologists on this subject, but the findings in both reports are
inconsistent with the evidence in the record regarding the
murder. Thus, in a 2023 report, a psychologist wrote, “It is
possible that Chacon, who suffered from [post-traumatic stress
disorder] and admitted to previously carrying a weapon for
protection, reacted in response to perceived danger during the
dispute, as a result of his severely compromised mental state.”
This is inconsistent with Daniel’s testimony that Chacon was
angry with Owens and sought out the gun the day before the
shooting, as well as Owens’s friend’s testimony that Chacon
initiated the confrontation with Owens. A second psychologist,
who examined Chacon in 2017, wrote that Chacon’s intellectual
disabilities would put him “at risk for being manipulated by
others.” But there is no evidence in the record of such
manipulation. Instead, all available evidence indicates that the
shooting was Chacon’s idea, and he reached out to his cousin
Daniel to find a gun.
The juvenile court stated, “I can’t think of an offense that’s
much more grave than this one,” and substantial evidence
supports that description. The court’s consideration of Chacon’s
mental and emotional development was for it to weigh, and we
find no abuse of discretion in its conclusion.
19
5. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Analysis of All Five Factors Together
Although the juvenile court must consider each of the five
factors specified in section 707, subdivision (a)(3), its ultimate
decision depends on an analysis of “all five factors together” (In re
E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 417), and the court may place as
much emphasis on each factor as the evidence warrants. (Ibid.)
Our review of the juvenile court’s determination is likewise
holistic, in that “we ‘determine whether the record, viewed as a
whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability
demanded by’ the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re
Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
In this case, the juvenile court’s analysis of the record was
sound. The court took seriously its prior determination in the
2018 hearing that Chacon could be rehabilitated, and also took
into account the traumas he had suffered in the past and the real
efforts he had made toward rehabilitation. Nevertheless, in light
of the gravity of the offense, Chacon’s evident inability to
renounce his gang membership and recommitment to gang life
since the 2018 hearing, and the passage of time, which left only
two years for Chacon to rehabilitate under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction, the court concluded that clear and convincing
evidence showed he was not amenable to rehabilitation. There is
room for disagreement regarding certain details of the court’s
analysis, but its conclusion was supported by substantial
evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion by granting
the transfer motion.
20
C. The Recent Amendments to Section 707 Do Not
Require Remand Because the Record Clearly
Indicates the Court Would Reach the Same
Conclusion
As we noted above, Chacon’s 2023 hearing took place prior
to the enactment of Senate Bill 545, which amended section 707
to “make consideration of any relevant factor mandatory.” (Stats.
2023, ch. 716.) We agree with Chacon that the amendment, by
“mak[ing] it more difficult to transfer juveniles from juvenile
court, which . . . reduces the possible punishment for juveniles”
(In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289), is an ameliorative
statute that applies retroactively to minors like Chacon whose
cases were not final when the law became effective. (See ibid.; In
re J.M. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745, 753, review granted Sept. 25,
2024, S286259.)
The primary manner in which the amendments in Senate
Bill 545 affect the juvenile court’s analysis is on the question of
criminal sophistication. As we explained above, Chacon’s
attorney argued that Chacon’s mental health, maturity, and
intellectual capacity were relevant to that issue. The court
indicated that it had read the psychologist’s report on the subject,
but it did not mention these factors when explaining its finding
that Chacon was criminally sophisticated. Ordinarily, we
presume the juvenile court followed the law, and “[e]rror may not
be presumed from a silent record.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229.) But that principle does not apply here,
where the law at issue has changed since the juvenile court made
its ruling, and there was no reason for the court to believe it was
required to give weight to the factors set out in section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii).
21
Nevertheless, it does not follow that remand is required to
allow the juvenile court to conduct a third transfer hearing. Our
Supreme Court explained in the context of a change in sentencing
law that when an ameliorative statute takes effect after the
superior court has made a ruling, “ ‘the appropriate remedy is to
remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]”
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion
“even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425.) Both
sides agree, as do we, that the analysis is the same for the change
in law at issue in this case, and the same standard applies.
There is no need for remand in this case because although
the juvenile court did not explicitly address the issue of Chacon’s
psychological problems and history of trauma in its 2023 ruling,
it did so in 2018. In that earlier ruling, the court acknowledged
that Chacon’s “life was filled with assaults, abandonment, [and]
abuse,” and explicitly measured that history against the
sophistication demonstrated in the commission of the offense.
The court noted, “The crime itself was sophisticated. . . .
[Chacon], he, himself is criminally sophisticated. He’s a member
of Ghetto Boyz. He sought out a gun, knew a location where to
get a gun, got the gun, knew the source that he had, [and]
confronted [Owens] . . . . And I do find those actions are
sophisticated[. W]ith regard to the consideration of the acts [and]
his impetuosity [or] failure to appreciate risks, and . . . effective
familial adult to peer pressure—there’s just nothing at that point
that has [been] shown, other than his history of abuse, being
abused, and not being nurtured which they talk about childhood
trauma, but that just does not answer the criminal
sophistication, does not emphatically respond to that.”
22
In short, at the 2018 hearing, the juvenile court considered
the evidence of childhood trauma and abuse and found that it
was “emphatically” less important than the criminal
sophistication demonstrated by Chacon’s actions. Chacon argues
that the court’s 2018 findings are not conclusive because a
different standard of proof applied at that time. Before the
recent amendments to section 707, “the prosecution [bore] the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the
minor is not a suitable candidate for treatment under the
juvenile court system.” (J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 706, 715.) Under the standard in effect at the 2023
hearing, the People must prove “by clear and convincing evidence
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); accord, In
re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)
But the issue at stake is not the juvenile court’s ultimate
determination on the 2018 transfer motion; instead, it is the
court’s analysis of Chacon’s criminal sophistication. The record
shows the court gave serious consideration to the evidence of his
psychological problems and history of trauma, but concluded
Chacon’s actions nevertheless demonstrated criminal
sophistication. To remand the case to the juvenile court for a new
hearing would require the court to perform the same analysis,
with no reason to believe it would come to a different conclusion.
This is particularly true in this case, where the court stated
during the 2023 hearing, conducted under the clear and
convincing evidence standard, that it had reviewed the transcript
from the 2018 hearing and continued to stand by its prior
conclusions.
23
Chacon makes the same argument regarding the change in
the standards applicable to the fifth factor, “[t]he circumstances
and gravity of the offense” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), but this
claim fails for similar reasons. At the time of the hearing, the
statute stated that “the juvenile court may give weight to any
relevant factor, including . . . the person’s mental and emotional
development” (former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii)), but Senate Bill
545 once again changed the “may” in this provision to a “shall.”
As we noted above (see Discussion, part B.4, ante), there was no
basis in the record for finding that Chacon’s mental and
emotional development meaningfully reduced the gravity of the
offense. Thus, there would be no purpose in remanding to
require the juvenile court to make a finding on this issue.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
24