Heitman v. 1315 Orange Ave LLC CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/21/24 Heitman v. 1315 Orange Ave LLC CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LAYLA HEITMAN, D083410
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
00002705-CU-PO-CTL)
1315 ORANGE AVE LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Reversed.
Law Offices of Derek J. Wilson and Derek J. Wilson for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Tyson & Mendes, Molly A. Gilardi, Jeffrey R. Siegel, and
Aaron Weissman for Defendant and Respondent.
In this premises liability case, Layla Heitman appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of 1315 Orange Ave LLC (Orange). We conclude the trial
court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that Orange’s negligence was not a
proximate cause of Heitman’s injury because reasonable minds can differ as
to whether Heitman’s conduct, which contributed to her injury, was
foreseeable. We further conclude Orange raised no other grounds on which to
affirm the judgment and therefore reverse.
I.
In June 2019, Heitman suffered a personal injury on the premises of a
hotel owned by Orange in Coronado, California. At the time, she was
17 years old and staying at the hotel with friends during summer break.
When Heitman went to swim in the hotel pool at around 9:30 a.m., the gate
was locked, despite posted hours indicating the pool should be open. She
climbed the five-foot-high gate, swam, dried off, and proceeded to climb the
gate to exit the pool area. Doing so, she slipped on the top of the gate and cut
her right foot on a metal sign affixed to it.
Heitman sued Orange for negligence and premises liability, alleging
Orange’s “failure to inspect and maintain the property and the condition of
the jagged metal pool gate sign foreseeably, directly, proximately and legally
caused [her] injuries.” She alleged the “location of the sign as well as the
sharp edges of [it] posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the public such that
it was a dangerous and hazardous condition to patrons visiting [Orange’s]
hotel.” Orange argued there was “no evidence” that it failed to “act
reasonably to prevent injury to others; rather, [Heitman’s] conduct caused”
her injury. Other than the grant deed showing it owned the hotel, the only
evidence Orange submitted with its motion was Heitman’s complaint and
special interrogatory responses. Orange’s motion relied on five material
facts, none of which Heitman disputed, establishing the accident occurred in
the manner alleged.
Based on those undisputed facts, Orange argued it did not breach any
duty of care to Heitman because the gate was locked, she elected to climb the
gate, and she slipped and injured herself while climbing back over the gate.
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Regarding causation, Orange argued there was “no evidence” any “dangerous
condition of the property or any negligence” on its part caused Heitman’s
injury. “Rather, the only available evidence in this case shows that
[Heitman’s] own conduct caused the accident and her alleged injuries.”
Orange urged “[i]t is unforeseeable that a guest or friend visiting a guest[,] as
[Heitman] was[,] would ignore a closed sign on a pool and a locked gate.”
In opposition, Heitman argued Orange failed to meet its initial burden
of producing evidence to establish it did not breach any duty of care or cause
her injury. To the contrary, she urged, Orange’s undisputed material facts
established breach of a duty and causation. Heitman submitted a declaration
stating she swam in the hotel pool the day before with no issue. She declared
and submitted evidence showing there was a large sign on the gate indicating
the pool was open from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. A photograph she submitted
shows a rectangular metal sign affixed on the bottom of the gate that cut
Heitman’s foot, the edges of which extend past vertical bars. Heitman argued
this evidence showed (1) Orange failed to meet its duty of care to her and the
public by having exposed metal on the gate; and (2) that failure was a
substantial contributing factor to her injury. She noted Orange’s contentions
that she caused her own injury and that it was unforeseeable someone would
climb a locked gate amounted to a comparative fault argument improper for
summary judgment.
In reply, Orange urged that Heitman’s decision to climb the locked gate
of a “clearly closed” pool was unreasonable and unforeseeable.
The court ruled there were triable issues of fact as to whether Orange
owed a duty to Heitman. While Heitman’s “particular injuries may not have
been reasonably foreseeable . . . , the question as to duty is whether the kind
of injury, a cut, was reasonably foreseeable” and it was “reasonably
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foreseeable that a hotel patron or guest could be injured from a jagged piece
of exposed metal on the gate, such as from leaning against the gate or using a
leg to hold the gate open” for others.
Regarding causation, the court found “[i]t is undisputed that but for the
existence of the jagged metal [Heitman] would not have cut her foot.” Yet it
ruled Orange “was not the proximate cause” due to “policy considerations”—
“namely that a defendant should not be held liable for conduct that [it] could
not reasonably foresee.” The court found “it is not reasonably foreseeable
that a hotel patron or guest would ignore the closed and locked gate and
climb the fence.” It therefore concluded Orange’s conduct in “allowing a
jagged piece of metal to be attached to the gate did not proximately cause
[Heitman’s] injuries.” Thus, the court granted Orange’s motion for summary
judgment.
II.
A.
“‘Summary judgment is appropriate only “where no triable issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.””’ (Hassaine v. Club Demonstration Services, Inc. (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 843, 849-850.) A moving defendant bears the initial burden
to show the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of
action, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at
p. 850.) “If the defendant meets this burden, ‘the burden shifts to the
plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists
as to the cause of action or defense thereto.’” (Ibid.)
When a summary judgment motion does not “‘negate theories of
[defendant’s] liability, the trial court should [hold] that [the defendant] failed
to carry [its] initial burden and stop[ ] there.’” (Hedayati v. Interinsurance
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Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 833, 846.) In that
event, “‘it is unnecessary to examine the plaintiff’s opposing evidence and the
motion must be denied.’” (Mireskandari v. Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 247, 256-257.)
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo using the
same method as the trial court. (Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (1993)
16 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1836.) “[A]ny doubts as to the propriety of granting a
summary judgment motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing
the motion.” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535.)
B.
The trial court erred in concluding Orange’s conduct in allowing the
metal sign on the pool gate was not a proximate cause of Heitman’s injury.
Proximate cause has two aspects. The first, cause in fact, is an act that
“‘“is a necessary antecedent of an event”’”—sometimes referred to as “‘but
for’” causation. (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015)
61 Cal.4th 339, 352.) The second aspect of proximate cause focuses on public
policy considerations that limit an actor’s responsibility for the consequences
of the actor’s conduct. (Id. at p. 353.) “‘[I]n certain situations where the
defendant’s conduct is an actual cause of the harm, the defendant will
nevertheless be absolved . . . where it would be considered unjust to hold him
or her legally responsible.’” (Ibid., quoting 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 1186, p. 553.) Proximate cause is a question of fact
that cannot be decided as a matter of law unless “‘the facts are such that the
only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation.’” (State Hospitals, at
p. 353.)
As to the first aspect of proximate cause, Orange argues the “only cause
of [Heitman’s] injury was her own decision to climb a locked gate knowing
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she must climb out.” This ignores the reality that “but for” the metal sign on
the gate, Heitman would not have cut her foot. Orange did not contend—
much less submit any evidence to establish—Heitman cut her foot on
anything else. Therefore, Orange did not meet its initial burden of
establishing that its conduct was not a cause in fact of Heitman’s injury.
The court below granted summary judgment based on the second
aspect of proximate cause—specifically, the policy that a defendant should
not be held liable for conduct not reasonably foreseeable. Orange argues the
court was correct in finding it “not reasonably foreseeable that a hotel patron
or guest would ignore the closed and locked gate and climb the fence.” Under
the correct standards for determining proximate cause at summary
judgment, however, this was not unforeseeable as a matter of law.
“The limitation on liability under the second component of proximate
cause comes down to the question of foreseeability.” (People v. Carney (2023)
14 Cal.5th 1130, 1139.) Like proximate cause generally, foreseeability is a
question of fact for the jury. “It may be decided as a question of law only if,
‘under the undisputed facts there is no room for a reasonable difference of
opinion.’” (Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (1983)
34 Cal.3d 49, 56.) Thus, “the determinative issue is whether, under the
evidence presented on the motion, foreseeability remains a question of fact.”
(Id. at p. 52.) In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court has instructed “it is
well to remember that ‘foreseeability is not to be measured by what is more
probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of
modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it in
guiding practical conduct.’” (Id. at p. 57.)
In Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District (1978) 22 Cal.3d
508, the Supreme Court concluded whether the plaintiff’s conduct was
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foreseeable was a question of fact. (Id. at p. 520.) The issue was whether a
school district could be liable for negligent supervision when a pupil leaves
the school grounds during school hours and is injured by a motorist. (Id. at
pp. 512-513.) The school district claimed that, as a matter of law, negligent
on-campus supervision could not be the proximate cause of an off-campus
injury because it should not be expected to foresee that students will take
advantage of a lapse in supervision to leave the premises. Thus, it argued
that any off-campus injury was unforeseeable as a matter of law. (Id. at
p. 520.) The court rejected this argument, reasoning, “children are often
tempted to wander off from school, and a jury might well conclude that
defendants could have reasonably foreseen that this temptation might be
especially strong during summer session when a student’s friends might not
be in school.” (Ibid.) Thus, the court could not conclude the plaintiff’s
departure from school was unforeseeable as a matter of law. (Ibid.)
Here, Orange operated a hotel with a pool in Coronado. The
undisputed facts established the incident occurred at about 9:30 a.m. during
the summer, and the locked gate was only five feet high. A jury could
reasonably conclude Orange should have foreseen a hotel patron might climb
the gate to use the pool if locked. To the extent Orange relies on evidence the
gate had a sign stating “Management reserves the right to deny use of pool to
anyone at anytime” and “NO TRESPASSING,” Orange did not submit this
evidence with its moving papers. It therefore cannot rely on it to meet its
initial burden of establishing unforeseeability. (See Hedayati, 67 Cal.App.5th
at p. 846.) In any event, Heitman’s opposing evidence that the same sign
stated the pool was open from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. and that she swam in
the pool the day prior creates a triable issue as to foreseeability. It is likely
enough in the setting of modern life that a hotel patron might climb the gate
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to use the pool under these circumstances. A jury may well disagree—or
assign Heitman considerable comparative fault—but because there is at least
room for a reasonable difference of opinion, we cannot conclude as a matter of
law that Heitman’s conduct was unforeseeable. (See Bigbee, 34 Cal.3d at
p. 56.) Thus, on this record, the factual issue of proximate cause should have
been submitted to the jury. The court erred in granting summary judgment
on this ground.
C.
An appellate court will affirm summary judgment if correct on any
ground the parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court.
(Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1119.) The only other
ground for Orange’s summary judgment motion was that it did not breach
any duty to Heitman. On appeal, Orange conflates duty and breach. We
conclude it did not meet its burden of negating either element.
1.
Orange conceded below that it “owed [Heitman] a duty” but contended
“it did not breach” that duty. On appeal, Orange claims it “had no duty to
[Heitman] once she climbed a locked fence with a sign that clearly told her
‘NO TRESPASSING.’” As the existence of duty is a pure question of law that
Heitman addressed below, we consider the issue. (Noe v. Superior Court
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 316, 335.)
A hotel owner owes a duty to its patrons to maintain its premises in a
reasonably safe condition. (Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club,
Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 11, 22.) Both below and here, Orange does not
undertake a fulsome analysis of whether the policy considerations set forth in
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113 warrant an exception to
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that general duty of care. (See Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019)
7 Cal.5th 391, 399.) Instead, Orange focuses solely on foreseeability.
Foreseeability is a crucial factor in determining the existence and scope
of a defendant’s duty of care. (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th
1177, 1189.) Foreseeability in this context is a question of law for the court.
(Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 678.) “A court
deciding the issue of the scope of a landlord’s duty ‘should limit its inquiry to
the specific action the plaintiff claims the particular landlord had a duty to
undertake in the particular case.’” (Lawrence, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 23.)
We conclude Orange failed to establish that the scope of its duty of care
did not extend to taking reasonable measures to prevent hotel patrons from
cutting themselves on the pool gate’s metal sign. We agree with the trial
court it was foreseeable the sign could cut a patron. Thus, Orange did not
meet its burden to show it had no duty to prevent the type of injury that
occurred in this case. (See Lawrence, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 29.)
Orange’s argument on appeal that it “had no duty to [Heitman] once
she climbed a locked fence with a sign that clearly told her ‘NO
TRESPASSING’” fails for two reasons. First, as discussed above, Orange did
not submit any evidence of the no trespassing sign with its motion.
Therefore, it cannot rely on it to meet its initial burden of production.
Second, and more importantly, Orange’s argument improperly focuses
on the factual details of the particular incident. Foreseeability for purposes
of duty is different from foreseeability “in the fact-specific sense in which we
allow juries to consider th[e] question.” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co.
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 476.) “[T]he court’s task in determining duty ‘is not to
decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in
light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more
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generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently
likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may
appropriately be imposed.’” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
764, 772.) Exceptions to the general duty of care may be made “only when
foreseeability and policy considerations justify a categorical no-duty rule.”
(Ibid., italics added.) This “preserve[s] the crucial distinction between a
determination that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of ordinary care,
which is for the court to make, and a determination that the defendant did
not breach the duty of ordinary care, which in a jury trial is for the jury to
make.” (Ibid.) An approach focusing the duty inquiry on case-specific facts
would “‘eliminate the role of the jury in negligence cases, transforming the
question of whether a defendant breached the duty of care under the facts of
a particular case into a legal issue.’” (Id. at p. 773.)
Here, it is foreseeable a metal sign affixed to a gate would result in
hotel patrons cutting themselves on it, and Orange set forth no policy reasons
justifying a categorical exception to the duty of ordinary care to prevent such
injury. That (1) Heitman cut herself on the metal sign while climbing over
the gate and (2) the gate had a no trespassing sign may be important to the
jury’s determination of whether Orange breached its duty. Yet those case-
specific facts cannot properly be considered in deciding whether Orange owed
Heitman a duty. (See Cabral, 51 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
Separate from the Rowland factors, on appeal, Orange argues it did not
owe a duty to Heitman because she was a flagrant trespasser. However, as
Orange did not raise this argument below, Heitman did not have an
opportunity to respond or submit evidence to create a dispute of fact on the
issue. We thus do not consider it. (Noe, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.)
2.
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We turn to what Orange considers the “central issue” in this case:
whether Orange breached its duty of care to Heitman. To meet its initial
burden, Orange was required to conclusively negate the breach element of
Heitman’s cause of action. (Taylor v. Financial Casualty & Surety,
Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 966, 979.) Orange failed to do so.
Whether a defendant exercised reasonable care is a fact-specific
question preserved for the jury. Of course, “[o]n the facts of a particular case,
a trial or appellate court may hold that no reasonable jury could find the
defendant failed to act with reasonable prudence under the circumstances.
Such a holding is simply to say that as a matter of law the defendant did not
breach his or her duty of care, i.e., was not negligent toward the plaintiff
under the circumstances.” (Cabral, 51 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Below, Orange argued the following undisputed facts precluded
Heitman from proving Orange breached its duty of care: (1) the pool gate was
locked, (2) she climbed the gate to use the pool, and (3) she slipped and cut
herself while climbing back over the gate. The crux of Orange’s argument is
that it was unforeseeable a hotel patron would climb the gate. “[T]he jury
‘may consider the likelihood or foreseeability of injury in determining
whether, in fact, the particular defendant’s conduct was negligent in the first
place.’” (Cabral, 51 Cal.4th at p. 773.) For this purpose, a jury may consider
whether a given injury was foreseeable in the fact-specific sense. (Parsons,
15 Cal.4th at p. 476.) Yet, for the reasons discussed above, we cannot
conclude as a matter of law that it was unforeseeable that a hotel patron
would climb the locked gate to use the pool under the circumstances of this
case.
Orange also argued “[t]here is no evidence that [it] did not act
reasonably to prevent injury.” Yet Heitman created a triable issue as to
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whether Orange breached its duty to exercise ordinary care by submitting a
photograph showing the metal sign that cut her foot was rectangular, with its
edges extending past the vertical bars of the gate. And evidence that the gate
had a no trespassing sign does not conclusively establish Orange satisfied its
duty of care. To the contrary, a reasonable jury could find that a reasonably
prudent hotel owner in Orange’s position would have taken other measures to
prevent an injury like Heitman’s by, for example, rounding the corners and
edges of the rectangular sign.
III.
We reverse the judgment. Heitman is entitled to her costs on appeal.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
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