Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Commission CA6 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/21/24 Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Commission CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WORKING FAMILIES OF MONTEREY H051232
COUNTY et al., (Monterey County
Super. Ct. No. 22CV001375)
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
KING CITY PLANNING COMMISSION
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents;
BEST DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
This CEQA1 action arises from the proposal of real party in interest Best
Development Group, LLC (Best Development) to develop a Grocery Outlet store in
King City. The King City Planning Commission (Planning Commission) determined
that the Grocery Outlet project was subject to the class 32 categorical exemption from
the provisions of CEQA for infill development that is provided by California Code of
California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000,
1
et seq. All further statutory references are to the Public Resources Code unless otherwise
indicated.
Regulations, title 14, section 15332, and approved the project.2 Efrain Aguilera appealed
the King City Planning Department’s decision to respondent King City Council (City
Council), which denied the appeal and approved the Grocery Outlet project as exempt
from CEQA pursuant to the class 32 exemption for infill development.
Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County (collectively, Working
Families) challenged City Council’s approval of the Grocery Outlet project by filing a
petition for writ of mandate contending that the class 32 exemption for infill development
did not apply to the project. The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate.
On appeal, Working Families contends that the class 32 exemption for infill
development cannot be applied to the Grocery Outlet project for three reasons: (1) the
class 32 exemption provided by CEQA Guidelines, section 15332, must be construed
to require an exempt project to be located in an “in-fill site” in an “urbanized area”
surrounded by “qualified urban uses” as these terms are defined in sections 21061.3,
21071, and 21072, respectively, and in CEQA Guidelines, section15387; (2) substantial
evidence does not support the application of the class 32 exemption because the Grocery
Outlet project is located in a rural area and therefore does not qualify as an infill site in an
urbanized area surrounded by qualified urban uses; and (3) City Council’s environmental
assessment failed to adequately analyze the impact on project occupant’s air quality from
automobile emissions due to the project’s location adjacent to Highway 101.
For the reasons stated below, we find no merit in Working Families’ contentions
and we will affirm the judgment.
2
“The regulations that guide the application of CEQA are set forth in title 14 of
the California Code of Regulations, and are often referred to as the CEQA Guidelines.
[Citation.]” (Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552,
1561, fn. 5; hereafter CEQA Guidelines or Guidelines.)
2
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April 2021 Best Development filed applications with the King City Community
Development Department (Community Development Department) for a conditional use
permit, architectural review, monument sign permit, and a landscaping permit for a
proposed Grocery Outlet store to be located at 1023 Broadway Street in King City. The
proposed Grocery Outlet store would be a single-story building of approximately
18,187 square feet with 72 parking spaces and approximately 13,908 square feet of
landscaping. The project site of approximately 1.6 acres is located adjacent to
Highway 101 and was previously used as a car sales lot. The surrounding vicinity
includes commercial buildings, parking lots, a cemetery, vacant land, and the Monterey
County Sheriffs’ Department.
In support of its permit applications, Best Development submitted an
environmental assessment dated March 3, 2022, to the Community Development
Department. The environmental assessment concluded that the Grocery Outlet project
would not result in any potentially significant environmental impacts relating to traffic,
noise, air quality, or water quality, or any other environmental factors. Additionally, the
environmental assessment concluded that the Grocery Outlet project qualified for the
class 32 categorical exemption for infill development from the provisions of CEQA.
(See Guidelines, § 15332.)3
3
Guidelines, section 15332 states: “Class 32 consists of projects characterized as
in-fill development meeting the conditions described in this section. [¶] (a) The project
is consistent with the applicable general plan designation and all applicable general plan
policies as well as with applicable zoning designation and regulations. [¶] (b) The
proposed development occurs within city limits on a project site of no more than five
acres substantially surrounded by urban uses. [¶] (c) The project site has no value, as
habitat for endangered, rare or threatened species. [¶] (d) Approval of the project would
not result in any significant effects relating to traffic, noise, air quality, or water quality.
[¶] (e) The site can be adequately served by all required utilities and public services.”
3
The environmental assessment stated that the project qualified for the class 32
exemption for infill development because: “it (i) is consistent with the applicable general
plan designation and all applicable general plan policies as well as with applicable zoning
designation and regulations, (ii) occurs within city limits on a project site of no more than
five acres substantially surrounded by urban uses, (iii) has no value as habitat for
endangered, rare or threatened species, (iv) would not result in any significant effects
relating to traffic, noise, air quality, or water quality, and (v) can be adequately served by
all required utilities and public services.” The environmental assessment further
concluded that there was no basis for an exception to the class 32 exemption. (See
Guidelines, § 15300.2 [exceptions to categorical exemptions].)
After holding a public hearing, the Planning Commission adopted
Resolution 2022-306 approving Best Development’s applications for a conditional use
permit, an architectural review permit, a landscaping permit, and a sign design review
permit with specified conditions of approval. The Planning Commission also determined
that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project
and directed staff to file a notice of exemption. (See Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (a)
[notice of exemption].)
An appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision to approve the permit
applications and the class 32 exemption for the Grocery Outlet project was submitted
to the City Council by Aguilera on behalf of United Food and Commercial Workers
Local 5. In his appeal, Aguilera argued, among other things, that the class 32 exemption
for infill development was improperly applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and a full
environmental review was required to assess the impact of the project site’s prior use as a
car sales lot, as well as the project’s significant impacts on soil quality, traffic, air quality,
ground water quality, noise, health, and safety.
After holding a public hearing on the appeal, the City Council found the appeal
was without basis and denied the appeal in Resolution 2022-4868. The City Council also
4
approved the application of the class 32 exemption for infill development to the Grocery
Outlet project and approved the conditional use permit, the architectural review permit,
the landscaping permit, and the sign design review permit with specified conditions of
approval.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Petition for Writ of Mandate
Working Families filed an amended verified petition for writ of mandate
challenging the City Council’s denial of Aguilera’s appeal from the Planning
Commission’s adoption of Resolution 2022-306 approving Best Development’s
applications for a conditional use permit, an architectural review permit, a landscaping
permit, and a sign design review permit with the specified conditions of approval, and
approving application of the class 32 exemption from the provisions of CEQA to the
Grocery Outlet project. The City Council and Planning Commission were named as
respondents (hereafter, collectively City) and Best Development was named as real party
in interest.
The writ petition included two causes of action alleging violations of CEQA. In
the first cause of action, Working Families contended that City had abused its discretion
in applying the class 32 exemption for infill development provided by the Guidelines,
section 15332, on the Grocery Outlet project. They argued that the class 32 exemption
for infill development was inapplicable to the Grocery Outlet project because the project
location in King City did not meet the definition of an “urbanized area,” as defined in
either section 21071, subdivision (a) [population 100,000 or more] or Guidelines,
section 15387 [population 50,000 or more] since King City has a population of only
13,332.
Working Families additionally contended that the class 32 exemption did not
apply to the Grocery Outlet project because the project site did not meet the definition of
an “infill site,” as defined in section 21061.3, since the project site was not previously
5
developed for “qualified urban uses.” Therefore, Working Families argued, a full
environmental review was necessary to study the cumulative environmental impacts of
the Grocery Outlet project, including the potential presence of hazardous materials
resulting from the operation of the car sales lot.
In the second cause of action for violation of CEQA, Working Families contended
that the environmental assessment obtained by City failed to adequately analyze the
impact on air quality from the increased traffic resulting from the Grocery Outlet project.
B. Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandate
In opposition to the petition for writ of mandate, City and Best Development
emphasized that the terms “qualified urban use,” “urbanized area,” and “infill site” are
absent from the language of Guidelines, section 15332 stating the requirements for the
application of the class 32 infill development exemption. City and Best Development
asserted that these terms are found in provisions of the Public Resources Code pertaining
to residential projects and in other sections of the CEQA Guidelines. They argued that
the omission of these terms from Guidelines, section 15332 showed that the class 32
exemption for an infill development project did not require the project to be a “qualified
urban use” located in an “urbanized area” on an “infill site,” and therefore these terms
could not be read into Guidelines, section 15332.
City and Best Development also argued that substantial evidence showed that City
properly found that the Grocery Outlet project site was “substantially surrounded by
urban uses,” as required by Guidelines, section 15332, subdivision (b). Although they
acknowledged that Guidelines, section 15332 does not include a definition of “urban
uses,” they asserted that City could reasonably determine, as shown by the findings in the
environmental assessment, that the property surrounding the Grocery Outlet site was
developed with urban uses, including commercial uses, a cemetery, a sheriff’s
department, and a nearby highway.
6
Finally, City and Best Development contended that substantial evidence supported
City’s finding that the Grocery Outlet project would not cause any significant effects
relating to traffic, noise, air quality, or water quality, or any of the other environmental
effects argued by Working Families, as analyzed in the environmental assessment
prepared for the project.
C. Trial Court Order and Judgment
In the order dated June 15, 2023, the trial court denied the petition for writ of
mandate. The court ruled that: (1) “the Class 32 categorical exemption found in CEQA
Guidelines section 15332 does not require a qualifying project to be located on an ‘infill
site’ in an ‘urbanized area’ as those terms of art are defined in Public Resources Code
sections 21061.3 and 21071,” (2) “substantial evidence supports the City’s determination
that the [Grocery Outlet] Project meets the requirements of the Class 32 categorical
exemption,” (3) “[p]etitioners fail to show that an exception to the exemption applies,”
and (4) “the City was not required to conduct any formal environmental review for the
Project.”
In so ruling, the trial court declined to read the terms “infill site” and “urbanized
area” into Guidelines, section 15332 because the rules of statutory interpretation prohibit
the court from inserting words into a statute. The trial court also found that substantial
evidence supported the City’s application of the Guidelines, section 15332 exemption
for infill developments because the aerial photographs included in the environmental
assessment showed that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses.
Having determined that City appropriately applied the Guidelines, section 15332
exemption to the Grocery Outlet project, the trial court further found that City was not
required to conduct any formal environmental review pursuant to CEQA.
The June 15, 2023 order also included a judgment denying the amended petition
for writ of mandate and awarding costs to City and Best Development in an amount to be
determined.
7
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Working Families contends that the class 32 exemption for infill
development from the provisions of CEQA cannot be applied to the Grocery Outlet
project for three reasons: (1) the class 32 exemption provided by CEQA Guidelines,
section 15332, must be construed to require an exempt project to be located in an “in-fill
site” in an “urbanized area” surrounded by “qualified urban uses” as these terms are
defined in sections 21061.3, 21071, and 21072, respectively, and in CEQA Guidelines,
section15387; (2) substantial evidence does not support the application of the class 32
exemption because the Grocery Outlet project is located in a rural area and therefore does
not qualify as an infill site in an urbanized area surrounded by qualified urban uses; and
(3) City’s environmental assessment failed to adequately analyze the impact on project
occupant’s air quality from automobile emissions due to the project’s location adjacent to
Highway 101.4
We will begin our evaluation of Working Families’ contentions with an overview
of CEQA principles and categorical exemptions.
A. Overview of CEQA Principles
The California Supreme Court has provided an overview of CEQA principles:
“ ‘The foremost principle under CEQA is that the Legislature intended the act “to be
interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.” ’ [Citations.] ‘With narrow
exceptions, CEQA requires an EIR whenever a public agency proposes to approve or to
carry out a project that may have a significant effect on the environment. [Citations.]’
4
Working Families argues for the first time in its reply brief that the significant
noise impacts from the Grocery Outlet project were not adequately analyzed in the
environmental assessment. We need not address this issue. “Appellate courts ordinarily
will not consider new issues that are raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief
as the respondent has no opportunity to counter such contentions. [Citation.]” (The
Highway 68 Coalition v. County of Monterey (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 883, 893.)
8
[Citation; see Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (f).) The basic purpose of an EIR is to ‘provide
public agencies and the public in general with detailed information about the effect [that]
a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the
significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to
such a project.’ (. . . § 21061; see Guidelines, § 15003, subds. (b)-(e).) ” (Sierra Club v.
County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 511-512, fn. omitted.)
However, “[f]or policy reasons, the Legislature has expressly exempted several
categories of projects from review under CEQA. (See § 21080, subd. (b)(1)-(15).) By
statute, the Legislature has also directed the Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency
(Secretary) to establish ‘a list of classes of projects that have been determined not to have
a significant effect on the environment and that shall be exempt from’ CEQA. (§ 21084,
subd. (a).)” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086,
1092 (Berkeley Hillside).)
Thus, “the Legislature, through the Guidelines, intended to enumerate classes of
projects that are exempt from CEQA because, notwithstanding their potential effect on
the environment, they already ‘have been determined not to have a significant effect on
the environment.’ (§ 21084, subd. (a).) The Guidelines implement this intent, by setting
forth the ‘classes of projects’ that the Secretary, acting ‘[i]n response to [the
Legislature’s] mandate,’ ‘has found . . . do not have a significant effect on the
environment.’ (Guidelines, § 15300.)” (Berkeley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1102.)
Accordingly, if a public agency “determines one of the exemptions applies, the
agency may prepare and file a notice of exemption, including a description of the project,
a finding that the project is exempt under the relevant class or classes, and a brief
statement of reasons supporting the finding. (Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (a).) ‘Where a
project is categorically exempt, it is not subject to CEQA requirements and “may be
implemented without any CEQA compliance whatsoever.” ’ [Citation.]” (Save Our
9
Carmel River v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th
677, 688 (Save Our Carmel River).)
B. Standard of Review
“In a CEQA case, the appellate court’s review ‘is the same as the trial court’s: [It]
reviews the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that sense appellate judicial
review under CEQA is de novo.’ [Citation.]” (Protecting Our Water & Environmental
Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479, 495.) Where a public agency
determines that a project is exempt from compliance with CEQA requirements, that
determination is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard set forth in
section 21168.5.5 (Protect Tustin Ranch v. City of Tustin (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 951, 960
(Protect Tustin Ranch).) “ ‘ “Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not
proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not
supported by substantial evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
However, “[w]here the issue turns only on an interpretation of the language of the
Guidelines or the scope of a particular CEQA exemption, this presents ‘a question of law,
subject to de novo review by this court.’ [Citations.] Our task is ‘to determine whether,
as a matter of law, the [project] met the definition of a categorically exempt project.’
[Citation.] Thus, as to the question whether the activity comes within the categorical
class of exemptions, ‘we apply a de novo standard of review, not a substantial evidence
standard.’ [Citations.]” (Save Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 693–
694.)
5
Section 21168.5 provides: “In any action or proceeding, other than an action
or proceeding under Section 21168, to attack, review, set aside, void or annul a
determination, finding, or decision of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance
with this division, the inquiry shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse
of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a
manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial
evidence.”
10
On the other hand, “[w]here the record contains evidence bearing on the question
whether the project qualifies for the exemption, such as reports or other information
submitted in connection with the project, and the agency makes factual determinations as
to whether the project fits within an exemption category, we determine whether the
record contains substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision. [Citations.] There
must be ‘ “substantial evidence that the [activity is] within the exempt category of
projects.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Generally speaking, the court ‘may consider only the
administrative record in determining whether a quasi-legislative decision was supported
by substantial evidence within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 21168.5.’
[Citation.]” (Save Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 694.)
C. Whether the Class 32 Categorical Exemption for Infill Development May Be
Applied to the Grocery Outlet Project
1. Interpretation of Class 32 Exemption
To determine whether the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development
may be applied to the Grocery Outlet project, we first consider the language of
Guidelines, section 15332.
Guidelines, section 15332 states: “Class 32 consists of projects characterized as
in-fill development meeting the conditions described in this section. [¶] (a) The project is
consistent with the applicable general plan designation and all applicable general plan
policies as well as with applicable zoning designation and regulations. [¶] (b) The
proposed development occurs within city limits on a project site of no more than five
acres substantially surrounded by urban uses. [¶] (c) The project site has no value, as
habitat for endangered, rare or threatened species. [¶] (d) Approval of the project would
not result in any significant effects relating to traffic, noise, air quality, or water quality.
[¶] (e) The site can be adequately served by all required utilities and public services.”
(Emphasis added.)
11
The parties disagree regarding the proper interpretation of Guidelines,
section 15332 with respect to the terms “infill development” and “substantially
surrounded by urban uses.” Working Families contends that when Guidelines,
section 15332 is properly interpreted, the Grocery Outlet project does not qualify for
the class 32 exemption for infill development. According to Working Families, because
Guidelines, section 15332 does not define the terms “in-fill development” or
“substantially surrounded by urban uses,” those terms must be interpreted by the CEQA
definitions of “in-fill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses,” as provided by
sections 21061.3, 21071, and 21072, respectively, and CEQA Guidelines, section 15387.
Sections 21061.3, 21071, and 21072 are included in the list of definitions provided
by CEQA at section 21060 et seq.6 Section 21061.3 defines “ ‘[i]nfill site’ ” as “a site in
an urbanized area” that meets the specified criteria. Section 21071 defines “ ‘[u]rbanized
area’ ” as either an incorporated city or two contiguous incorporated cities with a
population “of at least 100,000 persons.” Section 21072 defines “ ‘[q]ualified urban
uses’ ” as “any residential, commercial, public institutional, transit or transportation
passenger facility, or retail use, or any combination of those uses.” CEQA Guidelines,
section 15387 provides in part that “ ‘[u]rbanized area’ means a central city or a group of
contiguous cities with a population of 50,000 or more, together with adjacent densely
populated areas having a population density of at least 1,000 persons per square mile.”
Working Families argues that due to King City’s small rural population, the
Grocery Outlet project site in King City is not located in an “ ‘[u]rbanized area’ ” as
defined in section 21071 or Guidelines, section 15387. Further, since the Grocery Outlet
project is not located in an “urbanized area,” Working Families maintains that the project
site does not meet the definition of “infill site.” Applying these definitions to interpret
Guidelines, section 15332, Working Families argues, shows that the Guidelines,
6
Section 21060 states: “Unless the context otherwise requires, the definitions in
this chapter govern the construction of this division.”
12
section 15332 exemption for infill development cannot apply to the Grocery Outlet
project.
City and Best Development respond that there is no authority for the proposition
that the CEQA definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses,” as
provided by sections 21061.3, 21071, and 21072, respectively, and CEQA Guidelines,
section 15387, should be utilized in interpreting the Guidelines, section 15332 exemption
for infill development, and the rules of statutory interpretation compel a contrary result.7
As we will discuss, we agree.
“Generally, the rules that govern interpretation of statutes also govern
interpretation of administrative regulations. [Citations.]” (Berkeley Hillside, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1097.) “ ‘ “We give the regulatory language its plain, commonsense
meaning. If possible, we must accord meaning to every word and phrase in a regulation,
and we must read regulations as a whole so that all of the parts are given effect.
[Citation.] If the regulatory language is clear and unambiguous, our task is at an end, and
there is no need to resort to canons of construction and extrinsic aids to interpretation.
[Citation.]” [Citation.] Our primary aim is to ascertain the intent of the administrative
agency that issued the regulation. [Citation.] When that intent “cannot be discerned
directly from the language of the regulation, we may look to a variety of extrinsic aids,
including the purpose of the regulation, the legislative history, public policy, and the
regulatory scheme of which the regulation is a part.” ’ [Citation.]” (Berkeley Hills
Watershed Coalition v. City of Berkeley (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 880, 890–891 (Berkeley
Hills).)
7
The request for judicial notice filed by City and Best Development is granted as
to Exhibit A (Sen. Bill No. 1925 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) ch. 1039) and Exhibit B
(Sen. Bill No. 1108 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) ch. 22) and denied as to Exhibit C (excerpt
of treatise). (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)
13
Additionally, this court has noted that “[s]ince a determination that a project falls
within a categorical exemption excuses any further compliance with CEQA whatsoever,
we must construe the exemptions narrowly in order to afford the fullest possible
environmental protection. [Citations.] ‘[E]xemption categories are not to be expanded or
broadened beyond the reasonable scope of their statutory language.’ [Citations.]” (Save
Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.)
Here, the question before us is the meaning of the terms “in-fill development”
(Guidelines, § 15332) and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” (Guidelines,
§ 15332, subd. (b). To the extent these terms in Guidelines, section 15332 may be
considered ambiguous, we first turn to the intent of the Natural Resources Agency in
issuing Guidelines, section 15332. (See Berkeley Hills, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 890–891.) During the review period for Guidelines, section 15332 (originally
numbered 15333), the Natural Resources Agency provided an initial statement of reasons
for a regulation exempting infill development, which stated the public problem to be
addressed by the regulation: “Widely dispersed development, or ‘sprawl,’ though it
contributed to the economic and population boom in California in the past 50 years, now
stands as a force to degrade the quality of life for residents of the state. Reduction of
sprawl and its costs is a policy that needs attention in CEQA.”8 (Natural Resources
Agency,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20001002144443/http:/ceres.ca.gov/topic/env_law/ceqa/rev
/9798rev/9798isor.html> [as of October 21, 2024], archived at: <https://perma.cc/K723-
KJYV>.)
8
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the initial statement of reasons
pertaining to Guidelines, section 15332 as part of the official statement of regulatory
intent. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (b),(c); see Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra
Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 186, fn. 15.)
14
Regarding the necessity for a regulation exempting infill development, the initial
statement of reasons further stated: “As noted above, though sprawl is partly responsible
for the rise of the California economy, it now poses a threat to our quality of life. The
permanent loss of farmland, increased use of automobiles for commuting, and
degradation of central city neighborhoods are just some of the costs associated with
sprawl. [¶] This categorical exemption will implement a finding that development which
meets specific requirements and which is ‘in-fill’ or development in areas already
developed, does not pose a significant effect on the environment.” (Natural Resources
Agency,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20001002144443/http:/ceres.ca.gov/topic/env_law/ceqa/rev
/9798rev/9798isor.html> [as of October 21, 2024], archived at: <https://perma.cc/YCU6-
MQBA>.)
In addition, the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research provides a definition
of “infill development” on its website, as follows: “The term ‘infill development’ refers
to building within unused and underutilized lands within existing development patterns,
typically but not exclusively in urban areas. Infill development is critical to
accommodating growth and redesigning our cities to be environmentally- and socially-
sustainable.” (Governor’s Office of Planning and Research,
<https://opr.ca.gov/planning/land-use/infill-development/> [as of October 21, 2024],
archived at: <https://perma.cc/Z7UQ-KEWA>;9 see also United Neighborhoods for Los
Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1080, fn. 2 [“ ‘Infill’ refers,
9
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the statement of the Office of
Planning and Research regarding infill development as part of the official statement of
regulatory intent. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (b),(c); section 21083, subd (a) [“The
Office of Planning and Research shall prepare and develop proposed guidelines for the
implementation of this division by public agencies. The guidelines shall include
objectives and criteria for the orderly evaluation of projects and the preparation of
environmental impact reports and negative declarations in a manner consistent with this
division.”].)
15
both colloquially and for purposes of the Guidelines, to construction in areas that are
already largely developed. (Guidelines, § 15332, subd. (b) . . . ; [citations.]”.)
Our review of the statements of regulatory intent shows no indication that the
regulators intended to limit the Guidelines,section 15332 categorical exemption for infill
development to projects that meet the criteria set forth in the CEQA definitions of “infill
site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses,” as provided by sections 21061.3,
21071, and 21072, respectively, and CEQA Guidelines, section 15387. Not only are
those terms absent from the language of Guidelines, section 15332, the stated regulatory
intent lacks any indication of a population requirement such as section 21071’s definition
of an “ ‘[u]rbanized area’ ” as a city population “of at least 100,000 persons” (id.,
subd. (a)(1))or Guidelines, section 15387’s definition of an “ ‘[u]rbanized area’ ” as a
city or cities with a population of 50,000 or more. The regulators’ intent was to the
contrary, since the express intention was to reduce sprawl by exempting from the
provisions of CEQA development in unused or underutilized areas that were in already
developed areas, which were “typically but not exclusively in urban areas.” (Governor’s
Office of Planning and Research, <https://opr.ca.gov/planning/land-use/infill-
development/> [as of October 21, 2024], archived at: <https://perma.cc/6XQS-82EY>.)
Other rules of statutory interpretation also do not support Working Families’
interpretation of Guidelines, section 15332. The omission of the terms “infill site,”
“urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses,” from the language of Guidelines,
section 15332 is significant because the California Supreme Court has instructed that a
court “may not broaden or narrow the scope of the provision by reading into it language
that does not appear in it or reading out of it language that does.” (Doe v. City of Los
Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545.) We therefore find no merit in Working Families’
contention that the lack of definitions for the terms “in-fill development” and
“surrounded by urban uses” in Guidelines, section 15332 means that those terms should
be interpreted by inserting the statutory definitions of “in-fill site,” “urbanized area,” and
16
“qualified urban uses,” as provided by sections 21061.3, 21071, and 21072, respectively,
and CEQA Guidelines, section 15387.
Further, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that ‘[w]here
different words or phrases are used in the same connection in different parts of a statute,
it is presumed the Legislature intended a different meaning. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Branciforte Heights, LLC v. City of Santa Cruz (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 914, 936
(Branciforte).) Applying that rule to the CEQA Guidelines, we note that although
Guidelines, section 15387 includes a definition of “ ‘[u]rbanized area,’ ” as “a central
city or a group of contiguous cities with a population of 50,000 or more, together with
adjacent densely populated areas having a population density of at least 1,000 persons per
square mile,” the term “urbanized area” was not included in the language of Guidelines,
section 15332. We therefore determine that the phrase “surrounded by urban uses” in
Guidelines, section 15332, subdivision (b) cannot be construed to mean an “urbanized
area” as defined by Guidelines, section 15387, since we must presume that the regulators
intended a different meaning by using different phrases. (See Branciforte, supra, at
p. 936.)
Finally, we are mindful of “the Legislature’s express directive in section 21083.1
‘not [to] interpret’ the CEQA statutes and the Guidelines ‘in a manner which imposes
procedural or substantive requirements beyond those’ the statutes and the Guidelines
‘explicitly state[].’ ” (Berkeley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1108.) To adopt
Working Families’ interpretation of Guidelines, section 15332 would require
“environmental review of projects that one could argue may have a significant
environmental effect, but that the [Governor’s Office of Planning and Research] and the
Secretary [of the Natural Resources Agency], exercising the authority the Legislature has
by statute delegated to them and required them to exercise, have already determined do
not, in fact, ‘have a significant effect on the environment.’ (§ 21084, subd. (a).)”
(Berkeley Hillside, supra, at p. 1108.)
17
For these reasons, we find no merit in Working Families’ contention that
Guidelines, section 15332 should be interpreted by applying statutory definitions
of “in-fill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses,” as provided by
sections 21061.3, 21071, and 21072, respectively, and CEQA Guidelines,
section 15387.10 We therefore determine that City did not err in determining that the
Grocery Outlet project comes within the Guidelines, section 15332 exemption for infill
development.
2. Application of Guidelines, Section 15332 Exemption
Working Families further contends that the Guidelines, section 15332 exemption
should not apply to the Grocery Outlet project because the environmental assessment
obtained by Best Development failed to adequately analyze the “human health impacts
to Project users resulting from air quality impacts caused by the Project and that may be
cumulatively exacerbated by the Project and Interstate 101.” According to City and Best
Development, since the class 32 exemption for infill development applies, compliance
with CEQA’s requirements for an adequate environmental impact report is not necessary.
10
At oral argument, counsel for Working Families emphasized a decision not
included in their briefing, Banker’s Hill, Hillcrest, Park West Community Preservation
Group v. City of San Diego (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 249, 270-271 (Banker’s Hill),
which determined that the phrase “urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines, section 15332
should be defined under the Community Redevelopment Law, Health and Safety Code
section 33000 et seq. as “ ‘related to or characteristic of a city or a densely populated
area.’ ” The Banker’s Hill decision relied on the decision in Friends of Mammoth v.
Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 511, 538
(Mammoth Lakes), which concerned the issue of whether a redevelopment plan was
properly approved because it did not satisfy the requirement of being located in a
“ ‘predominantly urbanized’ ” area under Health and Safety Code section 33030,
subdivision (b)(1). We find Working Families’ reliance on these decisions misplaced,
since the decision in Mammoth Lakes did not construe Guidelines, section 15332. Also,
since we have construed the terms “in-fill development” (Guidelines, § 15332) and
“substantially surrounded by urban uses” (Guidelines, § 15332, subd. (b)) in accordance
with the intent of the administrative agency that issued Guidelines, section 15332, we
need not resort to the definitions found in the Health and Safety Code.
18
We need not address Working Families’ contention regarding the adequacy of the
environmental assessment with respect to the impact of Grocery Outlet on air quality. As
we have noted, “ ‘[w]here a project is categorically exempt, it is not subject to CEQA
requirements and “may be implemented without any CEQA compliance whatsoever.” ’
[Citation.]” (Save Our Carmel River, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.) Working
Families’ contention that the analysis of air quality impacts is inadequate relies upon
decisions that considered the adequacy of environmental impact reports that were
required under CEQA, and therefore those decisions have no application in the present
case. (See, e.g., California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management
Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 388; East Sacramento Partnerships for a Livable City v. City
of Sacramento (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 281, 287.)
Alternatively, Working Families contends that there is not substantial evidence in
the record to support City’s finding that the class 32 exemption applies to the Grocery
Outlet project because King City is not in an “urbanized area,” the project is not
surrounded by “qualified urban uses,” and the project site is not an “in-fill site.” City and
Best Development respond that the environmental assessment prepared for the Grocery
Outlet contains substantial evidence that the project site is surrounded by urban uses,
based on the description of the surrounding area and aerial photographs depicting the
project site.
We apply the following standard of review: “ ‘[W]here[, as here,] a public agency
makes a factual determination that a project falls within a . . . categorical exemption, we
apply the substantial evidence standard in reviewing the agency’s finding.’ [Citation.]
We do not weigh conflicting evidence, as that is the role of the public agency. [Citation.]
Rather, we review the administrative record to see if it contains evidence of ponderable
legal significance that is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value, to support the
agency’s decision. [Citation.]” (Protect Tustin Ranch, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 960.)
19
Here, the environmental assessment prepared for the Grocery Outlet project
includes a description of the area surrounding the project location that states the location
is “within 1,000 feet north of U.S. Highway 101” and “[s]urrounding land uses include
commercial to the northeast and southwest, a cemetery to the northwest, and vacant land
and the Monterey County Sheriff’s Department to the southeast. The project site has a
General Plan land use designation of HSC, Highway Service Commercial, with a zoning
designation of H-S, Highway Service District.” The environmental assessment also
includes two aerial photographs showing the project location and the surrounding areas.
Having reviewed the relevant portions of the environmental assessment, we
determine that substantial evidence supports City’s finding that the location of the
Grocery Outlet project is substantially surrounded by urban uses, as required by
Guidelines, section 15332, subdivision (b) for application of the class 32 infill
development exemption. In particular, the aerial photographs show that the project
location is surrounded on two sides by commercial buildings, on a third side by the
Monterey County Sheriff’s Department buildings adjoining a vacant lot, and on the
fourth side by the King City Cemetery. The photographs also show that the project
location is adjacent to Highway 101.
We therefore find no merit in Working Families’ contentions that the class 32
exemption for infill development provided by Guidelines, section 15332 does not apply
to exempt the Grocery Outlet project from the provisions of CEQA and an environmental
impact report must be prepared for the project. Having reached this conclusion, we will
affirm the judgment.
V. DISPOSITION
The June 15, 2023 judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
respondents King City Planning Commission and King City Council and respondent Best
Development Group, LLC.
20
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GREENWOOD, P.J.
WILSON, J.
Working Families of Monterey County et al. v. King City Planning Commission et al.
H051232