People v. Crosby CA5 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/22/24 P. v. Crosby CA5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    THE PEOPLE,
    F085458
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    (Super. Ct. No. MF014780A)
    v.
    LORENZO CROSBY,                                                                        OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gregory A.
    Pulskamp, Judge.
    Kaiya R. Pirolo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
    Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Paul E.
    O’Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    -ooOoo-
    On December 5, 2021, defendant Lorenzo Crosby cut Devonte J.’s throat with a
    knife. On July 14, 2022, defendant was found guilty of willful, deliberate, and
    premeditated attempted murder, as well as assault with a deadly weapon. On
    November 9, 2022, defendant was sentenced to a term of life with a minimum parole
    eligibility date of 14 years, plus eight years.
    On appeal, defendant argues that: 1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
    premeditation and deliberation finding; 2) the trial court erred when it excluded
    Devonte’s statements contained in his hospital medical records; 3) the trial court erred
    when it denied defendant’s motions for release of juror identification information; 4) the
    trial court erred when it denied defendant’s request to sentence him to the lower term on
    count 2 pursuant to Penal Code section 11701 because he experienced childhood trauma;
    and 5) the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s request to strike all enhancements
    pursuant to section 1385. The People disagree.
    We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. In all other respects,
    we affirm.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On June 30, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney filed a second amended
    information charging defendant with attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1);
    and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2). As to count 1, the
    second amended information alleged that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate,
    and premeditated (§ 189). As to both counts, the second amended information alleged
    five aggravating factors that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
    subd. (a)), that defendant had a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of the “Three
    Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and that defendant had
    suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
    On July 14, 2022, defendant was found guilty by a jury on both counts. The jury
    also found true that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
    Additionally, on both counts, the jury found true three aggravating factors and that
    defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. In a bifurcated proceeding held on
    1      All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2.
    July 15, 2022, the trial court found the prior strike allegation, the prior serious felony
    allegation, and the remaining two aggravating factors true on both counts.
    On August 10, 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for release of jury
    identifying information.
    On November 9, 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial,
    defendant’s second motion for release of jury identifying information, defendant’s request
    to strike all enhancements, and defendant’s request for imposition of the lower term on
    count 2. The trial court also sentenced defendant. On count 1, the trial court imposed a
    term of life with a minimum parole eligibility date of 14 years (seven years, doubled due
    to the prior strike conviction), plus eight years (three years for the great bodily injury
    enhancement and five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement). As to
    count 2, the trial court sentenced defendant to six years (the middle term of three years,
    doubled due to the prior strike conviction), plus three years for the great bodily injury
    enhancement and five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The
    trial court stayed the sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.
    On December 15, 2022, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
    FACTUAL SUMMARY
    The Prosecution’s Case
    On the night of December 4, 2021, defendant, Devonte, Aiana M., Alma B.,
    Devon D. (also known as Will), and others were hanging out at a park. Eventually, the
    group went into Alma’s car to hangout because it was cold.2 They were drinking,
    smoking marijuana, talking, and listening to music.
    2      According to Aiana, Alma, and Devonte, Alma was in the driver’s seat and
    Devonte was in the front passenger seat. However, accounts diverged as to where the
    individuals in the back were sitting. At trial, Aiana testified that defendant was in the
    back driver side seat, she was in the middle of the back seat, and Devon was in the back
    passenger side seat. On the night of the incident, Aiana told officers that she was in the
    back driver side seat, Devon was in middle of the back seat, and defendant was in the
    back passenger side seat. According to Devonte, Devon was in the back driver side seat,
    3.
    At around 1:30 a.m. on December 5, 2021, defendant was getting ready to leave.
    Witness accounts diverged as to what happened next.
    According to Aiana, defendant shook everyone’s hand. Defendant reached over
    Aiana to shake Devonte’s hand, and it looked to Aiana like he did. However, defendant
    actually cut Devonte’s neck. There was blood everywhere as defendant left the car.
    Defendant was in his vehicle by the time Aiana and the others realized what had
    happened, and Aiana did not see a knife in defendant’s hand.
    After Aiana realized what happened, she got out of the car and followed
    defendant. She asked defendant why he did it. Defendant did not tell her why, but he did
    say “don’t come up on me like that.” On cross-examination, Aiana testified that
    defendant also said, “he knows why.”
    On redirect-examination, after having her memory refreshed by body camera
    footage of a statement she made to an officer, Aiana testified that she saw a knife in
    defendant’s hand when he reached over. It was “a dark silver typical metallic color.”
    According to Devonte, defendant said goodbye to everyone. As defendant was
    getting out of the car, Devonte felt something go across his neck. He looked down and
    saw blood, which is how he knew his neck was cut. Devonte did not know why
    defendant attacked him.
    According to Alma, Aiana and Devon had already left the car, and defendant was
    the last one in the backseat. Defendant hugged Alma and Devonte from behind, then left
    the car. As defendant went to hug Devonte, his hand went across Devonte’s neck area.
    “[I]t took a second,” then Devonte said he could feel something wet. Alma turned on the
    interior lights, and she saw blood leaking from Devonte’s neck, as well as what looked
    like “white meat.”
    Aiana was in the middle of the back seat, and defendant was in the back passenger side
    seat. Alma did not remember where the individuals in the back were sitting.
    4.
    After attacking Devonte, defendant went to his vehicle and left. Devonte’s neck
    was bleeding badly. Alma was screaming and panicking. Clothing was placed and held
    on Devonte’s neck to stop the bleeding.
    Alma eventually called 911. Joshua Flores and Anthony Cabriales, police officers
    with the California City Police Department, responded to the call. Flores asked Devonte
    who stabbed him, and Devonte responded, “Lorenzo.”
    Devonte was subsequently transported to a hospital via ambulance. Devonte told
    medical professionals at the hospital what happened. Due to the amount of blood
    Devonte lost, he was given blood. Additionally, the wound was stitched and he had to
    have surgery.
    Defendant’s Case
    Defendant introduced the following stipulation into evidence:
    “If called to testify, California City Police Department Sergeant
    Stewart would testify that on December 9, 2021 at 1:48 P.M., [Devonte]
    responded to the California City Police Department to be interviewed.
    Sergeant Stewart would testify … that [Devonte] stated that on December
    5, 2021, he … was hanging out with friends in a vehicle that belonged to
    Alma …. [Devonte] was seated in the front passenger’s seat and there were
    two females sitting in the backseat. He heard the females talking to a
    person later identified as [defendant], whom he identified as an
    acquaintance. [Defendant] entered the backseat of the vehicle and sat
    directly behind [Devonte]. [Devonte] was talking to [Alma] when without
    warning he felt something touch his throat and saw [defendant’s] arm go
    back towards the backseat. He heard [defendant] exit the vehicle and walk
    to a nearby van, which [defendant] then entered and left the location.
    [Devonte] said he felt his neck get cold and began feeling dizzy.”
    DISCUSSION
    I.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Premeditation and Deliberation Finding
    and Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Eliciting Inconsistent Testimony
    When Cross-Examining Aiana
    Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the premeditation
    and deliberation finding. Alternatively, defendant argues that if there is sufficient
    5.
    evidence to support the finding because defense counsel elicited testimony from Aiana on
    cross-examination that defendant stated Devonte knew why defendant attacked him, then
    defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We reject both contentions.
    A.     Applicable Law re: Premeditation and Deliberation
    “The prosecution may seek a jury finding that an attempted murder was ‘willful,
    deliberate, and premeditated’ for purposes of sentence enhancement.” (People v. Smith
    (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 733
    , 740.)3 “ ‘[P]remeditation means “ ‘considered beforehand’ ”
    [citation] and deliberation means a “ ‘careful weighing of considerations in forming a
    course of action …’ ” [citation]. “The process of premeditation and deliberation does not
    require any extended period of time.” [Citation.] “ ‘Thoughts may follow each other
    with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly ….’ ” ’ ”
    (People v. Salazar (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 214
    , 245.). “ ‘ “ ‘The true test is not the duration of
    time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Watkins (2012)
    
    55 Cal.4th 999
    , 1026.)
    “[T]hree types of evidence … indicate premeditation and deliberation. They are:
    ‘(1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that
    the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to
    result in, the killing—what may be characterized as “planning” activity; (2) facts about
    the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury
    could reasonably infer a “motive” to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together
    with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that killing was the result
    of “a pre-existing reflection” and “careful thought and weighing of considerations” rather
    than “mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed” [citation]; (3) facts about the
    nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so
    3     “We do not distinguish between attempted murder and completed first degree
    murder for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient evidence of premeditation
    and deliberation.” (People v. Herrera (1999) 
    70 Cal.App.4th 1456
    , 1462, fn. 8,
    disapproved on another ground in People v. Mesa (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 191
    , 199.)
    6.
    particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
    “preconceived design” to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a “reason” which
    the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).’ ” (People v. Lenart (2004)
    
    32 Cal.4th 1107
    , 1127, quoting People v. Anderson (1968) 
    70 Cal.2d 15
    , 26–27.)4
    However, these “categories of evidence … do not represent an exhaustive list of
    evidence that could sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation, and the reviewing
    court need not accord them any particular weight.” (People v. Young (2005) 
    34 Cal.4th 1149
    , 1183; see People v. Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1127 [“The Anderson factors are
    not the exclusive means for establishing premeditation and deliberation”].) “The
    fundamental inquiry is whether … the crime occurred as a result of preexisting reflection
    rather than a rash or unconsidered impulse.” (People v. Felix (2009) 
    172 Cal.App.4th 1618
    , 1626; People v. Pride (1992) 
    3 Cal.4th 195
    , 247 [“Anderson was … intended to
    guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the
    killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash
    impulse”].)
    B.     Standard of Review re: Substantial Evidence
    When evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim, “ ‘we review the whole record in
    the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
    evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
    reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
    (People v. Cravens (2012) 
    53 Cal.4th 500
    , 507.) “The test for evaluating a sufficiency of
    evidence claim is deferential.” (People v. Flores (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 371
    , 411.) “We must
    presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could
    reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 913
    , 919.)
    “We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
    4      These three categories of evidence are sometimes referred to as the “Anderson
    factors.” (See, e.g., People v. Perez (1992) 
    2 Cal.4th 1117
    , 1125.)
    7.
    circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Flores, at p. 411.) “The conviction shall stand ‘unless it
    appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
    support [the conviction].” ’ ” (Cravens, at p. 508.)
    C.     Analysis re: Substantial Evidence
    Defendant does not argue that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding
    that he attempted to kill Devonte. Instead, defendant argues that “there was insufficient
    evidence that [he] acted with premeditation or deliberation.”
    We disagree with defendant. While there is little to no evidence as to motive,5
    there is strong circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have reasonably
    concluded that defendant engaged in planning activity and that defendant attacked
    Devonte according to a preconceived design. There is testimony that defendant had the
    knife in the car, and there is no evidence suggesting that defendant came into possession
    of the knife while he was in the car. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably have inferred
    that defendant brought the knife into the car, which made it “ ‘reasonable to [have]
    infer[red] that he considered the possibility of homicide from the outset.’ ” (People v.
    Steele (2002) 
    27 Cal.4th 1230
    , 1250.) Additionally, there is testimony that defendant was
    seated in the backseat, behind Devonte. Defendant waited until he was about to leave the
    car, and he reached towards Devonte under the guise of saying goodbye. However, as he
    was doing so, he cut Devonte’s throat. Finally, there is no evidence that, while defendant
    was in the car, something occurred that caused him to act on impulse.
    5      Defendant argues Aiana’s testimony that she asked defendant why he did it, and
    defendant’s response, “he knows why,” does not indicate that defendant considered
    attacking Devonte in advance or that defendant conducted a careful weighing of
    considerations. We do not disagree, especially in light of Devonte’s testimony that he did
    not know why defendant attacked him. However, as discussed in this opinion, other
    evidence amply supports the premeditation and deliberation finding.
    8.
    Accordingly, substantial evidence supports a finding that the attempted murder
    “occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash
    impulse.” (People v. Pride, 
    supra,
     3 Cal.4th at p. 247.)
    Moreover, our Supreme Court has “concluded that an execution-style killing may
    be committed with such calculation that the manner of killing will support a jury finding
    of premeditation and deliberation, despite little or no evidence of planning and motive.”
    (People v. Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1127; see People v. Boatman (2013)
    
    221 Cal.App.4th 1253
    , 1269 [“Cases that have found sufficient evidence of premeditation
    and deliberation in the absence of planning or motive evidence are those in which ‘[t]he
    manner of the killing clearly suggests an execution-style murder.’ ”].)
    And here, the jury could have reasonably found that defendant attempted to kill
    Devonte in a manner akin to “execution-style” because there is testimony that defendant
    cut Devonte’s throat from behind under the guise of saying goodbye, and there is no
    evidence suggesting that Devonte struggled or fought back. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart
    (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 425
    , 495 [“The killing was accomplished by a single execution-style
    shot fired from close range into the victim’s forehead, in circumstances showing no
    evidence of a struggle.”]; People v. Romero (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 386
    , 401 [“[The victim]
    was killed by a single gunshot fired from a gun placed against his head. We have held
    that this execution-style manner of killing supports a finding of premeditation and
    deliberation when, as here, there is no indication of a struggle.”]; People v. Bloyd (1987)
    
    43 Cal.3d 333
    , 348 [“The manner of killing … was very strong evidence of deliberation
    and premeditation: The evidence described actions that were cold and calculated—
    execution-style killings, shots to the head while [Victim 1] was lying on her back and
    [Victim 2] was kneeling. [Victim 1] had been shot pointblank, while [Victim 2] was shot
    by a standing killer from a distance of one foot. Further, there was no evidence, such as
    bruises or lacerations, to demonstrate a struggle.”].)
    9.
    Based on the foregoing, defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence
    to support the premeditation and deliberation finding fails.
    D.     Applicable Law re: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Defendant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v.
    Pope (1979) 
    23 Cal.3d 412
    , 425, overruled on other grounds in People v. Berryman
    (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 1048
    , 1081, fn. 10.) To establish such a claim, a defendant must show
    (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
    (2) prejudice, that is, but for counsel’s unprofessional error a different result would have
    been reasonably probable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687‒688, 694
    (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 
    43 Cal.3d 171
    , 216‒218.) “A reasonable
    probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
    (Strickland, at p. 694.) “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of
    counsel’s performance], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
    falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
    must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
    ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” (Id. at p. 689.)
    “It is … particularly difficult to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on
    direct appeal, where we are limited to evaluating the appellate record. If the record does
    not shed light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must
    reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to provide a
    satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v.
    Scott (1997) 
    15 Cal.4th 1188
    , 1212.) Reversal is permitted “ ‘only if (1) the record
    affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
    omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
    10.
    simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 694
    , 711.)6
    E.     Analysis re: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    We next turn to defendant’s alternative argument that defense counsel provided
    ineffective assistance.
    On direct-examination, Aiana testified that after defendant attacked Devonte, she
    got out of the car and followed defendant. She asked defendant why he did it. Defendant
    did not tell her why, but he did say “don’t come up on me like that.” On cross-
    examination, defense counsel asked Aiana, “Do you recall telling law enforcement that
    when you came up to [defendant] and asked him why …[,] [defendant] told you he
    knows why?” Aiana responded, “Yes, I do actually recall that.” Defense counsel pressed
    Aiana, “When you testified earlier, you gave a different statement?” Aiana responded,
    “Well, it was two things but I didn’t remember that one until you just said that and it
    came to me, yeah.” Defense counsel pressed further, asking “Did you tell law
    enforcement [about] the statement that [defendant] made about don’t come up on me that
    way?” Aiana responded, “No, I didn’t.”
    Defendant argues that, if sufficient evidence supports the finding of deliberation
    and premeditation because defense counsel elicited this testimony from Aiana on cross-
    examination, then defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
    First, as analyzed above, substantial evidence supports the finding of
    premeditation and deliberation even without this testimony from Aiana.
    Second, defense counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of
    reasonableness. “Although in extreme circumstances cross-examination may be deemed
    incompetent [citation], normally the decision to what extent and how to cross-examine
    witnesses comes within the wide range of tactical decisions competent counsel must
    6      Defendant argues ineffective assistance of counsel as an alternative argument
    several times. For the sake of brevity, we include the relevant legal standards only once.
    11.
    make. [Citation.] ‘Even where defense counsel may have “ ‘elicit[ed] evidence more
    damaging to [the defendant] than the prosecutor was able to accomplish on direct’ ”
    [citation], we have been “reluctant to second-guess counsel” [citation] where a tactical
    choice of questions led to the damaging testimony.’ ” (People v. Cleveland (2004)
    
    32 Cal.4th 704
    , 746.)
    Here, while there was risk in eliciting the statement and it may have ultimately
    been damaging to defendant, defense counsel had a rational tactical purpose for eliciting
    the testimony. Defense counsel’s theory of the case was that someone else attacked
    Devonte, and the three eyewitnesses knew who it was. As these three witnesses
    identified defendant as the attacker, defense counsel reasonably (and repeatedly)
    attempted to elicit inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses. This included the
    exchange described above, in which defense counsel reasonably pressed Aiana on the
    inconsistencies between what she told police and her testimony at trial.
    Moreover, in eliciting the testimony, it appears that defense counsel was
    attempting to challenge Aiana’s credibility in a second way. According to Aiana,
    defendant stated that Devonte knew why defendant attacked him. However, Devonte
    testified that he did not know why defendant attacked him. Given this, defense counsel
    could rationally have intended to convince the jury that Aiana lied about or
    misremembered what defendant said.
    Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument fails.
    II.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excluding Devonte’s Purported Statement
    Contained in a Medical Record, and any Error Made by Defense Counsel was
    Harmless
    A.     Additional Background
    On July 13, 2022 (after the prosecution’s case-in-chief), the trial court held a
    hearing regarding the admissibility of a medical record that contained a prior inconsistent
    statement purportedly made by Devonte. On cross-examination, defense counsel had
    asked Devonte if he “told medical professionals that [he was] seated in the passenger’s
    12.
    seat and the assailant came up to the window and sliced [his] neck?” Devonte answered,
    “I don’t remember.” Defense counsel also asked Devonte, “when you spoke to the
    medical professionals … you told them you did not know who attacked you?” Devonte
    responded, “That’s incorrect.”
    According to the medical record at issue, which was provided to the trial court by
    the prosecutor,7 “PT CONFIRMED HE WAS SITTING IN THE PASSENGER SEAT OF
    A VEHICLE WHEN THE ASSAILANT CAME UP TO THE WINDOW AND SLICED
    HIS NECK WITH A LARGE SHARP KNIFE. PT DENIED ANY OTHER INJURIES.”
    Defense counsel wanted to introduce this medical record as a prior inconsistent
    statement. Defense counsel argued that there were two levels of hearsay, Devonte’s out-
    of-court statement and the medical record documenting it. The exception for the first
    level was that Devonte’s out-of-court statement was inconsistent with his testimony at
    trial. The exception for the second level was that the medical record was a business
    record of the hospital, in part because the declaration from the hospital’s custodian of
    records indicated that the record was maintained in the regular course of business.
    The trial court found the declaration from the hospital’s custodian of records was
    not relevant because the record at issue was not created by the hospital. Instead, it was
    “very clear” from the record that it was created by the ambulance company, and there was
    no declaration from the custodian of records at the ambulance company.
    Additionally, there was “no sort of chain of sequence of events as to this particular
    statement.” That is, the statement attributed to defendant in the report could have come
    from a combination of people. “One person might hear it from [Devonte], tell another
    person, tell another person, and it ends up in a report.” Accordingly, the trial court found
    that the statement attributed to Devonte was unreliable and excluded it pursuant to
    7       The prosecutor only attached the first page of the six-page record, which contained
    the statement at issue.
    13.
    Evidence Code section 352 because “it has the undue prejudice of risking confusion to
    the jury.”
    As defense counsel still believed the record was prepared by the hospital, the trial
    court allowed defense counsel to contact the custodian of records to determine whether
    the hospital prepared the record, and if it was prepared by the hospital, to bring that to the
    court’s attention. Defense counsel later confirmed that she was not going to call the
    hospital’s custodian of records as a witness.
    That same day, the trial court provided additional explanation regarding its
    analysis. The court explained there were three levels of hearsay: Devonte’s statement to
    the EMTs who transported him to the hospital, the EMTs relaying that information to the
    hospital, and the hospital relaying that information to the court (through the medical
    records it sent). The court also held there was a hearsay exception for Devonte’s
    statement to the EMTs because it was a prior inconsistent statement.
    However, the trial court further held that there was no hearsay exception for the
    other levels. There was no evidence that the EMTs’ records qualified as business records.
    And even if the hospital’s records qualified as business records, Devonte’s “statements
    probably don’t qualify.” The multiple layers of hearsay called into question the
    authenticity of Devonte’s statement. The court also again noted that “there may be even
    more layers that we’re not even aware of the way it’s written there because we’re not sure
    who heard what and who transferred onto who.” Devonte’s statement “just ended up in
    some record,” which was not sufficient.
    On November 9, 2022, when ruling on defendant’s motion for a new trial,8 the
    trial court again addressed the admissibility of statement attributed to Devonte in the
    medical record. The court noted it previously excluded the statement, stated that it stood
    by its ruling, and provided clarification regarding the ruling. In clarifying its ruling, the
    8     Defendant does not make any claims of error based upon the trial court’s ruling on
    his motion for a new trial.
    14.
    court held that one reason the statement in the medical record did not qualify for the
    business record hearsay exception is that “the ambulance drivers didn’t personally
    observe what went on that day and they had no duty to record what went on that day.”
    B.     Applicable Law
    “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made
    inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, condition, or event if: [¶]
    (a) The writing was made in the regular course of a business; [¶] (b) The writing was
    made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; [¶] (c) The custodian or other
    qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation; and [¶] (d) The
    sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its
    trustworthiness.” (Evid. Code, § 1271.) “It is the burden of the party offering the
    evidence to establish that these foundational requirements have been met.” (People v.
    McVey (2018) 
    24 Cal.App.5th 405
    , 414.)
    C.     Standard of Review
    “A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a sufficient foundation
    has been laid to qualify evidence as a business record. On appeal, we will reverse a trial
    court’s ruling on such a foundational question only if the court clearly abused its
    discretion.” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 983
    , 1011.) This “is not a unified
    standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling
    under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
    conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
    reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008)
    
    43 Cal.4th 706
    , 711–712, fns. omitted.)
    Even if a trial court abuses its discretion, “[s]tate law error in the admission of
    hearsay requires reversal of the judgment [only] if ‘ “it is reasonably probable that a
    result more favorable to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the
    15.
    error.” ’ ” (People v. Turner (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 786
    , 823, quoting People v. Watson (1956)
    
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 837 (Watson).)
    D.     Analysis
    Defendant makes multiple claims of error regarding the admission of medical
    records. We address each argument in turn.
    Defendant argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
    finding that the medical record at issue was created by the ambulance company and not
    the hospital. According to defendant, in making its finding, the trial court erroneously
    “rel[ied] on its own outside knowledge instead of the evidence contained within the
    hospital records and the custodian of record’s declaration.”
    This argument is unpersuasive. As the trial court noted, “at the very top [the
    record] says ‘emergency medical transport.’ ” Near the top, the record also states that it
    is a “Prehospital Care Report.” In addition to this, the narrative section of the report
    appears to have been prepared by an individual working in the ambulance, not by hospital
    staff. Among other things, the narrative states that Devonte was “FOUND STANDING
    UPRIGHT.” It also states that Devonte was “PLACED ON GURNEY, STRAPPED IN
    AND LOADED FOR A PRIORITY 1 TRANSPORT TO [HOSPITAL].” Given this
    evidence and the deferential substantial evidence standard (People v. Flores, supra,
    9 Cal.5th at p. 411), the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the
    medical record was created by the ambulance company.9
    Defendant argues, in the alternative, that defense counsel provided ineffective
    assistance because the trial court only had one page of the six-page record, and defense
    counsel did not provide the court with the remaining five pages. According to defendant,
    had the court reviewed the additional five pages, it is reasonably probable that it would
    have admitted the medical record.
    9     As we conclude the trial court did not err in excluding the record on this ground,
    we do not address the court’s other grounds for excluding the record.
    16.
    Defendant is correct that the six-page medical record does address some of the
    trial court’s concerns regarding admissibility of the record. However, it also supports the
    court’s finding that the record was prepared by employees of the ambulance company, not
    the hospital. The record includes various entries supporting that finding, including when
    the “unit” was dispatched, was enroute, was at the scene, and when it arrived. Moreover,
    according to the record, it was signed by the EMTs who responded to the scene in the
    ambulance.
    As providing the full record to the trial court would have only reinforced its
    finding that the record was prepared by employees of the ambulance company, defense
    counsel could have reasonably concluded there was no reason to introduce the remainder
    of the record. For this same reason, even if defense counsel was ineffective, defendant
    was not prejudiced.
    Next, defendant argues that, even if the record was prepared by the ambulance
    company, the trial court still erred because the record was admissible, not as
    “independent proof of the facts,” but to impeach Devonte. In support of this argument,
    defendant relies on Rosener v. Larson (1967) 
    255 Cal.App.2d 871
     and Springer v.
    Reimers (1970) 
    4 Cal.App.3d 325
    . However, both cases are readily distinguishable.
    Both addressed the admissibility of medical records when an expert relies on those
    records in forming their opinion. (Rosener, at pp. 877–878; Springer, at p. 338.) Neither
    addressed whether a prior inconsistent statement contained in a medical record could be
    used to impeach a lay witness. Accordingly, this argument is also unpersuasive.
    Moreover, even if the record should have been admitted solely to impeach Devonte and
    not for the truth of the statement included therein, its evidentiary value would be severely
    diminished and any error was harmless for the same reasons described below.
    Finally, defendant argues that defense counsel’s performance was deficient
    because she failed to introduce a second medical record that would have impeached
    Devonte’s testimony. This record included the name of the hospital at the top, and it was
    17.
    signed and dated by an emergency department doctor. According to this record,
    “DEVONTE … is a 23 Years [sic] Male who was brought in after being attack [sic] by an
    unknown individual just prior to arrival. He was single [sic] by to [sic] his friends when
    he was suddenly accosted from behind and felt a sharp/across his neck.” The record also
    stated, “[p]atient states that they do not know the assailant.”
    Defendant argues that defense counsel should have introduced this record to
    impeach Devonte because “[t]here were no issues of authenticity or jury confusion and
    the two levels of hearsay each had an exception: [Devonte’s] statement was a prior
    inconsistent statement and it was made directly to the doctor so it clearly fell within the
    business records exception.” Defendant further argues that there was no tactical reason
    not to introduce this record. Instead, “[i]t is apparent that defense counsel simply was
    unaware that another page of the hospital records contained a prior inconsistent statement
    that she could use to impeach [Devonte].”
    Defendant argues that this (and the other) errors were prejudicial. According to
    defendant, the testimony of Aiana, Devonte, and Alma was “full of inconsistencies about
    who was present in the car, where everyone was seated, and who was present at the scene
    in general.” Additionally, “some of the jurors were not initially convinced that
    [defendant] was [Devonte’s] assailant.” Accordingly, Devonte’s “statement contained in
    the ambulance narrative would have damaged his credibility,” as well as the credibility of
    Aiana and Alma, and thus “could have caused at least one of the jurors to hold fast to
    their belief that the witnesses were lying.”
    Even assuming that defendant is correct and defense counsel’s performance was
    deficient because she did not introduce the second medical record, given the weight of
    the evidence, defendant suffered no prejudice.
    Multiple witnesses testified that, after the incident, Alma called 911. A copy of the
    911 call was introduced into evidence, and it supports the testimony that Alma was
    screaming and panicking. Flores, a police officer, testified that he arrived at the scene
    18.
    approximately three minutes after being dispatched. Flores further testified that he asked
    Devonte who stabbed him, and Devonte responded, “Lorenzo.” Moreover, according to
    Flores, Aiana and Alma also provided a statement to the officers regarding what occurred.
    Given Alma’s panic and how quickly officers arrived, defendant’s theory of the case, that
    Aiana, Alma, and Devonte agreed to lie and blame Devonte for the attack, was weak.10
    Moreover, while there were some internal inconsistencies in the testimony of the
    three eyewitnesses, as well as inconsistencies between their testimony, all three generally
    described the incident in the same way. According to all three witnesses, defendant,
    Devonte, Aiana, Devon, and Alma were in Alma’s car. Devonte was in the front
    passenger seat and defendant was in the back seat. As defendant was getting ready to
    leave, he cut Devonte’s throat. After the attack, defendant went to his vehicle and left.
    Finally, defense counsel was allowed to ask Devonte whether he told medical
    professionals that he did not know his attacker, and Devonte denied making the
    statement.
    Given this evidence, it is not reasonably probable there would have been a more
    favorable result for defendant had one medical record stating that Devonte was attacked
    “by an unknown individual” and that “[p]atient states that they do not know the assailant”
    been introduced.
    As to defendant’s argument that the fact several jurors initially believed he was
    innocent shows he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s performance, even assuming the
    evidence is properly before us,11 defendant has not cited any law, nor are we are of any,
    10      We also note that, while all three eyewitnesses testified that defendant was an
    acquaintance and not a friend, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that they had
    a motive for framing defendant. There is also no evidence that defendant was somewhere
    else at the time of the attack.
    11      The only evidence provided was a declaration from defense counsel that “[f]ive or
    six jurors remained in the hallway to speak with both counsel,” and that “[w]hen
    deliberations began, two or three jurors were adamant that they believed [defendant] was
    innocent and they would not convict him.” This is hearsay.
    19.
    suggesting that a juror’s initial thoughts have any relevance to the prejudice analysis.
    Moreover, there is nothing in the record suggesting that, after deliberating and reviewing
    the evidence, the jury reached an impasse or otherwise considered this a close case. (See,
    e.g., People v. McDaniel (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 986
    , 1009 [finding prejudice where “the
    record reveal[ed] that the jury found the case to be a close one and struggled to reach
    guilty verdicts on all counts”].) Accordingly, even assuming that several jurors thought
    defendant was innocent when deliberations began, this fact alone has no bearing on our
    analysis.
    III.   Denying Defendant’s Motions for Release of Jury Identifying Information
    Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
    A.     Background on Defendant’s First Motion for Release of Jury Identifying
    Information
    On July 27, 2022, defendant filed his first motion for release of jury identifying
    information, along with a declaration from defense counsel. The prosecutor opposed the
    motion.
    According to the declaration of defense counsel, after the verdict was read, five to
    six jurors remained in the hallway and spoke with defense counsel and the prosecutor.
    Those jurors told counsel that when deliberations began, two or three were “adamant”
    that defendant was innocent. The jurors who remained also told counsel that the jurors
    who thought defendant was innocent believed there was another person at the park when
    the incident occurred and that the witnesses hid his or her identity. One of the jurors who
    remained, Juror No. 8, stated that he was originally going to vote not guilty, but was
    convinced to change his vote. “The foreperson essentially said, ‘We got [those jurors] to
    admit that that didn’t matter.’ The foreperson also described that during the deliberations,
    she would identify one fact, such as whether the window was down or up, and go around
    the room and get each juror to ‘admit’ that that fact was proven to them.” Moreover,
    20.
    “when the jury walked out to read the verdict … Juror [No.] 9 looked dejected and beaten
    down, just from her body language.”
    Further, according to defense counsel, the jury requested readback of testimony
    from Devonte, Alma, Stewart, and Aiana while they were deliberating. Based on the
    timeline of the deliberations and the readbacks, “it appears that the jury was not allowed
    to deliberate for more than thirty minutes at any one session before the foreperson, who
    was adamantly on the side of guilt, would essentially end discussions by making those
    jurors listen to the read back she selected.” Overall, the jury was “probably only allowed
    to engage in discussions with each other for about two hours before rendering a verdict.”
    Defendant argued that “[t]he foreperson led the discussion, controlled the notes,
    controlled the readback, and ultimately controlled the verdict.” She “used un[due]
    influence on the jurors who wished to vote not guilty, and the hold out jurors were
    coerced into ‘admitting’ they were ‘wrong,’ as opposed to being allowed to discuss the
    evidence as they saw it and potentially sway other jurors in their favor.”
    Defendant asked the trial court to release jury identifying information so that he
    could conduct an investigation related to a motion for a new trial based on this
    misconduct.
    On August 10, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. After reviewing
    the briefs and hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court denied the motion.
    As to Juror No. 8, who initially believed defendant was not guilty, the trial court
    “did not detect any facts to support that there was any impropriety that took place in the
    course of Juror [No.] 8 changing his mind. In other words, the best [the court could] tell
    Juror [No.] 8 didn’t indicate that there was any undue influence or excessive coercion or
    pressure or anything that was really impermissible at all in term[s] of changing his mind.
    He just said he changed his mind, was convinced to change his mind. Not that there was
    any type of impropriety. Of course jurors changing their minds is part of the process. In
    fact, we tell jurors all the time in the jury instructions do not hesitate to change your mind
    21.
    if you’re convinced you’re wrong but do not change your mind just because of pressure.”
    Additionally, based on Juror No. 8’s statements, there was no indication that the other
    jurors who initially believed defendant was not guilty changed their minds because of
    inappropriate conduct. The trial court also held that even if it were “to go down that
    avenue,” it would “very clearly [be] an invasion of the mental processes of the jurors,”
    which is “not an appropriate basis for exploration and inquiry.”
    As to defense counsel’s assertion that Juror No. 9 looked “dejected and beaten
    down,” the trial court found that it was too speculative to support the release of juror
    information.
    Finally, the trial court noted that if any juror felt coerced to vote a certain way, that
    juror could have spoken to the bailiff or counsel after trial. Additionally, all the jurors
    were polled in open court as to whether they supported the verdict, and they all supported
    it.
    The trial court concluded:
    “Ultimately I do not feel that there was sufficient factual basis for
    me to conclude or have a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred.
    There’s no reasonable factual basis for me to reach that conclusion and
    when I look at the reasons for the release—potential release of information,
    it just doesn’t meet the burden. On top of that I also look at the public
    policy. There’s strong public policy in favor of protecting the personal
    identifying information of the jurors and then it becomes very clear to me
    that the motion should be denied. Obviously the jurors are volunteers
    essentially and we really have to protect their privacy, respect their
    deliberations, respect their efforts and to have them be contacted after their
    service to be questioned about the process it can happen honestly but it
    needs to have a good reason to really invade their privacy like that and the
    reasons are not sufficient so for that reason I will deny the motion.”
    B.      Background on Defendant’s Second Motion for Release of Jury
    Identifying Information
    On October 26, 2022, defendant filed a motion for new trial through which
    defendant made a second motion for release of jury identifying information. The motion
    was based on statements from defendant’s brother, defendant’s wife, defendant’s mother,
    22.
    and defendant’s father.12 The statements made were not identical, and there were
    inconsistencies as to whether the prosecutor or defendant’s wife initiated the
    conversation. However, all four stated that, in the hallway outside of the courtroom, near
    the end of the trial, the prosecutor commented on the strength of the evidence he
    presented. The prosecutor stated something along the lines of “It’s 4 against 1[,] [e]asy
    win,” “I’ve got 4 witnesses and it’s common sense,” or “It’s already done.” Once the
    prosecutor realized he was talking to defendant’s family, he left. Defendant’s wife stated
    that at least one juror heard the prosecutor’s comments.
    Defendant argued that the prosecutor’s statements violated a court order not to
    discuss the case where jurors could hear. Additionally, the statements directly
    contradicted the instructions provided to the jury. The prosecutor counted the number of
    witnesses on each side, which the jury was instructed not to do. The prosecutor
    commented on the fact that defendant did not testify, which the jury was instructed not to
    consider. Finally, the prosecutor made the comment before the defense presented any
    evidence, while the jury was instructed to not form an opinion about the case “until the
    evidence has been concluded.”
    Accordingly, defendant asked the trial court for juror identifying information so
    that he could “further investigate the misconduct.” The prosecutor opposed the motion.
    On November 9, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Defendant’s
    wife testified at the hearing that she was sitting in the hallway outside of the courtroom
    with her in-laws. One juror was standing close to her and about 10 other jurors were also
    in the hallway. The prosecutor walked out of the courtroom and asked defendant’s
    family, “What do you think?” Defendant’s wife asked, “What do you mean?” The
    prosecutor stated, “It’s only common sense.” Defendant’s wife replied, “Everybody
    wasn’t born with common sense.” The prosecutor also stated that he had four witnesses.
    12    While identified as defendant’s father, it appears the statement was provided by
    defendant’s second stepfather.
    23.
    The prosecutor stopped talking to defendant’s wife and her in-laws after he realized they
    “were for [defendant].” This occurred after the trial had ended.
    The trial court denied the motion. The trial court found that only one witness,
    defendant’s wife, “identified that the jurors were potentially present.” Not one other
    witness stated that jurors were present. In fact, “even one of the defense[’s] own
    witnesses said there were no other people around.” And even if a juror was present,
    nothing the prosecutor said “was inadmissible.” Instead, it was “the same type of thing”
    as what the prosecutor argued in his closing argument. Moreover, the jurors were
    instructed to disregard anything they saw or heard outside of the courtroom, “even if it
    [was] said or done by one of the parties or attorneys.”
    C.     Applicable Law
    In a criminal proceeding, the trial court’s record of the trial jurors’ “personal juror
    identifying information” must be sealed “[u]pon the recording of [the] jury’s verdict.”
    (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2).) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 206,
    subdivision (g), “a defendant or defendant’s counsel may, following the recording of a
    jury’s verdict in a criminal proceeding, petition the court for access to personal juror
    identifying information within the court’s records necessary for the defendant to
    communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any
    other lawful purpose.” “The petition shall be supported by a declaration that includes
    facts sufficient to establish good cause for the release of the juror’s personal identifying
    information.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) If a defendant makes “a prima facie
    showing of good cause,” the court shall set a hearing.13 (Ibid.)
    “ ‘[A] prima facie showing refers to those facts demonstrated by admissible
    evidence, which would sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted by the
    13     The trial court need not set a hearing if there is a “compelling interest against
    disclosure” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b)), but no one argues there is such an interest
    here.
    24.
    movant is credited.” (People v. Johnson (2015) 
    242 Cal.App.4th 1155
    , 1164, italics
    omitted.)
    “Good cause, in the context of a petition for disclosure to support a motion for a
    new trial based on juror misconduct, requires ‘a sufficient showing to support a
    reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred ….’ ” (People v. Cook (2015)
    
    236 Cal.App.4th 341
    , 345.) “Good cause does not exist where the allegations of jury
    misconduct are speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported.” (Id. at p. 346.) The
    misconduct alleged must be “ ‘of such a character as is likely to have influenced the
    verdict improperly.’ ” (People v. Jefflo (1998) 
    63 Cal.App.4th 1314
    , 1322.)
    D.     Standard of Review
    A trial court’s denial of a motion for release of jury identifying information is
    reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Munoz (2019) 
    31 Cal.App.5th 143
    , 165.)
    E.     Analysis
    As to defendant’s first motion for release of jury identifying information,
    defendant argues that “counsel’s declaration showed a basis to investigate whether the
    foreperson exercised coercive undue influence over the jurors who wanted to vote not
    guilty. The trial court failed to address the foreperson’s coercive method of wearing
    down the other jurors by putting them on the spot instead of engaging in discussion, and
    the court failed to address defense counsel’s assertion that the foreperson’s repeated
    readbacks cut off productive deliberation.”
    Defendant’s argument is without merit.
    It is true the language the foreperson allegedly used, that she “got” jurors to admit
    certain things, is strong. However, the trial court instructed the foreperson to “see to it
    that [the] discussions are carried on in an organized way and that everyone has a fair
    chance to be heard,” and it appears that this is exactly what the foreperson did.
    There is no evidence that the foreperson attempted to “wear[] down the other
    jurors by putting them on the spot instead of engaging in discussion.” Instead, it appears
    25.
    the foreperson guided the discussions and made sure that each juror gave their views on
    each fact. There is nothing before us suggesting the process was intended to be, or
    inherently was, coercive. There is also nothing before us suggesting that in controlling
    the “pace” of the deliberations the foreperson “cut off productive deliberation,” as argued
    by defendant. In fact, according to defense counsel’s declaration, one of the jurors who
    initially thought defendant was innocent stated that “he had been convinced to change his
    vote.” Nothing in this statement suggests that the juror witnessed coercive conduct.
    Thus, the evidence presented by defendant, even if credited, does not support a
    reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, and the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying defendant’s first motion for juror identifying information.
    As to the second motion, defendant argues that the trial court weighed the
    evidence, which was error at the prima facie stage. Defendant further argues that the
    prosecutor’s comment(s) “may have improperly impacted at least one juror’s
    consideration of the evidence at trial at a time when the jurors were supposed to presume
    [defendant] innocent and to keep an open mind going into the defense presentation of its
    case.”
    This argument is also without merit. Defendant’s second motion focused almost
    entirely on statements made by the prosecutor. Even crediting the testimony that a juror
    heard the prosecutor’s comments, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that even
    one juror considered the comments during deliberation or otherwise used the statements
    in an improper way. Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, “the jurors [were]
    specifically instructed the only evidence to consider is what is presented … in court and
    to specifically disregard anything [they] see or hear outside of the courtroom even if it is
    said or done by one of the parties or attorneys.” We presume jurors understand and
    follow a court’s instructions (People v. Sanchez (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 834
    , 852), and we see
    no reason to deviate from that presumption here.
    26.
    As the allegations of juror misconduct are speculative and unsupported, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s second motion for juror
    identifying information.
    IV.    The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Defendant’s Motion to Strike All
    Enhancements
    A.     Additional Background
    On October 28, 2022, defendant filed a sentencing motion. Among other things,
    defendant asked the trial court to strike all enhancements pursuant to section 1385 and to
    impose the lower term on count 2 pursuant to section 1170. Defendant’s sentencing
    motion included letters of support from his friends and family.
    As to the request to strike the enhancements, defendant argued that three
    mitigating circumstances applied: multiple enhancements were alleged (§ 1385,
    subd. (c)(2)(B)), applying the enhancements could result in a sentence over 20 years
    (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), and “[t]he current offense [was] connected to prior
    victimization or childhood trauma” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)). According to defendant, his
    “father was murdered before [defendant’s] first birthday. His stepfather of four years was
    abusive, before he was murdered as well. By the age of six, [defendant] had lost two
    father figures and experienced abuse himself.”
    Defendant’s request for imposition of the lower term on count 2 pursuant to
    section 1170 was also based on the alleged childhood trauma.
    Defendant’s sentencing hearing was held on November 9, 2022. At the hearing,
    the trial court denied defendant’s request to strike all enhancements because this case was
    “very serious” and because defendant “has a very long and extensive criminal history …
    that … is full of very serious crimes.”
    The trial court also denied defendant’s request for imposition of the lower term on
    count 2, stating:
    27.
    “To start that off with I do not believe that the defense has
    established … that the defendant here has suffered psychological physical
    childhood trauma within the meaning of the law and so there’s been some
    indications of abuse, neglect, and so forth but that’s come out in a very kind
    of conclusory way. Lots of the statements submitted by the defense
    indicate that the defendant in this case … had, you know, a tough childhood
    or something like that. But quite frankly from the tone of the letters and the
    support it actually seems like he has a very supportive family environment
    …. A lot of family members who seem to be doing fine in society and the
    general references were to him choosing a life of drugs and/or him making
    bad decisions and things of that nature. So there were no specifics that I
    was able to discern in any of those witness statements or any other
    evidence—doctors letters or counseling or anything to indicate that he
    suffered the type of trauma, abuse, neglect, exploitation, et cetera that falls
    within that. So I don’t find that to be a case where there’s the super
    mitigant under [section] 1170 or [section] 1385 ….”
    The trial court next addressed the mitigating and aggravating factors. When doing
    so, the trial court noted it previously found true “that the defendant has engaged in violent
    conduct that indicates a serious danger to society. That is a very important [factor] and
    weighs in on my decision on which term to go with but also in denying the defense
    motion to strike that prior and dismiss the enhancements. I do find that given the conduct
    in this case as well as his prior conduct it does indicate a very serious threat to public
    safety ….” Ultimately, the court found that the mitigating and aggravating factors
    “essentially weigh each other out” and sentenced defendant to the middle term on
    count 2.14
    B.     Applicable Law
    On January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81)
    went into effect (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), amending section 1385 “to specify factors that
    the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a
    defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.” (People v. Sek (2022) 
    74 Cal.App.5th 657
    , 674.)
    14     The sentence on this count was stayed pursuant to section 654.
    28.
    Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the
    court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
    dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” Section 1385,
    subdivision (c)(2), provides: “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
    shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
    any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the
    presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
    enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
    public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
    the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”
    C.     Standard of Review
    We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (People v. Gonzales (2018)
    
    6 Cal.5th 44
    , 49.) Our goal is to determine the legislative intent of the statute. (People v.
    Johnson (2022) 
    79 Cal.App.5th 1093
    , 1108.) “Because the statutory language is
    generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves,
    giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003)
    
    29 Cal.4th 1033
    , 1040, overruled on other grounds in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court
    (Touchstone) (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 329
    , 345, fn. 6.) When the statutory language is
    unambiguous, its plain meaning controls. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 
    45 Cal.3d 727
    ,
    735.) We also “generally must ‘accord[] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase
    and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose,’ and [the Supreme Court] ha[s]
    warned that ‘[a] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.’ ” (People
    v. Valencia (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 347
    , 357.) Where the language supports more than
    one reasonable construction, we may look to extrinsic aids, including the legislative
    history, for additional guidance. (People v. Ruiz (2018) 
    4 Cal.5th 1100
    , 1105–1106.)
    A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385,
    subdivision (c), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023)
    29.
    
    88 Cal.App.5th 287
    , 298.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
    decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.”
    (People v. Carmony (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 367
    , 377.) Additionally, “an abuse of discretion
    arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors [citation] or on an
    incorrect legal standard.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 139
    , 156; see also
    Conservatorship of Bower (2016) 
    247 Cal.App.4th 495
    , 506.) Finally, “[w]hen being
    sentenced, a defendant is entitled to decisions made by a court exercising informed
    discretion. [Citation.] A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is
    understood to have abused it.” (People v. Tirado (2022) 
    12 Cal.5th 688
    , 694.)
    D.        Analysis
    Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its application of section 1385,
    subdivision (c)(2). Specifically, defendant argues that “[t]he court’s comment that
    [defendant’s] conduct indicated a serious danger to society was an explanation of the
    ‘conduct in this case as well as his prior conduct’; it did not indicate that there would be a
    future threat to public safety if the enhancement was dismissed.” The People argue that
    “[p]art of this argument has been forfeited,” the trial court did find that dismissal of the
    enhancement would endanger public safety, and any error was harmless.
    To begin, even if this argument was forfeited, we exercise our discretion to address
    it. (People v. Williams (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 148
    , 161–162, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is
    generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review
    by a party”].)
    As to the merits, we agree with defendant that the trial court erred. The court’s
    analysis focused solely on defendant’s past conduct, and the court concluded that that
    conduct indicated a “very serious threat to public safety.” However, in the context of
    section 1385, the question is not whether a defendant’s past conduct indicates that he or
    she currently poses a threat to public safety, but whether striking the enhancement would
    likely endanger public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) “Although the current
    30.
    dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some
    bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part
    of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the
    defendant’s sentence.” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 
    103 Cal.App.5th 215
    , 228.)
    The People argue that “[t]his is a hyper-technical, hair-splitting distinction.” It is
    true that in some cases this distinction may make little difference to the outcome. As
    discussed above, trial courts may appropriately rely on a defendant’s past conduct when
    determining whether striking an enhancement would likely endanger public safety. (See
    People v. Mendoza (2023) 
    88 Cal.App.5th 287
    , 299 [finding that a trial court did not
    abuse its discretion when it determined that dismissal of the enhancement would likely
    endanger public safety in part because the defendant’s past conduct was “ ‘incredibly
    harmful and dangerous’ ”].)
    However, the distinction is important, especially in cases where the defendant is
    sentenced to a life term. In this case, even if the trial court struck all enhancements,
    defendant would still be serving a life term with a minimum parole eligibility date of
    14 years. And, “an inquiry into whether public safety will be endangered by the
    dismissal of an enhancement for a defendant serving a lengthy indeterminate sentence
    should … take into account that the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on
    review by the Board of Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor),
    who will have the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time.
    [Citations.] That future review will act as a safety valve against a release that would
    endanger the public and is relevant to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of
    an enhancement imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will
    endanger public safety.” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228,
    fn. omitted.)
    Finally, while “ ‘[t]he trial court [was] not required to state reasons for declining to
    exercise its discretion under section 1385’ [citations], and ‘is presumed to have
    31.
    considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the
    contrary’ ” (People v. Brugman (2021) 
    62 Cal.App.5th 608
    , 637), here, the court provided
    a detailed analysis. And nothing in that analysis suggests that it considered the impact
    striking the enhancements would have on defendant’s sentence.
    Accordingly, the trial court erred in its application of section 1385. Moreover,
    even applying the Watson harmless error standard, the error was not harmless. Under this
    standard, reversal is not required unless it is reasonably probable that defendant would
    have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred. (Watson, supra,
    46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Here, had the court considered the length of defendant’s sentence
    and that defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole
    Hearings when ruling on defendant’s motion to strike all enhancements, it is reasonably
    probable that the trial court would have dismissed at least one of the enhancements.
    We next turn to defendant’s argument that we should strike both enhancements.
    According to defendant, “[t]here is no evidence in the record of this case that striking the
    enhancement at issue could possibly cause danger to the public because even if the
    enhancement were to be struck, [defendant] would still be serving life in prison.”
    Defendant also asserts the trial court’s finding that defendant’s “prior performance on
    parole and [postrelease community supervision] was satisfactory in past cases” shows
    that defendant “would not be a threat to public safety upon release.”
    We disagree with defendant. As discussed above, defendant’s past conduct is an
    appropriate consideration when determining whether striking an enhancement would
    likely endanger public safety. Nothing in the text of section 1385 suggests that evidence
    of such conduct cannot support a future dangerousness finding when defendant is serving
    a life sentence, and defendant cites to no authority in support of this argument.
    Moreover, the trial court found that “defendant’s prior performance on parole and
    post-release community supervision was satisfactory at least on some of those priors”
    (italics added). While this may be a factor for the trial court to consider on remand, this
    32.
    finding does not demonstrate, nor did the trial court find, that defendant “would not be a
    threat to public safety upon release.”
    Accordingly, we will remand the matter for a full resentencing at which the trial
    court shall apply the appropriate standard in the first instance.15 (People v. Buycks (2018)
    
    5 Cal.5th 857
    , 893.) While we are remanding the matter, we take no position on whether
    the trial court should or should not strike any enhancements.16
    V.     Defendant’s Cumulative Errors Argument Fails
    Finally, defendant argues that even if reversal is not required by any error standing
    alone, “the combination of erroneously excluded evidence, the insufficient evidence of
    premeditation and deliberation, and multiple instances of defense counsel’s deficient
    performance combined to render [defendant’s] trial fundamentally unfair in violation of
    the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
    This argument fails. “ ‘We have found no error, and where we assumed error, we
    have found no prejudice. Nor do we discern cumulative prejudice.’ ” (People v. Duong
    (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 36
    , 75; People v. Westerfield (2019) 
    6 Cal.5th 632
    , 728.)
    15      At oral argument, the parties discussed People v. Walker (2024) 
    16 Cal.5th 1024
    ,
    which our Supreme Court recently decided. In this case, the Supreme Court held that “if
    the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating
    circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must
    determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a danger
    to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally
    result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
    credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
    great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not
    in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.)
    Walker does not address the standard for determining whether dismissal of an
    enhancement would endanger public safety and is thus not relevant to the analysis herein.
    However, on remand, if the trial court finds that dismissing enhancement(s) would not
    endanger public safety, it shall apply the holding in Walker.
    16    As we are remanding the matter for a full resentencing, we do not address
    defendant’s other claims of sentencing error.
    33.
    DISPOSITION
    Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court to
    conduct a full resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the
    judgment is affirmed.
    DE SANTOS, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    FRANSON, Acting P. J.
    MEEHAN, J.
    34.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: F085458

Filed Date: 10/22/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024